

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Francis Albey Rhodes
Darwin, M. A.

**THE REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF THE
3RD QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S OWN
GURKHA RIFLES**



Frontispiece.

Alvarado

THE REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF THE
3RD QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S OWN
GURKHA RIFLES

FROM APRIL 1815 TO DECEMBER 1927

EDITED BY
MAJ.-GEN. NIGEL G. WOODYATT, C.B., C.I.E.
COLONEL 7TH GURKHAS

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PREFACE

THE only excuse I can offer for my audacity in attempting to write this History is my affection for the 3rd Gurkhas.

As I served with them for over two decades, the best years of my life were spent with the regiment, which, of all Indian Army units, remains still my first love. At Almora was born my only son ¹; and I was with the old battalion there when the first serious effort was made ² to eliminate extraneous classes and enlist pure Gurkhas only.

The method of compilation may be considered somewhat novel, because I have adopted a narrative form almost throughout, banishing to appendices the tiresome statistics which seem to me to dull and confuse the pages of so many regimental volumes.

Mainly for the benefit of the young officer, the history opens with a few remarks about Nepal—the home of the Gurkha soldier—and concerning our war with Nepal, 1814-1816. The matter of this war is important, because, incidentally, it furnished the material for the formation of the first three Gurkha units. Limitation of space necessitates but brief references to these two most interesting subjects, but in Appendix 1 will be found some letters and a list of works and papers which will well repay perusal.

Much assistance in this matter has been given me by an old friend,³ who commenced the study of the Nepal war as far back as the year 1880. It was a piece of good fortune for the regiment that I was able to get in touch again with General Hamilton and benefit by his help, knowledge and advice.

In conclusion I must gratefully acknowledge the assistance I have received from many officers of the regiment and from some of the works enumerated in Appendix 1.

N.W.

¹ 2nd K.E.O. Gurkhas, killed in action 1916.

² In 1887, by Lieut.-Col. E. B. Bishop, the Commandant.

³ Brig.-General W. G. Hamilton, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., late Norfolk Regt.

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**BATTLE HONOURS
OF THE 3RD Q.A.O. GURKHA RIFLES**

DELHI, 1857.
AHMAD KHEL.
AFGHANISTAN, 1878-80.
BURMA, 1885-87.
CHITRAL.
TIRAH.
PUNJAB FRONTIER.
LA BASSEE, 1914.
ARMENTIERES, 1914.
FESTUBERT, 1914-15.
GIVENCHY, 1914.
NEUVE CHAPELLE.
AUBERS.

FRANCE AND FLANDERS, 1914-15.
EGYPT, 1915-16.
GAZA.
EL MUGHAR.
NEBI SAMWIL.
JERUSALEM.
TELL ASUR.
MEGIDDO.
SHARON.
PALESTINE, 1917-18.
SHARQAT.
MESOPOTAMIA, 1917-18.
AFGHANISTAN, 1919.

CHAPTER I¹

THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL

ALONG the southern slopes of the Himalayas and north of our two Indian Provinces of Bengal and The United Provinces of Agra and Oudh nestles the little kingdom of Nepal. Its territory covers an area of some 54,000 square miles, with a population of about six millions.

The State is entirely independent and not in the least in the same relation to the Government of India—so often erroneously supposed—as Hyderabad, Mysore and other important Indian States to which Residents are appointed to represent British interests. Nepal indeed makes treaties and agreements with us and is now classed as an ally of ours. A very good ally too she has proved herself.

The State is ruled by the Prime Minister, who wields all the power. This has been the case since 1846, when the head of the Jung family obtained from the sovereign the perpetual right to the office of Prime Minister of Nepal. This right is still enjoyed by his descendant, General His Highness Maharajah Sir Chandra Shamsheer Jung, Rana Bahadur, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.C.L. (Oxon), Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal.

His Majesty the King of Nepal is called the “Maharaj Adhiraj.” Although nominally the head of the State, he is too sacred a person to be troubled with mundane affairs and takes no share in the administration; at the same time he is treated with the greatest ceremony, respect and veneration. The Nepalese Royal Family comes in a straight line from the old Gurkha kings, to whom an allusion is made later on.

In the middle of the eighteenth century the inhabitants of the Valley of Nepal, an ancient race of Mongolian extraction, were generally known as Newars. Their country was divided up into numerous principalities, each governed by a hereditary ruler, bearing an appropriate title according to the territory he possessed. These petty governments were exceedingly jealous of one another and

¹ The text of this history was completed before the publication in 1928 of Perceval Landon's *Nepal* and Major Northey's work, *The Gurkhas*.—Ed.

2 REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF THIRD GURKHAS

continually fighting. Indeed, the state of affairs was not unlike the situation in the Highlands of Scotland during the height of the feudal system, but with this difference, that the independent rulers of these mountainous districts of Nepal had no nominal sovereign to whom they acknowledged any feudal subjection.

Continual warfare, and the frequent changes caused thereby, had so weakened each State at the period mentioned above, that the time was ripe for some man of action and ambition to attempt the consolidation of the whole. Prithwi Narain, king of a small principality in the north, called "Gurkha," proved himself to be the man, beginning his work by the subjection of his nearest neighbours. In 1765 he made his second invasion of Nepal proper and, after three or four years hard and severe fighting, conquered the whole valley, proclaimed himself King of Nepal and established his capital at Katmandu. After extending his conquests eastwards to the Teesta River, King Prithwi Narain died in 1771, having founded a kingdom, raised a nation to power, and initiated the term "Gurkha" as descriptive of the people of Nepal.

For many years after this consolidation the Nepal Government was engaged in almost continual fighting for conquest both to the east and to the west. Tibet was invaded and much loot and plunder was acquired. Then Sikkim was overrun and a large portion annexed. China, alarmed by their excursions, managed with great difficulty, in 1792, to penetrate Nepal with a small army and actually dictated terms at Nawakot, only twenty miles from Katmandu.

About a year before this the Gurkhas, having conquered the Kumaon State, made their first attempt on the adjoining State of Garhwal. Kumaon had indeed soon yielded, but the Garhwalis were of stouter heart and resisted the invaders so successfully—especially in the defence of the strong fortress of Lungoor near their capital, Srinagar—that the campaign failed. Another factor was the Chinese penetration, referred to above, to repel which required the whole Gurkha resources.

Why the Chinese did not exact harsher terms it is difficult to understand. Apparently they only demanded some nominal offerings and an acknowledgment of China's suzerainty; in token of which a deputation used to proceed to Peking from Katmandu every five years to renew the assurances of allegiance and good faith.

Twenty-two years later (1814), when the Nepal wars with the British broke out, the Gurkhas supplicated the Court of Peking for intervention and armed assistance, on the plea that the British real objective was China. They asserted that the passes from Nepal

through the Himalayas had been demanded of them, which they, as faithful allies to China, had refused to yield !

There was a good deal of diplomatic skill displayed on all sides over a protracted period, but the British assurances eventually prevailed. In 1816 some Nepalese confidential agents, whose attendance in Peking had been demanded, were scolded pretty severely by the Chinese authorities, and there the matter ended.

To return to Garhwal, it must be realised that, although the Gurkhas were repulsed in their first attempt in 1791, they frightened the ruler of the State so much that he consented to pay an annual tribute to the Nepalese Government. There was then peace without peace, until twelve years later (1803), when, with veteran leaders and considerably increased forces, the Gurkhas launched their second invasion. This being entirely successful, Garhwal, like its eastern neighbour, Kumaon, became a province of Nepal.

After establishing themselves at Srinagar, the capital of Garhwal, the Gurkhas pushed on even across the Sutlej, conquering everything *en route*. On the western side of that river they laid siege to the strong fort of Kangra in the valley of that name. Here, however, they were held up, for the inhabitants, assisted by the Sikhs to whom they were tributary, resisted all efforts of the invaders and caused them enormous losses.

All the same, these brave mountaineers in the space of some forty years had shown so great a prowess and made so many and such vast conquests that they were masters of all the hills and valleys from the Teesta in Sikkim to the Sutlej in the far west.

CHAPTER II

THE NEPAL WARS, 1814-16

THE military success of the Gurkhas, as narrated above, quite naturally gave the Nepal Government a somewhat exaggerated opinion of its own importance. So much so, that systematic encroachments into British territory became quite common and were carried out with much deliberation and at frequent intervals. Remonstrances were ignored, commissions flouted and all promises evaded, until, after the murder of British police officers at Gorakhpur, matters reached such a climax that towards the close of the year 1814 the Governor-General found himself compelled to declare war.

At this time General Bhim Sen Thapa was Prime Minister of Nepal and all powerful. The other most important personage of the period was Amar Sing Thapa who had been for many years at the head of the successful army which had acquired all the country west of Nepal up to the Sutlej River. The terms he was on with the Nepal Government at Katmandu were peculiar, but in spite of his undoubted power, influence and authority he was too patriotic to attempt to make himself independent.

Amar Sing was now ruling all the country west of the Ramgunga River, the eastern boundary of Garhwal, and chose to remain himself on the Sutlej, near the strongly fortified posts of Ramgarh and Malaun.

Unfortunately, space does not admit of more than this briefest reference to Amar Sing, but his marvellous defence of the Nepalese mountain strongholds for many months, with forces infinitely less than those of his opponents, is one of the most remarkable features of the Nepal campaigns.

The British force sanctioned for the hostilities was organised in four columns (termed divisions), and concentrated at Dinapur, Benares, Meerut and Ludhiana, under the command of Major-Generals Marley, Wood, Gillespie and Ochterlony respectively. The combined strength at first was about 16,000 men, and while the objective of the first two columns was Katmandu, that of the third

was Garhwal and the fourth the Gurkha fortified posts at Amar Sing's headquarters.

The operations of these columns, with the single exception of Ochterlony's, redound so little to our credit that the less said about them the better. The melancholy detail of timidity, ineptitude and lack of all military knowledge may be read in the works given in Appendix 1.

The same authorities will show how, after six months' fighting, Ochterlony gained his great victory at Deothal, adjoining Malaun, on the 16th April, 1815, which caused the capitulation of Amar Sing and the fortress of Malaun on the 15th of the following month ; also how Jasper Nicolls signally defeated the Gurkha forces in Kumaon at the battle of Almora fought on the 25th and 26th April, 1815.

An armistice was then established and peace negotiations put in hand.

Before proceeding any further on the question of further hostilities against the Nepalese Government it is necessary to point out here that the above dates are important because they mark the occasions on which men of the Nepal forces began seriously to lose heart in the Gurkha cause and to desert in considerable numbers to the British side. Not all pure Gurkhas, but some of them hillmen of Nepalese levies from Kumaon, Garhwal and other mountain districts. It was from these soldiers that the 1st,¹ 2nd and 3rd Gurkhas were originally raised.

As deeply connected with the locality that was to become the permanent home of the 3rd Gurkhas, it should also be mentioned that early in 1815 the Governor-General was so perturbed by the reverses to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions that he decided on a separate invasion of Kumaon, partly to cut across Amar Sing's line of communication with Nepal and partly because of information he had received that the British advent would be very welcome to the inhabitants on account of the harsh treatment they had met with under the Gurkha régime.

The Governor-General, therefore, deputed Colonel Gardner, the Commandant of a body of irregular horse, to raise other troops and, in conjunction with a Major Hearsey, to undertake the penetration. The two columns moved via Champawat and the Kosi River respectively, and although the former, under Major Hearsey, reached Champawat, he was there defeated and taken prisoner.

¹ Originally two units, namely 1st and 2nd Nasserri Battalion, formed at Subathu by Lieuts. Ross and MacHarg respectively (G.G.O. 24th April, 1815). The 2nd Nasserri battalion was disbanded in 1829 and all Gurkhas of over six years' service were drafted into the 1st Nasserri and Sirmoor battalions.

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Colonel Gardner conducted a very successful campaign, and by the end of March, 1815, had established himself in position on high ground overlooking the River Kosi and within three or four miles of Almora itself. Facing him, and distant some two thousand yards, was a concentration of Gurkhas strongly posted on the Sitoli ridge and covering the capital.

The enemy's position being too formidable to attack, Colonel Gardner awaited reinforcements of regular troops, which were on their way. After a fortnight these arrived under Col. Jasper Nicolls, who, assuming command of the entire force, directed all future engagements, including the attack on Sitoli and the bombardment of Almora, which led to its evacuation by the enemy, on the 26th of April, 1815.

The war did not end, however, with Amar Sing's capitulation at Malaun and the capture of Almora. The Nepal Government was dissatisfied ; and, although openly professing a desire for agreement, was secretly delaying matters in every way. Negotiations continued until December, when, indeed, a treaty (Treaty of Segowli, dated 2nd December, 1815) was concluded, publicly signed by the Governor-General in Council with much formality, notified to all native princes of India and dispatched to Katmandu for final ratification.

The mediator, a Brahmin of Benares named Gujraj Missur (who had come down from Katmandu and signed the treaty), may, or may not, have abetted the policy of the Nepal Government in wasting still more time in order, evidently, to consume the only practicable season for hostilities. Be that as it may, there were certainly divided councils at the capital. Fifteen days was the time limit for ratification. Gujraj left Katmandu early in February, 1816, with what he told the political agent was the ratified treaty, made a leisurely journey to the British camp, and then calmly announced the Gurkhas' intention to renew the war !

The British authorities, however, had not been entirely hoodwinked. A finely equipped force of over 12,000 infantry, with an adequate train of artillery, under the command of General Sir David Ochterlony, was ready to take the field against Nepal. By means of a masterly and bold turning movement, Makwanpur, within twenty miles of the capital, was reached on 27th February. There the Gurkhas attacked the invaders furiously, but were completely defeated, with a loss of over 800 killed and wounded. The old document was then produced and duly ratified. Thus the Treaty of Segowli, dated 4th March, 1816, became an accomplished fact.

For these campaigns a silver medal was bestowed on all officers, British and Indian, who had served within the hills of Nepal; but only to "other ranks" when recommended by their commanding officers for conspicuous zeal or gallantry. There was strict economy exercised even in those days.

CHAPTER III

THE RAISING OF "THE KUMAON BATTALION," LATER ON "THE 3RD GURKHAS"

BEYOND some bald statements, such as the fact that this unit was raised in the year 1815, after the conclusion of the first campaign of the 1814-16 Nepal wars, detail about the early history of the battalion is shrouded in mystery. The difficulty of obtaining exact information on many points may be due to a subsequent very stupid act, best described in the biting remarks of the writer of the *North-West Provinces Gazetteer*, who says, when describing events of those early days :

"The whole of the military correspondence and records of the period, belonging to the Station Staff Office at Almora, were (apparently about 1873) burned as waste paper, a fate which is gradually overtaking all the records in the country that are at all worth preserving."

The first official document to be traced about the raising of the 3rd Gurkhas was unearthed from the archives of the Naini Tal Katcherry. It is from the Secretary to Government to the Hon. Edward Gardner,¹ Commissioner of Kumaon, is dated the 11th of June, 1815, and is reproduced in Appendix 1.

As will be seen in the Appendix on establishments, the official date of the formation of the unit is the 24th of April, 1815. The first officer to be appointed was the adjutant, Lieut. A. Wight, on the 27th of July, followed by the commandant, Lieut. Sir Robert Colquhoun,²

¹ Mr. Gardner had been political agent with the force of irregulars deputed to penetrate Kumaon in February, 1815, and accompanied his relation, Col. Gardner, the successful commander. After the victory at Almora, Mr. Gardner was appointed Commissioner of Kumaon and a year later became the first British Resident at Katmandu.

² Last male heir of a Nova Scotia baronetcy and with him it became extinct. Sir James, his eldest brother—who succeeded his father—died on the march to Seringapatam. Sir George, his next elder brother, was killed at Salamanca. Their father, Sir George Augustus Ludovick, was buried in Hull Parish Church. Their mother was Sir George's second wife, Charlotte Barclay. Sir Robert Colquhoun, the first Commandant, married a Miss Anna Maria Colvin in Calcutta in 1822, an elder sister of John Russell Colvin, the Lieut.-Governor of the old North-West Provinces, who died in the fort at Agra, and was buried there, during the Mutiny. There was no issue. Sir Robert was appointed Commandant of the Calcutta Native Militia on the 22nd of November, 1828. He died at sea on board the *Reliance* on the 22nd of June, 1838. The picture of Sir Robert and his wife must have been taken between 1822 and 1828. It was obtained by the very kind endeavours of Lieut.-Col. John Colvin, late Indian Army, and a great nephew of Lady Colquhoun.—Ed.



LIEUT. SIR ROBERT COLQUHOUN
THE FIRST COMMANDANT (1815-1828), with LADY COLQUHOUN.

Facing page 8.

on the 26th of August, 1815. Old records state that three bodies of men met at Hawalbagh, on the 15th of August of that year, and were formed into one unit, designated "The Kumaon Battalion."

These three bodies of men were :

1. Enemy subjects, *i.e.* disbanded Gurkhas, etc., who joined the British after Ochterlony's victory at Deothal.
2. 300 Oudh and Palpa men from Gorukpur who had been employed by the British against the Nepalese.
3. Some Gurkhas and others who entered our service after the fighting round Almora.

Shortly after formation, the battalion was sent to Choupakkia on the new western frontier of Nepal. Conditions there were so unfavourable, however, that—as shown by the old letters given in Appendix 1—the unit was moved, early in 1816, to Hawalbagh where permanent lines for it were constructed.

The battalion was from the beginning under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, but its duties, for the first twenty-four years of its existence, were distinctly more of a civil than of a military nature. It was in fact a police battalion with headquarters at Hawalbagh. Its duties extended from Srinagar, the capital of Garhwal, in the west, to the Kali River (the boundary between Kumaon and Nepal) in the east, and as far south as the Bhabar.¹

This, of course, meant numerous small detachments scattered all over the country, popular with the rank and file, as there was much "go as you please," but very detrimental to the efficiency of the unit as a whole. Moreover, all the commissioned and non-commissioned Gurkha officers had been trained under the Nepalese régime, as it prevailed in their conquered provinces. That is to say, harsh treatment of the natives and oppressive exactions were not looked upon as crimes at all and were left unpunished.

As such grave offences were constantly practised, the Commandant, in less than six months, procured the removal of a number of Gurkha officers (granted, by the way, very handsome pensions by the Government) and received authority to fill their places by selections from regular units. Nevertheless, about eighteen months later, Sir Robert Colquhoun had recourse to Courts Martial, composed of officers of regulars, hoping that their awards would be sufficiently severe for him to feel that, for offences against the inhabitants, the punishment fitted the crime. But here he was disappointed, for the sentences were so hopelessly inadequate that he was constrained to

¹ The dry forest belt on the talus of the low hills of the Himalaya, at the lower edge of which the moisture comes to the surface and forms the wet forest belt called "Terai."—Ed.

ask the Commissioner of Kumaon, in one particular instance, to recommend "to the Most Noble the Governor-General that the two Havildars and Naick in question be reduced to the ranks !"

The channels of correspondence in those days were both peculiar and complicated. Although the battalion was nominally under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, most of the recommendations affecting it were put forward through the local Commissioner to the Government of India direct. For example in April, 1818, the Secretary to Government, in reply to a request from the Commissioner of Kumaon, wrote :

"I am directed to inform you that orders will be issued for substituting drums and fifes for the bugles now in use in the Kumaon Provincial¹ Battalion."

On the 13th July, 1816, as will be seen from the correspondence in Appendix 1, Sir Robert Colquhoun was appointed supervisor for the construction of the barracks at Hawalbagh, or, as they were called, "Civil Buildings." He apparently volunteered for the work in addition to his other duties, his Adjutant, Lieut. Arthur Wight, having declined the office. The immediate grant was Rs. 8,000/- but the civil architect estimated a total expenditure of Rs. 12,000/- and their completion in six months. What economies the Commandant effected is not known, but although not reported complete until July, 1818, the total charges only amounted to Rs. 5,921/12/10.

Seventy-six years later the Commandant of the new second battalion was entrusted with a similar charge at Lansdowne, but, with this difference, that Lt.-Col. Hutchinson received no extra emolument whatever. Sir Robert was given a special grant of Rs. 2,000/- for the six months' superintendence. Whether he obtained Rs. 8,000/-, because the task took four times as long, is not recorded.

The battalion was made "local" in 1823, but continued its police duties for sixteen years longer. The first "local corps" in India was a mounted unit, namely, two "risallas" of irregular cavalry, raised in July, 1760, and called the Moghul Horse. It was composed of, and officered entirely by, natives who provided their own horses, arms and accoutrements and received fifty rupees a month pay. By the year 1823 the number of "local corps" had increased beyond belief (ten regiments of horse and fourteen battalions of infantry, including, as regards Gurkhas, the two Nasseris, the Sirmoor and the Kumaon battalions). This necessitated action by Government to bring to some uniform level the various and nondescript irregular units in the service of the Company. Hence

¹ A new designation allotted in 1816. Hereafter there were many more, for which see Indian Army list.

G.O.C.C., 6th May, 1823, which placed the numbers of officers and other ranks on a fixed scale ; it also gave a detailed list of all the local corps, with their composition, numbers and duties.

The Mutiny, in its turn, saw a large increase in the number of local units, formed anywhere, anyhow, and almost by anybody. In May, 1861, or two and half years after Her Majesty Queen Victoria assumed the government of India and the Honourable East India Company passed away (1st November, 1858), the whole army of Bengal with its confused medley of regiments was completely reorganised. Those local infantry corps which were not disbanded, nor designated police, were all numbered and specified as units of the line.

CHAPTER IV

1839—1846

IN 1839 a change occurred in the habitat of the unit, now known as "The 7th (or Kumaon) Local Battalion." The Government of India deemed it expedient to have troops in evidence near the western border of Nepal. Orders, therefore, arrived for the provincial battalion to garrison Lohoghat and Pithoragarh, where Nepalese posts had formerly existed. Headquarters and five companies occupied the former and three companies the latter cantonment. Years later, these two posts were evacuated, because the location of troops there was looked upon by Nepal as a menace !

Lohoghat is distant fifty, and Pithoragarh fifty-two, miles from Almora, both being approached by a bridle path. Their elevation is much the same as Almora, namely 5,500 feet above sea level.

This move to the Nepal border meant to the battalion the end of its rôle as a police unit. It remained in the new area continuously for seven years with the exception of one little jaunt, about which very little is known, but it occurred in the following circumstances :

The famous Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh, "The Lion of the Punjab," died in 1839, which soon meant trouble for the British. In December, 1845, the Sikh army crossed the Sutlej in force and thus began the first Sikh war, often called the Sutlej campaign. In January, 1846, the battalion left the Nepal border to join the army of the Sutlej, but it got no further than Moradabad, where it was ordered to halt. After a brief stay there it returned to Lohoghat and Pithoragarh.

The reason of this countermand is nowhere recorded. It is one of the events, as stated earlier, shrouded in mystery. Probably the Almora Station Staff office records (burnt, by such indescribable folly in 1873) contained full details of this and other ambiguous happenings.

In December, 1846, the battalion was ordered to garrison Almora, but still to provide detachments at Lohoghat and Pithoragarh. This date is of great interest as marking the advent of the local unit in a station, which it was eventually to occupy until the present day.

The detachments referred to above were of a strength of 200 and

100 men respectively. Lohoghat, except for its inaccessibility, was a most desirable spot. A beautiful climate, rolling downs, fit for a division to manœuvre over, and an abundance of excellent water. So enthusiastically did everyone visiting the cantonment write about it that it was not long before it was made a hill station for British troops, with their families, in the hot weather and remained so for many years. During this period the battalion's strength there was reduced to 100 Gurkhas and that at Pithoragarh increased to 200.

As regards British troops, however, it was soon realised there were two serious drawbacks to Lohoghat. Firstly, the expense of moving them there from Bareilly, Sitapur, Moradabad and Lucknow, as well as the heavy cost of their maintenance, in such an out of the way spot. Secondly, the marches through the Terai to Tanakpur meant a good deal of malaria, frequently followed by pneumonia on reaching the cold of the hills.

Finally the authorities in 1866-67 sought the advice of Sir Henry Ramsay, the Commissioner of Kumaon, who selected for them Ranikhet instead of Lohoghat. The latter station therefore knew the British soldier no more, nor was any garrison maintained there.

But at Pithoragarh the strength of 200 Gurkhas was continued until after the second Afghan War, when it was reduced to one and a half companies. A few years later, a guard of one N.C.O. and four riflemen was considered sufficient. Eventually the cantonment was handed over to the civil authorities.

CHAPTER V

OLD-TIME SOLDIERING : ALMORA ITSELF : FORT MOIRA : SIR HENRY RAMSAY : "GENERAL SERVICE CORPS" AND "THE CHARTER"

ONE wonders what soldiering was like when posted on the Nepal border and later on in Almora ? For the first twenty-four years of the unit's existence there could have been hardly any military training at all, bar recruits' drill, for the whole time of the British ranks must have been occupied with administration and the inspection of detachments. On the border, too, the battalion was split up so that the establishment of British at Pithoragarh could only consist of one wretched officer. Rumour has it that the poor fellow detailed occasionally committed suicide.

Parades were probably very few and, according to old pensioners' stories told in the "'eighties," most of the drill—after the departure of the British Sergt.-Major in 1861—took place under Gurkha officers. Their British superiors turned up for musketry at all times, but there was not really half enough of that, the annual expenditure per man of ball ammunition being negligible.

Indeed, reflection on peace-time soldiering, both before and after the Mutiny, leads one to believe that the British officer of those periods had a very soft job. Of field days at Almora there were none, but time was fully occupied with *shikar*. The only military activity manifest during the year occurred a few weeks before the annual visit of the inspecting general, which was notified in ample time. Rehearsals of the ceremonial parade were frequent, uniforms were overhauled, the "lines" were given a touch of paint and the mess wines and viands were carefully examined. In fact, there was a regular epidemic of "inspection fever." On his departure there was a sigh of relief and the station resumed its normal state of *dolce far niente*. Even as late as the "'seventies," if report speaks truly, one commandant did not reside at Almora at all, but six to ten miles higher up the mountains.

Yet in spite of all this there must have been worth and grit somewhere, for, besides excellent reports by inspecting generals and on

field service, one reads year by year, in the very scanty records that remain, eulogistic accounts of inspections at Almora. For example :

“ *December, 1851.*—Regiment inspected by Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, and highly praised.”

1852.—“ Regiment inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Gomm, and received much commendation for its drill, dress and high state of discipline.”

A word or two about Almora itself should be of interest at this juncture.

At the end of the ridge, nearest the town, stands Fort Moira, called after General the Earl of Moira (afterwards the Marquess of Hastings), Governor-General of India from 1813 to 1823.

The main gateway bears the following inscription :

“ FORT MOIRA, LALMANDI, ALMORA

This Fort, before its completion, was captured by the British under Colonel Nicolls on 26th April, 1815.”

Which statement is not correct. Col. Nicolls launched his attack from Katarmal about one hour after midday on the 25th of April. After capturing the Gurkha stockades on Sitoli ridge,¹ a general advance was made on Almora. By nightfall his troops were in position close to the town and on Haridungi, above Pokhar Khali. At this place he established his headquarters.

Fighting continued all night, mainly remarkable for the gallant attempts made by the Gurkhas to drive back the attackers. The most northerly British post was actually taken by a Gurkha detachment from Kalimat, but recaptured, after severe hand-to-hand fighting by native infantry and irregulars, led by Col. Gardner in person.

The Gurkhas in the fort,² although heavily bombarded by small and eight-inch mortars, made a glorious sortie, right up to the stockades of the British main positions, some to fall dead inside.

At dawn on the 26th, Col. Nicolls' advanced troops pushed on to within seventy yards of the fort. One party worked up the street running to the ditch on the east side, but being met by fire fell back in good order. The bombardment continued until 9 a.m. when the fort commander sent out a flag of truce and an armistice was agreed on.

It is incorrect, therefore, to assert that any fort was actually captured by the British.

¹ A monument exists on this ridge erected to the memory of Lieuts. Kirk and Tapley of the 27th Regiment of Native Infantry, by their brother officers. The latter was killed on the 26th of April, when on duty at an advanced post in the town of Almora. The former died on the 16th of the next month from his strenuous exertions in the final operations of the campaign.—Ed.

² This was not Fort Moira at all, but one in the town now used as the *kutcherry*.

In 1816 they completed the construction of Fort Moira on their own design, which included a deep and wide ditch round the outside of the circumference of the walls.

The ground now occupied by the barracks, parade ground, fort, Almora Club and its tennis courts, was, at that time, the home of a large colony of "fakirs"—Nath fakirs—who wore enormous earrings and lived in caves, or other shelters on the hillside. As the actual site of the fort and its vicinity was their cemetery, these men had to be bought out. This was done and the whole place cleared, with the exception of the "Gari Bhairab" temple, which still stands beside the lower tennis court.

On first completion—and up to the Mutiny—Fort Moira was occupied by a native company of garrison artillery. After the transfer of the Bengal artillery to the Royal Corps in 1861, the fort was held by a small detachment of native gunners until about 1867-68, when it was handed over to the Public Works Department and its guns transferred or dismantled.

At the end of 1881, a year after the return from the second Afghan War, the buildings in the fort were given to the battalion for the accommodation of 200 additional men. These buildings were converted into barracks by the Military Works Department, the Gurkhas carrying up the stones and earth for the masonry.

In 1885 the enlargement of the quite inadequate parade ground was commenced, but work was suspended the next summer owing to orders for the Burma campaign.

When the unit returned from Burma in May, 1887, the whole of the fort was handed over and occupied by the single men of four companies. It was at this period that the ditch first became a zoo, holding for some years jarao (sambhur), ghoral, khakur and wild pig.

On the demolition of the old married quarters and the construction of the new bachelor double-storeyed barracks in 1900, married men and their families were transferred to fort Moira.

It is inappropriate to mention Almora without some reference to General the Honourable Sir Henry Ramsay, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner of Kumaon from 1856 to 1884, and commonly called "The King of Kumaon."

Ensign Henry Ramsay joined the seventh (or Kumaon) Local Battalion—as it was then—as adjutant on the 13th of August, 1839, from the 53rd Native Infantry. He succeeded Lieut. John Liptrot, transferred on that date to the 3rd Local Horse as Second in Command. Ramsay vacated his regimental appointment, on selection as junior assistant to the Commissioner of Kumaon on the 8th of August, 1840, handing over to his brother, Robert Anderson

Ramsay, and himself continuing in civil employ in the same province for the rest of his service. R. A. Ramsay became Second-in-Command in 1847 and commanded for ten years from the 1st of October, 1851.

Although their father was never the Earl of Dalhousie, Henry and Robert were raised to the rank of an Earl's son on the succession to the title of their brother, Admiral George Ramsay. Hence the appellation "Honourable" prefixed to their names.

Further information about Sir Henry's wonderful career in Kumaon is added here from notes most kindly supplied recently by the Deputy Secretary to Government, United Provinces, and the Rev. E. L. Oakley of the London Missionary Society at Almora. Also from the writer's personal knowledge of the Commissioner (after the latter had retired and was living at Almora) for a period just a little longer than Mr. Oakley's.

In 1850 Capt. Ramsay, the Assistant Commissioner, was placed in charge of the sub-mountain tract, the "Bhabar" and "Terai" in the Kumaon Division, as "administrator" with power to expend any available surplus on improvements.

So great was the success of his development system of cultivation in the Bhabar that, in a few years' time, it began to show an immense growth of prosperity. Large areas were cleared and came under cultivation. Villages and towns sprang up. Canals were opened and a scheme of irrigation was introduced. The land revenue nearly doubled itself within the first three years of his régime.

In 1856 Major Ramsay, with sixteen years' service in the division, succeeded Mr. Batten as Commissioner of Kumaon. On assumption of charge he interested himself greatly in the numerous problems in the division. His sympathies were wide and his activities multifarious. At the same time he was somewhat intolerant of control. As years rolled by and secretariats became increasingly bureaucratic, Sir Henry Ramsay had frequent occasion to show his strong distaste to dictation from above. His favourite method of disposal of an order, or circular, from Government which failed to meet with his approval was a red ink entry across it, reading, "not applicable to Kumaon."

Sir Henry's achievements in Kumaon were so numerous that they would, in themselves, easily fill a volume. Indeed, it is amazing that a record of his work has never appeared. Space does not admit of a reference to one half of the benefits he conferred on his people, but a few of the principal ones may be touched on.

Settlements.—Although Mr. Beckett effected the tenth settlement of Kumaon (excluding the Bhabar), Sir Henry was the guiding and

ruling spirit throughout. His decisions were invariably accepted as just—such was his wonderful influence over the people.

Communications.—The excellent bridle paths in the hills and the tracks below were constructed under the direction and general supervision of this zealous and diligent Commissioner. To him is due the boon to the wayfarer of the long avenue of shady trees on the hot climb to Almora from the Ghurari bridge.

Forests.—The Kumaon division contains some of the most valuable forests in India. Sir Henry was the first to realise the great significance of conserving them in order to ensure a regular supply of water to the great rivers which fertilise the plains. In 1858 he secured the forests under his own control and became their first conservator.

The Leper Asylum, Almora.—As soon as he arrived at Almora, Ensign Ramsay began giving periodical alms to the lepers who frequented the town. When appointed to the civil in 1840 he put up a few stone huts for the accommodation of about twenty lepers. When Commissioner, he arranged for a house to be taken and eventually formed an institution and got it placed in charge of the London Missionary Society.

Conservation of Water for the Bhabar.—The Bhim Tal and Sat Tal lakes, situated in the hills a few miles above the Bhabar, were artificially dammed by Sir Henry, in order to store water and supply it to the Bhabar through canals.

Naini Tal.—The hill station of Naini Tal is indebted to Sir Henry Ramsay for its present position. In the Mutiny of 1857 this place formed a refuge for the fugitives from Bareilly, etc. Major Ramsay—as he then was—made it his headquarters and from it conducted the operations against the rebels in the Terai. During the great landslide at Naini in 1880, which carried a portion of the mountain side into the lake, the Commissioner himself took a prominent part in life-saving operations. While thus engaged, he was overtaken by a great wave caused by the debris. He was swept into the lake and narrowly escaped the fate of a British soldier and some Indians working by his side, who were drowned.

Education.—In 1850 the Ramsay High School was established in Almora by Sir Henry Ramsay and the Rev. J. H. Budden of the London Missionary Society. It was mainly due to Sir Henry's endeavours that the Ramsay College, Almora, came into existence in 1871.

Memorials.—The College, just referred to, was one ; the Ramsay Hospital, Naini Tal, another. But, to those who know, his great and ineffaceable memorial is in the outstanding benefits he conferred on Kumaon.

Of the man himself ("Ranji Sahib" as his name—a household word—went with the people) anecdotes abound. A few of these, as told by him personally to Mr. Oakley, or the writer of this history, may be recorded as deeply connected with the home of the Kumaon Battalion.

Sir Henry after retirement loved to talk of the past and give reminiscences of the hill country over which he had reigned, indisputably, for so lengthy a period.

He was very proud of his regal sobriquet. Nothing pleased him more than to relate how, on a brief visit to England and a guest of the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VII), he was refused permission to terminate his stay at Marlborough House, because, as the Prince put it, it was such a pleasure to have the opportunity of "entertaining the King of Kumaon."

Sir Henry introduced the potato into Kumaon. Amongst other places, he cleared a large area for it at Muktesar and built an inspection bungalow there. This was available to European travellers if permission was asked. One year in the late 'seventies a High Court Judge who knew the Commissioner by reputation occupied the bungalow for a few days. He enjoyed the potatoes so much that he took away a sack of them, sending the cost, three rupees, to Almora, as directed by the caretaker. In a moment of facetiousness he addressed his letter inside to the "King of Kumaon." A short time afterwards, at Allahabad, the three rupees were returned to him and across his letter was written, "Kings don't sell."

No police were foisted on Kumaon during Sir Henry's time, as he refused to have any. His Courts were often held by candle light after a day's shooting. His "judgments" were seldom written. Once an Almora murderer, sentenced to death, escaped to the plains. He was pursued by Sir Henry himself. After a long search and the exercise of "Sherlock Holmes" astuteness, he was arrested, by this magistrate's own hand, on a railway station platform, haled back in custody and duly executed.

After the Mutiny of 1857, many rebels fled to the Himalayas and twelve of them were captured by Sir Henry in Garhwal. The orders of government were, "capital punishment on the spot." The Commissioner did not like this task at all. Fortunately, "Baghi Lyall" (Sir Alfred's brother) was near at hand and, by Sir Henry's orders, acted as executioner. The men were placed along the edge of a precipice overhanging a river and Lyall shot them one by one with his revolver.

About the same period two "fakirs" arrived at Almora and commenced preaching sedition. Sir Henry had them arrested at

once and hanged from the "Hangman's Tree" on the Sitoli Ridge, close to the bridle path. This tree was still standing in the 'nineties and perhaps later.

"Mahamari," or plague, has been endemic in the Himalayas for centuries. Nearly half a century ago Sir Henry expressed to Mr. Oakley his conviction that it was connected with rats, giving his reasons. Goitre, so common in many Kumaon valleys, he attributed to drinking the limy water of glacial rivers.

During the whole course of his service—so great was his zeal—Sir Henry only took the following leave :

- (i) Privilege leave from 1st to 10th February, 1855.
- (ii) Privilege leave from 1st May to 31st July, 1861.
- (iii) Privilege leave from 31st May to 9th July, 1867 ; followed by leave to Europe on medical certificate up to 22nd January, 1868.
- (iv) Privilege leave from 22nd August to 21st November, 1876, during which period he was a guest once at Balmoral and twice at Marlborough House.

Such, in brief, is a very inadequate description of a remarkable personality, a many-sided man of great practical ability. The 3rd Gurkhas may well be proud of the fact that he was the seventh adjutant of the Kumaon Battalion.

In March, 1850, the battalion was made a "general service corps" although no elimination of the word "local" can be traced until the year 1860, when a new designation, "The Kumaon Battalion," was allotted.

The three original Gurkha units, the Nassira (1st), Sirmoor (2nd) and Kumaon (3rd) battalions, having been made liable for "general service" and incorporated in the Line, it now occurred to someone at Army Headquarters that changes in their location ought to take place. The Nassira battalion was at Amritsar, the Sirmoor at Dehra Dun and the Kumaon at Almora. In October, 1850, the Sirmoor and Kumaon battalions were ordered to exchange stations, which marked the beginning of a great deal of movement. The Sirmoor battalion marched at once, leaving a depot at Dehra Dun, and garrisoned Almora for six years with detachments at Lohoghat and Pithoragarh. The Kumaon battalion, less some families and details remaining behind, merely moved headquarters and one wing to Dehra at first. The other wing followed in February, 1851, only to be sent on the next month to Jutogh for an eight months' spell before joining headquarters in Dehra.

A little later on, and evidently consequent on the "general service" mandate, a notion was conceived by the men of the Sirmoor battalion—most probably abetted by their confrères of Kumaon between 1850 to 1856, when the two units were so closely associated

—that a permanent home for their families, when the breadwinners were ordered away, was very desirable. Indeed, so anxious were the Sirmoor men on this matter, because of the expense to themselves of taking their wives and children with them when changing stations, that they petitioned their Commanding Officer about it and offered to pay rent for a vacant site within cantonments at Dehra if it could be given them. The case became still harder a little later on when it was ordained that the families must be left behind, as happened to those of the Kumaon battalion in 1856 when ordered to Rawalpindi.

Although this petition was eventually forwarded to Government, just before the Mutiny, nothing happened then—due partly to the site becoming unavailable at Dehra and partly to the exigencies of that period.

There can be little doubt, however, that this petition originated the question of what to do with the families of soldiers, the majority of whom were married, hailing from a far away country like Nepal, very difficult of access, when their men were called away on government service. It was only reasonable, in such contingencies, that the Gurkhas at Dehra, or at Almora, etc., should wish to provide suitable homes for their women and children. This, as will be seen, became eventually the Government view, and the question is of so much importance and of so great an interest that it is referred to fully. Moreover, although an anticipation in the matter of dates, the changes of stations referred to above make it imperative to add here the final orders regarding the location of the four¹ original Gurkha battalions which, prior to the promulgation of these orders (1864), already had been designated the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Gurkha Regiments.

In future, attempts will be made to chronicle events in their sequence. Now, to make the chronology quite clear, in spite of a digression, the various quarterings of the 3rd Gurkhas from 1850 to 1864 must be noted :

October, 1850, to October, 1856,	Under orders for, or actually at, Dehra Dun.
December, 1856, to June, 1857,	At, or near, Rawalpindi.
June, 1857, to June, 1859,	En route to, or at, Delhi and the Mutiny Campaign.
July, 1859, to April, 1864,	Almora and Bareilly.
October, 1863, to September, 1864,	Headquarters and left wing at Bareilly until April, 1864. In accordance with orders received, the whole battalion expected to be quartered in Dehra Dun again after a lapse of eight years.

¹ The 4th Gurkha Regiment was raised at Pithoragarh in 1857 as the "Extra Gurkha Regiment."

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The right wing, marching from Almora, reached Dehra on 1st April, 1864, and went into camp. Headquarters and the other wing left Bareilly early the same month, but were halted on arrival at Roorkee on account of the following telegram from the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster-General in India :

“ Let the 3rd Gurkhas halt at Roorkee or some convenient place until their destination be decided on. More by post.”

The battalion (joined at Roorkee by its right wing from Dehra on 31st May) remained in camp at Roorkee until 1st July, when it was moved into temporary huts until it left there for the Bhutan campaign on 27th September, 1864.

The “ more by post ” quoted in the above telegram proved to be the following letter No. 692, dated Fort William, 18th March, 1864 ; and this letter, together with one succeeding it (both from the Secretary, Government of India Military Department, to Quartermaster-General, India) are embodied in the text of this history, because of their important decision on this question of location, as well as for facility of reference :

No. 692, dated 18th March, 1864 :

“ Sir,

In continuation of my telegram and with reference to your No. 499 dated 18th February, 1864, I am directed to acquaint you that the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council sanctions the retention of the lines at Dehra by the families of the 2nd Gurkha Regiment during the absence of the Corps, as His Excellency in Council considers it very desirable—looking to the different circumstances in which recruits from Nepal find themselves as compared with men of other races—that each of the four Gurkha Regiments should have a station peculiarly its own, at which it should usually be stationed ; though liable of course to removal anywhere and at any time for active service, or for a tour of regular duty either at Peshawar or at any other station, where it may be considered desirable to have a regiment composed of men of that class.

2. On these occasions of absence the families will be able to remain in quiet occupation of the lines as heretofore until the regiment returns.

3. The stations of Almorah, Dehra and Dharmasala provide quarters for three of the four regiments and the Governor-General in Council sanctions the selection of a suitable site for the fourth.

*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

(Signed) H. W. NORMAN, Lt.-Colonel.
Secretary to Govt. of India.”

FORT WILLIAM,
18.3.1864.

The second letter clinching this question of "homes" for the Gurkha units reads as below :

" No. 424 : dated 29th June, 1864.

I am directed to acknowledge your letter No. 1657 dated 13th May, 1864, conveying the wish of H. E. the C. in C. that before communicating to the several Gurkha regiments, the decision of the Government announced in this Department's letter No. 692, dated 18th March, 1864, it may be distinctly understood that the localities of the existing cantonment lines in which the corps are now located be given over to them in perpetuity as their homes.

2. H.E. also expresses his wish that regular sub-division Sepoy Barracks be constructed entirely separate from such Gurkha villages.

3. I am to acquaint you for the information of the C. in C. that the Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council sanctions the present lines being considered as belonging to the regiments in perpetuity, and H.E. in Council sanctions the erection of lines, as proposed by Sir Hugh Rose for a Native Regiment, in the immediate neighbourhood of the existing Gurkha lines.

4. I am to request that it be explained to each corps, in the clearest possible manner, so as to leave no chance of a misunderstanding hereafter, that the Gurkha regiments are liable to be taken away from the stations allotted to them whenever Government may see fit to do so ; and that they are liable to be kept away as long as it may be convenient to Government to keep them away, and that this may be necessary in times of peace as well as of war ; but that they will always eventually return to their own stations and that during their absence their families will remain in their 'homes.'

5. I am, however, to dwell on the fact, that in assigning these lines as 'homes' it is not contemplated by Government to grant more than this. It is not intended to give free grants of land for cultivation, or to form a rent-free settlement in the more extended sense of the term.

6. On these points being clearly explained to the men of these regiments, the Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council is pleased to approve of the communication, which H.E. proposes to make to the regiments to the following extent :

That the 1st Regiment will have its home at Dharmsala, with its lines in the neighbourhood :

That the 2nd Regiment will be similarly situated at Dehra and the 3rd Regiment at Almorah. The location of the 4th Regiment will hereafter be decided upon."

This latter document is generally known in the four old original Gurkha regiments as "The Charter," for it is a written grant of certain rights to them by the Government. Excitable field officers of Gurkha units, when twitted with the probability of a permanent change of station, have been known to go so far as to declare that the document was a large vellum Deed of Conveyance signed by Queen Victoria and therefore absolutely inviolable. Such as it is, however, it has

served its purpose more than once when would-be reformers advocated the movement of the older Gurkha units in ordinary relief.

The famous Lord Kitchener was the last to make the attempt and was a man not easily foiled. He launched his campaign in Dehra and explained his wishes in the orderly room of the 2nd Gurkhas. In breathless silence "The Charter" was produced and read. All wondered what the great man would do and say. "K" chucked it on the floor and snarled out, "What nonsense ; they had no business to write such a letter and bind posterity."

Later on he came to Almora and what happened there will be related in its proper place.

CHAPTER VI

THE MUTINY

As recorded in the last chapter the battalion, under the command of Capt. R. A. Ramsay, left Dehra Dun for Rawalpindi in October, 1856. It reached its destination on the 10th of December.

The following May came the news of the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny at Meerut and the march of the mutineers to Delhi. Then, in common with many other units, both British and Indian, the Kumaon Battalion, in the highest temperature of the hot weather, began to lead a very strenuous existence. Gurkhas are not supposed to be capable of standing excessive heat. It appears to depend on the game in hand, for experience proves that the Gurkha—like the average Britisher—rather thrives on great heat, sleepless nights, want of food and other privations, *provided* there is plenty of daily excitement and good fighting in prospect.

The first move came quickly, the unit marching at short notice towards Lahore to join John Nicholson's force. Then arrived counter-orders—probably 'Pindi was considered insecure—for at Jhelum the battalion was ordered to return. Early in June, off it tramped to Abbottabad, but only for one week, during which period a court martial of its Gurkha officers tried, and sentenced to death, three mutineers, deserters from the 26th Bengal Native Infantry. On return to 'Pindi the battalion had the honour of an inspection on the 22nd June by Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. It was ordered to march next day for Delhi.

Nor did it move alone, for into its sole charge was given £70,000 worth of treasure and a train of guns, ammunition, etc., over 5,000 yards in length. The completion of the journey was interrupted by a detention at Jallundur in early July and the incorporation of the Kumaon Battalion in a small movable column, formed there to look out for any Sialkote mutineers who might escape the rounding-up movement being carried out by the great John Nicholson. It may be added, in parenthesis, none did escape.

This was indeed a memorable march, worthy to rank with the remarkable feat performed a few weeks earlier by the Corps of

Guides. Leaving Hoti Mardan on May 13th, this famous corps were at Delhi on the morning of the 9th of June, having completed 580 miles in twenty-seven days at the hottest season of the year, and with only three days' halts by the way.

The Gurkha task was in some ways more severe, meaning, as it did, close on 500 miles of escort duty to a lengthy and cumbersome column over a period lasting five and a half weeks, with all the harassing changes and vexatious delays of a fruitless inclusion in a reserve force *en route*. This march, too, commenced in the very hottest period of the hot weather and finished in the muggy heat and pestilential atmosphere of the "rains." Anyone knowing India, or even having only read about its summer climate, will realise that this was a prodigious performance, demanding the very highest form of discipline, endurance and courage.

At the end of July there was rather a lull in hostilities at Delhi, but, on the 31st of the month, a force of several thousand mutineers, with ten field guns and three mortars, moved out of the city. The Kumaon Battalion, between 400 and 500 strong, had this day reached Rhye, two marches away, and on the enemy's movements being ascertained, orders were sent to the Commanding Officer to press on to Alipore, act in conjunction with Major Coke's movable column there, and afterwards accompany it on its return to camp on the Ridge. Major Coke's instructions were to intercept the force from the city should it succeed in placing a temporary bridge over a swampy cut. The rain, however, was so heavy that the bridge was washed away before completion, and the mutineers retired towards the city. At 3 a.m. on the 1st of August, in drenching rain, our unit marched into camp on the Ridge, very tired, but with the immense satisfaction of a heavy and onerous duty well and safely accomplished.

This arrival on the 1st August synchronised with the big Mahomedan Festival of the Baqr' Id, when the mutineers attacked our breastworks on the Ridge in vain, but with great persistency, for close on twenty-four hours. The Battalion was posted to the 1st Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier Showers, with the 1st Bn. European Bengal Fusiliers (now 1st Bn. Royal Munster Fusiliers) as the only other unit, and was engaged on the very day of its arrival in the above mentioned lengthy affair. A few days later the brigade was reformed, its battalions being : 2nd Bn. European Bengal Fusiliers, 75th Foot and Kumaon Battalion.

The next event of note occurred a few days later, when a force under Brigadier Showers, moving before dawn on the 12th August, carried out a brilliant little coup and completely surprised the enemy

under the very walls of the Delhi fortress.¹ The Brigadier's orders were a model of clarity and conciseness, being simply : "Move up silently and take the guns at Ludlow Castle."

The task was most successfully accomplished. Of the six guns, one twenty-four pounder, two nine pounders and one six pounder were captured and brought away, while our men, after killing a great number of the enemy, returned to camp in the highest spirits. But for some little confusion, consequent on the severe wound sustained by the Brigadier, the enemy would never have managed to get away the other twenty-four pounder and six pounder.

We read in "Allen's Indian Mail" about this time, in a private letter dated Almora, 24th July, 1857, that every effort was being made to keep the battalion up to strength. The correspondent stated that there were over a thousand Gurkhas in the station, with more coming in every day, adding that, the hill station of Naini-Tal being considered too near the plains to be safe, between two and three hundred English ladies with hundreds of children had arrived at Almora for better security.

After the Ludlow Castle affair on the 12th of August there was little doing before Delhi for some days, the main event being the arrival of Nicholson on the 14th with his very welcome reinforcements of nearly 3,000 men.

This is not the place to dilate on the influence and reputation of this resourceful and daring soldier, but it is necessary to explain that his arrival acted as an enormous stimulant. The force in front of Delhi, after over two months' constant fighting, was worn out with repelling an everlasting succession of attacks and sorties. Units were gravely depleted, and the number of sick and wounded was nearly 2,000 when Nicholson arrived (a month later it was 1,000 more), exclusive of the many cases transferred to Ambala. But so great was the prestige and so powerful the personality of this remarkable man, that his mere presence in camp infused fresh vigour into the whole force.

It may be mentioned here that his brother, Capt. Charles Nicholson of Coke's Corps (1st Punjab Infantry), has some connection with this narrative. He had his right arm badly smashed in the assault on the Kashmir Battery on the 14th September, and was so ill afterwards

¹ Six Horse Artillery guns (Capt. Remington).
One squadron 9th Lancers (Capt. Anson).
The Guides Cavalry (Capt. Sanford).
1st Bengal Fusiliers (Major Jacob), 350 men.
Coke's Rifles (Major Coke), 250 men.
100 men each of 75th, 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, and
8th Foot, Kumaon Battalion (Lieut. Thompson), and
4th Sikh Infantry.

that he was not expected to survive. Granted long leave home, he eventually recovered, however, married an American lady, and returned to India on appointment to the Kumaon Battalion. On his way to join he died in a lonely dāk bungalow.

The siege-train having arrived on the 4th September, the bombardment of the city bastions and walls commenced on the 11th and the long hoped for assault was fixed to take place at daybreak on the 14th. The troops detailed were divided into five columns. The first, second and third columns were under the direct command of Nicholson. He led No. 1 personally, its mission being to storm the breach made near Kashmir Bastion. The third column, with which only we are really concerned, was under Col. Campbell of the 52nd Light Infantry and was composed of the 52nd (200 men, Major Vigors) Kumaon Battalion (250, Capt. Ramsay) and 1st Punjab Infantry (500, Lieut. Nicholson), total 950 only. Its orders were to enter the Kashmir Gate after it had been blown open by our engineers. There were also sixty-five men of the Kumaon Battalion (taken from picquet duty) in the fourth column commanded by Major Charles Reid, Sirmoor Battalion, whose duty it was to clear the suburb of Kishanganj and enter the city by the Kabul Gate.

The extreme gallantry of the explosion party selected to blow up the Kashmir Gate is well known, but, as the Kumaon Battalion was deeply concerned, it is necessary to give some detail of the actual occurrence.

The party was composed of Lieuts. Salkeld and Horne of the Engineers ; Sergts. Carmichael, Smith and Corporal Burgess of the Bengal Sappers and Miners, a few sappers, and Bugler Hawthorne of the 52nd Light Infantry. Such was the heroism displayed as to make the exploit one of the most daring ever recorded in military annals, and a deed reflecting undying glory on the Bengal Sappers and Miners.

Advancing at the double, in broad daylight, from the head of the third column—which was concealed by a bend in the road—this small but dauntless band made straight for the gate, which was a massive structure of immensely heavy timbers, flanked by loopholes and embrasures.

Covered by the fire of the 60th Rifles (who were under orders to join the fifth column (Reserve) on the completion of this duty), the detachment pressed forward in two parties.

In front, Lieut. Horne with Sergts. Smith and Carmichael, Havildar Mahor and the sappers carrying the powder bags. Following them came the firing party composed of Lieut. Salkeld, Corpl. Burgess, etc.

The advanced party reached their objective unhurt, although a portion of the drawbridge had been destroyed and the rifles of the mutineers protruded from the open gate, left ajar for that purpose. Balancing themselves as best they could across the remaining beams of the drawbridge, these gallant fellows lodged the powder bags against the gate, but Sergt. Carmichael was killed, as he laid his bag, and Hav. Mahor wounded.

The advanced party then slipped into the ditch to make way for the firing party. As Salkeld endeavoured to fire the charge he was shot through the leg (which was broken), as well as through the arm, which had eventually to be amputated. He handed over the slow match to Corporal Burgess, who managed to light the port fire, but, pierced by three bullets, fell immediately, mortally wounded. Seeing the port fire well alight, all the firers jumped into the ditch, where Salkeld had already fallen.

Meanwhile the enemy, quite unaware of what had been done, continued firing until the explosion took place. The result was astounding, for the demolition was most successful. The bodies of twenty mutineers strewed the road inside the gate, not one of whom would it have been possible to recognise. Many others lay writhing on the ground in all directions, with their mutilated limbs scattered here, there and everywhere.

Almost mingling with the crash of the ponderous gates, and the shrieks and curses of the panic-stricken rebels behind them, came the crisp, clear notes of the English bugle sounding the regimental call of the 52nd Light Infantry. Lieut. Horne gave the order for it, which was the arranged signal for the 3rd Column to advance.

Nor was there any delay. As one man, British soldiers, Gurkhas and Punjabis, rushed forward and forced an entrance through the blackened and bloody chasm in front of them. Nothing could stop such men—not even the strenuous opposition they encountered; for the enemy, realising the situation at last, brought all available heavy artillery and musket fire to bear on the position.

In such manner did the 3rd column enter Delhi—almost at the moment that the 1st and 2nd columns also fulfilled their mission. For having gained the breaches made at the Kashmir and Water bastions, the men were sweeping the ramparts from the latter gap to the Kabul Gate.

The victors were naturally much elated, nor—after the scenes of horror during the Mutiny they had many of them witnessed, and the deeds of abomination they had been told—were they inclined to be forbearing. Prostrate rebels were trampled on; every mutineer visible was shot down and bayoneted without mercy. The work of

vengeance had commenced within the walls of the traitor city ; no quarter could be expected—none was given.

For their heroic deeds Lieuts. Salkeld and Horne, Sergt. Smith and Bugler Hawthorne were awarded the Victoria Cross—Salkeld, alas ! never to wear it, for he succumbed to his wounds.

It is interesting to record that on the 19th of October, 1909, there died in London a mutiny veteran, aged 77, who fifty-two years before, when a youngster in the 52nd Light Infantry, was the first to enter the Kashmir Gate after it had been blown up. This was Lieut.-Col. Charles Kenrick Crosse, well known to the writer, when a boy, as a keen rider to hounds in Cheshire.

The third column, after storming the Kashmir Gate, proceeded through the city towards the Jumma Masjid, conducted in the most gallant manner by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe of the Civil Service, who had volunteered for the duty. For this he was well qualified from local knowledge, and his skilful leading by a circuitous route resulted in but little opposition being met with until the Chandni Chowk was reached and possession obtained of the Kotwali. Then men began to fall fast and it was found impossible to capture the Jumma Masjid as intended, for the column had neither artillery nor any powder with which to blow up the gates of the mosque. Eventually, therefore, Col. Campbell retired leisurely, and in order, to the neighbourhood of the church and joined what was left of the Reserve. The Kumaon Battalion was placed in Skinner's House, where headquarters were formed, the 52nd L.I. at the church and the 1st Punjab Infantry in houses near the church.

All that night the column was engaged with the mutineers under a heavy fire. Next morning, and daily up to the final capture of the city on the 20th September, the Kumaon Battalion was employed with three companies of the 60th Rifles in mining houses and in general operations within the walls. On the last day a portion of it joined the rush of the 60th into the Moghul Palace, after its great gate had been blown in. The next morning headquarters was transferred to the palace, which was held by the 60th Rifles and the Kumaon Battalion.

From the 1st August to 30th September, 1857, with an effective strength on 11th September of 312, the number of killed and wounded in the latter unit amounted to :

Killed : 1 British officer (Lieut. J. H. Browne) and twenty Gurkha ranks.

Wounded : 2 British officers (Capt. H. Boisragon, Lieut. A. B. Temple), 3 Gurkha officers and thirty-three other ranks.

In early October, 1857, a column, under Brigadier Showers, left

Delhi and marched westward as far as the edge of the Bikanir desert, capturing leading rebels. The column was formed of the Kumaon Battalion and the 1st Punjab Infantry, with detachments of Hodson's Horse and the Guides Cavalry. There was no organised resistance and, after a short period, the little force returned to Delhi. For the next year the battalion was constantly employed in various columns marching about the country to re-establish law and order. There was very little fighting, but all rebel forces that did not at once surrender were summarily dealt with.

Directly after the rainy season in 1858, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Clyde, commenced his very skilfully planned measures for driving the mutineers and rebels from the province of Oudh. In October of that year the Kumaon Battalion, having escorted the Crown jewels from Delhi to Cawnpore, crossed the Ganges and joined the Chief's army at Lucknow. It was there employed in the Bahraich district of Oudh. Against the ancient city of the same name Lord Clyde himself, with his headquarters column, advanced on the 15th December. The place was held by the Nana Sahib and the Begum of Oudh, but on the Chief's arrival the bulk of the enemy disappeared.

It had been Lord Clyde's intention all along—as reported by him to the Duke of Cambridge on the 2nd of October—in the second part of his campaign in this quarter, to drive the enemy into the kingdom of Nepal, where, as he writes, “they would be captured, or perish in the malarious belt at the foot of the mountains.” But, subsequently, permission was given to the British forces by the Nepal Government to follow the rebels into the territory of Nepal. Accordingly, early in February, 1859, Brigadier Horsford crossed the Rapti River with a small force which included the 1st Punjab Cavalry, Kumaon Battalion and 5th Punjab Infantry. The enemy made a stand at Sitka Ghat, but were defeated with heavy losses, including fifteen guns. The battalion remained in Oudh until the month of June following, but there was no more fighting and the next month (July, 1859) it returned to Almora.

Captain Robert A. Ramsay, who commanded the battalion during the march from 'Pindi to the Ridge, throughout the siege and in the final assault on the Delhi citadel, was thanked in Government despatches.

G.O.C.C. 497 of 1858 reads :

“In acknowledgment of the distinguished services of the Kumaon Battalion during the late Mutiny and outbreak of the native troops, the Right Honorable the Governor-General is pleased to sanction the appointment of one colour havildar per company in that corps. His Lordship is

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also pleased to admit the undermentioned native officers of the corps to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit for gallantry and exemplary conduct :

Subadar Parsaram
Jemadar Kirparam

The following promotions are also gazetted :

Havildar Sibu Sing to be Jemadar from 14th Sept., 1857, and further to be Subadar from 1st May, 1861, for distinguished conduct at the storm of Delhi.

Sepoy Rahi Sing to be Naick for gallantry in action on 8th October, 1857."

This finishes the very creditable part the Kumaon Battalion played in the great revolt—a revolt which, at one time, threatened to overthrow entirely British supremacy in Northern India and undo the work of a hundred years. Amongst the many fighting classes that maintained, or enhanced, their former reputation for loyalty, bravery, endurance and grit, no troops surpassed the Gurkhas. To the Sirmoor Battalion belongs the distinction of being the first Indian unit in the field, and the first to pull a trigger against the mutineers. This battalion was also the only Indian regiment present at the battle of Badli-ke-Sarai on the 8th of June, 1857. To this splendid corps, with its gallant and resourceful commander (Major C. Reid), was given the post of honour on the Ridge, namely, the defence of the main picquet on the British right (Hindu Rao's House), from which it was never once relieved during the whole siege. With the assistance of the 60th Rifles, the Guides Corps and other infantry detachments, it sustained and defeated twenty-six separate attacks on the Ridge and moreover made two assaults on the enemy's position at Kishanganj. Inclusive of the final assault on 14th September, this battalion's losses totalled 327 of all ranks, out of the 490 with which it entered the siege. Eight British officers out of nine were killed or wounded. For a period of three months and eight days the Sirmoor Battalion was under fire morning, noon and night.

Then there were the Gurkhas in the Nepalese army. Just as on the outbreak of the Great War in August, 1914, the present Prime Minister of Nepal placed the whole military resources of his country at the disposal of the British Government, so in 1857 a predecessor, the all-powerful chieftain Jung Bahadur, did exactly the same.

In 1857, after a slight hesitation, 3,000 men were accepted, who entered British territory at the end of June and occupied Gorakhpore, and then Jaunpore. While this force was under instruction in our methods of drill, etc., information was received of a strong gathering of mutineers fifty miles away and threatening Azimgarh. Col. Shamsher Sing's battalion was sent off at once, covered the distance

in a day and a half, attacked the enemy's position at the double, drove out his far superior force and captured three guns.

A month later (October, 1857) the Gurkhas proved their worth again at Chanda, when a column of eleven hundred men attacked and dislodged a force of five thousand rebels posted in a strong and well-chosen position and aided by very efficient artillery. Nearly all the enemy's guns and ammunition were captured, while deeds of heroism occurred all over the field. Lieut. Gumbhir Sing of the Shere battalion rushed on seven of the rebels defending a gun, cut down five and wounded the remainder with his own hand, himself receiving eight sword cuts.

Further successful actions were reported during November, until the Gurkhas had established a great reputation for marching and fighting. By this time Lord Canning, the Governor-General, felt so great a confidence in Jung Bahadar, that he arranged with him that he should lead a force into the disaffected districts and, having cleared them of rebels, march into Oudh and co-operate with Sir Colin Campbell in his attack on Lucknow.

On the 21st of December, 1857, Jung Bahadar reached the British frontier from Nepal with a force of 10,000 Gurkhas, composed of fourteen battalions of infantry and four artillery batteries of six guns apiece. These troops specially distinguished themselves in various actions and then entered the province of Oudh *en route* to Lucknow. In the final stages of the city's capture, our gallant allies gave most valuable assistance. On the morning of the 17th of March, 1858, the Gurkha force occupied the Char Bagh and Cawnpore road, being fiercely attacked by the enemy, in great strength, the same afternoon. The Maharajah, grasping the situation at once, himself gave directions to turn the rebels' flank, which resulted in a complete victory, with the capture of ten guns and all the wagons of a light field battery.

But, long before this, the gallant conduct of the men from Nepal had dispelled entirely any prejudice that may have existed formerly in the minds of British officers and other ranks against these tough little mountain warriors. It was perhaps not unreasonable that the opening horrors of the great Mutiny, with the constant and harrowing tales of treachery, cruelty, faithlessness and hatred, should have caused British soldiers of all grades to distrust any inhabitants of India, or India's borders. For example, the first Indian corp (The Sirmoor Battalion, now 2nd King Edward's Own Gurkhas) engaged in the Mutiny were very pleased on joining Sir H. Barnard's British troops at Alipore on the 7th of June, 1857, to find their tents pitched ready for them on the left of the force and alongside the

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artillery. But their complaisance would have been tempered with vexation had they known then—as they learnt later—that the site was specially selected for them with the view of the artillery blotting them out on the slightest sign of mutiny. It is pleasing to add that this suspicion lasted less than thirty-two hours. Next day came the battle of Badli-ke-Serai, the occupation of the famous Ridge in front of Delhi, the defeat of an attack on its southern end by the Sirmoor Battalion, and the selection of these Gurkhas to hold the post of honour (Hindu Rao's House) on our right flank. When the little men came into camp at 5 p.m. that evening, having fought two actions and been sixteen hours under arms, the soldiers of all the British units formed up to cheer them in. All doubts as to their loyalty were at an end ; distrust had given way to friendliness and admiration.

CHAPTER VII

THE BHUTAN WAR AND LATER

FROM July 1859 to October 1863, as already stated, the battalion remained at Almora. In 1860 it received its fifth designation, reverting to its name at birth, namely, "The Kumaon Battalion."

In 1861 a reorganisation of the army in Bengal was found necessary to produce some kind of order in the confused mass of regiments, old and new, regular and irregular, left after the embers of the Mutiny had disappeared.

In the new order, the original Nasiri Battalion (then the 66th Light Infantry) became the 11th Regiment; the Sirmoor Battalion, the 17th Regiment, and the Kumaon Battalion the 18th Regiment, of Bengal Native Infantry.

But this lasted only six months, for the Secretary of State intervened; the arrangement was altered, and all the Gurkha corps were withdrawn from the line and numbered separately from the 1st to the 5th, the last two being born in the years 1857 and 1858, respectively.

In Chapter V mention has been made of a projected move of the Kumaon Battalion to Dehra, frustrated by the issue of the famous Charter. Headquarters and half of the unit did, indeed, as mentioned, move from Almora in October 1863, and the whole battalion found itself in temporary huts in Roorkee until 7th September, 1864, when it proceeded on active service for the Bhutan campaign.

Bhutan is a small independent State, extending for about 190 miles east and west along the southern boundary of Tibet, and touching the northern borders of Bengal and Assam. It has a population of Buddhists and Hindus estimated at 350,000. It cannot boast of a Resident or a Political Agent, its relations with the Government of India being regulated by treaties concluded in the years 1865 and 1910.

Long before the year 1864 the Bhutias had been guilty of continual raids into British territory, culminating in so gross an insult to a British Mission that the Governor-General had no option but to declare war in November 1864.

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Four columns were detailed with separate and distinct objectives. We are only concerned with the left centre column under Lieut.-Col. Watson, which moved from Cooch Behar late in November against the fort of Baksa and the Bala Pass and was composed as follows :

Half No. 5 Battery (mountain guns).

Half No. 6 Battery (mortars).

One Company Sappers and Miners.

The 3rd Gurkhas.

Wing of 11th Native Infantry.

There was but little opposition, the fort of Baksa being occupied on the 6th December. For the successful storming of the stockade the day before Lieut. Rowcroft, in command of the party, and Subadar Kirthi Sing were thanked in the C.-in-C.'s despatches ; and No. 437, Sepoy Baktbir Karki was given the Third Class Order of Merit. Major Sanders, who had succeeded Ramsay in command, was also mentioned for his able conduct of the operations after the stockade had fallen. On the 21st December, the Bala Pass was forced and the Tazagong position captured. As a matter of fact, each column had secured its objective by the end of the first week of January 1865. The expedition having apparently fulfilled its mission, orders were actually issued for the demobilisation of the field force, when, as so often occurs in war, the unexpected happened.

Although for many days warnings had been active that the Bhutias were not yet done with, no notice was taken, and during the last week of January all our posts were attacked in great strength and with much persistency. The 3rd Gurkhas repulsed the enemy's attempt on Baksa without difficulty. The other attacks were also driven back with more or less trouble, except that on the right column at Dewahgiri. This post was so hard pressed that the officer commanding decided to withdraw before daybreak on the 5th February, 1865. The attempt to retreat ended in a very disastrous affair. The main column lost its way in the darkness and a panic set in. The result was the loss of the guns (thrown down a ravine), all the baggage, and the abandonment of some of the wounded.

Reinforcements in the shape of two British battalions (55th and 80th Foot), a company of Sappers and Miners and three native infantry units, were hurried up and, by the first week in April 1865 the war was practically concluded, except that the lost guns had not been surrendered. There was a good deal of delay over this. It took months of negotiations and an advance well into Bhutan by a special column before peace was finally signed in the spring of 1866, and the troops free to return to quarters.

This was a dull and uninteresting campaign in a country of

pestilential swamps and hills heavily timbered. Fighting was very difficult indeed and the absence of roads made movements of even small bodies of troops very hazardous. The 3rd Gurkhas were indeed occasionally engaged, but were nearly always split up into detachments. Only at the final expulsion of the Bhutias from their stockades in the vicinity of Baksa on the 23rd March, 1865, did the battalion act together as a unit. The fighting could not be called heavy, but there was considerable hardship and much sickness. Parties of men were employed for months in clearing jungle and making roads, so that, from constant exposure to the wet and lack of proper food, scurvy broke out among them, with the result that at one time over 250 rank and file were sick in hospital.

As for Delhi, a medal with clasp was granted for the Bhutan ¹ campaign to all troops actively engaged with the enemy. During the operations Lieuts. Gregory, Morrison and Kingscote with twenty other ranks were wounded.

All ranks were filled with joy when, on the 23rd of April, 1866, their eyes fell once more on the little Almora spur, a feature clearly visible from the fir-covered ridge of Peora, nine miles distant by the bridle path. Amongst the "doing duty" officers was Lieut. Edwin Venour, who had just been mentioned in Bhutan despatches for good work when in charge of the skirmishers in an affair at the Bala Pass on the 4th of February, 1866. This officer was "off and on" with the 3rd Gurkhas for a period of seven years, having been appointed a "doing duty" officer first in 1861. Two and a half years later he was transferred, only to be reappointed nine months afterwards and kept with the battalion until July 1868, when his final transfer took place. But the charms of the district had eaten into his soul, for when he retired in the "'eighties" he settled down at Dinapani, between Almora and Binsar. There he died, a Lieut.-General, in the year 1894.

For five years after the return from Bhutan the 3rd Gurkhas were left in peace at Almora. A little musketry, a still smaller amount of drill and a general hustling up for the annual inspection, was the routine year by year. When, however, Lord Napier of Magdala became Commander-in-Chief in the year 1870 he took steps to dig out, for more strenuous training, the units quartered in isolated stations. Thus it was that in the cold weathers of 1871-72 and 1875-76 the battalion marched on both occasions to the vicinity of Delhi for a camp of exercise. At the latter camp the opportunity was seized to form a brigade of rifles in the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division. The three battalions on this occasion were the 4th Rifle Brigade and

¹ G.G.O. No. 86 of 1870.

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3rd and 4th Gurkhas. During the camp H.R.H. the Prince of Wales (the late King Edward) inspected the troops at a magnificent review held on the 12th January, 1876.

The tiger shooting for the Prince of Wales took place in the Kumaon Terai under the direction of the Commissioner of Kumaon and was very successful. The escort for H.R.H. was provided by the 3rd Gurkhas. Originally, headquarters and a wing were detailed ; but, as this was found to be unnecessarily large, it was soon reduced to seventy rifles and the band, under the command of Capt. G. C. Gregory.

December of the same year found the battalion on the march to Delhi again, to take part in the Imperial assemblage held there on the 1st January, 1877, to proclaim Queen Victoria Empress of India. A brigade of " Riflemen " was again formed, the units being the 2/60th and 2nd and 3rd Gurkhas.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

FOR some years before 1878 relations between the Indian Government and Sher Ali, the Amir of Afghanistan, had been very strained. This son of Dost Mohamed had shown the grossest ingratitude and the most unreasonable hostility to the British, although to their gifts of arms and money he mainly owed his throne. He showed an active ill-will and open discourtesy on every occasion, going so far as to instil in his people a religious hatred against the English and also to incite them to favour a war against the Indian Empire. This state of affairs culminated in 1878 by, firstly, his formal and public reception in Kabul of a Russian embassy—although we were on the verge of war with that country over Turkish complications—and, secondly, by ignominiously repulsing at Ali Musjid a British envoy ¹ of high rank (while the Russians were still at his capital) and of whose advent he had received formal and timely notice from the Governor-General.

This was too much. Unwilling as we were to engage in the hazardous enterprise of a campaign against Afghanistan, there was no other course possible than to demand reparation ; with an ultimatum that, if not conceded, war would be declared and a British force would cross his frontier on the 20th of November, 1878. As there was no reply, war was duly declared, and, the interval having given time for preparations, promptly begun.

The troops detailed for what came to be called later the “ First Kabul Campaign ” were divided into three separate forces as below :

1. *Peshawar Valley Field Force*, under Lieut.-Gen. Sir Sam Browne.
2. *Kuram Column*, under Major-General F. S. Roberts.
3. *Kandahar Column*, composed of two divisions, of which the *First* was assembled at Multan under Lieut.-Gen. D. M. Stewart and the *Second* at Quetta under Major-Gen. A. M. S. Biddulph ; the whole for operations against the southern portion of the Amir's dominions.

To the 2nd Brigade of the First Division of this Kandahar Column,

¹ General Sir Neville B. Chamberlain.

together with the 59th Foot and the 1st Gurkhas, was posted the 3rd Gurkhas commanded by Col. A. Paterson. This 2nd Brigade was under Brigadier R. J. Hughes of the 63rd Foot. The battalion left Almora on the 12th October and reached Mittankote, trans Indus, by road, rail and steamer, on the 26th November, 1878.

Then came a very trying march of some 200 miles, by wings, to Dadar, across the Dera Boogti desert, with a supply column of 500 camels allotted to each wing. The route to Dadar (now a station beyond Sibi on the North Western railway and just short of the Bolan Pass) did not then boast of any roads, only a track over the waterless "pat" (desert sand), varied by diversions along dry stony nullahs and so-called water-courses. The day's march was determined, not by distance, but by the existence of water at the camping site, often necessitating a very long tramp, sometimes as much as thirty miles.

The headquarters of the First Division reached Quetta on the 8th December, from which date Lieut.-General Stewart assumed command of all the troops detailed for these operations as G.O.C. "Southern Afghanistan Field Force." From Dadar the 3rd Gurkhas, still moving by wings, escorted the 5/11th and 6/11th R.A., with forty pounder "Armstrongs," through the Bolan Pass and via the Ghwaja Pass, over the Khoja Amran range, to Kandahar. Owing to the rough nature of the stony tracks, the gun bullocks broke down from the severe strain, while their bleeding hoofs were so sore they could do no pulling. It was then a case of man-handling. March after march, men of the 59th Foot, 60th Rifles (lent from the 1st Infantry Brigade) and 3rd Gurkhas dragged these heavy guns over rock and sand, through water and shingle, along cliffs and precipices and up considerable ascents. One march of twenty-two miles, from Doyan to Siriab, occupied twenty hours, the detachments starting at 7.30 a.m. one morning, and not arriving in camp until 3.30 a.m. the following day.

From Kandahar the battalion proceeded further afield to Kalat-i-Ghilzai and, after experiencing heavy snow there, on the 4th February, 1879, headquarters and left wing returned to Kandahar by the almost unknown track through the Arghasan Valley, in mid-winter. There was much privation from exposure to deep snow and lack of food, owing to transport difficulties. But the men pulled through somehow. The right half battalion left Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the 22nd of February and by the 2nd March the united wings were together again in Kandahar. The total distance marched by the 3rd Gurkhas from Mittankote to Kalat-i-Ghilzai and back to Kandahar was over 630 miles. With the exception of a few small cavalry skirmishes there was no opposition. Early in March 1879 the second

division was broken up, a large number of the troops returning to India under General Biddulph. Nothing of much importance occurred in Southern Afghanistan during the remaining period of this first phase of the war.

On the 21st of February, 1879, the Amir Sher Ali died and was succeeded by his son Yakub Khan, who, soon after his accession, notified his willingness to open negotiations. A meeting between him and the British authorities took place at Gandamak, where a treaty was concluded on the 26th of May.

The Kandahar force under Sir Donald Stewart was ordered to stand fast, although other troops were withdrawn to India. The 3rd Gurkhas were moved into an adjacent village in May and found some respite from the heat by building a thatched "lean-to" against every high mud wall available. In June the men suffered from an epidemic of fever and in July lost forty-two men from cholera. In August the battalion was ordered to return to India, the headquarters and right wing marching off on the 1st and reaching Quetta on the 16th. Accompanying them were their old friends the guns of the 5/11th R.A. The men were in high spirits, for had they not received, through the Commander-in-Chief, the thanks of both Houses of Parliament ; ¹ were they not to receive a special Afghan medal ; had they not been granted six months' batta, ² and were they not on their way back to Almora ?

Alas ! for the slip between the cup and the lip. The left wing had only got three marches from Kandahar when Cavignari was killed, and they were at once ordered to return. The right wing was kept immobile in Quetta nearly three months for lack of transport, eventually reaching Kandahar again on the 21st of November, with £140,000 worth of treasure.

In September Sir Donald Stewart was ordered to demonstrate towards Gazni, and for this purpose deputed Brigadier R. J. Hughes to command a small column of six guns, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, half the 59th Foot, left wing 3rd Gurkhas and the 29th Bombay Native Infantry. Marching from Kandahar on the 23rd September, Kalat-i-Ghilzai was reached without opposition, and Brigadier Hughes advanced another three marches to Tazi, where he remained three weeks. Towards the end of October, having heard that the Taraki Ghilzais were assembling at Shahjui to attack his camp, he sent forward a detachment under Col. Kennedy on the 24th October to surprise the enemy. This was a very smart little affair and entirely successful, the tribal chief and forty-one of his men being left dead on the ground. The 3rd Gurkha wing acted as a reserve. Two days

¹ G.G.O. No. 1085 of 1879.

² G.G.O. No. 804 of 1879.

later Brigadier Hughes returned to Kalat-i-Ghilzai and, leaving a garrison there, arrived at Kandahar with his main body on the 2nd of November. For the rest of the winter there was no more trouble in the neighbourhood of that city, but there was a good deal of excitement in the north-west due to constant reports that the late Amir's brother, Ayub Khan, was advancing on Kandahar from Herat.

On the 1st of December, 1879, Col. A. Paterson retired and was succeeded in the command of the 3rd Gurkhas by Lieut.-Col. H. H. Lyster, V.C., an officer who joined the battalion as a Captain in 1863 from the late 72nd Native Infantry ; won his Victoria Cross in the Mutiny in 1858 and was subsequently the hero of the Battle of Ahmad Khel in Afghanistan on the 19th of April, 1880.

The New Year found Kabul quite quiet, the main interest on all sides being political, that is to say, who was going to rule in Afghanistan. The question of the general pacification of the country and our eventual withdrawal had to be considered. As part of the plan to achieve these objects, Sir Donald Stewart was ordered to move up from Kandahar to Ghazni, and Bombay troops were detailed to replace his men. The force—now designated " Ghazni Field Force "—started on the 29th March and for three weeks met with no opposition. On the morning of the 19th April, however, the Afghans were discovered in great force, both in advance of the head of the column and also in occupation of a ridge to the left of the road at Ahmad Khel, twenty-three miles short of Ghazni.

Sir Donald determined at once to attack and disposed his force as follows :

In the centre, a horse and field battery with their escort of one squadron 19th Bengal Lancers and one company 19th Native Infantry.

On the right, 19th Bengal Lancers less 2½ squadrons, 1st Punjab and 2nd Punjab Cavalry.

On the left of the guns, Brigadier Hughes' brigade, the 59th Foot, 2nd Sikh Infantry and 3rd Gurkhas in that order from right to left, with one troop 19th Bengal Lancers.

On the extreme left and echeloned in rear, one heavy battery ; and, at the commencement of the action, as a reinforcement, one squadron 19th Bengal Lancers.

In reserve, two companies of sappers, a troop of 19th Bengal Lancers, one company 2/60th Rifles and eight companies of the 19th and 25th Native Infantry.

On the road in the rear, were the hospital, ordnance and baggage trains, with half of Brigadier Barter's brigade in front of the baggage and half in rear.

At 9 a.m. our guns came into action and almost immediately

large masses of gladi Med Afghans, sword in hand rushed furiously from their position down the hill slopes and against the line of British infantry. At the same time a very strong body of horsemen enveloping the British left poured down two or three inclines in the foot of the hill, crumpled up the squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers before it had any time to get up sufficient pace to meet the shock. So powerful was the weight and impetus of the charge, which took place immediately in front of the 1st Gurkhas, that friend and foe, inextricably mixed, fighting, shouting and cursing, were hurled pell-mell into the line of Gurkha skirmishers, and some of our cavalry even further, for they were pushed back on to the knoll occupied by Sir Donald and his staff. Nor could they be rallied until they had passed to the rear of the right of the line of infantry, which was itself hard pressed and beginning to give way.

It was a most critical moment—a crisis when inaction or a false move, meant inevitable disaster. Not for one second did Col. Lyster lose his head. Taking in the hazardous situation at a glance, he roared out to his men :

*"Form company squares, first line, in the centre line, double rank!"*¹

It was a consummate inspiration. A real and most opportune brain-wave, presenting, as it did, a solid front to the fanatical horsemen; providing spaces through which the heaving mass of sowars and tribesmen could pass, and, finally, preserving for the Gurkhas an adequate field of fire against either the railways of the mounted enemy or the swords of his charging foot soldiers. Indeed in any direction. It is not a bit too much to say that it saved the day.

The effect of the concentrated fire was terrible. Men and horses rolled over together in the wildest confusion. But our cavalry, having freedom of movement, extricated themselves from their foes, and fell upon the leading Afghan horsemen to such good purpose that eventually the latter were driven back through the squares.

Quickly as Col. Lyster's order was carried out, still quicker was the onslaught of the enemy's footmen towards the artillery in the British centre. Indeed, so rapid was their advance and so desperate their courage, that they actually reached to within a few yards of the guns. Such a foe was this, impervious even to case shot. To make things worse, the British infantry on the right had been forced back.

¹ Mohammedan anti-infidel fanatic, the bravest and most terrible of our Eastern antagonists, being absolutely fearless, scornful of death and desirous only of the blood of the infidel.

² A now obsolete drill movement, formerly practised for defence against cavalry.

The situation at one time looked really ominous. Both flanks had been turned ; the whole of the reserves were in the front line ; the batteries had expended all their ammunition and had been compelled to withdraw a couple of hundred yards. Would the enemy's swordsmen still press on, or had they shot their bolt ? What does the chronicler say ?

" The enemy's advance on the British left was now effectually checked and turned back by the deadly fire of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment. The 2nd Sikh Infantry, in the centre, still maintained their position with unswerving steadiness. On the right the enemy were charged and pushed back by the 19th Bengal Lancers and the 2nd Punjab Cavalry. All along the line the attack began to slacken. In a few minutes it ceased, and as part of Barter's Brigade came up, the Afghans began to fall back ; soon the retirement became a rout, and the masses of the enemy, flying in all directions, were dispersed over the country. Of the 15,000 they brought into action upwards of a thousand were left dead on the field, and the total loss could not have been less than three times that number. Our own losses amounted to seventeen killed and one hundred and twenty-five (including nine British officers) wounded."

Sir Donald Stewart, in a letter to Government, referred to the resolute firmness with which the 3rd Gurkhas and 2nd Sikhs held the key of the position under Brigadier Hughes' direction when the right of the line was pushed back.¹

After a rest of two hours the march was resumed and Ghazni reached on the 21st of April. The next day the battalion was again engaged in the action of Arzu, six miles south-east of Ghazni, undertaken to dislodge a large body of the enemy who had taken post there and in the village of Shalez. This was principally an artillery engagement, the affair being all over in less than an hour, although the Afghan losses amounted to four hundred. Our casualties were only ten.

From Kalat-i-Ghilzai, rather less than half way from Kandahar to Ghazni, all the villages were found entirely deserted and supplies were a matter of great difficulty. So much so, that the men got very inadequate rations, especially considering the fighting, foraging, marching and picquetting they had to undertake.

On the 25th April Sir Donald Stewart got into touch with General Ross' division of Sir F. Roberts' force. He then handed over the command of Ghazni Field Force to Brigadier Hughes, left for Kabul and, arriving there on the 2nd May, assumed supreme command of the forces in Northern Afghanistan. The Ghazni Field Force now became the Third Division of the Kabul Field Force and moved into the fertile Logar Valley, where supplies were much more plentiful.

¹ G.G.O. No. 326, dated 28th May, 1880.

On the 16th May Major-General J. Hills, V.C., took over the command.

As soon as Sir Frederick Roberts' force had started on its memorable march for Kandahar, in August 1880, the remaining troops in Kabul commenced to withdraw. The 3rd Gurkhas marched with Sir Donald Stewart's command, via Jalalabad, through the Khaiber Pass to Peshawar, crossing the frontier on the 9th of September, 1880. This was a most trying undertaking owing to the extreme heat.

The good conduct of the men of the 3rd Gurkhas during a campaign of twenty-one months in an enemy's country was remarkable. There was an entire absence of crime or any outrage against the inhabitants. Only three courts martial were held during the whole period.

On the 11th of December, 1879, Capt. E. B. Bishop was attached for duty to the 3rd Gurkhas from the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, but at the time was superintendent of army signalling with the Kandahar Force and military correspondent for the *Times*. These appointments he had received when aide-de-camp to General Sir Charles Palliser, commanding the cavalry brigade of Sir M. Biddulph's force.

His transfer from cavalry to infantry was necessitated by a bad accident, resulting in concussion of the spine, received while on scouting duty at the beginning of the Jowaki campaign (1877). This made really hard riding unbearable. For this reason Capt. Bishop specialised in signalling while on sick leave in England, just before the Afghan War, in the hope of it assisting him to obtain staff employment.

When hostilities with Afghanistan broke out Bishop rejoined immediately and on board ship met someone who offered to introduce him, at Karachi, to a Mr. Mause, inventor of a miniature helio. Mr. Mause was duly interviewed, was much pleased, and presented Bishop with a pair of his instruments. These were taken up to Sir Michael Biddulph's Command, then in the Bolan Pass, and were actually the only helios in the force.

Now Sir Michael was doing all he could to get in touch with Sir Donald Stewart, but was for some time unsuccessful. Meanwhile the Afghans were massing in front. Soon after Capt. Bishop's arrival he set off one day by himself to an adjoining hill top and flashed a small pocket mirror in every direction. Suddenly to his joy he observed a very small answering flash in the far distance. Rushing down to his tent he brought up one of his little helios, got on to the light and signalled "Who are you?" Back flashed the answer, "Sir Donald Stewart."

The relief and utter astonishment of the staff on getting the news

beggars description. Capt. Bishop received much kudos, and at the end of the war a brevet majority.

This officer's attachment was eventually made permanent and, later on, he commanded the battalion with great distinction, for seven years, from April 1887.

For services in Afghanistan, Colonel Lyster was appointed a Companion of the Bath, Capt. Bishop received a Brevet Majority and Subadar Chamu Khattri was admitted to the Order of British India, second class, with the title of "Bahadar." A clasp "Ahmad Khel" ¹ was given with the Afghan medal, and a second grant of six months' batta was made to all ranks.²

The battalion was halted a short time at Peshawar in September 1880 and then marched to Lahore via Kohat and Jhelum, arriving on the 28th October. It then took part in the Lahore Durbar in the following month, forming a portion of the escort to the Marquess of Ripon, Viceroy and Governor-General. On the 30th of November the unit was railed as far as Moradabad, whence it proceeded by route-march to Almora, where it arrived on the 16th December, 1880, after an absence of over two years.

¹ G.G.O. No. 418 of 1881.

² G.G.O. No. 434 of 1880.

CHAPTER IX

1881—1887, INCLUDING THE THIRD BURMESE WAR

THE next few years after the second Afghan war were uneventful for the 3rd Gurkhas. At the close of 1881 the buildings in Fort Moira were made over to the battalion for the accommodation of 200 additional Gurkhas, as already stated in Chapter V. It was during the hot weather and rains of 1882 that the men were employed in carrying stone and earth for the masonry of the new barracks in the fort.

In the winters of 1882-83 and 1883-4, the battalion marched to Meerut and back to take part in camps of exercise, directed by Lieut.-General Sir R. O. Bright, K.C.B., on the first occasion, and H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught on the second. The Duke seems to have been quite satisfied with the unit, for on the 22nd June, 1884, he used the following words when writing to Col. Lyster from Mussoorie :

“ I was very much pleased with the 3rd Gurkhas, whose smartness and efficiency reflect the greatest credit on their Commanding Officer, etc., etc.”

On the 24th December, 1885, Col. H. H. Lyster, V.C., C.B., vacated the command and was succeeded by Lieut.-Col. R. E. K. Money. Shortly afterwards there was some trouble in Almora, not a very pleasing episode, but still one that should be recorded in a regimental history, however briefly, on account of the consequences that followed in its wake.

In those days, as in the whole Indian Army, the Gurkha ranks provided their own rations and were granted a monthly allowance for “dearness of provisions,” based on the difference between the cost of the daily “ration” at a fixed government scale and rate, and the actual cost of the same scale at the current market rate, furnished monthly by the civil authorities. The official forms contained, amongst the pay papers, a declaration, signed by the C.O., to the effect that everything was in order and the men had consumed the class of provision entered in the particulars.

Now Gurkhas are rice eaters and there are two or three qualities of rice, the very best called "basmati," then class one, next class two, etc. It had always been the custom for the men to claim on "basmati," although it was very well known that they never purchased that article but class one, or two, instead.

In the year 1885 the question arose as to whether the above-mentioned declaration ought to be signed. The difficulty was got over by the usual signatures to the rest of the papers, leaving that particular form unsigned.

Either the pay department moved very slowly or they failed to notice the omission, for pay was received and disbursed as usual for some months and then the matter was referred by the district pay people to the accountant general. This resulted in an old order being discovered, under the terms of which the Gurkhas at Almora were not entitled to compensation on rice at all, but on "atta,"¹ a much lower priced commodity. The order only authorised compensation to be drawn on rice by units located south of Benares. It ought to have been rescinded, of course, ages before, but as a matter of fact had not been. Its existence in a much overworked department was sufficient to hold matters up for a considerable period, until the climax came in the spring of 1886, when a monthly allotment of pay arrived without any compensation at all.

The Gurkha ranks were naturally very upset. They did not stop to think about the rights or wrongs of the case. They would not listen to assurances that the matter would be referred, but, feeling they were expected to accept a monthly stipend some three or four rupees less than usual, promptly refused it and would not be comforted. The matter was telegraphed to brigade headquarters at Bareilly. The brigadier (Gordon) came up at once to enquire and holding a parade asked in a loud voice whether any man had a complaint (*nalish*). As he should have said "*arez*" (petition), which the men were waiting for, no man moved and the parade was dismissed.

The men then broke off, but, realising they had missed their chance, got together in groups to discuss the matter. One or two leaders were very prominent and possibly much excited. The brigadier, walking with the officers towards the barracks, noticed the groups, and misinterpreted the situation. Disappointed at getting no satisfaction out of the parade, he was rather nonplussed. Thinking the groups meant mischief he ordered the guard to turn out and told the C.O. and officers that the men were out of hand.

Never was there a greater mistake. Owing to his faulty wording

¹ Flour.

of the usual query in those days at inspections, and over-quick dismissal of the parade, no explanation of the refusal to accept their pay had been possible. The men's desire, after the parade, was simply to discuss the means of how to bring the matter before the brigadier. The latter quite misunderstood ; but he must have been reassured when he saw the men disperse quickly to their barracks after being told to do so by their British and Gurkha officers.

The Brigadier wrote his report. The Commander-in-Chief (Sir Frederick Roberts) decided that Lieut.-Col. Money should be transferred elsewhere, as it was impossible for him, in the circumstances, to remain in command. The Chief (loth as he was to do it to so distinguished an officer) censured Col. Lyster—although then in England on pension—in general orders, and the poor fellow spent years of his retirement trying, unsuccessfully, to get the order rescinded. Col. Money was appointed Commandant of Fort Chunar, where he remained some years. Col. E. Stedman of the 32nd Pioneers was brought in as Commandant from 30th June, 1886, and, so as to give everyone a change of air amid new surroundings, the battalion was ordered to proceed on active service to Burma.

The battalion entrained at Bareilly for Burma on the 17th of July, 1886, but next day cholera broke out amongst the Gurkhas and the unit was detained at Madhupur on the East Indian railway for three weeks, eventually embarking at Calcutta for Rangoon on the 9th of August. The next move was to Prome by rail and on by steamer to Pagan where cholera broke out afresh. The total casualties from the epidemic were twenty-two fighting men and three followers.

A word about the origin of this Burma campaign, officially called "The Third Burmese War, 1885-1889."

King Thebaw ascended the throne in 1879 and trouble commenced immediately. There were the usual acts of aggression on the British boundary, so common a precursor of war on our Indian frontiers. In addition, there were outrages upon British subjects ; injustice to British traders ; and the intrigues of the King with a foreign European power, namely the French, with whom negotiations were actually in progress for the establishment of a bank in Mandalay, with French troops to guard it. Finally, in the year 1885, Thebaw imposed on a British trading concern (Burma and Bombay Trading Company) a fine of ruinous amount, and insolently refused to submit the matter to impartial inquiry. The result was an ultimatum by the British, an evasive reply, and war (30th October, 1885).

Major-General H. N. P. Prendergast, V.C., C.B., was appointed

D

to the command of the field force detailed. This was composed of six batteries of artillery, six companies of sappers, three regiments of British and seven of native infantry and a naval brigade.

With the exception of some stout opposition when Fort Minhla was attacked and captured, there was little resistance to the British advance. On the 28th of November, 1885, Mandalay was reached, the palace occupied, the King made prisoner and deported to India, Upper Burma annexed and the war finished ! At least, everyone thought so, but a bad mistake had been perpetrated, and this error of judgment was the real cause of all the trouble that followed. It is hardly credible, but a fact, that on the disbandment of King Thebaw's army, hundreds of Burmese soldiery were allowed to disperse, *with their arms*, all over the country.

The result can easily be imagined in a land where members of armed robber bands were looked up to and admired. Dacoities and outrages became the order of the day, with increasing frequency. In spite of considerable reinforcements in the winter of 1885-86, and the succeeding spring, matters did not improve. On the 1st of April, 1886, General G. S. White, V.C., replaced Prendergast. Expeditions and various actions took place throughout the summer, with forces still inadequate for the control of so large an area.

The battalion got its fair share of these enterprises at once, and in extremely hot and unpleasant weather. On the 21st August a small expedition under command of Major E. B. Bishop proceeded from Pagan to Popa (Shawdadung). On 4th September a detachment under Lieut. G. H. Loch ¹ marched to Say where the men constructed a fort. That would be dear to the heart of Loch, who always loved building, as witness the 3rd Gurkha mess at Almora ; his complete edifices at Fort Aijal in Assam ; and many another testimony to his architectural skill.

On the 2nd October the battalion marched to Mandalay, and at the end of the month the right wing proceeded eastwards to the North Shan Hills, thence to Thonzai and back to Mandalay by three different routes.

By the autumn of the year 1886 the whole military strength in Burma had been largely augmented and General Sir Herbert Macpherson appointed to the chief command. The field force was reorganised and divided into six brigades and one independent command. Into the first brigade, together with the 7th Cavalry, some sappers, and the 43rd Regiment of Gurkha Light Infantry (now the 8th Gurkhas) came the Almora battalion of the 3rd.

¹ Now Lieut.-Col. G. H. Loch, C.I.E.

The plan of operations was for these brigades to traverse certain districts, the objective in each case being the capture or destruction of the local chiefs, who headed the dacoit bands. Unfortunately, before hostilities commenced, Sir H. Macpherson died of fever near Prome on the 26th of October, 1886. Apart from their concern at the untimely death of so distinguished a soldier, the Government of India were exceedingly troubled as to who to send for the pacification of this turbulent province. Finally, at their special request, Sir Frederick Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief in India, transferred his headquarters to Burma and assumed command of all the troops there.

At the end of October a column from the first brigade composed of a wing of the 3rd Gurkhas, a detachment of Bengal sappers and some Madras Infantry, under Col. Stedman of the 3rd, and designated the "Shan Column," marched for the hills east of Mandalay. A few unimportant skirmishes occurred and the column continued its movements in the hills for some time.

On the 20th November a small force under Capt. Pulley proceeded from Mandalay to Lamaing and on the 25th attacked and captured a strong position at Zibyubin. He himself and six men were wounded and two followers killed. The Brigadier (East) reported very favourably on the conduct of this little affair. About the same time Jemadar Chamu Sing Burathoki, with a small escort working eastwards, explored an unknown passage through the Shan Hills debouching at Yaukintong. He was also commended by the Brigadier for the skilful execution of his mission. Lastly, a detachment under Capt. A. G. F. Browne moved south-westwards to Minbu and did a great deal of dacoit hunting.

In January 1887 the Shan column under Col. Stedman got on the move once more, assembling at Hlaingdet for this purpose. The troops comprised artillery, some of the Hampshire Regiment and the 3rd Gurkhas from the first brigade, who had embarked at Mandalay on the 22nd of December and marched from Myingyan to Hlaingdet. This column marched into the Shan States, but, with the exception of the capture of a strongly stockaded position near Hayho, little opposition was experienced, and no fighting. On the eastern shore of Lake Nyaungwai was erected Fort Stedman, named after the column commander.

The troops returned from the Shan States by various routes, the 3rd Gurkhas finishing up at the railway terminus of Toungoo on the Irrawaddy River, whence they railed for Rangoon, embarked for Calcutta on the 25th April and reached Almora on the 12th of May, 1887. Col. Stedman did not accompany the battalion, as he vacated

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the command on the 25th of April on appointment as Inspector-General of Police, Burma, and Lieut.-Col. E. B. Bishop reigned in his stead.

Besides the medal with clasp "Burma, 1885-1887," Col. Stedman was made a Commander of the Bath and both Major Bishop and Capt. Pulley received brevets.

CHAPTER X

RAISING OF THE SECOND BATTALION

IN the winter of the years 1885-1886, very shortly after Sir Frederick Roberts took over the chief command in India (November 1885), Government decided to increase its Gurkha units. Negotiations had already been entered into with the Nepal Durbar, by which they finally agreed to allow greater facilities to our recruiting parties and permit the enlistment of a larger number of their men so as to supply a second battalion to the first five Gurkha regiments. As a *quid pro quo* a goodly sum of money was transferred to Nepal together with a handsome present in the shape of a great number of service rifles.

Definite orders for the immediate raising of these new battalions were issued in February 1886—not to the 3rd Gurkhas, however, as the question of a site for the fresh unit, anywhere close to Almora, was a very complex one, and Sir Frederick had also another idea in his mind. Then came the welcome summons to the battalion for the Burma campaign and matters were still further delayed.

The chief had long held a very high opinion of the soldierly qualities of the hill-men of Garhwal, of which there were some in every Gurkha unit. In the year 1886 when the writer's appointment—which never matured—to the new 2/3rd Gurkhas was under consideration, Sir Frederick Roberts himself told him that the composition of the new battalion would be, in all probability, mainly Garhwalis. He added that he had been looking the matter up and found that, out of the rank and file of Gurkha regiments decorated with the Indian Order of Merit, a very large proportion were men of Garhwal.

So it came to pass that, in April 1887, before the 3rd Gurkhas had returned from Burma, their new second battalion started life in Almora with a nucleus of Garhwali soldiers from every existing Gurkha unit.

The old battalion was naturally upset at this arrangement. Much as Garhwalis were esteemed as a fighting race, it was felt that it would be detrimental to the efficiency of the regiment as a whole to have its two battalions composed of diverse material. Moreover, there

was some doubt as to whether the best classes in Garhwal would enlist freely, and, speaking generally, both the British and Gurkha ranks somewhat resented being made the subject of an experiment.

That there was good reason for the doubt regarding recruiting in Garhwal at that time is borne out by the fact that within three years the C.O. of the second battalion reported he was unable to complete to strength. He asked permission to attain his complement by enlisting Gurkhas. The request was granted, up to a total of two hundred. This officer, who had been appointed to raise the battalion, was Lieut.-Col. E. P. Mainwaring from the 4th Gurkhas. Major L. R. D. Campbell was his second-in-command and Lieut. J. T. Evatt¹ Adjutant, both hailing from the Punjab Frontier Force. The only officer appointed from the old 3rd was Capt. A. G. F. Browne,² who received the vacant wing command. In the autumn of 1887 this second battalion moved to an absolutely new cantonment in Garhwal called Kaladanda, which name was changed a little later to "Lansdowne," after the then Viceroy.

In December 1890 a vacancy for another infantry unit was caused by the decision of the military authorities to reconstitute the 39th Bengal Infantry as a Garhwali battalion. For this purpose the *then* second battalion of the 3rd Gurkhas (at that time serving in Upper Burma) was ordered to hand over its two companies of Gurkhas to a new battalion of that class to be raised to the 3rd Gurkhas and formed at Lansdowne, Col. Mainwaring's unit to be designated the "39th (The Garhwali) Regiment of Bengal Infantry."

There was much heartburning amongst Col. Mainwaring's officers over this momentous change, and no wonder. Not only had they lost the distinction of being designated "Gurkhas" and the advantage of possessing a sister battalion, but they had been given also a number of unenviable repute in the army, owing to an unfortunate happening at the great Delhi march-past of 35,000 troops in a deluge of rain on the 18th of January, 1886. But it would take more than this permanently to dishearten the officers and riflemen of a Garhwal corps. To a new crest designed by their gifted adjutant he gave the motto "Resurgam." Never was there a more prophetic inspiration, for, from the small but brilliant affair under Lieut. D. E. Mocatta in the Chin Hills on the 2nd of April, 1891, to the many famous engagements in the Great War, the battalions of Garhwal have greatly distinguished themselves by steadiness, gallantry and

¹ Now Brigadier-General J. T. Evatt, D.S.O., Colonel, 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.

² Now Lieut.-General Sir Arthur G. F. Browne, K.C.B., D.S.O., Colonel, 4th Prince of Wales's Own Gurkha Rifles.

bravery in all circumstances. Well earned, indeed, is their present title of "18th Royal Garhwal Rifles."

In the month of January, 1891, Major H. D. Hutchinson ¹ and Lieut. Nigel G. Woodyatt, appointed Commandant and Adjutant respectively, left the first battalion 3rd Gurkhas and proceeded to Lansdowne to raise the new second battalion. Major H. S. Wheatley from the 2nd Gurkhas and Capt. E. H. Molesworth from the old 39th Bengal Infantry were the wing commanders.

By the end of the year the unit was at full strength complete and efficient in all respects. So much so, that it attended a camp of exercise at Bareilly in the winter, where it was inspected and complimented by Sir Frederick Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief. As it was desired that the two battalions should be quartered together, the new one, on the conclusion of the Bareilly manœuvres, marched to the Sitoli ridge, opposite Almora, and there commenced to level sites and build barracks. But before much progress had been made a serious epidemic of cholera, causing the death of over forty men, put a stop to all work, and raised the question as to the suitability of the Sitoli site as a permanent location for the battalion.

Committees were held and many opinions given, with the result that Headquarters finally decided to send the unit back to Lansdowne, where it arrived on New Year's Day 1893 and made a fresh start at barrack building. By the beginning of the year 1894 this work was completed and Lansdowne has been the headquarters of the 2/3rd Gurkhas ever since.

The building of their barracks on a hilltop was one of the hardest tasks ever given to an infantry battalion. With a less remarkable organiser than the Commandant (Col. Hutchinson) it is very doubtful whether the work could ever have been successfully completed.

In the first place Lansdowne was miles away from anywhere, was most unpopular with all native artificers and labourers—who were continually bolting away—and extremely cold in the winter months. Secondly, there were no genuine contractors. Simply a few men of straw, who had never built anything except a village shanty, but who, eager to make money, swarmed round the C.O. from the very first with offers of skilled, and unskilled, labour galore. Their promises were seldom, if ever, fulfilled. The majority disappeared after a month or two.

Never was a Commandant better served by his British and Gurkha officers. Day in and day out, not only had they to supervise the work, but also know all about height of walls, mixing of mortar, dimensions

¹ Later Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I., Colonel, 3rd Q.A.O. Gurkhas, died in London 1925.

of beams, joists and other timber, etc.; as well as arranging for quarrying of stone and felling trees in distant forests. True, there was a garrison engineer, but he had no staff, and had all his ordinary duties to perform. He was simply there, as regards the barracks, for preparation of estimates, checking of work completed, and to give advice.

With the exception of such skilled operations as facing stone and squaring timber, etc., the Gurkhas carried out all the manual labour of clearing and levelling sites, mixing mortar, carrying stones to the masons and timber to the carpenters, making roads, plastering walls, etc., etc. The work was very strenuous indeed, but mindful of the ultimate object in view they never faltered. The barracks (at that time *le dernier cri*) came first, but they were not all. There was the parade ground—an enormous problem—the mess, private houses, etc.

Yet, in spite of such excessive and continuous toil, it was a very happy crowd at Lansdowne in the period 1893-94. Perhaps the life and soul of the officers' mess was "Kinger" (the late Major F. A. Kingston) then quartermaster, whose cheery manner and good-humoured chaff endeared him to all ranks.

There was one cloud, and that was the heavy feeling at almost every one's heart, that permanent separation from the first battalion seemed inevitable.

This apparently unavoidable disjunction of the two battalions was felt very deeply by both officers and men. For nearly a year they had been together, had become great friends¹ and had looked forward to a united future. Even now, after almost three and a half decades, the officers deplore this separation, but can advance no proof that they are justified in expecting a consummation of their wishes. Who knows? Let us live in hopes they may still see their desire fulfilled.

¹ Established from the very beginning by Col. Bishop's noble behaviour in the matter of transfers from the old first to the new second battalion. Not only did he give two of his best Subadars (Hanuman Sing Thapa and Bikram Thapa, the former as Subadar-Major), but three good Jemadars, ten Havildars and eighty-two rank and file. He also parted with his pipe-major, a very good performer, and by far his best armourer, Singbir. With 622 recruits obtained quickly from Nepal through the efforts of Capt. Vansittart, the recruiting officer, the new unit was bound to make a good start.

CHAPTER XI

THE YEAR 1888 TO THE YEAR 1896

NITI AND CHITRAL

IN the period which elapsed between the raising of one second battalion in the year 1887, its reorganisation as a Garhwali corps in December 1890, and the formation of the existing second battalion in January 1891, several interesting events concerning the first battalion took place which must be chronicled in their proper order.

In the year 1888 sanction was asked for, and obtained, to form a pipe band of fourteen performers, on the understanding that no expense to the State was incurred and the men were kept efficient as fighting soldiers. There was no difficulty about the last condition (although the actual number was much more than fourteen, being twelve pipers, two big drummers and eight side drummers), because the men soon acquired that particular general competency which seems to be characteristic of all specialised units in a regiment. The performers were sent for six months to a Highland corps and came back with excellent reports and a fair knowledge of marching and the bagpipes. Within a year they were playing out regularly at the Almora Club in conjunction with the band proper.

In January 1889 Subadar Chamu Sing proceeded with fourteen signallers to join the Lushai expeditionary force, and at the conclusion of hostilities the battalion received an extract from the report of the Superintendent Army Signalling, commenting favourably on the good work done by the Subadar and his men. The next year, the signallers were employed in the operations of the Chittagong field force and two men were marked out for mention.

During the year 1889 the civil authorities in Kumaon became alarmed at persistent rumours of a fortified post said to have been constructed on the British side of the Tibetan border near Niti. The reports were apparently given ready credence to—due possibly to the fact that our relations with Tibet at that time were a little strained, and the attitude, in general, adopted by her frontier officials distinctly truculent. In the autumn the Government of India sanctioned an armed reconnaissance towards Niti to ascertain the

truth of the rumour. The party consisted of one hundred rifles from each battalion under Major C. Pulley of the first, the other British officers being Captains Lyster and Rose from Almora and Lieuts. Roberts and Battye from Lansdowne.

A start was made on the 2nd of November and the Barahoti valley reached on the 24th. No Tibetans were encountered. The only sign of fortifications was a wall, at a camping ground near the frontier, which had been thrown up as a protection against the prevailing high and merciless wind. The marches were severe, but the men stood them well, as evinced by the following extract : ¹

“ The Commander-in-Chief would observe that the height of about 18,000 feet reached by the Gurkha detachments in the course of their very severe march over the Mirchauk Pass is worthy of remark as probably being the greatest height ever covered by a body of organised and disciplined troops while on the march ; and His Excellency considers that the able manner in which the reconnaissance was performed reflects much credit on Major Pulley and the officers and men concerned.”

Two year later, to a month, Major Pulley commanded a detachment of the first battalion, consisting of five British, eight Gurkha officers and five hundred other ranks, which proceeded to the Chin-Lushai hills, and received a similar encomium.

The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Roberts, accompanied by Lady Roberts and their daughter Aileen, now Countess Roberts, visited Almora in April 1890 and stayed for three or four days at the Sessions House. Sir Frederick inspected everything, and Lady Roberts evinced much interest in the married families, so much so that owing to the tactful persuasiveness of Lieut.-Col. Bishop, the Commandant, she was instrumental in the families obtaining a special allowance for dearness of provisions.² The Chief was much pleased with all he saw and complimented the unit particularly on its fine figure of merit in the annual musketry course for the season

¹ Quartermaster-General in India, No. 2674 of 4th March, 1890, to the Sec., Government of India, Military Department.

² At this period the pay of a rifleman was only seven rupees a month ; grain was very expensive at Almora, and a married man with two or three children was unable to feed his family properly. To acquire grain cheaper, Col. Bishop had already secured an allotment of forty Government mules, which went down to Haldawani periodically to carry up rice, etc., purchased by special parties of the men. During Lord Roberts' inspection of the lines, and at the instigation of the Subadar-Major (Chamu Sing), the C.O. mentioned this matter, and asked if Lady Roberts would consent to receive a deputation of selected women and children to present a petition on behalf of the 160 Gurkha families. Lady Roberts consented, and the result was a special family allowance to the battalion of 320 rupees a month. This is still continued although no other battalion receives it (Authority, A.G. India, No. 311 of 21st February, 1891). The married families of the 1/3rd, after receipt of this concession, gave to Col. Bishop the sobriquet of “gurib parwa,” i.e. “protector of the poor,” or, poor man's helper.

1888-1889, when, with 803 men exercised, it was fourth in the Indian Army with an average of 161·67.

The date 25th of April, 1894, was a sad one at Almora, for it indicated the vacation of the command of the first battalion by Col. G. B. Bishop. His tenure had been a most memorable one, for his main thought was ever the welfare of his unit and the care and well-being of his Gurkhas. He it was who, in 1887, turned his attention to the composition of the battalion, gradually eliminating extraneous classes and enlisting the best type of men from Nepal. To Col. Bishop the Gurkha officers and rank and file owe a deep debt of gratitude for his unceasing efforts, throughout his command, to raise their standard of living and increase their means and their comfort. To the British officers who served under him he will always be remembered as a very able commanding officer and an absolute "Sahib."

In April 1895 the second battalion experienced its first service outside cantonments, being detailed to form part of the reserve brigade to the Chitral Relief Force.

It reached Mardan on the 15th April, after a night march from the railhead at Nowshera. The Brigadier was Major-General Channer, V.C., C.B., and the other units of the reserve brigade were the 2/1st Gurkhas, 26th Punjab Infantry and No. 7 Mountain Battery. This reserve brigade was not employed. On the 5th of June the battalion moved up to the Malakand, and on the 23rd of August left there for Kila Drosh to become part of the first Chitral garrison, formed there under the unit's own commandant, Lieut.-Col. Hutchinson, who was appointed a temporary Colonel-on-the-Staff.

There was no fighting, to the sore disappointment of all ranks. An additional hardship was particularly bad health during the early part of the sojourn in Chitral. Eighteen men died of malaria ; and one British officer, Lieut. Bliss ("Mother") succumbed to enteric fever at Drosh, deeply regretted by all who knew him. The men were kept very busy, however, in building barracks, messes, quarters, hospitals, etc., and as they received "working pay" for all this, in addition to their ordinary emolument, every Gurkha returned to Lansdowne on the 10th June, 1896, full of rupees.

CHAPTER XII

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER : TIRAH, 1897

A **SHORT** spell of peace on the frontier followed the relief of Chitral, and the acceptance by the tribesmen of the British terms, including an open road up the Swat Valley. But in the summer of the year 1897 it looked as if the whole of the north-west frontier of India, from the Gomal to the Swat, was soon to be ablaze.

In June and July the Waziris had a burst of fanaticism ending in a treacherous attack on the political officers and their escort in the Tochi Valley. Then, north-east, the Mohmands and Swatis rose and fiercely attacked the Malakand post. In August the Orakzais and Afridis, on the frontier between Kohat and Peshawar, although in receipt of handsome subsidies from Government to guard and keep open the Khyber Pass, showed unmistakable signs of ebullition and disquietude. It was no time for hivering ; Government had to act and mobilise its forces for punitive operations. The political reports proved to be quite accurate. On the afternoon of the 23rd of August, while our guns were in action at the mouth of the Khyber Pass, smoke was visible issuing from Fort Maude, which had been captured and set on fire by the Afridis. Within three days the same tribe had occupied the whole of the Khyber Pass and taken possession of the post at Landi Kotal. At the same time reliable information came to hand that the Orakzais were meditating an attack on all our posts on the Samana Range, west of Kohat.

The first battalion received orders at Almora on the 12th of August to proceed to Hoti Mardan—beyond railhead at Nowshera, and the headquarters of the Guides—on ordinary relief scale for garrison duty. Before leaving the station, however, the destination was changed to Peshawar and the scale to “field service.”

Heroic and superhuman efforts by Mr. Gracey, the Deputy Commissioner, and his assistants followed. The unit was actually provided with sufficient coolies, ponies, mules and donkeys to enable it to start for the railway terminus at Katgodam on the 14th. The thirty odd miles of hill paths were completed, and the battalion able to entrain, on the 17th. Owing to furlough, and the impracticability

of recalling Gurkhas from Nepal in the rains, the numbers were short. Lieut.-Col. Pulley, the Commandant, had with him ten British (including four who joined a little later) and twelve Gurkha officers, but only 537 other ranks.

At Katgodam orders were received changing the destination to Kohat. This station was reached, by rail to Kushalgarh and then two stiff marches, on the 22nd August. Then a halt of two or three days and on to Hangu (26 miles), where the battalion joined the "Kurram-Kohat Flying Column" under the command of Col. George Richardson,¹ 18th Bengal Lancers, and comprising the 15th Sikhs, 5th Punjab Infantry, 3rd Gurkhas, some guns and a few sabres. The heat on these severe marches had been so intense that both British officers and Gurkhas suffered considerably, and the question of a suitable head-dress became paramount. The officers' regulation helmet was quite an inadequate protection, and the Cawnpore Tent Club "sola topee" was universally adopted by them at once.

But the matter of head protection for the men was much more difficult. They were wearing their little black "Kilmarnock" caps with a khaki cover, and khaki shade hooked to the cover to shield the neck, but it was not sufficient. The 2nd Gurkhas suffered just as badly. After marching into Kohat on 31st August, thirteen of their men were admitted to hospital, five being bad cases of sunstroke, of whom the armourer-havildar died that night. As regards Gurkhas and pugris, thereby hangs a tale.

In the second Afghan War of 1878-80 the 3rd Gurkhas wore pugris, the 2nd Gurkhas their little caps. The two units happened to meet and the 2nd chaffed the 3rd about their pugris, which are looked on with disdain in Nepal as being the outward sign of a man from the "plains." The 2nd quoted to the 3rd the old Nepalese proverb :

"Topeewar, kamwar, lungiwar, khaniwar."

which being interpreted means :

"He who wears a cap is a worker, and he who wears a pugri an eater."

However, after the Tirah experience the 1/2nd Gurkhas adopted the pugri as a field service head-dress and wore it in 1901 during the Waziristan operations. Although over twenty years had elapsed the old gibe had not been forgotten, and when the 3rd Gurkhas saw the 2nd in their new khaki pugris the former at once threw the old adage

¹ Now Lieut.-General Sir George Richardson, K.C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., Colonel, 19th King George's Own Lancers.

at the latter.¹ All the same the pugri, although extremely unpopular with the men of Gurkha units, is a most serviceable and useful head-dress. The two Gurkha companies of the Guides always wore it and looked remarkably well in it.

On the 2nd of September Col. Richardson's column moved forward from Hangu to Doaba, less the 15th Sikhs under Col. Abbott, who had already proceeded by the same route towards Sadda and Parachinar. This march to Doaba was a forced one of some twenty to twenty-five miles and the men felt its severity and the heat considerably, mainly on account of their little caps and the great scarcity of drinking water. It being necessary to garrison Doaba so as to protect Col. Richardson's line of communications and provide escorts for the supplies passing up from Kohat, the 3rd Gurkhas were ordered to stand fast there; while the column commander, with a few sabres and the 5th Punjab Infantry, pushed on.

All this time the troops in this area were under Major-General Yeatman-Biggs as commander of the "Kurram-Kohat" line. The most vital necessity was to keep the posts on the Samana Range, overlooking Hangu, properly provisioned. For this purpose the General left Hangu at 10 p.m. on the 7th September for Fort Lockhart with a column escorting ammunition and supplies for the three Samana forts, Lockhart, Saragheri and Gulistan. The 3rd Gurkhas at Doaba were ordered to join this column, and retracing their footsteps towards Hangu, arrived at Pat Darband, at the foot of the ascent to the Samana Ridge, at 1 a.m. on the 8th. There they found, in bivouac, the 1st battalion 2nd Gurkhas, some of the 18th Royal Irish and a battery of field artillery. At 6 a.m. the troops (less the artillery) continued their march, with the 3rd told off for advanced and rear guards. After an hour's climb Fort Dhar was reached, held by the 36th Sikhs. Five hours later the column arrived at Fort Lockhart and went into bivouac.

A halt of two days now took place and during this interval a large body of tribesmen, estimated at about ten thousand, was observed wending its way down the Khanki Valley. Early on the 11th of September some companies of the 3rd Gurkhas were ordered to move down the spurs running into this valley and try the effect of long-range volleys on the enemy. The result was not very marked. On returning to bivouac at 3 p.m. the party found orders awaiting them to

¹ Whether for this reason or because the pugri was otherwise found unsatisfactory, the 2nd Gurkhas got permission while in Waziristan to adopt a hat introduced by Lieut. Becher—a Kashmir hat with small pugri, big brim, chin strap, etc., and lined with orange coloured cloth. The 3rd Gurkhas wore a head-cover of a similar pattern. Gurkha units mostly wear something like this on service when not supplied with a pith hat, or a tin helmet.

prepare to load up, as the column was returning to Hangu that evening. It may be remarked here, *en passant*, that up to this time there seems to have been a perfect mania for moving by night, which in an enemy's country on the N.W. Frontier is nothing less than asking for trouble. Up to date there had been little opposition. "Snipers" ¹ had been busy after dark, small detached parties had suffered and baggage columns had been fired on, but no serious fighting had taken place. That was to come later.

About midday at Fort Lockhart on the 11th of September, when the commander had issued orders to return to Hangu via Lakha, the 2nd Punjab Infantry were sent on ahead to occupy the Gogra hill, three miles distant from Fort Lockhart. At 4 p.m. the 2nd Gurkhas followed, and on their arrival at Gogra the 2nd P.I. moved on to Lakha. Four hours later, as the latter unit required support, the 2nd Gurkhas hastened to their assistance, leaving two companies under Capt. Robinson to hold the Gogra hill and then follow as a rear-guard.

The main column left bivouac at 11 p.m., with the left wing of the 3rd Gurkhas, under Capt. V. Ormsby, acting as rear-guard. About midnight, when the 3rd Gurkhas were near the Gogra hill and the 2nd Gurkhas had joined the 2nd P.I. at Lakha, the two latter units heard heavy and continuous firing. Firstly from Gogra, and then nearer and nearer, until Capt. Robinson and his men at 2.30 a.m., and Capt. Ormsby with his wing at 3 a.m., escorting their respective baggage trains, joined the bivouac of the main body at Lakha.

From the two rear-guard commanders' reports it appeared that the enemy had not only assaulted Capt. Robinson at Gogra in force, but made persistent attacks on both rear-guards during the whole march. They were in such numbers, too, that at one time they threatened to cut off Capt. Ormsby's wing from all communication with the main body. Robinson of the 2nd was so hardly pressed that Ormsby detached a company of the 3rd, under Lieut. West, to help him—an act of sound tactical judgment and handsomely acknowledged later by the 2nd Gurkhas with the words "invaluable assistance."

Let us picture the scene from the reports of those present. A running fight in the dark of four hours' duration against a virile tribe like the Orakzais, not only in much superior strength, but also acquainted with every inch of the ground. For the Gurkhas, an unknown road, casualties which could never be abandoned, bolting camels, or camels shot dead. Others breaking away and casting

¹ Individual marksmen, usually firing into camp at long range.

their loads in every direction—Robinson could only bring in twelve camels out of fifty-one—while all the time the darkness, which emboldened the enemy, made it most difficult to distinguish friend from foe. But the Gurkhas, most ably led and encouraged by their British officers, repelled every rush on detached parties carrying the wounded, shot or bayoneted every Orakzai who came too near—in short, defied every attempt of the enemy to surround the rear-guards. Slowly, but surely, the little force retired, the 2nd Gurkhas on the high ground to the right, the 3rd on the road below. The fact that it held its own in the dark, when sorely harassed by superior numbers, with only four killed and nine wounded, is sufficient proof of the steadiness and gallantry of the men.

Col. Pulley, in his battalion's Digest of Services, expresses his indebtedness to Capt. Ormsby for his able conduct of the retirement, and indicates his disappointment that Ormsby's services on this special occasion were not marked by the bestowal of some form of recognition. Subadar Harkbir Gurung, maimed when assisting to succour a wounded rifleman, was awarded the Order of Merit for personal gallantry.

Before reaching Hangu next day (12th September) General Yeatman-Biggs received news that the Orakzais and Afridis had captured Fort Saragheri by creeping up under shelter of the dead ground outside the hornwork and undermining the main wall ; also that they were besieging Fort Gulistan, garrisoned by a wing of the 36th Sikhs, under Major Des Vœux, who had with him his wife, child and European nurse.

The men of Capt. Ormsby's wing of the 3rd Gurkhas were so utterly spent by their ordeal on the night of the 11th-12th September that the march on to Hangu was not resumed until 11 a.m., on the latter date, and completed at 7 p.m. A few hours later orders were received to be in readiness to move back again to the relief of the Samana posts. Taking only the lightest equipment, General Bigg's column started at 10 p.m. on the 13th, and in the early morning of the 14th the advanced troops, composed of Gurkhas, found themselves opposed by the enemy on the Gogra heights, which showed a lavish display of standards. The artillery opened fire to cover the advance of the 2nd and 3rd Gurkhas, who soon cleared the hill at small loss and pushed on to Fort Lockhart, which was reached at 10 a.m.

But the column commander was most apprehensive regarding Fort Gulistan and its gallant garrison. From Fort Lockhart, large masses of tribesmen could be seen on the Saragheri ridge, who retired on being shelled. The G.O.C., taking with him the guns, the 2nd P.I. and all the Gurkhas who were ahead (that is, had descended the

reverse side of the Gogra hill after their victory), hurried on to Major Des Vœux's relief as fast as he could. When the troops approached, the tribesmen surrounding the fort began to disperse down the ravines and nullahs leading to the Khanki Valley, harassed considerably by the shells and bullets of both the relievers and the relieved. A special clasp was given for "Samana."

That night the 2nd and 3rd Gurkhas celebrated together Delhi Day (14th September), sending and receiving friendly messages to and from Sir Charles Reid, Lord Roberts and other old friends. The 2nd remained on at Fort Lockhart for a fortnight, but on the 17th of September the 3rd returned to Doaba.

A lull now occurred in hostilities, while our plans and arrangements were made for an advance into Tirah, the home of the Afridis. This was to take place from Shinawari, as soon as the operations then in hand against the Mohmands, and in Bajour, should be concluded. On the 27th of September the 3rd Gurkhas—less one company detached at Thal since 18th of September and which rejoined headquarters the middle of October—moved from Doaba to Shinawari, where troops, supplies, etc., were being concentrated, and were employed for three weeks in strengthening the entrenched camp and on fatigues, escorts and road-making.

The command of the force detailed for the invasion of Tirah was given to Lieut.-General Sir William Lockhart—the Commander-in-Chief of India elect—and numbered nearly 44,000 fighting men. The arrangement was for the operations to be carried out by three columns, while separate troops held the lines of communication and a mixed brigade was kept in reserve at Rawalpindi. The "main column" was intended for the hard fighting and for the direct advance into Tirah from the Samana Range. It consisted of two weak divisions, composed of two brigades of infantry each, with certain divisional troops, and was under the personal direction of Sir William Lockhart. The other two columns (the Peshawar Column and the Kurram Moveable Column) were to act as supports to the main column and operate as required.

On the 3rd of October the troops which had been operating under Major-General Yeatman-Biggs were incorporated in the Tirah Expeditionary Force and he was given command of the second division of the main column with Kempster and Westmacott as his brigadiers of the third and fourth brigades, respectively. The former's troops were composed of the first battalions of the Gordons, Dorsets and 2nd Gurkhas, also the 15th Sikhs; the latter had the second battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the first battalions of the Northampton and 3rd Gurkhas and the 36th Sikhs.

The road up to the Chagru Kotal ¹ (eight miles from Shinawari) was reported fit for camels by the 15th of October. This was the route to be taken by the main column into the Khanki Valley, before tackling the Sampagha and Arhanga defiles, leading into Tirah itself. But beyond the Kotal was the Chagru-Karappa defile, where road-making was also necessary to prevent delays. As, however, the enemy were occupying the ridges to the west of the Kotal (close to the village of Dargai and completely commanding the defile) it was necessary to clear them out before attempting any road-making to the north of the Kotal.

General Biggs was ill, so Lieut.-General Sir Power Palmer was taken from the lines of communication and directed to occupy the Dargai heights with the third and fourth brigades on the 18th of October. He divided his force into two columns, directing Brigadier Westmacott, with the K.O.S.B.s, 3rd Gurkhas and No. 5 Mountain Battery, to advance by the main road to Chagru Kotal. Brigadier Kempster, with the third brigade, was to turn the right flank of the enemy's position by a mountain track leading in a north-westerly direction and reported fit for laden mules. Such, however, was not the case. After five miles No. 5 Mountain Battery and all mules and chargers were sent back, escorted by the Dorsets and two companies 15th Sikhs.

The "Tiger's" (Brigadier "Dicky" Westmacott's) men left camp at 5 a.m. on the 18th, or half an hour after Kempster's brigade had started. By 8.30 a.m. the Kotal was reached without opposition and a right flank guard, consisting of No. 9 Mountain Battery and the Northhamptons, joined the main body. Under cover of the mountain guns, and supported by the K.O.S.B.s, the 3rd Gurkhas were ordered to attack the Dargai heights, about two thousand yards ahead and now being occupied by the enemy in gradually increasing numbers. The advance was necessarily slow, owing to the nature of the ground, but very steady. The ascending track which was followed allowed of fair cover being taken up to about half a mile west of the village of Mama Khan, where the path turns sharply northwards over a narrow razor-edged spur, running down from the foot of the cliffs held by the enemy. This presented to the attackers a piece of level ground extremely exposed for a distance of about one hundred yards.

Here, at about 11 a.m., our infantry opened fire, and under cover of this, as well as the shells of the guns posted on the Kotal, the 3rd Gurkhas, advancing by alternate rushes, gained the dead ground at the foot of the cliffs. But there was still the summit to be reached, by a track not only narrow but very steep. Led by Lieut. W. G. L.

¹ Watershed or pass.

Beynon, the advance was at once continued, but the Ali Khel enemy, taken aback by the determined onrush of our men, and seeing the approach of Kempster's brigade, threatening to cut off their retreat, did not wait to defend their *sangars*,¹ but fled hastily in a north-westerly direction towards the Khanki Valley. Shortly before noon the position was carried by a company of the 3rd Gurkhas under Major Rose, and the morning's work was finished with a loss of only two men killed and eleven wounded. Major Rose, Capt. Bateman-Champain and Lieut. Beynon, who were the leaders of the advanced troops that day, were all favourably mentioned in despatches.

Since 11 a.m. heliographic communication had been established between Kempster and Westmacott, and when the 3rd Gurkhas reached their objective, the 2nd Gurkhas, accompanied by the 5th Gurkha Scouts, had just seized, unopposed, the commanding position of Khand Talao, about two and a half miles away. Sir William Lockhart had witnessed the operations from the Samana Ridge, and, considering it undesirable to attempt to hold the Dargai heights, sent orders, shortly before 2 p.m., for both brigades to withdraw to Shinawari. There seems to have been some misunderstanding over this, for Sir Power Palmer—with whom Westmacott was in full agreement—had every intention of remaining where he was, and had arranged, in anticipation, for food, water and ammunition to be sent up. Sir William, however, does not appear to have been informed of this when he ordered the withdrawal. As events turned out, we should have been saved heavy casualties had the two brigades remained in possession of the Dargai heights.

On the 20th of October the second division, augmented by No. 1 Mountain Battery, the Derbys and the 3rd Sikhs from the first division, marched from Shinawari for Karappa in the Khanki Valley. Reliable information having been received on the 19th that the Dargai position was strongly held by the tribesmen, General Yeatman-Biggs, knowing how these ridges absolutely commanded the route via the Chagru Kotal, proposed to advance to Karappa over the Samana Suk and Talai spur. Indeed, at 7.30 p.m. on the 19th October his orders were issued to this effect. He was, however, overruled from headquarters, and at 4.30 a.m. on the 20th the advanced guard, under Brigadier Kempster, left Shinawari camp, headed by the 3rd Gurkha Scouts under Lieut. A. B. Tillard and the 2nd Gurkhas. The rear-guard was formed of the K.O.S.B.s and the 3rd Gurkhas.

About 9 a.m. Kempster, at the Chagru Kotal, was directed to clear the Dargai heights and at 9.30 had disposed his brigade for

¹ Stone breastworks.

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attack under the available cover. The 3rd Gurkha Scouts and the 2nd Gurkhas formed the first line, supported by the Dorsets, with the Derbys in reserve. The track to be followed was that taken by the 3rd Gurkhas on the 18th of October.

By 11.30 a.m. the assaulting troops had reached the cover of a spur five hundred yards from the foot of the cliffs on which the enemy were massed. Just in front of them was the hundred yards exposed portion of level ground mentioned in describing the attack on the 18th. Every tribesman's rifle was now directed on this spot and fire was withheld. The reason for this was at once realised by the Gurkhas. Nevertheless at 11.45, gathering themselves together, up jumped Tillard and his scouts and raced for, and gained, the dead ground ahead. They were accompanied by a portion of the 2nd Gurkhas, led by their Colonel (Travers), Adjutant (Norie) and three other officers.

Many fell, killed and wounded, not only in this rush, but in several other gallant but futile attempts made up to 2.20 p.m. by the 2nd Gurkhas, Dorsets and Derbys, to cross the exposed zone. When it was then manifest that the assault had come to a standstill, Kempster was directed by the divisional commander to order up the Gordon Highlanders and 3rd Sikhs from Mama Khan. It was also arranged that the Gordons' onslaught should be immediately preceded by three minutes' gunfire by every available mountain battery. The intrepid Gordons came up the hill to the cover, where the remnants of the assaulting troops were crouching, without the slightest hesitation or check. Immediately the batteries ceased firing, two companies dashed across the fire-swept area with pipes playing. The remainder of the battalion followed on the heels of the first rush, as also did the 3rd Sikhs and the jumble of men of all the other units waiting in dead ground. It was one eager spurt up the precipitous goat track to the summit, and, if reports speak truly, Tillard got there first.

The tribesmen had fled hastily, but should have been well satisfied, for they had caused just one short of two hundred casualties to the attackers (*killed*: officers four, other ranks thirty-four; *wounded*: officers fourteen, other ranks one hundred and forty-seven). The enemy's losses were never discovered, but were probably trifling, for their *sangars* were very strongly and cunningly constructed in the clefts of the rocks, with head cover in the shape of large flat stones and heavy beams. Lieut. Tillard was specially mentioned in despatches and subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Order; while Rifleman Hastbir Thapa, who reached the top of the Dargai ridge with him, was made a naick (corporal) direct. The troops bivouacked that night on the captured position and at Chagru Kotal. The second division resumed its march to Karappa next morning at daybreak.

CHAPTER XIII

GURKHA SCOUTS. MOVE INTO MAIDAN TIRAH

ON the 22nd of October Sir William Lockhart arrived in the Karappa camp, and by the 31st the final pass (Arhanga) into the Tirah Valley had been carried with only two men wounded, for, contrary to expectations, the enemy made no attempt to hold it seriously. The 3rd Gurkhas and the K.O.S.B.s formed part of the advanced guard, subsequently delivering the frontal attack on the pass, supported by the rest of the 4th Brigade.

There was also a flanking movement to the right entrusted to the 2nd Brigade. This assault was led by the "Gurkha Scouts" and the 2nd Bn. Yorkshires, the former body consisting of men of the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas. G.G.O. No. 244 of 1898 published a dispatch from General Sir William Lockhart, in para. 14 of which he remarked as follows :

"During the present expedition the scouts drawn from the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas have proved specially valuable. Being trained mountaineers and accustomed to guerilla warfare they were able to climb the most precipitous hills, lie in ambush at night, and surpass the tribesmen in their own tactics."

This reference to "Gurkha Scouts" marks a very interesting innovation in mountain warfare, the origin of which should be known by all officers of Gurkha units. It is quite a little history in itself, the facts being as follows :

Regimental "scouting," as now known in all Gurkha battalions, was quite in its infancy at the time of the Tirah campaign in the year 1897. The 5th Gurkhas undoubtedly can claim to be the pioneers of this method of working in the hills, for two of their officers—Lucas ¹ and Bruce ²—took the matter up in 1891 after the Black Mountain operations of that year. Suggestions then were made to them by Col. Hammond of the Guides, and on these they evolved a system of feeling for an enemy with the greatest circumspection

¹ The late Brigadier-General F. G. Lucas, C.B., D.S.O.

² Brigadier-General the Honourable C. G. Bruce, C.B., M.V.O., leader of two Mount Everest expeditions.

and the utmost celerity, the scouts themselves being invisible and unheard.

The idea was next enlarged by these two officers, and in the Waziristan Expedition of 1894 "Gurkha Scouts" were used freely as a separate body, to act as "eyes" in front of British or other troops advancing, retiring, or attacking. The two leaders were Harkbir and Karbir of the 5th, the same men who led so often and so well in Tirah in 1897.

In the month of September 1897 (neither battalion of the 5th Gurkhas having been detailed for the Tirah Expedition) Bruce went personally to Murree and saw Sir William Lockhart. Bruce suggested the employment of the Scouts of both battalions of the 5th under Lucas as "Gurkha Scouts"—for leading at night, covering advances and retirements, acting as flanking parties far out, for reconnaissance duties, and to work against snipers.

Sir William pointed out that Bruce had better take the Scouts himself, because if Lucas went too, being the senior, he would command. Bruce explained that he and Lucas were old pals and could comfortably work in conjunction; at the same time he asked for the 3rd Gurkha Scouts as well.

All the above was sanctioned and ninety scouts of the two battalions of the 5th, under Lucas and Bruce, with thirty scouts of the 3rd under Tillard, joined hands at Hangu. They worked together for the first time when leading Brigadier Kempster's brigade at the preliminary occupation of the Dargai heights on the 18th of October. On the second assault of the same position two days later the 5th Scouts were not present, as that body had been allotted to the First Division. It has already been recorded how on the 20th of October the 3rd Gurkha Scouts, under Tillard, led the 2nd Gurkhas in the attack.

From this date onwards the 3rd and 5th Scouts, though separate bodies, often worked together with whatever brigade required them. Later, when Tillard sprained his ankle so severely and was invalided, the scouts of the 3rd came directly under Bruce and Lucas.

That the services of the "Gurkha Scouts" were appreciated, Sir William Lockhart testifies. That they knew their job is proved by the fact that, in spite of their hazardous and risky employment, the casualties were surprisingly small. For instance, from October 1897 to January 1898 the scout losses in the 5th Gurkhas were only one killed and three wounded.

That the venture was successful may be assumed, for, under Sir William Lockhart's orders, a whole battalion of "Gurkha Scouts" (total strength, four hundred and fifty to six hundred) was formed in

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Peshawar in January 1898 and joined the second Division at Ali Musjid the middle of the month following. The units with British officers were as below :

No. 1 Company Second/Fifth Gurkhas	-	-	Lucas.
No. 2 Company First/Fifth Gurkhas	-	-	Bruce.
No. 3 Company First/Fifth Gurkhas	-	-	Nightingale.
No. 4 Company First/Fifth Gurkhas	-	-	Browne.
No. 5 Company First/Fifth Gurkhas	-	-	Barlow.
No. 6 Company Second/Fifth Gurkhas	-	-	Warburton.
No. 7 Company First/First Gurkhas	-	-	Money.
No. 8 Company Second/Third Gurkhas	-	-	Brakspear.

They were only used on two or three occasions in minor operations, for there was little doing. In April peace was declared.

To return to our narrative after this digression on Gurkha scouting.

On the 1st of November, 1897, for political purposes a reconnaissance was directed, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Dixon, K.O.S.B.s, to visit the famous mosque at Bagh, situated about three miles west of camp, which was in and around the village of Maidan. The troops detailed were No. 8 Mountain Battery, 2nd K.O.S.B.s and 1/3rd Gurkhas. The only opposition encountered was on the way out, when the advanced guard was fired on from the Landawar Hill. The guns soon drove the enemy out of their *sangar*, but not before they had managed to kill one and wound three of the 3rd Gurkhas. The mosque, although celebrated as the centre of intrigue and fanaticism, was not found to be an imposing structure—simply an open shed, surrounded by walnut, mulberry and poplar trees.

Guerilla tactics by the enemy now became the order of the day. Opportunities for practising them were frequent in a country admirably adapted for the purpose. Daily foraging parties were a necessity, in order to feed the enormous transport. This meant, for example, a journey to an outlying village, piqueting all dangerous heights *en route* ; collection and loading of grain and grass ; destruction of the village by burning, and its towers by gun cotton ; retirement to camp and withdrawal of the road picquets. Meanwhile the tribesmen had been sullenly watching events, with a desultory shot or two at intervals. Immediately the retirement began, every ravine and every vacant spur swarmed with riflemen who, a few minutes before, had been invisible. Such fighting, day by day, was not only arduous, but harassing and (including sniping by night both into camp and into the outlying picquets) accounted for numerous casualties. At the same time the enemy did not get off scot-free. Foraging and reconnaissance parties killed many, and there were

several instances of outlying piquets and surprise parties scoring considerably.

On the 9th of November the Northamptons lost heavily when covering the return to camp of a reconnaissance to Saran Sah. It was just the old story of getting trapped in a ravine which caused the deaths of an officer and twelve men in one heap. The next day to the 3rd Gurkhas was allotted the melancholy task of going out to collect the bodies and bring them into camp for burial. Many were found stripped of all clothing and some were mutilated.

Sir William Lockhart made a second reconnaissance of Saran Sah on the 11th of November, in which the 3rd Gurkhas took part. The retirement to camp was in this case successfully accomplished, without any casualties, and the enemy severely punished when pressing close on to the rear-guard.

The next event of any importance was the move of the main column to Bagh, distant three miles, to facilitate the further collection of supplies. The 4th Brigade, with Sir William's headquarters, moved on the 19th of November with the 3rd Gurkhas in the advanced guard. There was very little opposition on the march, but the enemy brought their Lee-Metfords into play as soon as the camping ground was reached.

The Force Commander now decided to visit the Kuki Khel country and issued orders on the 21st of November for a reconnaissance in force the next day through the Shaloba defile to Dwa-Toi, Brigadier Westmacott to command the troops, which consisted of No. 5 M.B., K.O.S.B.s, Yorkshires, 36th Sikhs, 2nd and 3rd Gurkhas, 28th Bo. Pioneers, Gurkha Scouts and two companies of sappers and miners. The 3rd Gurkhas formed the advanced guard. Opposition was met with throughout the day and, as the country was too difficult for the guns, the enemy's successive positions had to be carried by the Gurkhas. The picqueting of the heights was most admirably carried out by Major Rose and Capt. Ormsby. The Shaloba defile was six miles long and very bad going; moreover, it was in parts extremely narrow, with almost perpendicular sides covered with trees. The stream, which averaged about two feet in depth and was icy cold, had to be crossed time after time. The little Gurkhas were frequently up to their waists in it. On such a track the baggage became hopelessly blocked and, although the main body reached Dwa-Toi at 4 p.m., which was late enough, the baggage did not *begin* to come in until 11 a.m. next morning. The delay would have been greater had not the Yorkshires and 2nd Gurkhas been sent on in advance as flanking battalions, one to the right and the other to the left. This prevented large bodies of the enemy assembling, and

these two battalions remained in their posts until the return of the troops on the 24th of November. All ranks suffered grievous discomfort on the night of the 22nd, with no blankets, greatcoats or rations, and seventeen degrees of frost.

On the 23rd, at Dwa-Toi, the battalion assisted in the destruction of many Kuki Khel villages and on the 24th returned with the force to Bagh at the tail of the main body.

Sir William Lockhart now decided to evacuate Tirah, as the weather showed signs of breaking up, and, establishing a new base near Peshawar, re-occupy the Khyber Pass and operate against the Afridi winter settlements in the lower Bara and Bazaar valleys. The next few days were occupied in packing up and transferring all heavy baggage to Shinawari for transfer to Peshawar. The Commander himself accompanied the 3rd Brigade westwards to punish the Chamkannis, who had absolutely refused to comply with the terms imposed on them, although many other tribes had already submitted.

The second division was ordered to march to Dwa-Toi and thence down the Bara Valley to join Brigadier Hammond's brigade at Barkai. The first division's route was the Mastura Valley, to punish the Aka Khel; and then over the Sapri Pass, joining the second division near Barkai.

The 4th Brigade started on the 7th of December, and up to the 13th inclusive "The Tiger's Fighting Brigade," as it was called, had as much frontier warfare as any unit could desire. On the 7th the 4th Brigade worked alone to Dwa-Toi; on the 8th the 3rd Gurkhas formed part of a small force under "The Tiger" to punish the Kuki Khel and collect forage; on the 10th and 11th the 4th Brigade led, while the 3rd Brigade did rear-guard, and on the latter date were heavily engaged. On the 12th there was a halt, for it had rained continuously for thirty-six hours and the men had not a dry stitch on them. When the march was resumed next day the 3rd Brigade was in front and the 4th Brigade was continuously attacked, and at times severely pressed by the tribesmen, as it moved back step by step under a pitiless and searching fire from the enemy's sharpshooters. As ammunition began to run out and darkness threatened, the enemy became bolder and bolder, advancing to close quarters in the open. The Brigadier, seeing it was impossible to reach his destination, decided to halt for the night on a ridge running right across the line of retirement. The enemy then charged in with much courage to within a few yards of the K.O.S.B.s and 3rd Gurkhas, but were repulsed with heavy losses.

It was at this moment that Lieut. G. M. West, the newly appointed

adjutant of the 1/3rd Gurkhas, was killed instantaneously by a shot in the chest, and much mourned by everyone who knew him. A tribute to him occurs in the 1/3rd Digest of Services and in the regimental history of the 2nd K.E.O. Gurkha Rifles. All through the campaign he had been noted for his conspicuous gallantry, his contempt of danger and his unfailing cheerfulness and resource. Already mentioned in dispatches, the *London Gazette* of 20th May, 1898, records that had he survived he would have been recommended to Her Majesty for reward in recognition of his services in the campaign.

On the night of the 13th of December the 4th Brigade slept on its ground, worn out and exhausted, but prepared for an attack at any moment. It was a miserable night, for all ranks were without food, blankets or water. The next day this unit again covered the rear of the division and Brigadier Westmacott once more severely punished those tribesmen who ventured to follow him up, as he had done on the day before. In the afternoon it reached Mamanai just beyond the camp of Brigadier Hammond's Peshawar column at Swaikot.

The march down the Bara Valley ended all serious offensive action as regards the 3rd Gurkhas in the Tirah campaign. The battalion, throughout, had its full share of fighting, as well as of hardships, and gained much kudos. Its total casualties were : killed nineteen (including Lieut. West), wounded fifty-three (including Capt. Bateman-Champain and two Gurkha officers). From the 7th to the 14th December the second division, consisting of three mountain batteries and eight battalions, from Bagh to Mamanai, lost one hundred and sixty-six killed and wounded. Of this total the share of the 3rd Gurkhas was eight killed and twenty-two wounded.

The 4th Brigade remained at Mamanai for two months. On the 23rd of January, 1898, an attempt was made to round up some Afridi raiding parties by a converging movement under the direction of Sir Power Palmer. The 3rd Gurkhas took part, together with five other infantry battalions, but the enemy evaded contact. Under the same commander another enveloping movement—with the object of securing a large number of cattle, said to have arrived in the Kajuri Plain—took place on the 29th of January. This was quite a big affair, troops of both divisions being employed, but the 3rd Gurkhas only participated at first to the extent of sending a company up an adjacent height to cover the retirement of the Mamanai column back to camp. The 36th Sikhs of the 4th and Yorkshires of the 2nd Brigade became seriously engaged near the Shinkamar Pass, and the latter unit lost twenty-six men killed and thirty-two wounded.

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Another hundred men of the 3rd Gurkhas with two hundred of the K.O.S.B.s and two guns were taken out by Brigadier Westmacott at 4.30 p.m. and covered the last part of the retirement. Very few cattle were seen or captured. The surmise is that, although the plan was marked secret, it became known to the enemy.

Next day Brigadier Westmacott was supposed to carry out the dual task of protecting his own camp and again attacking the Shinkamar Pass to recover the dead bodies of the Yorkshires left behind. It was too much for him to risk. In the afternoon, therefore, he was reinforced by four hundred of the Gordons and three hundred of the 2nd Gurkhas from the 3rd Brigade at Bara and revisited the pass on the 31st January. At the entrance to the pass the 3rd Gurkhas were pushed forward and occupied the heights on both sides. There was no opposition until the retirement began, when, as usual, the tribesmen followed up and caused a few casualties.

Up to the 12th of February the 3rd Gurkhas remained at Mamai, but on that date were ordered to a new camp opposite Barkai, to join the 3rd Brigade now commanded by Brigadier Ian Hamilton, vice Kempster who had returned to his permanent appointment in Madras. On the 15th of March this brigade moved up the Bara River a couple of miles to Ghullo Kaddai as a threat to the Afridis, who were bringing in their rifles and fines very slowly. The 3rd Gurkhas provided a strong picquet on the Lawata heights.

This threat and other preparations, as if for a spring campaign, had the desired effect ; and by the 3rd of April, the last to submit—the Zakka Khels—had fully paid up all rifles and money fines demanded of them. Five days later the battalion left Bara for Peshawar and arrived at Almora on the 17th of April, 1898.

As regards despatches, Lieut.-Col. C. Pulley was mentioned for his good work during the campaign and awarded a brevet. Capt. W. G. L. Beynon, the same. Major Hugh Rose was specially commented on twice. Capt. Arthur Bateman-Champain received kudos in despatches for his gallant conduct and Lieut. A. B. Tillard *twice* for his conspicuously able leading with the scouts. Subadar-Major Chamu Sing, Subadar Harkbir Gurung and six other ranks were awarded the Indian Order of Merit.

The *Englishman* newspaper started a fund in Calcutta, in connection with the capture of Dargai on the 20th of October, 1897. It was called the "Gordon and Gurkha Fund." A sum of Rs. 8,260 was collected and handed over to the 1st Gordons and 2nd Gurkhas in equal proportion. The latter unit paid the 1/3rd a share, according to the number of Tillard's Scouts engaged that day.

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The "Indian Heroes," or "Patriotic" fund was a subscription list started in England to help the relatives of men who were killed or wounded in (a) the 2nd Afghan War, (b) the Tirah Campaign. About 1,500 rupees per battalion was received for (b). The amount awarded was decided on the merits of each case and varied up to as much as 200 rupees.

CHAPTER XIV

1899-1902

FOR rather more than three and a half years after the return of the first battalion to Almora, in April 1898, it did not move, except for a training camp or two. In May 1900 all parades were suspended and the men employed on working parties in the construction of new barracks. The foundation stone of these was laid on the 16th of March, 1900, by Mrs. Vincent Ormsby, and the four double-storied bachelor barracks and two blocks of married quarters were completed in November 1901.

Meanwhile the second battalion, in January 1899, marched from Lansdowne to Jhelum, railed to Peshawar, and then marched on to Landi Kotal. The garrison there consisted of :

1/1st Gurkhas,
2/3rd Gurkhas,
one company sappers and miners,
one company mountain artillery,

all under the command of Col. Neville Chamberlain, now Col. Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

In December 1901 the first battalion 3rd Gurkhas was training at Bareilly when it received orders to proceed to Tank on the North-West Frontier to form part of a supporting brigade to the Waziristan Blockade Force.

As already chronicled in the introduction to the Tirah campaign, Government had been compelled in 1894-95 to carry out operations against the Mahsuds of *Southern* Waziristan. It was also mentioned that in 1897 punitive measures were undertaken against the Waziris of *Northern* Waziristan for the treacherous attack by Madda Khels on the political officer's escort in the Tochi Valley.

It has always been impossible to foretell what the Mahsuds would, or would not, do. There is—as the natives say—no *tikana* (certainty) of their actions. For a long time they were much under the influence of a religious teacher, rather a remarkable man, called the Mullah Powindah. Then came the settlement after the 1894-95 expedition,

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whereby their allowances for general good behaviour were increased to over Rs. 60,000 per annum. For about two years they remained quiet. The Mullah's influence waned, and even when he held out the tempting bait of a bit of fighting for them in 1897 if they would revolt and help the Waziris, still they held aloof.

But in the summer of 1898, soon after the Afridis had submitted to the Government's terms, the Mahsuds began their depredations once more, in the protected areas of the British border—soldiers at our various outposts shot, cattle raided, civilians kidnapped, mails robbed, caravans looted, etc., etc. Many depredations; and pretty continuous during 1899 and 1900. When called to account the Mahsud elders confessed they could not restrain the offenders or punish them. The local allowances were therefore taken away from these elders and allotted to the people of the tribes themselves (termed *Ulus*); at the same time, a fine of one lakh of rupees was demanded, with the warning that, if half of it was not forthcoming within fifteen days, a strict blockade would be enforced. There being no prospect of payment at the termination of the time limit, the blockade was proclaimed to come into operation from the 1st of December, 1900.

At first the measures adopted to ensure the effectiveness of the blockade consisted of reinforcements of regulars to the existing police posts and the mobilisation of two movable columns to form a cordon. Early in April 1901 nearly half the fine had been paid, but raids and offences still continued. *Jirgas*¹ were summoned and the *maliks* were full of assurances of good-will, but no improvement occurred. Government sat tight, with the intention of retaliating on a large scale in the cold weather by means of punitive columns, camped at different quarters of the cordon. Each column would be based in our territory and would make frequent incursions into the Mahsuds' country, of two or four days' duration, and then return to its base.

All this was kept very secret, for the mission of each column was the destruction of towers and defences, and the capture of offending Mahsuds and their cattle. Orders, therefore, for the 1/3rd Gurkhas and other units, contained instructions to proceed to Tank (forty miles beyond Dera Ismail Khan) to form part of a supporting brigade to the Waziristan Blockade Force, which was being directed by Brigadier Denning, the G.O.C. Derajat District.

The 1/3rd reached Tank on the 17th of December, 1901. The day before, the 1/2nd from Dehra arrived at Dera Ismail Khan, having attached to them, to complete their strength, three Gurkha officers and fifty-nine other ranks of the 2/3rd G.R.

¹ Assembly of tribal representatives, or *maliks* (elders).

It was then discovered that there was no reserve brigade at all ; that the first series of active operations had commenced on the 23rd of November ; that the third series was at that time approaching completion ; that troops for the next series would probably move about the 1st of January, 1902 ; finally, that, with the advent of four extra battalions and the Murree Mountain Battery (originally intended as a reserve brigade), Major-General C. Egerton had taken over command of the blockade operations.

General Egerton had formed three columns, to work simultaneously from different bases in the eastern and north-eastern portion of Mahsud territory. The 1/3rd joined No. 2 Column under Col. McRae, and the 1/2nd, with its contingent from the 2/3rd, were sent to No. 3, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Tonnochy of the 3rd Sikhs. Before this, however, the 1/3rd had been employed with other columns in the final stages of the third series from the 19th of December until Christmas Day.

Lt.-Col. C. S. Eastmead, D.S.O., then a captain in the first battalion, writes as follows of this period :

“ Xmas Day was spent at Jhandola, where some eleven battalions were concentrated. Next day troops of the three columns marched to their starting points for the ‘ round-up.’ Our column (No. 2, McRae) marched via Zam, 26th ; Mullazai, 27th ; Khairu Khel, 28th ; Suleiman Khel, 29th ; to Jani Khel (S. of Bannu), 30th. Active operations commenced on 1st January, ’02. No. 2 Column moved up the bed of the Shaktu River. 1/3rd were advance guard, piqueting heights, on 2nd January, and were fairly heavily engaged that day and the next, when, from Mandawam, the column hammered the Mahsuds badly on the hills to the south, returning to Mandawam that evening with great captures of sheep and cattle, most of which were taken by our men. Fighting took place daily as column advanced to Baramand, 4th ; Matwam, 5th ; Waladin, 6th, where the columns met.

To facilitate the crossing of the Sham Plain on 7th January, 500 men of 3rd and 500 of 2nd Gurkhas (under Col. Tonnachy, a Piffer who was very skilful in that sort of warfare), engaged the enemy and kept him busy until baggage, etc., was safely across the open plain, and then slipped away from him, calling in the flanking picquets the column had posted. My picquet was the last to come in. We bivouacked that evening at Dosalli. On 8th we marched practically unmolested to Datta Khel and reached Miram Shah on 11th January. Subsequently 1/3rd moved to Baran, E. of Bannu, and remained there until the march home commenced. We reached Kohat on Ahmed Khel Day and had a great night at the Piffer mess, where numerous regiments which had been at Ahmed Khel were represented. Here we first heard the splendid band of the 1st Gurkhas.”

Less than a fortnight of continual harassment was enough for the enemy. Great damage had been inflicted on Mahsud settlements, and

in some districts they had lost heavily both in men and live stock. On the 16th of January the Mahsuds made full submission. Later a *jirga* was assembled to hear the Government's terms, which were accepted, but with the usual delay in compliance. Finally, however, matters were settled satisfactorily, and the blockade was raised on the 10th of March, 1902.

In the Mahsud country it was the usual kind of hill warfare, but against an enemy much less enterprising than the Afridis. Retirements were usually followed up, but any attempt to hold a position was seldom made by the Mahsuds. In short, the actual fighting during these operations was insignificant, but all ranks had to endure considerable hardship. The cold was intense throughout, marches long and severe, the country very difficult and piqueting incessant. The men of the 3rd Gurkhas stood the test well, and some excellent work was done by the 1/3rd regimental scouts under the direction of Lieut. G. K. Channer.

The 1/3rd returned to Almora on the 1st of April, being re-armed with the Lee-Enfield rifle at Rawalpindi *en route*. When the Waziristan Blockade despatches appeared it was seen that Lieut.-Col. Hugh Rose, the Commandant, and Lieut. G. K. Channer had received "mentions." A medal with clasp "Waziristan, 1901-02," as well as the usual "batta," was sanctioned.

CHAPTER XV

COLONEL CHARLES PULLEY : LIEUT.-GENERAL HUTCHINSON : "K's" INTRODUCTION TO GURKHAS

BEFORE the first battalion went to Tank in December 1901—indeed it was on the 25th of April of that year—Col. Charles Pulley vacated the command, on completion of his seven years' tenure, and was succeeded by Major Hugh Rose. The former officer had served continuously with the 1/3rd Gurkhas for over twenty-six years ; had fought with it in Afghanistan, Burma and Chin-Lushai ; had commanded it throughout the Tirah expedition in 1897-98. He received two brevets for his services, namely, one to Major for Burma, and one to Colonel for Tirah. In 1904 he was created a Companion of the Bath, and he died in England in November 1925. Col. Pulley was particularly clever with his pencil. His large caricature of celebrities in the Kandahar Force in 1878 is a very clever production, while the mess at Almora is full of his efforts at depicting the Gurkha in all sorts of ludicrous situations. He had a strong appreciation of the ridiculous.

But Col. Pulley had proceeded on one year's leave to Europe in May 1900, so Rose's tenure of command practically commenced then. In January 1901 he initiated a novel savings-bank scheme which was destined to become of great benefit to the men. It was called "The Provident Fund," and, according to its rules, every Gurkha rank was compelled to be a subscriber to the extent of a small sum deducted from his monthly pay. On discharge a subscriber was repaid the whole of his subscriptions, or on his decease, while serving, the amount was paid to his estate. The subscriptions of deserters reverted to the fund. The sum total obtained was invested, or placed at fixed deposit, in a Government bank.

The object of the fund was twofold : (a) to encourage thrift and ensure that every Gurkha on discharge had a certain amount of cash to his credit ; (b) to provide a pecuniary resource from interest accruing ; this to be utilised for the supply of accessories to games, and other objects, entirely for the benefit of the rank and file.

Now, although the Gurkha ranks had been freely consulted and

had welcomed the scheme when proposed, no sooner were the first monthly deductions made than they liked it much less. Rose, however, said "Wait a bit," and his advice proved sound, for after about a year or so, when men discharged had realised the benefits of this compulsory saving, those still serving actually requested that their subscriptions might be doubled. To this there were, however, objections, mainly resting on figures. Indeed, the aggregate to be dealt with, and invested, soon increased to a surprising degree. In 1927 the total sums invested amounted to : "A" Fund, Rs. 48,772 ; "B" Fund, Rs. 24,251.

In connection with the period (1900), about which we are now writing, it is curious that the Boxer rising in China should be indirectly associated with the appointment of the regiment's first colonel. At that time General Sir Edward Stedman, the commandant of the first battalion in 1886, was Military Secretary at the India Office, where a new temporary department was created to deal with Chinese affairs. This was very necessary, for there were many troops from India in the combined force of 50,000 men, sent by the Powers to defend their subjects. General Stedman, looking about for some one to be at the head of this branch as "Assistant Military Secretary for Indian Affairs," came across Col. H. D. Hutchinson at the United Service Club and offered him the appointment, which was accepted. For his good work in this connection Col. Hutchinson was created a Companion of the Star of India in the New Year's Honours List of 1903. A year later, when promoted Major-General, he was appointed Colonel of the 3rd Gurkha Rifles.

Lieut.-General Henry Doveton Hutchinson was a well-known figure in India. As a particularly smart youngster he was for eight years adjutant of the 40th Bengal Infantry, passing on to the same appointment with a Volunteer Corps on obtaining his company. In those days, what were called "garrison courses" existed, for the preparation of officers for their promotion tests. Hutchinson passed such a brilliant examination, to qualify for his own majority, that he was promptly ear-marked by the Director of Military Education for an appointment on his staff, and eventually became garrison instructor at Kasauli. There he remained seven years, proved himself most capable and received the sobriquet of "Teacher."

Amongst the books he wrote were *Field Fortification* and *Sketching made Easy* ; the latter being an extraordinarily able work, which obtained a very large sale amongst officers, and helped many a lame dog over the difficult obstacles of map-reading and scales. During the latter portion of Hutchinson's tenure it happened that Major Lord William Beresford, the Military Secretary to the Viceroy, had to

qualify for promotion. As it was considered inadvisable for this officer to be absent from his duties at Simla, and—what is more to the point—as Lord William himself did not wish to be banished to Kasauli, the authorities arranged for the next garrison course to take place at Simla. Thither the “Teacher” proceeded, thus coming still more prominently before the eyes of the authorities, Lord Roberts being then the Commander-in-Chief.

Shortly afterwards Hutchinson was transferred from the 40th Bengal Infantry to our first battalion as second-in-command, but to remain seconded. He joined at Almora in 1890, but, when the present second battalion was sanctioned at the end of the same year, was selected to raise it, and remained in command from 1891 to 1896. The Directorship of Military Education in India being then vacant, the post was given to Col. Hutchinson. At the end of his tenure, when on the unemployed list at home, he entered the India Office as recorded. Soon after his work there ended—that is, in 1904—the present Army Council was created. Hutchinson, then a Major-General, became the first Director of Staff duties at the War Office, a most unusual billet for an Indian Army officer. He had to relinquish his appointment on promotion to Lieut.-General on the 1st of June, 1907.

Always brilliant with his pen—a talent inherited by his son, the eminent A. S. M. Hutchinson, author of *If Winter Comes*, etc.—General Hutchinson occupied his active brain hereafter in literary work, coupled with much time given to the affairs of the Royal Bath School for Officers’ Daughters, until his eyesight began to give way. He died in London in November 1924.

In November 1902 Lord Kitchener arrived in India to take up his appointment as Commander-in-Chief. Prior to his arrival, troops had been concentrated at Umballa and Delhi, respectively, to oppose each other, as Northern and Southern Army. The 1/3rd Gurkhas were allotted to the 6th Brigade of the Southern force and found the other units to be the Royal Irish Rifles, 6th Jats and 13th Rajputs, with Sir J. W. Willcocks¹ as their brigadier. Attached to the first battalion were two Gurkha officers and 159 other ranks of the second battalion, with Captains Vincent Ormsby, Arthur Bateman-Champain and Lieut. C. A. B. Hamilton in charge.

The first phase of the manœuvres took place over the historic battlefields of Panipat and Sonapat, since centuries the scene of heavy fighting for the conquest and defence of Delhi. The last week’s

¹ Later General Sir James Willcocks, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., etc., General Officer Commanding the Indian Army Corps in France 1914-1915, and who died while on a visit to India in 1926.

operations were of even greater interest in the country south of Delhi, where the astonishing Kutab Minar towers supreme, and the huge rugged fortress of Taglakabad frowns down from its stony ridge. To finish up, a general engagement took place near Patparganj, where, a hundred years before, General Gerard Lake, with only 4,500 men, had overthrown in battle the successor to Perron (Louis Bourquin), with his hundred guns and 19,000 Mahrattas, organised and drilled by his French officers.

The 3rd Gurkhas achieved much merit during these operations, receiving warm praise from their brigadier, a keen and earnest soldier little given to eulogy undeserved. After the manœuvres, the unit went into standing camp beyond the ridge and took part—with the same units—but re-named the 3rd Brigade—in all the ceremonial functions which were such a wonderful feature of this coronation assemblage, commonly known as the “Curzon Durbar.” On the day of the big review the march past of the 1/3rd Gurkhas was particularly good, so much so as to elicit great applause from the spectators. The battalion returned to Almora in February 1903.

It was at these manœuvres before the Durbar that Lord Kitchener got his first introduction to Gurkhas. The writer, then Brigade Major to Volunteers in India, happened to be present. The Chief was doing a tour of the front of the Southern Army the day after he arrived in Delhi. It was the luncheon hour—horses with nose-bags on, “K” munching a sandwich in a “*bagh*,”¹ staff officers near by, in various attitudes, eating their frugal meal. “K” finished rather quickly, lighted a cigarette, and began to look restless. The quick-witted Horace Smith-Dorrien, then Adjutant-General, realised he must create a diversion at once, for the horses had not finished their corn. A brain-wave helped him to remember there was a Gurkha mounted infantry detachment close at hand, which might be told to do something to amuse the great man. He sent orders for them to draw near.

It then struck the Adjutant-General that “K” should be given some information about Gurkhas and, seeing General W. Hill (late of the 2nd Gurkhas) standing near, he called him up and told him to instruct the Chief fully about this class of soldier. Now, General Hill was a great character, full of humour and very outspoken. He knew it was an absurd idea to try and make Gurkhas into mounted infantry, and had already indited a very sarcastic note on the subject to army headquarters. He was a little apprehensive as to the result of any crucial test on horseback before “K,” but he was not going to say so.

Meanwhile the O.C. Mounted Infantry (Porteous of the 9th

¹ Grove of trees.

Gurkhas) turned up, and the Chief, leading him outside the shade of the trees, said :

"Take your men a good half mile over there, gallop up to about here and come into dismounted action against that mound, some eight hundred yards away."

"K" liked everything done at a great pace. If you could manage that, every fault was forgiven. Porteous could hardly have been aware of this, but his men galloped up like the devil. A bit ragged, of course, but nippy out of the saddle, led-horses nicely handled, and the attack on foot well carried out, *but* absurdly fast. The Chief was delighted and, turning to Hill, asked several questions : "What sort of shots are they?" "None better," said Hill. "Have they good eyesight?" "Can see through a brick wall," was the reply; "How do they stand hardship?" "They'll stand anything except abuse," answered the General, saluted, and walked away. "K" smiled, pulled out his cigarette case, gazed into the blue and beginning with his favourite "Humph," muttered : "Pretty useful sort of soldier apparently."

Another very interesting experience of the 1903 Durbar for the 3rd Gurkhas was the first meeting with His Highness Sir Chander Shamsher Jang, the Prime Minister of Nepal, who was good enough to return the C.O.'s call in person. The Maharajah's escort of picked men of the Nepal Army rather took Col. Rose by surprise, when he visited the Nepal Camp. Expecting to see selected riflemen of sturdy physique but ordinary Gurkha type and stature, he was somewhat astonished to find magnificent men, nearly as tall as the Guards, with handsome, aquiline features.

On the 16th of May, 1903, the second battalion lost their Commandant, Col. H. S. Wheatley, C.B., on his attaining fifty-two years of age. Originally of the 2nd Gurkhas, he had joined us as second-in-command to Major Hutchinson in 1891. His departure was deeply regretted, and he was succeeded by Lieut.-Col. George Ommanney from the 1st Gurkhas.

CHAPTER XVI

THE "KITCHENER TEST"

LORD KITCHENER AT ALMORA ; FOOTBALL

LORD KITCHENER had not been a year in India before he began to inaugurate many reforms. The training of the infantry did not meet with his satisfaction. He thought divisional and brigade commanders, as well as their staffs, were out of touch with troops, that they did not see enough of the training in progress, and that it was being conducted on un-uniform lines. Moreover, after touring about, he felt assured that many infantry units were very good and some very bad, and that something must be done to make the standard of efficiency more even.

In 1904, therefore, he introduced, for both British and Indian infantry, the "Kitchener Test," as it came to be called. This meant that each brigade commander must subject his units to a very sound and thorough three days' inspection, during the training season of 1904-05, under the five main headings given him, and must mark each event according to instructions detailed. The best British and Indian battalion, of each brigade, would then be tested by the divisional commander in a similar manner. Then, the first in the division would undergo a further test by the G.O.C. command ; and, finally, the highest marked British and Indian unit, of each command, would be inspected and marked by the Chief's own board of headquarter staff officers. This board would award a trophy, given by Lord Kitchener himself, to the British and Indian battalion, respectively, coming out on top.

The rules caused a certain amount of consternation, which increased in places where brigade and divisional commanders failed to adapt the method of inspection to local conditions, and unduly taxed their troops. The amazing point was, that no one seemed to realise that this order was really aimed at Generals and their staffs, to ensure soundness and uniformity in their annual inspections. The Chief was the last man to wish to bully troops. He was greatly concerned, later, when informed that some units had almost broken down under the strain, and had found even *one* test, let alone *four*,

too severe. His face lighted up with pleasure when he was told at Almora that the first battalion, instead of feeling any strain, had thoroughly *enjoyed* each inspection.

Now, under Lord Kitchener's reorganisation scheme for the location of troops, the 1/3rd Gurkhas came into the newly formed Garhwal Brigade, consisting of the garrisons of Chakrata, Almora, Roorki, Lansdowne, Dehra and Landour, and commanded by Major-General A. G. F. Browne, C.B., D.S.O., with headquarters at Dehra. On the 24th to 26th February, 1905, at Almora, and on the 9th to 11th March at Bhim Tal, the first battalion gained the highest marks in the brigade and divisional tests. General Gaselee, the G.O.C. Eastern Command, said there was no necessity for him to test the unit, as he knew it well. He nominated it at once as being the best trained battalion in the command.

Only four battalions were left in, and now came the final test for the trophy, by the Chief's board. This took place on three April days, and towards Majkali. A short time afterwards " K " came on a visit to Almora, and on reaching the house of the second-in-command was handed a telegram. After perusing it he handed it to his host, with a characteristic sweep of the arm. The wire read :

" Result Chief's Cup Indian Army : first, 130th Baluchis ; second, 1/3rd Gurkhas, five marks behind ; third, 55th Coke's Rifles."

Lord Kitchener's visit to Almora in April 1905 was mainly in connection with its abandonment as a cantonment under the new scheme. Mention has been made in Chapter V of the famous charter, allotting certain stations to Gurkhas ; and of the Chief's indignation when shown a copy of the document at Dehra. Before coming to Almora, however, he had apparently given up any idea of riding rough-shod over it, for the battalion was asked officially if it would agree to leave the place.

The reply was in the affirmative, conditionally to :

- (a) Being stationed in the same cantonment as the second battalion.
- (b) Being fully compensated for the officers' mess (their own property), and certain other buildings.

Then came the great man.

He rode over from Ranikhet, a matter of twenty-four miles, on a hill pony and went straight to the barracks. In front of him loomed the massive double-storied stone buildings constructed by the men themselves, with expert assistance, and under the supervision of the resident engineers. " K " got off his pony and stared at them without saying a single word. Then, still staring—almost glaring—he backed

and backed to get a better view, until we were apprehensive he would fall over the edge of the plateau. Rose had backed with him, and just as he was going to warn the Chief that they had reached the limit of the flat ground, "K" turned round at him quite savagely and snapped out : "Who on earth built them ?" When he was told, he added in the same tone, "What nonsense : it is inconceivable such barracks should ever have been constructed at all in a place so remote from anywhere." Then, mellowing somewhat, he repeated time after time, as if to himself : "How can I take you away from these ? How can I take you away from these ? And yet I must."

The next morning there was a ceremonial parade, and the men were on the top of their form. You could see "K" was very pleased. At breakfast he remarked : "Well, I have already seen the 130th Baluchis, and now I have inspected the 1/3rd Gurkhas. Had I been told to choose, I should have selected the latter as winners of my cup." His hostess suggested he might override the decision of his board, but he was not for doing that ! The mess delighted the Chief beyond words. When he entered the ante-room he walked round it, looking at the shape of the room, the chairs, curtains and everything ; and finally remarked : "This is the result of being localised." On his departure he said : "Good-bye, I have enjoyed my visit very much. I must modify my views about localised units. The question of the abandonment of Almora will remain in abeyance at present." No official announcement was made, no cancellation of previous orders was ever received. That was in April 1905, and not another word has ever, to the writer's knowledge, been heard on the subject.

Football was always popular at Almora and a good deal was played in Gurkha units even over fifty years ago. But it was a desultory kind of game, with no definite rules. Even in the late 'eighties, as far as the 3rd Gurkhas are concerned, sides consisted of any number, like Gilgit polo. The ball was sometimes oval and sometimes round. The by-laws varied at the fancy of the predominant Britisher playing.

In the year 1888 Association rules were adopted by the 3rd Gurkhas at Almora and the game soon flourished, until, within less than a couple of years, matches at home and abroad were played with teams of officers of the Buffs, etc., at Ranikhet. In 1896 the 3rd Gurkhas presented a football challenge cup for competition amongst all the battalions of the Gurkha Brigade. The second battalion 3rd Gurkhas were strong enough to win this three years in succession, 1902-03-04. There is a cup in the mess to commemorate this achievement.

It is generally understood to be an accepted fact that Lieut. Nigel

Woodyatt of the 3rd and Lieut. F. G. Lucas of the 5th were the pioneers of football proper in Gurkha units.

The following officers served with the Sikkim-Tibet Mission Force, 1903-04 :

Second Battalion.—Major W. L. G. Bennon, D.S.O., as Commandant of a coolie corps until the 15th of March, 1904, when he was appointed D.A.Q.M.G. of the force.

First Battalion.—Capt. A. B. Tillard, D.S.O., in command of No. 2 Yak Transport Corps.

Second Battalion.—Lieut. C. A. B. Hamilton, attached to the 8th G.R. from the 12th of November, 1903, to the 19th of February, 1904.

Second Battalion.—Subadar (then Jemadar) Kharakbahadar Thakur, attached to the 8th G.R. and awarded the I.D.S.M. for gallantry at the storming of Gyantse, when Grant of the 8th got his V.C.

CHAPTER XVII

THE GURKHA BRIGADE *KHUD* RACE

NEW DESIGNATION AS "QUEEN'S OWN,"
LATER "QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S OWN"

In 1906 the second battalion carried off the "Meerut Cup" at the Bengal Presidency Rifle Association at Meerut, the first battalion tying for second place. The competition was open to teams of six from any unit of the Indian Army.

In the same year at Ranikhet there was some interesting hill racing, which calls for a few remarks about the origin of this particular form of sport.

In the year 1890 the 5th Gurkhas held their annual *Khud* race for the first time. It was an individual competition for men of the 5th, a sort of up-and-down-hill cross-country run. The reward was a silver model of a Gurkha in his national costume, exquisitely finished, and commonly called "The Little Man." This was kept in the mess and each winner's name engraved on it. Four years after its conception, the race was opened to the whole brigade of Gurkhas, but for a long period entries were received only from the 3rd and 5th. Then the 6th took up *Khud* racing with so much enthusiasm and method that by 1906 their crack man, Dharmjit Pun, had scored his fourth win. Prior to this, the Almora battalion had produced a marvellous performer in Budhiparsad, who ran altogether in eleven competitions and actually won six years in succession. In fact, he so dominated the others by his prowess that it is quite probable his two last victories were as much due to brow-beating as to merit.

On account of no competition just after Tirah, "The Little Man" remained seven years in the Almora mess and was greatly missed when it returned to Abbottabad. In 1905 Santbir Thapa, a younger brother of Budhiparsad, brought back the trophy to Almora, only to let it slip away again to its old cantonment the following year.

The following is a list of winners of the Brigade *Khud* Race Trophy and the years they won :

- 1894. Rfn. Deoram Thapa, 1/5th G.R.
- 1895. Rfn. Budhiparsad Thapa, 1/3rd G.R.

- 1896. Rfn. Budhiparsad Thapa, 1/3rd G.R.
- 1897. Rfn. Budhiparsad Thapa, 1/3rd G.R.
- 1898. Rfn. Budhiparsad Thapa, 1/3rd G.R.
- 1899. No Race.
- 1900. L.-Nk. Budhiparsad Thapa, 1/3rd G.R.
- 1901. L.-Nk. Budhiparsad Thapa, 1/3rd G.R.
- 1902. Rfn. Dharmjit Pun, 1/6th G.R.
- 1903. Rfn. Dharmjit Pun, 1/6th G.R.
- 1904. Rfn. Dharmjit Pun, 1/6th G.R.
- 1905. Rfn. Santbir Thapa, 1/3rd G.R.
- 1906. Rfn. Dharmjit Pun, 1/6th G.R.
- 1907. Rfn. Maniraj Gharti, 2/6th G.R.
- 1908. Rfn. Pahal Sing Gurung, 1/5th G.R.
- 1909. Rfn. Tulbir Gurung, 1/6th G.R.
- 1910. Rfn. Tulbir Gurung, 1/6th G.R.
- 1911. L.-Nk. Tulbir Gurung, 1/6th G.R.
- 1912. Nk. Tulbir Gurung, 1/6th G.R.
- 1913. Nk. Tulbir Gurung, 1/6th G.R.
- 1914. Rfn. Maniraj Gharti, 2/6th G.R.

NO RACE SINCE.

In the year 1906 the race was run at Ranikhet on the 3rd April, at the request of the late General Martin, formerly 5th Gurkhas, and then commanding the Bareilly Brigade. There were nineteen competitors, hailing from the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th and 9th Gurkhas.

This year is mentioned in particular because it marks a period when British units began to get really interested in *Khud* racing. An impulse, undoubtedly, was given by the training of the various teams for the above fixture, followed by the event itself. The units in particular were a battalion of the Rifle Brigade and the second battalion 60th K.R. Rifles, then stationed at Chaubuttia and Ranikhet respectively. So great was their enthusiasm that General Martin wrote to Almora, before the competition, saying the above-named units did "nothing but run round and round and round the selected course, against the clock."

Now Col. Sir T. H. Holditch in one of his books says : "The Gurkha in the mountains is as much superior to the British soldier as the Urial is to the Southdown sheep." Charlie Bruce has taken Gurkhas to Europe, where they defeated, on the ground of their opponents, all with whom they came in contact, from Cumberland hill-men to Swiss guides. They have also defeated every hill race in India, including Pathans, Baluchis, Dogras and Chitralis. With the British soldier there has been no actual contest, because the regulations forbid it.

After the competition on the 3rd April, 1906, already referred to, the second battalion 60th challenged the 1/3rd Gurkhas to a *Khud*

race of one hundred men a side, to take place in September over the same course. This was accepted, but, at the last moment, owing to the regulations referred to, it could not come off. Something had to be devised in its place. Therefore the 60th decided to get up a company race and invite the Gurkhas to run on the same day, for prizes offered by the battalion.

The arrangement was for the 60th to run sixteen men per company in two heats of sixty-four men each and the best eight of each company to run together in the last race—the Gurkhas to run alternately with the 60th in two heats of fifty, the best half last.

At 4 p.m. on the 27th October a start was made with the second best batch of Gurkhas. Splendid time was done, the last man taking 29 min. 15 sec. to complete the course. Next came the worst half of the 60th, best man 31 mins., last in 41 mins. with a sprained ankle. The next heat with the best fifty Gurkhas was a grand sight, winner Santbir Thapa in 25 mins. The last heat of the best 60th finished the afternoon, the winner's time being 28 min. 27 sec. As the *K.R.R.C. Chronicle* says :

“ Thus there was a matter of only $4\frac{1}{4}$ minutes between the Gurkhas' first and hundredth man, a very notable performance and one which it is doubtful whether any Gurkha battalion could equal.”

The hospitality of the 2/60th was unbounded, and all ranks enjoyed themselves immensely.

In the winter of 1906-07 the Amir of Afghanistan, Habibulla Khan, paid a visit to India, just after he had been recognised as “ His Majesty.” For his benefit there was a Durbar and a large concentration of troops ; also a review on the 11th of January, 1907, when the Gurkhas received as much applause from the spectators, at the march past, as in 1903 at Delhi. Both battalions met at Moradabad on the 23rd December, 1906, and marched together to Agra. This was the first time they had come together since the second battalion left Sitoli in December 1892.

On the 22nd February, 1907, the *London Gazette* contained the announcement that the King was graciously pleased to approve that the regiment should be styled in future

THE 3RD QUEEN'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES,

with permission to bear upon its appointments the Royal and Imperial Cypher, ensigned by the Imperial Crown.

During the summer of the same year, as both commandants were at home on leave, Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I., the colonel of the regiment, was granted permission for the three of them to go on deputation to Buckingham Palace, to be presented to

the Queen. Her Majesty received them very graciously and was delighted with the Address, gold kukri and brief history of the corps which were laid before her. In conversation Queen Alexandra remarked she was sorry the title was "Queen's Own," as that was quite impersonal and conveyed nothing to her, as there were so many Queens. Naturally, the deputation lost no time in explaining that the regiment had no voice in the new designation and would infinitely prefer the honour of being entitled

3RD QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES.

Her Majesty approached King Edward forthwith, who directed it should be so arranged. The *Gazette of India* of 17th January, 1908, duly announced the title, accordingly, as above. General Hutchinson's brief history of the regiment was exceedingly well got up, and most kindly he presented thirty-six copies of the booklet for the officers of both battalions.

The close of the year 1907 saw the retirement on pension of Hon. Captain Subadar-Major Chamu Sing Burathoki, I.O.M., Sardar Bahadur, after close on thirty-five years' service with the first battalion. He enlisted on the 21st of January, 1873, became a jemadar in 1886 and subadar-major in 1892. His war record included Afghanistan, 1878-80; Burmah, 1886-87; Lushai, 1888-89; Tirah, 1897-98; Waziristan, 1901-02. In Tirah he won the Order of Merit for gallantry on the 13th of December, 1897, and in Lushai he was most favourably reported on for good work with his signallers.

During his whole service this subadar-major maintained an absolutely clean record and was frequently commended for most efficient performance of his duties. He was always of the greatest help to his commanding officers. Col. Rose, in his farewell order, placed on record his opinion that the good reputation held by the battalion was, in no small measure, due to the zeal, capability and discretion of Subadar-Major Chamu Sing.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE MEERUT RIFLE MEETING : COLONEL HUGH
ROSE : GURKHA OFFICERS IN ENGLAND : GEORGE
OMMANNEY : CORONATION DURBAR : COLONEL
W. H. SAVAGE : SUBADAR-MAJOR SINGBIR GHALE

IN 1907, Lance-Naick Dalbahadar Nagarkoti of the second battalion, in winning the championship of the Indian Army at the central rifle meeting at Meerut (B.P.R.A.), with an aggregate of 305 points, gained for the regiment an honour and a distinction never achieved before or since. The same year Naick Tikaram Rana, also of the second battalion, won a silver cup for the best aggregate in the practice match series, which just precedes the championship. These splendid performances at the Indian Bisley, in conjunction with the second battalion's victory in the "Meerut Cup" the year before (with the first battalion tying for second place and only five points behind), are evidence of the proficiency gained by the regiment in rifle shooting.

Shortly before his seven years' tenure of command expired, Col. Hugh Rose, the commandant of the first battalion, was appointed A.Q.M.G. Lucknow division and was succeeded on 15th April, 1908, by Lieut-Col. W. H. Savage. It is no exaggeration to say that Col. Rose was one of the best commandants the battalion ever possessed ; it is doubtful if there was a better one in all India. A man of quiet manner and even demeanour, his knowledge of training, of country and of interior economy, combined with his commonsense view of looking at things, had a very beneficial effect on all those working under him and contributed in a large degree to the extremely efficient state to which he brought his battalion before he left it.

In September of the following year (1909) the first battalion took its turn for a twelvemonth's sojourn in Chitral. At Camp Maluakhan on the march down to Ramnagar, where the unit was to entrain, a tragic occurrence, resulting in the death of Capt. R. C. Jackson, the Adjutant, deprived the regiment of one of its best officers. A week after the unit's arrival in Chitral Lieut.-Col. Savage

had to return to India, and eventually to England, on one year's leave on very urgent private affairs. His brother officers profoundly sympathised with this piece of ill-fortune to a keen sportsman, who had looked forward for years to this El Dorado for the ardent *shikari*. The battalion returned to Almora on the 4th November, 1910.

But the British officers were not solely engaged in sport during their stay in Chitral, for, besides their ordinary duties, it is recorded that the thanks of the Chief of the General Staff were conveyed to them, in December 1910, for other activities. All the routes in Chitral and the surrounding hills were traversed and existing reports amended. Accompanying the documents to Simla were a series of photographs which were pronounced by the General Staff to be of much interest.

The years 1910 and 1911 were remarkable for the fact that for the first time Gurkha officers of the 3rd G.R. were deputed to England.

Subadar-Major Singbir Ghale, Bahadur, of the second battalion, was the first to go in March 1910, having been selected as one of King Edward VII's four Gurkha orderlies for that year. The King died on the 6th of May, and these Gurkha officers shared the honour, with the officers of the Grenadier Guards, of guarding the body during the lying in state. They subsequently attended the obsequies at Windsor, and later on acted as orderlies to King George. Subadar-Major Singbir was presented to Queen Alexandra, who gave him a jewelled scarf-pin and autographed photographs of herself and his late Majesty. The Subadar-Major and his batman were also decorated with the Victorian medal.

Then in May 1911, this Gurkha officer went to England again with the Indian contingent for the coronation. Indeed, four Gurkha officers of the 3rd, accompanied by four orderlies, were deputed on this occasion, the other three being, Subadar-Major Gunjbir Ale and Subadar Parbir Thapa of the first and Subadar Gambhir Sing Gurung of the second battalion. The whole eight of them were presented with coronation medals by King George. It was just at this time that the regiment was granted the cypher of Queen Alexandra instead of the royal and imperial cypher borne since 1907.

Every Gurkha would like to go to England, therefore the eight mentioned above were very lucky. Unfortunately, the ban prescribed by Nepal against voyages overseas—on account of the danger of neglecting, and the difficulty of strictly maintaining, all caste observances—tends to get stricter every year. It is true that any inhabitant of Nepal, crossing the *Kalapani* (black waters of the sea),

can receive a special dispensation, on return, by means of *Pani pathya* (purification ceremony) ; but His Highness the Maharajah seems, of late years, to be less and less inclined to consult his supreme religious authority about granting this exemption. Active service by order of the Indian Government makes the consent of the Nepal Government a different matter.

Not only does every Gurkha long to go to England, but he wishes, above all things, to see *London*. He thinks the world of our great capital and the "bridge that breaks in half," as he describes the Tower Bridge. Every wounded man, evacuated in 1914-15 from the western front to England, inquired at once if he would see London. To keep him happy and contented he was always told he would. But sometimes he did not ; for example :

The ladies of the regiment interested themselves greatly in all wounded Gurkhas. Many of the 3rd were sent to the New Forest and made very comfortable. In the summer of 1915 Mrs. Vincent Ormsby paid her first visit to see them. The men welcomed her warmly ; but, knowing Gurkhas as she did, it was manifest they were not entirely content—there was something on their mind. With much patience, the lady tried to ascertain the reason. Was it food trouble ? No. Was it financial ? Not in the least. Were there any unwelcome restrictions ? None. Then, one who had been their batman at Almora, blurted out :

"We are now convalescent and were promised we should see London. What then are we doing in this jungle ?"

If report speaks truly, Mrs. "Vin" took the whole lot up to London at her own expense and showed them many "sights." Anyway, it would be quite like her to do so, for she has a very large heart and is devoted to Gurkhas.

Speaking of Mrs. Ormsby is a reminder of the fact that just a year before Singbir Ghale paid his second visit to England, her husband, "Vin," took over the command of the second battalion from George Ommanney at Lansdowne. The latter had been brought in to succeed Wheatley, as previously mentioned in Chapter XV, and had carried out all his Gurkha soldiering with the 1st at Dharmasala. It was remarkable, however, from the moment he took up his command until the day he vacated, with what zeal and enthusiasm he adopted the 3rd Gurkhas as his very own. Soon after joining he originated the idea of the Ahmed Khel day, inter-battalion musketry competition, *vide* Appendix 12. Col. Ommanney died in London on the 21st of March, 1918.

In connection with Col. Ommanney, it is interesting to record that in the year 1912 there was formally opened at Lansdowne the

“Nellie Ommanney Hospital” for women and children of the second battalion. This building was a gift from Mr. and Miss Beach in memory of their late sister, Mrs. George Ommanney. As the section hospital adjoining it was closed down during the War, thus depriving it of the services of a medical officer, the edifice was sold to Government in 1925 with the consent of the donors. The proceeds (Rs. 8,624) were invested in Government stock for the benefit of the “Nellie Ommanney Fund” for women and children.

In the month of November 1911 both battalions proceeded to Delhi for the Coronation Durbar. The first battalion was brigaded with the 4th Worcesters, 16th Rajputs and 2/10th Gurkhas in the 21st Brigade; the second battalion joined the 20th Brigade composed of 1st South Lancs., first and second battalions Garhwal Rifles and 2/3rd Gurkhas. There were many brilliant ceremonies, in all of which the units took part. It was a great joy to the Gurkhas to see, and at time to be quite close to, the much venerated “*Badshah*” and his consort. Delighted were they, too, at the prominence of their old friend, Pensioned Subadar and Hon. Lieut. Balbir Rana, Sirdar Bahadur, late of the 1/3rd. He had been selected for the appointment of “State Paraphernalia Bearer,” and his duties consisted mainly of holding the large State umbrella over Their Majesties at all functions, for which he received both the Durbar and Victorian Medals.

The next spring the second battalion was in great form on the football field, for, under the leadership of Lieut. Tuite-Dalton, the battalion team won both the Gurkha Brigade and Garhwal Brigade challenge cups.

Col. W. H. Savage vacated his command of the first battalion in April 1913 after just twenty-six years with the third Gurkhas, all of which were spent in regimental duty. To sever his intimate connection with Almora must have been as great a sorrow to him as it was to those he left for whom he had done so well. He was succeeded by Lieut.-Col. A. C. Hickley, another officer wedded to the corps.

A month later the second battalion lost to pension their distinguished Subadar-Major Singbir, after 35½ years' service with the regiment. He retired full of honours and was most fitly given a ceremonial parade at Lansdowne, when the whole battalion marched past before him. From the time when, as a Lance-Naick in Almora in 1887, he helped to start serious football, to the day he departed, Singbir always “played the game.” He was a typical Gurkha of the select Ghale clan. Col. Ormsby in a farewell order dated the 31st of May, 1913, did him full justice, and expressed “the hope of every

officer and man of the battalion, past and present, that he may long live and enjoy to the full, the care, the honours and the dignity which he has so deservedly won."

But Honorary Captain Subadar-Major Singbir Ghale, Sirdar Bahadur, returned to the depot at Lansdowne after the outbreak of the Great War and died there while still in harness.

CHAPTER XIX

THE GREAT WAR

FRANCE: THE SECOND BATTALION

THE year 1914 started gloomily in India. Sedition was rife in many districts, especially Bengal. So much so that the Government concentrated a large body of troops at Dacca in January, mainly British. Lieut.-General Sir Robert Scallon commanded, and the venture was a great success. The people had been warned by seditious extremists that the British soldier was a cruel and lascivious monster of the worst type. His advent was dreaded and his first appearances greeted with sullen looks and passive resentment. But his spell is so magical that he soon made friends, and the departure of the troops, after a month, was genuinely regretted.

In February, General Sir Beauchamp Duff, formerly of the 9th Gurkhas, succeeded Sir O'Moore Creagh as Commander-in-Chief. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst had entered on his fourth year of office as Viceroy.

In the British Isles, this same year there was a strange uneasy feeling abroad. Ever since the Agadir incident in the year 1911, the Imperial General Staff had been striving to convince the Prime Minister and his Cabinet that Germany's aim was world conquest; that she intended soon to act; that the meaning of this was world war; that Great Britain inevitably must be committed. Mr. Lloyd George, at first an unbeliever, was at last converted and took other members of the Cabinet with him, but not the Prime Minister. Still Germany made no move, and there was so much excitement in England in the spring over the Home Rule trouble in Ireland, that more serious matters still were temporarily disregarded.

Then at the end of June came the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, with his consort, at Serajevo. This created a political crisis in Europe of the highest magnitude. Events moved rapidly, and after violation of Belgian neutrality by German troops, Great Britain declared war on Germany on the 4th of August, 1914.

Reuter's cables at the end of July and beginning of August caused feverish excitement in India. Rumours of every kind filled the air,

some probable, others quite impossible. On the 31st of July all leave was stopped beyond forty-eight hours' recall. Five days later the Secretary of State for India cabled the Viceroy, approving the dispatch of an Army Corps from India to France composed of the 3rd (Lahore) and 6th (Poona) Divisions. At the same time he made suggestions regarding the disposal of the large number of officers of all ranks and services who were at home on leave. His views were that a certain percentage should be permitted to remain at home for duty under the War Office. This varied considerably from a high percentage in the cavalry to a smaller one of infantry regimental officers. Those holding staff appointments in India were ordered to rejoin immediately.

Shortly afterwards the 7th (Meerut) Division was substituted for the 6th Division, and Lieut.-General Sir James Willcocks was appointed Corps Commander. This change in Divisions is often attributed to some fad of Lord Kitchener's, but a much more simple explanation can be found. In mobilisation schemes the 6th Division was always earmarked for Persia. When, therefore, the demand came for a brigade for Basra, (to be followed by the rest of a division), the Poona Division was told to supply it and was replaced in the force for France by the 7th Meerut Division.

The 7th Division ¹ meant the Garhwal Brigade, composed of the 2nd Leicesters, 2/3rd Gurkhas, and 1st and 2nd Bns. Garhwal Rifles.

Before relating the part taken by the 3rd Gurkhas in affairs on the Western front, one fact should be mentioned. This fact is that an excellent narrative of the services of the second battalion, from the day it left Lansdowne to the end of its fighting in France, was compiled by Major Tuite-Dalton. This officer was adjutant of the battalion in August 1914, and accompanied it to France. The existence of this record much simplifies the task of the present historian. Indeed, much of the detail is given in the adjutant's very words. When Col. C. S. Eastmead undertook, originally, to edit this history, Major Tuite-Dalton handed on his narrative for re-edition and inclusion, but the former found it so excellent that he typed it out practically unchanged.

On the 9th of August, 1914, orders were received at Lansdowne for the 2/3rd to mobilise. In the monsoon this is a very difficult matter for any Gurkha battalion to carry out at full strength, because so large a proportion of the men (about 240) are on furlough in Nepal. Communications in the interior of that country are primitive, and the numerous rivers are so swollen by the rains that the men are quite unable to get from one side to the other, often for some days. It

¹ For troops and commanders of the Indian Corps, see Appendix 2.

can have hardly escaped notice that in the many cases where both battalions of a Gurkha regiment have been in war brigades, only one has been ordered to mobilise in order that the other one may supply a large draft to complete to strength the unit warned.¹ In our case, the 1/3rd at Almora, on the 16th of August, provided a draft of four Gurkha officers and two hundred and fifteen other ranks to the second battalion and another of similar strength to the 2/8th Gurkhas.

As regards this particular time, there were other special difficulties. The mobilisation regulations in India were under process of reconstruction. Much detail was ambiguous, requiring continual reference to superior authority. An entirely new system of pay was just being introduced. This caused further complications. Still, in spite of these and similar difficulties, the battalion, warned on the 9th, was mobilised and ready to move by the evening of the 12th of August.

At the foot of the hills is the railway terminus of Kotdwara situated in the Terai. During the rains, and indeed up to early November, this is the most malarial spot in the world. To make the sojourn there as short as possible the regimental authorities earnestly requested that the men's arrival at Kotdwara and their entrainment should be practically simultaneous.

This was promised, and the first battalion draft reached Kotdwara on the 18th and the 2/3rd itself on the 21st August. So far so good, and much satisfaction was felt by the unit when it received orders on arrival to entrain for Karachi the next evening. A few hours later, however, these orders were cancelled, and for ten days the battalion remained under canvas in the Terai during the most malarious season of the year. It may be someone blundered or, more likely, the exigencies of the time made rail transport impossible. Be that as it may, one solid fact remains, namely, that in spite of precautionary quinine and other measures, scores of the men got saturated with malaria, making them thoroughly unfit for weeks and months.

Nor was this all, for there was another vexatious delay at Karachi. The battalion left Kotdwara in two trains on the 31st August. It arrived at Karachi on the 3rd September, but did not sail until the 21st. All people who know Karachi are aware of the fact that everyone who can do so gets away in September to avoid both heat and malaria. At the commencement of a war of vast magnitude discomforts are laughed at and hardships inevitable. Still, it is everything to have soldiers fit. Better staff work should have prevented so great a risk being taken. It was more than stupid to dump

¹ See Appendix 13 regarding the present training company maintained now to obviate this difficulty.

down hillmen, peculiarly susceptible to intermittent and remittent fever, for a total period of nearly a month, in places renowned for malaria. The result was unfortunate and far-reaching. Out of five British officers present at Kotdwara, four went down with fever, and the percentage of sick amongst the men was exceedingly high.

Not that the spirits of anyone were damped in the very least. All were most cheerful. Were they not going on service overseas, to take part in a war that seemed likely to be world-wide? Heaven only knew what the destination might be : the 7th Division appeared quite in the dark. The favourite guess was Egypt ; nobody, at first, dreamt of Indian troops going to France. So all was joy, and everyone in the highest spirits. Sea bathing, to men who had never seen salt water and were greatly surprised at the taste, was freely indulged in. There was only one misgiving, and that was lest these unaccountable delays should cause the unit to be too late for the war !

On the 16th September battalion headquarters and the left half battalion embarked on the s.s. *Ekma*. Not to sail, however, but just to move out into the dock. Rather bad for the mules, etc., whose legs swelled enormously. Worse for the men, as conditions on board were atrocious. The food was bad ; cooking facilities so inadequate that food preparations had to continue day and night, in order to give each man one hot meal a day. Latrine accommodation was wholly insufficient, and, worst of all, space was so confined that only about half the men could lie down at once. In fine weather it was better, as the upper decks could be utilised.

Yet no one was downhearted. Even the rank and file realised that this was a very big thing, straining the resources of the Empire to the utmost. But at the bottom of each little Gurkha heart was a sinking, which echoed the foreboding of his sahib : " If they do not hurry, we shall never arrive in time to fight."

At 8 a.m. on the 21st of September the *Ekma*, *Coconada* and ten other transports put out to sea from Karachi, escorted by H.M. ships *Dartmouth* and *Hardinge*. On the 23rd the remainder of the 7th Division, on board a convoy of some thirty vessels from Bombay, was sighted. The whole then steamed together to Suez. Not a word there about destination. It was not until the Division had left Port Said that each unit learnt it was bound for France.

Three officers,¹ who had been at home on leave when war was declared, joined up at Port Said. This completed the British officers of the battalion, with the exception of Lieut. W. G. Bagot-Chester, who had been detailed to command a small advanced party and left Lansdowne on the 12th of August. Since that date the battalion had

¹ Lieut.-Col. W. R. Brakspear, Major F. Manners Smith and Captain H. Bennett.

A list of the British officers of the 2/3rd Gurkhas in September 1914 is given below with date and place of casualties :

France	- - - - -	- -	28th April, 1917.
Lt.-Col. W. R. Brakspear, killed in France	- -	- -	25th Sept., 1915.
Major W. C. French, killed in France	- -	- -	10th March, 1915.
Major F. Manners Smith, killed in France	- -	- -	3rd Nov., 1914.
Major W. L. Dundas, wounded in France	- -	- -	19th Dec., 1914.
" severely wounded in France	- -	- -	10th March, 1915.

At the depot in Lansdowne were left :
 Captain C. A. B. Hamilton and Lieut. W. D. G. Batten.

After leaving Malta the convoy formation was abandoned and each ship made for Marseilles at full steam ahead. The *Ekma*, with battalion headquarters and the left wing aboard, was one of the first to arrive on the 12th of October. Some vessels did not reach the harbour until the next day.

But arrival in camp soon brought all ranks back to the stern

realities of warlike conditions. No tents were found pitched ; indeed, many were not received until next morning. The camp was sited in a hollow, and all night it rained heavily. More than that, the rain continued for the next few days. Everybody and everything was drenched. The ground soon became a quagmire and the tenacious and sticky mud adhered to boots, clothing and equipment. None knew it then, but this was only a precursor of the delights of waterlogged trenches. What everyone felt was, that the conditions were most unfavourable for the reorganisation, so necessary after a three weeks' voyage ; yet nobody grumbled. News from the front was *nil*. No information could be obtained of when, or where, the unit would be required to fight. The suspense was terrible and increased the uneasiness, which still prevailed, lest the 2/3rd Gurkhas should be too late to enter the war.

At 2 a.m. on the 19th of October the battalion left Marseilles by rail for Orleans, reaching there at 6 a.m. on the 21st. The whole of the 7th (Meerut) Division, in three lines of brigades, was encamped in Les Groues, Orleans, and remained there five days. A lot of route marching was indulged in, and the troops generally smartened up, but heavy rain again made things difficult. The Corps Commander took the opportunity of this halt to inspect the 7th Division.

On the 26th of October the unit entrained again. This time for an unknown destination ; but it detrained at Lillers at 4.30 a.m. on the 28th. The rail journey provided a new experience. The first and third class carriages were replaced by large covered wagons. This was found much more comfortable, with ample room to spread out bedding, and so sleep at ease. At Lillers orders were received to proceed by route march about eight miles north-east to Calonne.

Up to this time no one in the battalion, except possibly the C.O., had the least idea of what was happening anywhere. It was not known how far distant was the battle front, or what role had been assigned to the Indian corps. The prevalent idea was that at least a week would be allotted to the unit to learn and practice the nature of the warfare then taking place. That the situation was desperate no one imagined. It was a revelation to hear afterwards that only a thin line of British soldiers, utterly worn out by weeks of incessant fighting, was holding back the enemy. An enemy, too, vastly superior in numbers, and with troops still fresh for any adventure. A foe with ample reserves and the necessary armament for trench warfare. Supported, too, by a far stronger and more suitable artillery, infinitely better supplied with ammunition, than that opposed to them.

All this was soon to be realised, however, for at Calonne the battalion received orders to relieve the K.O.S.B.s in the front line



trenches covering Richebourg l'Avoué on the night of the 29th October.

Period—29th of October to the end of the year 1914

The general situation was now briefly as follows : subsequent to the operations of the Allied Forces during the retreat from Mons, terminating with the German defeat on the Marne, each side commenced a series of turning movements on the north flank, in an endeavour to outflank the communications of the other. Each new attempt met with a corresponding effort of the other side, which merely served to prolong the battle front and continued to do so until the north flank of both armies rested on the sea.

The Germans at this time had the mass of their armies on the French front, and had not yet begun to draw off troops to oppose the Russian advance. Hence, being much superior to the Allies in numbers and in armament, they were in a position to try to break through our now continuous and attenuated line. Where the Germans could hurl division after division of fresh troops into the battle, the Allies, having no general reserves left, had to hold on with tired, and continually diminishing, forces.

A month later, in November, the pressure of the Russians began to make itself felt. The withdrawal of German troops from the French front eased the critical situation and enabled the Allied Forces to reorganise and recoup.

The last great effort on the part of the Germans to break through in 1914 is known as the First Battle of Ypres. The fighting took place from Ypres, inclusive, to La Bassée, inclusive, and continued without respite from early in October to about the 23rd November, 1914.

Such was briefly the situation when the Indian Corps was thrown into the battle front.

The Lahore Division (less the Sirhind Brigade) arrived in France on the 26th September and, after a fortnight's rest at Orleans, reached the battle front on the 21st October. On the 28th October the arrival of the Meerut Division in the front line enabled the Indian Corps to take over the trenches of the 2nd British Corps, which extended from Givenchy, exclusive, in the south to Rouges Bancs, just north of Fromelles, in the north.

The line taken over by the 2/3rd Gurkhas from the K.O.S.B.s covered two sides of a large re-entrant in front of Richebourg l'Avoué. The fire trenches were not continuous, and there were no communication trenches leading up to them. On the right were the 2nd Leicesters, on the left the 1/39th Garhwal Rifles and beyond them the 2/39th. The Bareilly Brigade carried on from the right of the

Leicesters, while the Dehra Dun Brigade prolonged the line on the left of the 2/39th.

Early in the morning of the 29th October it commenced to rain heavily. During the day the battalion marched from Calonne to Les Glatigmes, under the command of Lieut.-Col. W. R. Brakspear. Lieut.-Col. Ormsby, in the meantime, proceeded to brigade headquarters to learn all details of the forthcoming relief. As soon as it was really dark the C.O., Adjutant and all the company commanders proceeded to the front line and walked round the trenches, accompanied by officers of the K.O.S.B.s.

The ground was muddy and very slippery, but the night was quiet ; only an occasional sniper fired aimlessly into the void. It was impossible to get a clear idea of the situation of the trenches, or of the exact direction of the enemy. Had the Germans seriously attacked that night, the battalion would have fought under a great disadvantage.

As soon as company ¹ commanders had completed their inspection officers returned to lead up their men, who had been left about one mile in rear. The trenches were too small to hold both battalions at the same time, so the K.O.S.B.s arranged to lie out on the parapet while the Gurkhas filed into the positions vacated. This took a considerable time, and the K.O.S.B.s marched off with barely time to get out of view of the German trenches before daylight.

No one slept that first night. For one thing it was too cold. Secondly, trench conditions were quite misunderstood. For instance, it was not realised that the warfare had become stationary, and that the Allies were, for the time being, on the defensive. Officers and other ranks had come up to the trenches in light fighting order, with greatcoats only. The trenches were *not* trenches at all, as the men subsequently knew them. In many places they were not more than three feet deep. There were a few, but very few, so-called dug-outs where men could rest. The heavy rain had filled the trenches with mud and water.

The only communications were natural ditches and a few hedges along which everyone crept, and gathered much mud in doing so. Battalion headquarters was at first much better off than occupants of the trenches, as it was established in a house—partly demolished

¹ *N.B.*—Although the four company system, with its sixteen platoons, was in force in British infantry, having been introduced on the 1st of October, 1913, by Army Order 323 of that year, this was not the case in the Indian infantry. With them—although imperfect attempts were made here and there—the eight company system, arranged in four double companies, was not superseded officially until the publication of Indian Army Order 684 of 1916.

by shell fire, it is true, but still half a house. It was situated on the Rue du Bois, some 800 yards in rear of the front line.

Dawn was indeed welcome the next morning, for with it came the sun and warmth, and it was possible to get some idea of the nature of the position which it was the lot of the 2/3rd to hold. The German line opposite was, in most places, 200 to 300 yards distant. The country was very open and generally free from hedges. Except for a few trees on the right flank, "No Man's Land" was quite open.

Hostile artillery, directed by aeroplanes flying overhead, soon began to search for reserves in likely houses or behind trees and orchards. All ranks quickly realised the danger of moving about in the open. Telephone wires got broken and had to be repaired by the signallers under fire. During such breaks, runners had to cross the open ground between headquarters and the front line, as the brigade continually required returns, which could only be completed after many inquiries in the trenches. In short, conditions were difficult.


The battalion was holding considerably over 1,000 yards of frontage with less than 600 men, and it was well known that there was no one behind. This was not the "five men to one yard of frontage" which the text-books had laid down as the safe minimum.

However, the fates were kind to the 2/3rd during these first momentous days. Shell fire there was in plenty—in fact, headquarters were soon shelled out of their half a house—but no serious infantry attack was made on the trenches. The Germans were busy sapping towards our line, and we were occupied in improving our trenches and communications. Heavy shell fire and lack of cover forced battalion headquarters to shift position time after time.


On the 31st October Lieut.-Col. Brakspear was ordered to take command of a brigade reserve. Next day, orders were received for half the battalion to be withdrawn into this reserve. To do this, the trench system had to be remodelled. This was accomplished in the manner shown roughly on the two following diagrams (p. 108) :

The whole of No. 2 D.C. trench and part of No. 1 D.C. trench were evacuated. A fresh position some 400 yards in rear was dug near the road, and the interval closed by a "V"-shaped barbed wire entanglement, erected by the sappers and miners, which was to be covered by machine guns. This was called Dead Cow Trench.

These alterations took four nights to complete and, at 4 a.m. on the 5th November, No. 2 D.C. took over from No. 1 D.C., which was withdrawn into brigade reserve, while No. 3 D.C., relieved No. 4 D.C., two platoons of which occupied Dead Cow Trench, the other two joining the brigade reserve.



Stanford's Geog. Estab. London.



**BRIGADE RESERVE AT
JUNCTION OF RUE DU BOIS
AND RUE DE L'ÉPINETTE.**

Stanford's Geog. Estab. London.

On the 3rd November, while this work was in progress, the battalion lost the services of Major Manners Smith. He was killed by a sniper while walking along the front line trench. His death was a serious blow to the unit, for he was a born leader of men. Known amongst his brother officers since he joined as "The Shifter," his keen, cool and fearless nature made him universally loved and respected by all ranks of the regiment, with which he had served since 1895.

Capt. Alexander was sent to command No. 2 Double Company in his place.

During the next few days both battalions of the 39th Garhwal Rifles came in for an undue amount of attention from the Germans, who attacked them in force on the 7th November, and after being repulsed with considerable loss, subjected their trenches to very heavy shelling. A broad ditch, running almost straight for about 100 yards, formed the means of communication between the two battalions. It was a weak spot, which the Germans soon recognised, for they commenced sapping towards it. On the night of the 9-10th November Major Taylor and a party of about 100 of the Garhwal Rifles raided this sap. This raid was a complete success. The Germans were surprised and fled, leaving a few prisoners. It was found to be impossible, however, to fill in the trench, which was fully eight feet deep and strongly revetted. Major Taylor accordingly withdrew his force. The enemy soon reoccupied the trench and their sapping operations continued. Stronger measures were now considered desirable and arrangements were made for a raid by the half battalion 2/3rd, which was in brigade reserve.

The attack was ordered for 9 p.m. on the 13th November. The half battalion, after taking the sap, was to block the communication trenches running from it to the German main line. A party of sappers and miners would then advance and demolish the sap. The whole operation was timed to conclude by twelve midnight, when our artillery was to bombard the German trenches to cover the withdrawal of the party.

The adventure was unfortunate from the very start. To prevent any possibility of the enemy discovering the project in hand, the C.O. received orders that the attacking companies were on no account to pass a given spot before 7 p.m. At this spot and time a guide from the 39th Garhwal Rifles would meet them and guide them, via a communication trench, to the aforesaid broad ditch, from which the attack was to be launched. By a piece of ill-fortune this communication trench proved to be but a sunken alley in which, during some previous fighting, manholes had been dug for cover from artillery

fire. These holes presented no serious obstacle to runners using the trench as a means of communication by day. But now, owing to recent rain, they had become mud traps and in the darkness formed serious obstacles to the assaulting companies in battle order. Progress was, therefore, very slow, with the result that, instead of having (as had been anticipated) over half an hour for the companies to line up and get into position for the assault, they had barely five minutes.

A salvo by our guns was to be the signal for the assault, which was to be made silently. Lieut.-Col. Brakspear was in command of the assaulting troops, strength about one company, and had with him Capts. Alexander and Bennett and Lieut. McSwiney. Major Taylor, with a small party of the 39th Garhwal Rifles, was ordered to advance at the same time and cover the left flank of the attack.

Battalion headquarters, with whom were Lieut.-Col. Ormsby, Major Drummond and Capt. Tuite-Dalton, Adjutant, were established in the ditch behind the centre of the assault. Major Drummond had joined that morning from England and had only been allowed to be present with headquarters, at his own earnest request, to gain some experience of trench warfare.

Immediately on arrival at the ditch, the assaulting parties had to climb out and lie in the open to await the signal for the assault. There was no time to ensure that the men had a clear understanding of the direction of the attack, and the Germans were keeping up a persistent fire from their trenches, rather pointing to the fact that they expected something out of the ordinary. The signal for the assault came almost at once, and soon after a cheer was heard on the right flank. It is not known by whom the cheer was started, but it was probably an effort on the part of some N.C.O. to collect his men around him. Almost simultaneously with the advance, the Germans opened a terrific rifle fire, while two machine guns, aided by a searchlight, swept across the front and concentrated on any grouping of men.

This resulted in the advance being thinned to such an extent almost immediately, that many Gurkhas found themselves alone in the darkness. The attack was, for the most part, held up, except on the right flank. This was the party under Lieut. McSwiney, who had orders to block the enemy's communication trench. Major Taylor and his party of Garhwalis on the left flank disappeared into the darkness, and the majority were killed, including Major Taylor. Capt. Bennett and a party he led suffered a similar fate. Capt H. Bennett was the second of the battalion's British officers to fall in the war and was a great loss. His gallantry on this occasion, when he charged to his death, was accentuated by the fact that he laboured

under the great disadvantage of short sight, necessitating the use of spectacles in the dark. His body was never recovered.

Lieut.-Col. Brakspear, in the centre, fell into a shell-hole and was severely shaken. Nothing daunted, however, he carried on until he reached the German trenches, where happily he found a few of our men under Subadar Dalkesar Gurung, of Capt. Alexander's party.

Capt. Alexander himself was then lying on the parapet of the enemy's trench with a shattered ankle, but still able to shout instructions to his men. Touch was soon gained with Lieut. McSwiney's party, and that officer, leaving his men to proceed with the blocking of the communication trench, joined Lieut.-Col. Brakspear to discuss the situation. It was decided to work along the trench to the left and endeavour to get into communication with Capt. Bennett and his party. In doing this, they soon ran into Germans who showed fight. After driving the enemy back along one or two bays of his trench, the party was held up by rifle fire on rounding a traverse. Lieut. McSwiney, without a moment's hesitation, sprang on to the top of the traverse to get at the Germans in the trench, but was immediately shot down, receiving a severe wound in his right side.

Lieut.-Col. Brakspear was now the only unwounded British officer left. Although feeling very shaky after his fall, he decided to go back himself and bring up men to clear the Germans out. Leaving Subadar Dalkesar to hold the portion of the trench he was occupying, Brakspear made his way back under heavy fire from the German main line, and eventually reached battalion headquarters, where he reported the situation.

Meanwhile no news had come in from the left flank, but the adjacent German fire at that point made it quite clear that the enemy's line there was still untaken. Lieut.-Col. Ormsby decided to launch a fresh attack against the centre and left.

Lieut.-Col. Brakspear again led this attack, and Major Drummond, at his own urgent request, was detailed to assist him. But by now the Germans were very much on the "qui vive," and the searchlight prevented any body of men mounting the bank of the ditch without being seen. Major Drummond was found by that pitiless beam as he was climbing out into the open, and the machine guns concentrated on him. Thus died this gallant officer, within twelve hours of joining the battalion.

Still the Gurkhas went forward, in spite of the ruthless fire, until Col. Brakspear found he had only four men left. This made the success of the venture impossible. The attack was thus again held up.

By this time it was close on twelve midnight—the hour when the

whole operation was to have been concluded and the divisional artillery were in orders to bombard the captured trench. Subadar Dalkesar and his handful of men had successfully repulsed all attempts of the Germans to retake that portion of the trench. Lieut. McSwiney had sufficiently recovered from the shock of his wound to realise that, Lieut.-Col. Brakspear, having failed to return, and the hour for the bombardment having almost arrived, it was essential to withdraw from the captured trench as soon as possible. The evacuation of the wounded was carried out successfully, Lieut. McSwiney being assisted back by two men with the last of them. On nearing the 39th Garhwal Rifles trenches, he learnt that a special carrying party, told off by him to bring in Capt. Alexander, had, for some reason, returned without him. In spite of much loss of blood from his wound, and the fact that the German trench had been completely evacuated by our troops, he insisted on at once returning there to look for Alexander. Off he went immediately, taking with him Subadar Dalkesar and a few men. Luckily he found the trench still unoccupied. All along it he stumbled, calling and calling for Alexander. There was no reply and no trace of him, so McSwiney was forced to return empty handed. It was only a matter of just managing to regain the battalion's trenches, when he collapsed from loss of blood. It subsequently transpired that Capt. Alexander had refused to be taken back until some wounded Gurkhas near him had been removed ; also, that he had been discovered and captured by the Germans before any rescue by men of the 2/3rd was possible.

It is rather difficult to estimate the true bearings of incidents occurring during the confusion of a night attack, but the regiment may well be proud of the bravery, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice which inspired the actions of Lieut. McSwiney, Capt. Alexander, Lieut.-Col. Brakspear and Subadar Dalkesar Gurung on that tragic night. Capt. Bennett and Major Drummond, with thirty-five Gurkha ranks, made the supreme sacrifice, and, besides the two British officers, thirty-one Gurkha ranks were wounded, or some fifty per cent. of the troops engaged.

The shattered half-battalion was withdrawn into brigade reserve. Capt. Lodwick rejoined from the command of the brigade machine guns to take over No. 2 Double Company.

On his way up from brigade headquarters this officer met with an adventure which caused much merriment. Some days before, the 2/3rd headquarters' section discovered a cellar, in which were several large stone jars of the most seductive gin. To prevent the possibility of its proving too great a temptation, the C.O. had the major portion of this enticing liquor poured away, leaving only sufficient for the

officers' use, and the entertainment of any visitors. The fame of this gin soon spread to the front line, and it was remarkable how many officers thought it advisable to come in to headquarters to discuss the situation, or to make a personal report of the progress of work in hand. At brigade headquarters, Capt. Lodwick, too, had heard of the famous beverage, but had been given no opportunity of sampling it. The day he arrived the battalion headquarters was undergoing one of its many moves. Seeing a mess orderly carrying an inviting looking bottle, Lodwick, asking no questions, seized it and took a copious draught. A horrible and choking sensation, followed by much sickness, quickly made him realise he had made a mistake. The bottle was full of kerosene oil !

The next nine days were spent by the battalion in the same trenches—working all night and getting snatches of sleep at intervals during the day. It was a most wearisome existence.

On the 15th November Major D. C. Young, 2/4th Gurkha Rifles, joined and took over command of No. 2 D.C. On the 16th, Subadar Kharakbahadur Thakur, representing the battalion, attended the funeral of Lord Roberts. On the 17th, Major J. G. Edwardes, of the first battalion, reported his arrival and was posted to No. 3 Double Company.

On the 22nd November the battalion was relieved by the 15th Sikhs and withdrawn into billets at Lacouture, about three miles in rear of the front line. The prospect of a rest and plenty of sleep was welcome. The billets were reached soon after 11 p.m. and the rest of the night was spent in settling down. The following day the men were busy washing their clothes and their bodies, which badly needed it, and in cleaning their accoutrements. At 4 p.m. orders were received for the battalion to move as quickly as possible to Gorre, about 3½ miles south. Let us paint the picture :

Three weeks' tireless effort, day and night, with at last some prospect of a few nights' sleep ; everything unpacked and opened out, with all equipment taken to pieces for cleaning purposes ; newly washed clothes only half dry and a tasty hot meal in contemplation. No wonder indeed that the order to move off again at a moment's notice, before even one night in bed had been enjoyed, came as a bombshell to all. However, it was obvious that the necessity was one of extreme urgency, and the speed with which the men got ready for action, in spite of their physical weariness, was only further testimony to the wonderful moral and *esprit de corps* actuating all ranks. These indeed formed the foundation of this unit's successes throughout the Great War.

Orders to move were received at 4 p.m. By 4.45 p.m. three

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double companies had marched. The fourth followed soon afterwards, having been at the disadvantage of occupying billets distant nearly one mile from headquarters.

On arrival at Gorre, orders were received to report to Brigadier-General Egerton, commanding the Ferozepore Brigade.

The situation which had necessitated the call of the battalion from its well-earned and much-needed rest was briefly as follows :

At dawn on the 23rd November the Germans had attacked a portion of our line in front of Festubert. At the time of the attack the process of relief of the Meerut Division by the Lahore Division was still in progress, and brigade commanders were in the act of handing and taking over. The enemy had some success with the aid of bombs and trench mortars, with which our troops were not then properly equipped. He managed indeed, by the aid of the same armament, to turn the flanks of the units on either side. This enabled him to enlarge his gains, until he occupied the front of about three battalions. In the subsequent recovery of these positions the 2/3rd was not asked to give more than its moral support in reserve. But the 1/39th Garhwal Rifles and the Garhwal Brigade covered themselves with glory by their brilliant share in the success.

The battalion, after passing under the command of four different brigade commanders, was given a portion of the line to hold on the 24th November. Relieved again on the night of the 25-26th, it marched back to its former billets at Lacouture, having had no sleep for three nights.

Then, for a week, the unit was kept out of the line in these billets. Every effort was made during this and subsequent periods of rest behind the line to smarten up the men, and thoroughly to clean all equipment, etc. But it was no easy matter. Every night large working parties of a strength never less than two strong companies were ordered off to different parts of the trenches. Let it be noted, therefore, that when "rests" behind the line are referred to, it must be understood that the only form of "rest" that is implied is rest from the mental strain of being actually in the trenches and at grips with the enemy. Further, that the rest billets were well within range of the German field artillery, and not infrequently came in for a share of their attention.

On the 1st December, the battalion sent 100 men, with Majors Edwardes and Young, to take part in the inspection by His Majesty King George.

When the 2/3rd returned to trench life on the 3rd December it was to take over, from the 1st Manchesters and 15th Sikhs, the line previously occupied on the Rue du Bois, but with an additional

hundred yards of frontage. The units on each flank were the same as on the 29th of October.

Ordinary trench life was then continued, but with conditions slightly improved. As more experience was gained, as to the degree of comfort it was advisable to maintain, so the men benefited. Decent dug-out accommodation and more suitable communication trenches were the first matters duly attended to. The weather, however, was not so good, and the water level was rising. This necessitated much work in the construction and completion of elaborate drainage schemes.

The number of casualties in action, and from sickness, was a constant drain on the strength of the unit, and it was a welcome sight to all when the first reinforcement of ninety-nine rank and file arrived from India on the 8th December. With it came two British officers from the first battalion, Capts. H. H. Grigg and A. G. Stone, and its own Subadar-Major, Gambhir Sing Gurung, who had been on furlough when war broke out. Lieut. G. T. Fisher, also from the first battalion, reported his arrival next day, and on the 10th December, Major Edwardes was transferred to the 2/8th Gurkha Rifles.

On the 12th December, Capt. M. C. McWatters reported his arrival to take over medical charge from Lieut. Black, R.A.M.C., who had been temporarily doing the work, owing to the permanent medical officer, Major E. H. B. Stanley, having to go sick with a sprained ankle.

Major A. Young, 1st Gurkha Rifles, Brigade Major to the Garhwal Brigade, was killed on the 13th December by a stray shot behind the 39th Garhwal Rifles lines. This officer was an enormous loss, for he had gained the esteem and affection of the whole brigade by his capable and untiring work on its behalf.

"Verrey Light" pistols were first issued to the battalion on the 14th December.

On the 15th *idem*, the 1/39th Garhwal Rifles made an unsuccessful attack, in which the 2/3rd, by request, co-operated with fire action.

For quite a considerable period the British forces had been mainly on the defensive. At the same time, the strength and persistence of the German attacks had materially decreased. With the double object of preventing the enemy from withdrawing troops for the Russian front, and for the maintenance of moral, G.H.Q. issued orders that local offensive operations were to be carried out by certain formations, of which the Indian Corps was one.

On the 19th December, the reserve companies, under Majors

Dundas and Young and Capt. Stone, were ordered to support the 2nd Leicesters in a raid on the enemy's trenches. The Leicesters were on the right of the Garhwal Brigade, next to two companies of the 2/3rd. On the right of the Leicesters came the Dehra Dun Brigade, with the 6th Jats occupying the left. Further to the right came the Bareilly and then the Sirhind Brigades. Should the sally of the Leicesters prove successful, it was to be followed up by an advance by the Dehra Dun Brigade from their position in the "Orchard." Major Young, with C, D, and H Companies, remained in the support trenches during the action, but G Company, under Major Dundas, followed immediately in rear of the Leicesters' attack at 3.15 a.m.

This officer was soon called upon to capture a section of the German trench, which formed a gap between two parties of the Leicesters. Carrying out his assault with dash and vigour, Major Dundas then joined hands with the right body of the Leicesters. There was still a gap, however, between him and the left party. To rectify this, he proceeded at once to work along the trench to the left and drove the enemy, with some loss, out of the nearest portion. Then, quite suddenly, a machine gun opened fire, at a range of less than a hundred yards, and from a position which enfiladed the whole of the captured portion of the trench. The enemy surprise caused G Company heavy casualties, Major Dundas himself being wounded. In spite of that, however, he put up a traverse of sandbags without delay, thus obtaining some protection from the enfilade fire, and ordered up the bombing party, only to find it had gone with another detachment. Soon after daylight the whole trench was subjected to a severe bombing, and the right body of the Leicesters received orders to rejoin their company. By this time Dundas had lost almost fifty per cent. of his small command. The withdrawal of the Leicesters making his position untenable, he also was forced to go back. The retirement was a difficult business, but he managed it most successfully, even to the evacuation of his wounded.

Major Young, with the other three companies, remained all day in support of the main body of the Leicesters. These troops were holding the German trench they had captured still further to the left, and Young was ordered to take part in a fresh attack at dark. This assault had, however, to be cancelled at the last moment, as the Dehra Dun Brigade, on the right, reported that they were unable to co-operate, owing to an intensive bombardment of their line with trench mortars during the afternoon. The abandonment of this attack necessitated the withdrawal of the Leicesters from their exposed position.

The following message was sent to the Division by the Corps Commander :

" I congratulate you on the good work done last night, which shows what can be done by enterprise and care. Please send my hearty congratulations to Major-General Keary, the Leicesters and the 2/3rd Gurkhas, for their gallant behaviour."

Our casualties in this action, out of fifty-six engaged, were :

Wounded : Major Dundas and sixteen men.

Missing : Ten men.

For some days after the Leicesters' attack, on the 19th December, the situation was most precarious. Strong enemy counter-attacks had forced back both the Bareilly and Sirhind Brigades.

The following very brief description of the position of affairs shows of what vital importance it was that the 2/3rd, although neither actually called into action nor themselves attacked, should hold on to their trenches during this critical period.

In accordance with the scheme of local attacks the Lahore Division carried out an attack opposite Givenchy. Although this was at first successful, the positions gained had eventually to be evacuated owing to the German superiority in bombs and trench mortars. The Germans then counter-attacked the Lahore Division along the greater portion of its front ; also along the fronts of the Bareilly and Dehra Dun Brigades. They had mined, successfully, the British trenches round Givenchy, and the 2nd Gurkhas' trenches in front of the Orchard. The occupants, when blown out of them, unwittingly but inevitably caused gaps in the line, which left the units on either side with their flanks in the air. The Germans, with their overwhelming superiority in bombs, enlarged these gaps by bombing outwards. The Meerut Division managed to keep an unbroken front, although it was badly indented at the Orchard. As a result of this indentation, the whole of the battalion's communications were swept by rifle and machine gun fire. In addition, the German artillery was very active.

During this period, which lasted until the 22nd December, Lieut.-Col. Ormsby was continually in consultation with Lieut.-Col. Roche of the 6th Jats and Lieut.-Col. Norie of the 2nd Gurkhas, placing our reserve companies at their disposal in case of desperate emergency.

This hazardous situation was mitigated by the arrival of the 1st Corps. On the night of the 27th December the battalion was relieved by the Highland Light Infantry. As this unit was given only about half the 2/3rd frontage, although twice as strong, it was at once manifest that the great risks which had been taken formerly were not to be allowed to recur, if higher authority could help it.

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On relief, the battalion marched back to billets in Vieille Chapelle, reaching that place at 11 p.m. Next day, 28th December, the move was continued to Paradis, on the 19th to Robecq, and on the 30th, via Lillers, to Ecquesdecques, its destination.

Thus ended the share of the 2/3rd Gurkhas in the 1914 operations on the Western Front. The two months that had elapsed since its arrival in the first line may well be described as ghastly. All ranks had constantly been subjected to shell fire of an intensity beyond anything imaginable. They had fought, and held their own, against an enemy far better equipped than themselves, in all the requirements of close siege warfare ; while the steady drain on the strength of the battalion from casualties and sickness had told severely. In addition, the severity of the winter in that dismal region had been unusually depressing. Notwithstanding all this, the Gurkhas won through and were able to retire to their well-earned rest, conscious of duty well and truly accomplished. So much so, that Sir John French in his dispatch of the 2nd February, 1915, said of his troops from the East :

“The Indian Corps have fought with the utmost steadfastness and gallantry whenever they have been called upon.”

The battalion's total casualties up to date were as under :

	British Officers	Gurkha Officers	Gurkha Ranks
Killed - - -	3	0	16
Wounded - - -	2	3	83
Missing - - -	2	2	34
Sick - - -	1	3	410
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Total - - -	8	8	543

Most of the sickness was due to malaria, the result of those long delays at Kotdwara and Karachi, of which so much has already been propounded, or to trench feet, caused by weeks of soaking in the mud and water of the trenches.

Practically the whole of the missing were subsequently found to have been killed in action.

Period—1st January to 14th March, 1915

At Ecquesdecques the battalion had three weeks' real rest from fighting, and spent the time in reorganisation and training.

Several changes in divisional and brigade commands were made early in January 1915. Those that affected the 2/3rd were the appointment of Lieut.-Col. Blackader, D.S.O., to the command of the Garhwal Brigade in place of Major-General D'Urban Keary, C.B., D.S.O., who was promoted to the command of the Lahore Division. The new Brigadier was well known to the battalion as he had up to now been in command of the 2nd Leicesters.

The following drafts joined the battalion on the dates specified :

On 1st January : One Gurkha officer and forty-one Gurkha ranks.

On 16th January : Major Tillard and twenty-five Gurkha ranks.

On 17th January : Five Gurkha officers and 102 Gurkha ranks of the First Battalion, who had been attached to the 2/8th Gurkhas, and were all that remained of a double company, 215 strong, sent from Almora to the 2/8th on mobilisation in India.

On 18th January : Lieut. Ashmore, 1/10th Gurkhas, and Lieut. Moran, 1/8th Gurkhas.

On 19th January : One Gurkha officer and 124 Gurkha ranks. Of these forty-four were men of the Naga Hills Military Police.

Major Tillard's case is rather curious. When war broke out he was in Norway and never knew anything about hostilities until the 11th of August. Then there was no shipping available and he could not get away at once, but eventually he landed in Edinburgh on 17th August. Hastening to London and reporting himself at the India Office, he was ordered to India by the next boat sailing. Fortunately, in Norway he had run a splinter into his foot, and being not at all desirous of returning to India, he went sick. The splinter was worse than he thought, necessitating an operation, with six weeks in hospital and a month's sick leave on top of it. After this he was put on to train the Eleventh Battalion East Surreys, and then, on the 6th of January, 1915, received urgent orders to report himself to the embarkation officer at Southampton for duty with the Indian Corps in France. This officer told him to take a draft of Indian soldiers to the front from Milford-on-Sea. After disposing of them all except twenty-five Gurkhas, he was directed to join the 2/3rd at Lillers with these men. On arrival he took over command of No. 2 Double Company, vice Young, transferred to the 2/4th.

The first three weeks of January 1915 were fully occupied with intensive training. Two N.C.O.s and eight men per company (corresponding to two platoons) were trained in bombing tactics, especially throwing. Trenches were dug on the correct scale and model, and with their aid mock battles were rehearsed.

The battalion was inspected by various Generals, all of whom spoke in high terms of its achievements.

On the 21st January it marched to Calonne, and next day to Lacouture. On the 23rd it moved into brigade reserve at Richebourg St. Vaast, and on the 26th January took over from the 2nd Leicesters a part of the line in front of the " Factory Chimney " on the Rue du Bois.

Here, it was found that conditions had changed completely since the battalion left in December. All the old trenches were entirely

under water. In lieu of them, attempts had been made to build up parapets on a line nearer the Rue du Bois. These parapets were neither continuous nor in any way complete. Troops defending the line lived in the cellars of battered houses along the road, and were in a state of instant readiness to man the parapets. As an outpost line, picquets of one N.C.O. and six men were posted in small redoubts some few hundred yards from the road in the vicinity of the old trench line. These picquets were on duty day and night, reliefs taking place at 0500 and 1700 hours.

To man such posts was a severe test of bravery, and the men knew it. Should the Germans attack, those in the posts would certainly be exterminated in giving the alarm. Further, they were a target for German gunners whenever the latter felt disposed to practice.

Meanwhile, the men occupying the houses in the Rue du Bois were at work night and day. At night they worked on the parapets defending the road, and by day in converting the houses into strong points.

In these conditions no one could be asked to hold the line for any length of time, and after three days (on the 29th January) the battalion was relieved by the Seaforth Highlanders and moved back to billets in Lacouture, whence the usual nightly working parties were sent out.

During the whole of February the 2/3rd was alternately holding a portion of the line for a few days and spending a few days in reserve.

On the 28th of February the unit was relieved in the front line by the Black Watch and withdrew to billets in Locon. Here the Garhwal Brigade was in Divisional Reserve, and further training in route marching and trench warfare was the order of the day.

It soon became apparent, from the momentous preparations in hand, that something out of the common was in contemplation. Guns of every description began to appear. Each morning the country behind the front line, opposite Neuve Chapelle, showed the result of the great activity of the preceding night. Guns seemed to sprout in every field. Finally, things reached such a pitch that it seemed impossible for any more guns to find positions—and yet they came.

On the 9th of March the General Officer Commanding 1st Army issued an order, telling all troops who were to take part the great possibilities of an offensive to be commenced the next day. These were to the effect that we were now superior to the enemy before us in numbers, guns and aircraft. The Germans had been forced to withdraw a large number of troops to meet the Russian menace. To help our friends the Russians, and to win a decisive victory, all that

was required was for the troops to show the same gallantry as they had shown in the past months, with the odds all against them. In addition to this, word was passed down from the Corps Commander that after this next fight the Indian troops would be sent back to India. This news was duly passed on to all ranks and created a very favourable impression. The men had experienced a very difficult and trying time since arrival in France. There is no doubt many were homesick.

From the foregoing it will be readily understood that a strong feeling of optimistic excitement now permeated through all ranks. The battalion was up to strength in both officers and men. The drafts received in January had just been given sufficient time to look upon themselves as experienced soldiers.

The objectives chosen were, firstly, the village of Neuve Chapelle, which formed a salient in our line, and secondly, the ridges on the far side of the Bois du Biez surrounding Lille, a very important French manufacturing centre.

The troops chosen for the task were the 4th British Corps and the Indian Corps. Of the latter, the Meerut Division was chosen to carry out the attack, with the Lahore Division in reserve.

The Garhwal Brigade formed the assault troops for the Meerut Division, and units attacked in the following order :

2/39th	2/3rd	2nd	1/39th
Garhwal Rifles	Gurkhas	Leicesters	Garhwal Rifles
<i>Brigade Reserve</i>			
3rd Londons (Territorials)			

The country in the immediate vicinity of Neuve Chapelle is flat. The only cover is afforded by buildings, hedgerows, orchards and trees. The ground was heavy, muddy and slippery from the recent bad weather. Between Neuve Chapelle and the Bois du Biez, a fair-sized wood, was the valley of the River Des Lays, a small stream from six to ten feet broad and three to four feet deep. This valley was very open and devoid of hedges. The village of Neuve Chapelle itself was by no means in bad repair before the bombardment, and its houses were for the most part standing. The ground beyond the Bois du Biez towards Lille rises in undulating ridges round the villages of Aubers, Herlies and Illies.

The defences from which the battalion was ordered to launch the attack were held by the 6th Jats of the Bareilly Brigade, and consisted of a substantial parapet with a ditch in front. The German trenches were from 100 to 200 yards distant. The left of the battalion's portion of the line rested on the road running into Neuve Chapelle. At the

junction of the trench line with this road a square salient had been thrown forward to take in a natural bank, hedge and a small house. The German trench line opposite this point ran immediately in front of a few small buildings, with a road and orchard in rear.

The enemy had constructed a very strong sandbagged barricade across the road and connected with the buildings. The whole formed a well-wired and formidable strong point, further strengthened by machine guns, sited so as to enfilade the German front line running on either side. Havildar Bahadur Thapa was specially detailed to deal with this alarming obstacle and prevent the enemy machine guns enfilading the attack of the 2/3rd and the 2/39th Garhwalis.

When reconnoitring the position prior to the attack, Lieut.-Col. Ormsby, with great prevision, saw that it was dangerous to rely only on the few planks placed across the ditch in front of the parapet by the sappers and miners, as a means of crossing this obstacle on the launching of the attack. He also noticed that the ground on the German side of the ditch rose sufficiently to give men kneeling complete cover from view. He accordingly decided to file his men out from the salient along this small depression during our own bombardment. This sound scheme enabled the attacking troops to advance in line without check to the German trenches, and was taken up by the 2/39th Garhwal Rifles on our left with equal success.

The battalion was in position by 4.30 a.m. on the morning of the 10th March, which opened cold and dull, while low-lying clouds completely neutralised aerial observation. Then came three hours of weary waiting, the worst moments of a battle, while officers busied themselves in seeing that every detail was in accordance with orders.

The artillery bombardment was to commence at 7.30 a.m. for the Indian Corps. At 8.5 a.m. the attack was to be launched.

At 7.30 a.m. the silence of the morning was suddenly broken by an indescribable din. It was as if one were standing under an enormous railway bridge, over which thousands of express trains were passing at lightning speed. The noise was quite deafening, and it was with difficulty any conversation could be heard. This continued without respite. It was impossible to tell whether the German guns were replying or not. They were probably employed in counter-battery work. Many of our own projectiles fell short, which made it difficult to judge. Apparently no enemy shell came the way of the 2/3rd. At the same time one man was observed kneeling down but minus his head. The screech of shell and splinter was everywhere, as if a fountain of steel fragments was falling from the sky. Col. Ormsby was hit on the top of the forefinger. So great was the pain

that he felt sure he had lost the whole finger. But, on taking off his glove, he could find nothing but a bruised tip.

In fact, casualties there were, but marvellously few, considering the low trajectory of the field guns and the immense volume of fire. The shooting of our artillery must have been well-nigh perfect, as variation in the ammunition would be quite sufficient to account for the number of short bursts observed and received.

At 8.5 a.m. the first lines rushed the German front line trenches : No. 1 D.C. on the right under Major French, with Lieut. Fisher ; No. 2 D.C. on the left under Major Tillard, with Capt. Stone ; with Nos. 3 [Capt. Grigg] and 4 [Majors Dundas and Bagot-Chester] in support. The wire had been effectively destroyed, except on the right, and the Germans had not recovered from the shock of our bombardment. Wherever the men on the right of Major Tillard's command found uncut wire, the wet earth was scooped out in several places under the wire, enabling them to crawl through without much difficulty. The first line swept on, over two lines of trenches, across the road and into the orchard beyond, leaving small parties to clear up the wounded. Meanwhile, Havildar Bahadur Thapa, with his bombing party, distinguished himself greatly by rushing his objective and capturing sixteen Germans and two machine guns in it. The speed and dash of his attack contributed largely to the success of the 2/3rd and 2/39th, as regards the enemy defences facing them. Indeed it is not too much to say that the complete failure of the German machine guns to play their part was due entirely to this gallant havildar's bravery and leadership.

In the meantime, one flank company bore away to the right to keep touch with the 2nd Leicesters, who were themselves engaged with Germans on their right flank. This was in the portion of the enemy's line which should, according to plan, have been the objective of the 1/39th Garhwal Rifles. This battalion, unfortunately, itself inclined too much to the right and came up against uncut barbed wire, thus not only suffering heavy losses, but also leaving a gap between themselves and the Leicesters.

At this point the front line should have halted and organised a line of resistance. This would have been in conformity with the brigade scheme of consolidation in rear of the German support trench line, before further advance. Major Tillard, however, observed that the Germans were preparing for a stand in the groups of houses along the road into Neuve Chapelle. Now, this road was the left of the 2/3rd's line of attack, so Tillard at once decided to exceed his instructions and push on with his company into Neuve Chapelle. This he did, killing many Germans and taking a number of prisoners. In fact, his D.C.

cleared all the houses on the left of the road, and he got the Germans well on the run towards the village. When advancing, beyond and clear of the village, Tillard was joined by a few of the Rifle Brigade from the left flank, as he paused to reform, and was almost on the Smith-Dorrien line. Some of these were heard by Lieut. Fisher to call out joyfully : " Here are them bloody little Gurks." Major Tillard's action subsequently met the full approval of the brigade commander. It undoubtedly had the effect of preventing the Germans from organising resistance in Neuve Chapelle itself. Had the Germans been able to do so, the whole fortunes of the day might have been changed.

While these houses were being cleared, many acts of daring and bravery came to notice, the most noteworthy being that of No. 1749 Rifleman Gane Gurung. This stout fellow outstripped his comrades in rushing a house, and, entering single-handed, cowed eight Germans into submission. He happened to be marching them out with triumphant joy depicted on his face when, just at that moment, the leading lines of the 8th Corps' attack, in the shape of the Rifle Brigade, arrived from a different direction. So striking was the sight of this one small man, proudly marching his eight bulky prisoners out of the building, that he was welcomed with a rousing cheer by all ranks of the Rifle Brigade who witnessed the deed. Sir James Willcocks said subsequently, when addressing the battalion after the battle, that it was an incident quite unique in history. Never before had the contemplation of the deed of a single individual Gurkha been heartily cheered by a British regiment in action.

In the meantime the second line, consisting of Nos. 3 and 4 D.C.s, closely followed by battalion headquarters, were hot on the heels of the first line. Their mission was to collect prisoners and clear out dug-outs. On arrival at the orchard the second line was met with a hot enfilade fire from the right flank. This fire seemed almost to take the second line in reverse, and was directed from the German trench which was holding up the 2nd Leicesters' advance. Sending No. 3 D.C. to clear up the situation, the commanding officer directed the scouts to ascertain and report the exact position where Major Tillard was consolidating his portion of the line. News soon came to hand that Major Tillard had pushed on into Neuve Chapelle and was not consolidating anywhere. This was rather awkward and necessitated immediate steps being taken to comply with the very clear orders of the brigade regarding consolidation. Only one double company now remained in hand, as Capt. Grigg with No. 3 had come into line on the left of No. 2 to close the gap between the 2/3rd and the Rifle Brigade. Normally the 2/39th would have held this, but, in strict

conformity with the original orders, this unit had been kept behind to consolidate the support trenches of the enemy front line. The men, indeed, were busily engaged at this task when their C.O., Lieut.-Col. Drake-Brockman, was altruistic enough to send over some men at once. After a short time the 3rd London (Territorials) came up and also assisted.

Meanwhile urgent messages came from Major Tillard to say that he had cleared the houses in front of the battalion up to Neuve Chapelle ; that, after reaching that village he had wheeled to the right facing the Bois du Biez and had taken up a position on the old Smith-Dorrien trench line (the line held by our troops in 1914 before the Germans took the village) ; that the few Germans who had escaped were in full retreat ; and that it appeared there were none of the enemy to prevent him advancing on the Bois du Biez.

This news was immediately sent on to the brigade by two separate messengers. In due course a reply came back that no advance beyond the Smith-Dorrien line was to be contemplated without definite orders to do so.

Leaving the 3rd Londons and the 2/39th Garhwalis to consolidate the first line of resistance, the C.O. now brought up the remainder of the battalion and established it at Tillard's position. To do so it was necessary to come into quite open country, and the Germans were beginning to recover from the first shock of their defeat. The result was that these later parties, while crossing the open, came under considerable shell, rifle, and machine gun fire from the right flank, as well as from the still undefeated German strong posts in rear.

Arriving at the Smith-Dorrien line, the C.O. found all the men hard at work digging fresh protection behind it, as it was under water. This work had to be done with the Sirhind pattern tool ¹ only, and the speed with which the men managed to dig themselves in is remarkable testimony to the value of this implement.

The battalion was now holding a line of trench some few hundreds of yards beyond Neuve Chapelle. The trenches were by no means continuous and consisted mostly of manholes. On the left flank touch was established with the 2nd Rifle Brigade of the 8th Division, and on the right flank with the 2nd Leicesters. It was barely midday, but a lull seemed to have spread over the field of battle. Why could the troops not go on at once ? There was little visible opposition in front of them. The Bois du Biez looked close and most inviting. Yet for five more weary hours the battalion was engaged digging itself

¹ A diminutive " grubber " introduced by the late Major-General Clements about 1905, when commanding the Sirhind District, and adopted as the service entrenching tool by the Government of India. Easily carried on the back.

in and connecting up the various lengths of trench—while nothing happened.

Finally, at 5 p.m., nine hours after the first attack, came the welcome sight of troops debouching from behind Neuve Chapelle in artillery formation. This was the attack of the Dehra Dun Brigade, the 2nd and 9th Gurkhas leading. It came under shell and long-range machine gun fire as soon as it appeared in the open, and the attackers began to suffer casualties long before they reached the Smith-Dorrien line. However, they were not to be denied and swept on over the trenched occupants. Then across the River Des Lays, finally disappearing in the dusk towards the Bois du Biez.

Unfortunately a simultaneous advance which should have been carried out by the 8th Division failed to mature, and the Dehra Dun Brigade, after gallantly advancing as far as the Bois du Biez, was forced to retire from its too exposed position and take up a line a short distance in front of the Garhwal Brigade on the line of the River Des Lays.

That night was spent by the troops in consolidation; also in bringing up stores of ammunition, bombs, sandbags and food. There was no rest for anybody.

The following morning the Dehra Dun Brigade, assisted by the 2/39th Garhwal Rifles, again attacked the Bois du Biez. For the second time the 8th Division failed to make headway, and the attack of the Dehra Dun Brigade could not be pressed home.

At 5 p.m. on this day Major Dundas was severely wounded in the head and Lieut. Bagot-Chester took command of No. 4 D.C.

On the night of the 11-12th March, the Sirhind Brigade was ordered to relieve the Dehra Dun Brigade, but they did not take up the line of the River Des Lays, and the battalion was left to hold the front line during the night.

At 5 a.m. on the 12th March the Germans made a massed attack over the whole front. The slaughter was terrific, and mounds of dead Germans covered the ground in front of the 2/3rd trenches. The marked success of the defenders was largely due to the skill, ingenuity and daring of Capt. Lodwick of the 2/3rd, an officer of much promise, who, as brigade machine gun officer, had personally chosen the site of all his machine guns during the two previous days. It was a chance for the battalion, quite unequalled during their period of service in France, of getting a bit back from the Germans. It is not too much to say that full advantage was taken of it.

It was during this action that the battalion lost one of its most beloved officers, Major W. Cotton French. Originally known as "The Fairy" in the regiment, he earned, subsequently, the sobriquet

of "Uncle William," and was thus affectionately termed by his brother officers. French was shot through the head while firing off a "Veréy" pistol to light up the attacking Germans. Broad-shouldered and over six feet in height, he had fewer chances than most of coming through the war. His was a wonderfully sweet and unselfish nature, combined with a complete indifference to danger. On his death Lieut. Fisher took over command of No. 1 D.C. until the battalion was relieved on the 14th March. Next day Stone took it over permanently.

A word about Capt. J. T. Lodwick and the torpedoing of the *s.s. Persia*.

Lodwick had made a study of machine gun tactics and was an acknowledged authority on the subject. He was also a very good all-round soldier, a born leader of men and a sturdy specimen of the best type of British officer. Had he lived he should have gone far. His death was a great calamity for the 3rd Gurkhas.

The loss of two officers of the regiment and the miraculous escape of a third, in one and the same catastrophe, appear to demand some notice in this volume. Details of the sinking of the *Persia* have, therefore, been obtained from Major G.T. Fisher, himself the "third" victim referred to above.

This officer, now in the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, joined the first battalion at Almora in 1910 ; was sent to France with the first reinforcements to the second battalion in November 1914 ; was wounded at the battle of Loos, 25th September, 1915, and, after recovery, was a passenger on the *Persia*, *en route* to rejoin, when that vessel was torpedoed on the 31st of December, 1915.

Lodwick, Robertson and Fisher of the 3rd Gurkhas, as well as Lyall and Berriman of the Garhwal Rifles, had meals at the same table. They had just gone down to luncheon when a "crump, crunch" was heard and the saloon became filled with smoke and coal dust.

The *Persia* had been hit in the engine room, on the port side, by a torpedo.

There was no sign of alarm whatever amongst the passengers, who [Fisher thinks] remained seated, until the captain of the ship blew a whistle and told all of them to go to their cabins, get their life belts and fall in at their boat stations.

The chief engineer hurried off to the engine room. It is believed he was suffocated by the fumes of the explosion, when descending the ladder to see the extent of the injury to his ship's side.

Fisher found that his cabin, and one or two on each side, had been blown up by the explosion. This made a hole from about ten feet below water level right through all the decks, including the boat deck.

He then went to his boat, which was on the starboard side, and found Lodwick and Robertson there before him. The vessel had taken a pronounced list to port and these officers found their boat swung inboard. No amount of pushing would induce it to hang over the side to make lowering possible. Exactly the same happened to all the other boats on the starboard side, so the women and children detailed for them were sent round to the port side where launching was feasible.

Fisher, having no life belt, pulled down the emergency contrivance, acetylene light and all ; but being very heavy he soon discarded it. Luckily Col. Swiney of the Garhwal Rifles (drowned shortly afterwards), with a deck cabin to himself, had spare belts and handed one over to Fisher.

Nets had been arranged on the port side for after-luncheon cricket. These interfered with the launching of the boats, and Fisher recollects seeing Lodwick very busy pulling them down. He never saw him again.

Then the port side boats were lowered, but on touching the water an alarming situation arose. The *Persia* was still moving pretty fast ; the sea was choppy. The consequence was that the bows of the boats were caught in the swirl of the waves and went right under them.

Thus it appeared to those left behind, balancing themselves with difficulty on the sloping deck. But these port boats and their occupants soon vanished astern.

On their disappearance Fisher went to the bow gangway on the promenade deck. From this vantage point he imagined he would be able to dart to port or to starboard, as deemed most desirable, when the *Persia* made her final plunge.

He soon found it was a stupid place to choose, for he could keep no foothold on any part of a ship rapidly turning over on to her port side.

It appeared to be time to quit the vessel. Slipping down the deck he fetched up against the port railings, climbed these and leapt into the sea.

Almost immediately he was washed back on to deck by a huge wave. Not only washed back, but, with several other passengers, swept spinning along it, like so many straws.

What happened to the others God knows, but Fisher was bumped up against the stern end of the promenade deck. He felt pretty dazed,

but was soon to realise that the roof of the promenade deck had gone under water. *He was shut in.*

Things seemed pretty hopeless. It appeared futile to attempt to cope with an element which just played cup and ball with you. Then, to his astonishment, he found himself washed overboard again.

This seemed better, and he struggled to the surface. But, as he bobbed up, Fisher was struck with horror to behold the aft mast coming straight down at him. Lower and lower the structure came, with amazing swiftness. In that fleeting moment he had just time to wonder where and how he would be hit.

The mast missed him, but the stays catching in his belt and clothes forced him under water once more.

Heavens ! how he fought. With clenched teeth and frenzied hands he tore at his belt and clothes. With strained muscles he wrestled and tussled with those stays.

At last he won through. He was clear. The joy of freedom seemed to lend him renewed strength. With mighty strokes, when he came to the surface, he swam as fast as he could away from the sinking *Persia*.

Next came some reaction and a lessening of power. Fisher found the waves kept breaking in his face, taking away his breath before he had quite got it. Everything about him seemed to become wonderfully green, a painless, and by no means disagreeable, unconsciousness was very near.

Something caught his vision. Something on the water and not far away. Rousing himself and stretching upwards he was soon aware that it looked like a boat. He swam towards it. It *was* a boat, and sitting in it was a solitary lascar.

Fisher caught hold of the gunwale loop line and tried to pull himself up. He might as well have tried to walk on the sea. His legs and feet just bobbed up against the boat's side.

"Kaincho," he shouted to the lascar, but the man never moved. He simply sat where he was and moaned out, "Margya, Sahib, Margya."

Scott of the 2/10th Gurkhas then swam up. He was wearing gymnastic shoes. With their help he managed to climb into the boat over Fisher's arms, and pulled the latter alongside him.

The pair of them set about collecting anyone they saw floating. There were three other boats drifting besides their own. How these boats got away from the *Persia* is not known, except that one of them had floated off the stern, with one of the ship's officers in it.

Lyall and Berriman were in another. Berriman walked down the

starboard side of the *Persia* as she turned over—another of the astounding marvels of this terrible afternoon.

Fisher and Scott pulled a French girl into their boat from the sea. She was engaged to be married to the Registrar of the High Court of Calcutta. An extraordinarily plucky girl. Even before she was dragged out of the water she screwed up some little joke.

Berriman had saved her life. He got her off the ship somehow. The details are wanting, but he was awarded a medal for his gallantry in this connection.

Nelson of the I.M.S. and another man were washed down the funnels when the *Persia* turned on to her port side ; then belched out again. Their faces, clothing, etc., were jet black.

The four boats were tied up bow to stern and improvised sea anchors adjusted. The submarine was observed shelling a merchant vessel about two miles away and believed to have been the *Clan Macellin*. It seemed quite possible that shrapnel might be switched next on to the four boats, but no notice was taken of them. Next night, about eight o'clock, a mine sweeper sighted them just as she was returning to Alexandria from a routine patrol. She landed the occupants at that port the next afternoon.

Hours before the rescue by the mine sweeper Fisher had become unconscious, and remained so for some six hours. The ship's barber suggested he should be chucked overboard. It was quite rough and the boats were 300 miles from land. No ships took any notice of them, though a few were sighted on the horizon.

It is understood no boats had any water except Fisher's. In this one, indeed, it was so scarce that only one ration was issued, in the metal case of a shaving stick. There was no food.

On the second evening the sea began to rise and things appeared quite hopeless. So much so that at dusk one of the boats, which had a sail, cut loose from the other three and went on alone. Most fortunate it was, too, that this occurred, for she got some four miles ahead and just succeeded in attracting the attention of the mine sweeper mentioned above, as she was on the point of turning.

Such is the tale of the *Persia*, and it is well to realise that she disappeared entirely within five minutes of being struck. Many lives most valuable to the Indian Army were lost and might well have been saved had rafts formed part of the ship's equipment. Later on in the war these were invariably provided.

Just a year afterwards two more officers of the 3rd Gurkhas—McSwiney and Allanson—were on board the Cunard liner *Ivernia* when she was torpedoed by a "U" boat about 40 miles S.W. of Crete,

on the 1st of January, 1917. Some 10 per cent. of a total of 2,500 troops were lost.

The weather was so cold, with such a nasty swell, that there was actually a discussion as to whether a submarine could operate, when "Bang," "Boom," and the great vessel staggered and listed. Off went every soul to his boat station and, amongst them, Allanson to the poop, where his charge was two canvas boats. As these could not be released from their moorings without tearing them to pieces, a hasty search was made for other means of escape. Around the ship's funnel rafts were found, and, by means of a chain of men, were passed down, secured by a rope and dropped overboard. This part of the deck was soon cleared, enabling Allanson to report accordingly, when he received orders to get over the side by the aid of an adjacent rope. To his vast astonishment the rope ended on the deck of a British mine sweeper, the *Princess Mary*. Hardly had the *Ivernias*' officers, following in his wake, reached the deck when the liner disappeared beneath the waves. A companion mine sweeper was then discovered close at hand, and the two of them, hour after hour, scoured the sea in their work of rescue. By dusk the two decks were simply stacked with a mass of human beings, wet, shivering and miserably cold, but immensely thankful to be saved. Next morning broke with bright sunshine as the sweepers entered Suda Bay; but McSwiney and Allanson, in their respective corners, were sad at heart, for each thought the other drowned. Imagine, therefore, the joy when on landing they suddenly met.

After the bold German advance on the 12th, British attacks in the direction of the Bois du Biez continued and were carried out by successive brigades of the Lahore and Meerut Divisions. All these assaults were conducted with magnificent bravery. Each one, by advancing in daylight over the open, lost heavily, before even the leading lines reached the Smith-Dorrien entrenchments. They failed because the German defence was daily being established in ever increasing strength. Also because the 8th Corps, on the left, was unable to make headway.

Finally, after hanging on to the line for four days without sleep, the battalion received news, on the evening of the 13th, that it would be relieved that night. At 6.10 p.m., however, a message was received to the effect that the Germans were massing in the Bois du Biez for an attack. Col. Ormsby went immediately to the headquarters of the Sirhind Brigade and offered to remain where he was until the situation developed. On the matter being referred to the Garhwal Brigade, orders were received to hang on until 11 p.m.

Reliefs were subsequently completed at 2.15 a.m. on 14th March, when the 1st Highland Light Infantry and the 4th King's Liverpool Regiment (Special Reserve) of the Sirhind Brigade took over the line. During the relief the Germans kept up a continuous artillery bombardment and intense rifle fire.

The battalion then marched back to Fosse, arriving there at 7.30 a.m. During this march a somewhat amusing incident occurred. Various parties of the Garhwal Brigade were withdrawing by the same road. At an important road junction some of these parties were held up by troops moving across their line towards another part of the front. The 2/3rd found themselves halted behind some mules about 200 yards short of the cross roads. The Adjutant was sent forward to ascertain the cause of the delay. He found it would take some little time before the road was cleared. When this was reported, all ranks were told to sit down in their fours on the road. Almost immediately everyone, including the C.O. and Adjutant, fell fast asleep.

The whole battalion must have been asleep nearly an hour, when the C.O. awoke and proceeded himself to the cross roads to find out what was still causing the delay. He found the route now quite unobstructed, with evidence that the troops using the cross road had all passed some time before. Close by were some machine gunners in the deepest slumber and further back the whole column wrapped in the arms of Morpheus. Col. Ormsby's next mission was to awaken everyone. Not for a moment had he supposed the task would prove so formidable.

One cannot conclude the account of the battle of Neuve Chapelle without placing on record the services rendered to the battalion by other units. For instance, by the 4th Gurkhas and 15th Sikhs during the German massed attack on the morning of the 12th March. At a critical period of this action, the 2/3rd were running short of ammunition and the C.O. felt he was not justified in using his very small reserve to augment the supply.

The 4th Gurkhas and the 15th Sikhs, who were in the rear of the battalion, in the most gallant and unselfish manner detailed carrying parties for the purpose. It is probable that these carriers lost 75 per cent. of their number in killed and wounded. Words fail to express the feelings of gratitude and admiration with which battalion headquarters watched these brave fellows struggling with their heavy loads over the 2/3rd reserve trenches. Thence across the open to the front line. Four men started with each box which, if it ever got to the front line at all, generally arrived on the back of one survivor. Without this generous help, it is possible the front line could never have withstood the German attack.

The casualties during the four days were as under. Most of them were due to the heavy shell fire during the days subsequent to the enemy's attack and not to the attack itself.

Killed.—Major W. C. French, Jemadar Dhanraj Thapa, Jemadar Maniratan Bura and forty-five Gurkha ranks.

Wounded.—Major W. L. Dundas, Subadar Dalkesar Gurung and 170 Gurkha ranks. (Major Tillard and Capt. Grigg were also wounded but remained in action.)

Missing.—Three Gurkha ranks.

TOTAL.—Two British officers, Three Gurkha officers, 218 Gurkha ranks.

Period—15th March to 10th November, 1915

With the battalion in rest at Fosse, it would only be wearisome to describe in detail each subsequent move, nature of duty, the casualties and the reinforcements. A continuous description of such throughout the period in France would, by the similarity of the incidents, not only be tedious but confusing. Periods of purely trench warfare, with the continual strain on the nerves, the discomfort, the bombardments and the counter-bombardments, the mining operations and the dread of counter-mines (though the battalion was never blown up, it frequently occupied trenches suspected of being mined by the Germans), all the various periods in and out of the front line, etc., are sufficiently exciting to live for ever in the minds of those who experienced them and survived. But to others, the cake may be too rich for a surfeit of it to be comfortably digested. A record of officers' services during the period in France, with a list of rewards, and accounts of deeds of valour on the part of the men, will be found in Appendix 3.

During the whole of its service in France the battalion was in or behind that part of the British front which extended from Givenchy to a few miles north of Neuve Chapelle. The country over which it operated was similar throughout.

On the 28th of March there was a reorganisation of brigades in the Indian Corps. The Garhwal Brigade was reconstructed as below :

2nd Leicesters.

3rd Londons.

The Garhwal Rifles (the two battalions being temporarily amalgamated).

2/3rd Gurkhas.

2/8th Gurkhas.

Two severe actions remain to be described : (1) the operations commencing on the 9th May, 1915, and (2) the operations in the

neighbourhood of Neuve Chapelle on the 25th September, 1915, synchronising with the Battle of Loos.

In the meantime (17th March) a further reinforcement arrived from the first battalion in the person of Lieut. J. C. Hutchinson, a nephew of Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, Colonel of the regiment. Later on, Lieut. C. C. Nott-Bower, I.A.R.O., and then 2nd Lieut. J. W. Riddell and Lieuts. Voelcker, J. Tyson Tyson and T. P. Wood, joined from various sources.

Operations Commencing 9th May

The following extract from the information given in Garhwal Brigade Operation Order, No. 49, dated 7th May, 1915, is sufficient to give an idea of the situation :

" Information 1.—The 1st Army is attacking on the 8th May, with the object of breaking through the enemy's line and gaining the La Bassée-Lille road between La Bassée and Fournes, and then advancing on Don to the line Bauvin-Don.

The 1st Corps, retaining its right at Givenchy, advances on the Rue du Marais, Lorgies and Illies.

The Indian Corps will operate to cover the right of the 1st Corps, capture the Ferme du Biez, and subsequently advance to the line Ligny le Grand—La Cliqueterie Ferme.

The 4th Corps operates through Aubers with a view to effecting a junction with the Indian Corps at La Cliqueterie Ferme.

Lahore Division holds the front, except that portion from which the attack is to be delivered.

Meerut Division is to deliver the attack, artillery of the Meerut Division, reinforced by that of the Lahore Division, one section Hotchkiss motor battery, one section mountain artillery and some heavy batteries will prepare and support the attack.

The Dehra Dun Brigade is to assault the enemy's front line trenches, from the point V 6 to the vicinity of the point 56, and push on against further objectives, leaving garrisons at the southern end of La Tourelle, Distillery road junction, S 11 a (points 52 and 53), and houses near point 50 and the Ferme du Biez.

Bareilly Brigade (less one battalion), in trenches north of Rue du Bois, and in and east of Lansdowne Post, is to occupy the assembly positions of the Dehra Dun Brigade, as they are vacated, and to support that brigade. One battalion Bareilly Brigade (less two companies with sappers and miners) will remain in Lansdowne Post and follow the Garhwal Brigade into the assembly trenches just north of the Rue du Bois.

Garhwal Brigade (less two battalions) will be Divisional Reserve."

The whole operation was subsequently postponed twenty-four hours, and commenced on the 9th May.

The Lahore Division had but lately returned decimated by the

Second Battle of Ypres, at which the Germans had used gas for the first time.

It therefore again fell to the Meerut Division, which had been only "holding the line" since the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, to open the attack.

All troops were now equipped with a primitive form of gas mask. This entailed frequent practice in the art of speedy investment, when the gas alarm was sounded. It was looked upon by the Gurkhas as a huge joke on the part of the "Sahib log," and they roared with laughter at one another whenever it had to be worn. British officers tempered their amusement with a wholesome respect for the possibilities of its utility. The tales of the awful effects of this new weapon of war had not been slow to filter through.

At 3 a.m. on the morning of the 9th May, the battalion was in its allotted position in the redoubt between the Rue du Puits and the Loretto road.

Here it remained the whole morning. The assault of the Dehra Dun Brigade commenced at 5.40 a.m. An hour later, streams of wounded passed close to the redoubt on their way to the rear. Reports from these men were very conflicting. Some asserted we had got well into the Hun, others said that the whole affair was a ghastly failure. Unfortunately, a ghastly failure it turned out to be.

The Germans had learnt a lesson from the battle of Neuve Chapelle. Not only had their trenches and wire been greatly improved and strengthened, but they had covered their front with carefully concealed machine guns. Moreover, the damage done by our artillery on the occasion under reference seems to have been much less than they were able to accomplish at Neuve Chapelle. Nor, if report speaks truly, was the fire as accurate. Further, the secrecy of the proposed operations had not been kept with such care and success as had been the case in the former battle.

On our part, we had initiated a fresh experiment, in an attempt to obviate the heavy losses caused in the reserves during the Neuve Chapelle actions by the enemy's high explosives. Immediately in rear of the front line great blocks of "assembly trenches" had been constructed previously, with much labour.

These assembly trenches, two feet deep, three feet wide, with one foot of parapet, were arranged in rows from front to rear in lengths of about twenty yards, with no lateral communication between the rows. They gave the simplest form of intimation to German aeroplanes as to what they were intended for. They could be nothing else than assembly trenches for an attack. This being so, they proved an absolute death trap for the troops destined to occupy them. The

mass of the enemy's artillery directed by information from the air, concentrated on the blocks and they afforded but little protection from shell fire.

On the failure of the Dehra Dun Brigade to make good, the Bareilly Brigade, which had been occupying these assembly trenches, was ordered to attack. This unit had already suffered enormous losses from the enemy's shells, for our artillery fire had been insufficient to make any appreciable effect on the Germans. This, coupled with the fact that they had to attack over heaps of dead bodies of the Dehra Dun Brigade, with no chance of a surprise, makes their effort a very fine one, doomed to failure as it was. It was timed to commence at 3.40 p.m.

In the meantime the battalion got orders to move, at 1.25 p.m., to the assembly trenches in rear of the Bareilly Brigade, and nicknamed the "Gridiron." The route up to the front line ran for some few hundred yards along a road and then along nearly a mile of winding communication trench, which may be described fairly as follows : The floor was from one to two feet below the surface of the ground and consisted of sticky mud and water. On this floor trestles of cross boards had been placed to prevent troops sticking in the mud. The sides were sandbagged parapets, about three feet wide at the top. The trench was not broad enough for men to pass each other on the move in single file. One man had to flatten himself against the parapet to enable the other to pass.

Before the arrival of the battalion this communication channel had been subjected to continual bombardment since six o'clock that morning. The parapet had been blown down in many places. Sandbags thrown into the trench at such places had been roughly heaped against the sides, or trampled into a mound by passers-by. In many places the boarding had been broken up in the mud or thrown clean out of the trench. Badly wounded men lay in nooks all along the alley, and many a dead man lay trampled into the mud. Accoutrements, rifles, bomb-boxes and other odds and ends of equipment lay hugger-mugger, an indescribably confused mess. This was the corridor through which the men had to thread their way, whilst the roar of the passing shell made music in their ears.

Such is the vision stamped subconsciously on the mind and perhaps retained for always. But, at the time, no such picture presented itself to an eager battalion in fighting trim. This was battle. Once more we were to come to grips with the Hun. The trench was but a tedious obstacle race that had to be completed before we could test his strength. Here and there a shell found a few victims. " Rough luck on someone, but thank heaven I got past that

point before it fell." Such was the feeling and spirit actuating all ranks.

When the head of the battalion reached the top of the communication trench, at a point where a lateral communication way branched off through the "Gridiron" to brigade headquarters, the rear could only just have been entering the passage. At this point all trenches seemed alive with the movement of troops trying to pass one another in these narrow alleys.

Here the battalion was halted while the C.O. went to brigade headquarters to find out which part of the "Gridiron" the battalion was to occupy. These instructions received, the men commenced to file across the "Gridiron" into the allotted positions. The trenches through which it was essential to pass were packed with men, and consequently afforded little cover to those scrambling over them. Every twenty yards it was necessary to dash across the open, while a continuous shower of bursting shrapnel swept these open spaces.

While this move was in progress orders were received to take over the front line from the La Bassée-Estaires road to the Orchard. The battalion lost forty-four killed and wounded during this period, including Capt. Stone, wounded in the head. His unit was taken over by Lieut. G. T. Fisher.

The scene in the front line trenches beggars all description. It was just a shambles of dead bodies and broken parapet inextricably mixed together.

The battalion held these trenches for four days, clearing the battlefield, and working at very high pressure, under heavy shell fire the whole time. During this period, *i.e.* 11th May, Lieut. J. A. T. Robertson, Indian Army Reserve of officers, arrived as a reinforcement from the first battalion at Almora. Major J. G. Edwardes also rejoined at the same time, but had to be evacuated sick the very next day. He should never have been allowed out of hospital, for he was quite unfit to take part in such frightful and formidable operations as those in which his unit was at this time engaged.

On the night of the 13-14th May the 2/3rd were relieved by the 2/8th Gurkhas, but only moved a few hundred yards back into some support trenches, evacuated by the 2nd Leicesters.

The following night at 7.30 p.m. the battalion again took over a portion of the front line in relief of the 2nd Leicesters. This portion was about 300 yards of trench, with the Orchard on its left flank.

On the night of the 15-16th May, the unit provided two double companies to support an attack made by the 2nd Leicesters and the

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Garhwal Rifles. The remaining half-battalion was placed in brigade reserve.

The attack was timed for 11.30 p.m. and, like its predecessor on the 9th, was a complete failure. The Germans were more than ready. They seemed to be aware not only of the hour of the attack, but exactly where it was to be delivered. The concentrated fire of rifles and machine guns was murderous. Success was impossible.

As soon as the failure of this attack became known at brigade headquarters the battalion was ordered to make a fresh assault at 3 a.m. over the same ground, in conjunction with the 3rd Londons on their left, supported by the 2nd Leicesters and the Garhwal Rifles.

Owing to the congestion in the communication trenches, the darkness and the heavy shell fire, the Leicesters had great difficulty in clearing the front line trench, and the relief was not completed until 2.50 a.m. The front was then hurriedly taken up and arrangements made for the assault at 3.15 a.m.

Nos. 1 and 2 D.C.s were detailed for this assault, and Lieut. Robertson and Lieut. Nott-Bower, each in command of two platoons, led the way over the parapet at 3.15 a.m. Even before they started, the Germans opened a heavy rifle and machine gun fire, and the moment the Gurkhas cleared the parapet, a rain of shrapnel was poured into the trench. Again it appeared quite evident that the Germans must have had knowledge of our intentions, but even if they had not, the enterprise was hopeless. The four platoons withered away. Lieut. Robertson was stunned while endeavouring to advance by short rushes from shell hole to shell hole.

In the meantime the Londons' attack on the left was held up, as also an attack by the Worcesters of the British Division on the right. The situation was reported to the brigade, resulting in directions to stand fast, pending further orders.

When retiring from the position reached during the assault, Lieut. Nott-Bower was killed in a gallant endeavour to save a badly wounded private of the Leicesters. Even worse happened, for Capt. Grigg was also killed during the morning by shell fire.

This was the end of the offensive of the 9th to 16th May, it having been decided, in view of the extraordinary strength of the defence, that no further attempts to advance should be made on this front.

On the night of the 16th of May the Garhwal Brigade was relieved by the Bareilly Brigade, and at 8.30 p.m. the 58th Rifles took over the 2/3rd portion of the front line. The battalion then withdrew to so-called billets, houses without roofs, at Croix-Barbée. Wet weather set in and conditions became very trying.

During the period 9th to 16th May the battalion suffered the following casualties :

Killed : British officers	2	Capt. H. H. Grigg, 1/3rd Gurkhas. 2nd Lieut. C. C. Nott-Bower, I.A.R.O., attached 2/3rd.
Gurkha officers	1	Jemadar Ganj Sing Gurung.
Gurkha ranks	13	
Wounded : British officers	1	Captain A. G. Stone.
Gurkha officers	1	Subadar Narbahadur Gurung.
Gurkha ranks	111	
<hr/> TOTAL		129 (excluding 30 to 40 sick).

Of the two British officers killed on the 16th of May, Capt. Grigg had been continuously present with the battalion since December 1914, when he joined from the 1/3rd. He had proved his great worth on numerous occasions, particularly at Neuve Chapelle in March, when he remained on duty though wounded. Of striking appearance and of a quiet, retiring disposition, he consistently put the welfare of his unit before all other considerations. He truly belonged to the type Gurkhas will follow to the death. 2nd Lieut. Nott-Bower was an officer of much dash and great promise. The circumstances in which he met his death testify to his gallantry and daring.

On the 19th of May 2nd Lieut. J. W. Riddell joined, and Capt. C. Newton-Davis reported his arrival in medical charge, relieving Major E. H. B. Stanley, who had gone sick.

The same evening the battalion occupied the front line again, *vice* the 58th Rifles. The unit held these trenches until the 27th May, when the 2/8th Gurkhas came in relief. This period was spent in clearing the battle-field, burying dead, improving and rebuilding the defences, etc. Heavy shell fire was experienced all along. Various local attacks were made along the front from time to time, with the object of straightening out salients, and generally consolidating such portions of the German trenches as the British had captured during the recent offensive. These enterprises kept the enemy busy anticipating another attack, so there was no diminution of their artillery fire.

On the 24th of May Capt. Stone, and next day Lieut.-Col. Brakspear, rejoined from the sick list and resumed command of No. 1 D.C. and the duties of second in command respectively.

The battalion marched back to Croix Barbée on the night of the 27th May, and moved on the 31st to better billets near Lacouture and King's Road. During the following week the 2/3rd Gurkhas were lent to the Bareilly Brigade as a reserve and supplied large working parties every night.

On the 7th of June trenches in the vicinity of the Ferme Cours d'Avoué were taken over from the 2nd Gurkhas. While occupying these trenches, which were new and required much work and improvement, we lost a patrol of two men, captured by a party of Germans whom the Gurkhas mistook for a British patrol. Capt. Bagot-Chester, with one N.C.O. and six men, carried out a most useful reconnaissance of the German defences opposite his part of the line. The weather at this time was very wet, and the viscous mud made it impossible to move about without getting plastered with it from head to foot.

On the 24th June the glad news came that Lieut.-Col. Ormsby had been awarded a Companionship of the Bath, and Major Tillard, Capt. Grigg, Capt. Lodwick, Subadar-Major Gambhir Sing Gurung and Subadar Bhim Sing Thapa a mention in despatches.

The 4th Camerons relieved the 2/3rd on the night of the 10-11th July, when the latter unit moved back to Vieille Chapelle. The next night the battalion marched with the 2nd Leicesters, via Fosse and l'Epinette, to good billets in Le Sart, about two miles west of Merville. This was the first time the men had been out of the immediate proximity to the front line since the middle of April. They were badly in need of rest, baths, "de-lousing," etc. The rest of the month was spent in training, route-marching, paper-chases, and other means of keeping the men fit.

On the 27th of July Lieut. Voelcker, Jemadar Lilambar Thapa and three men were unfortunately wounded at bomb practice; Lieut. Voelcker lost the sight of one eye.

The beginning of August saw the battalion back again in the front line trenches. It was on the 5th that Lieut. J. C. Hutchinson was killed by a bullet while inspecting barbed wire entanglements in front of the line.

On the 16th of August the 2/3rd occupied a section of the line north of Neuve Chapelle. Headquarters was called Winchester Farm. Col. Ormsby and his adjutant, Capt. Tuite-Dalton, both old Wykehamists, carved their names on an old oaken board which they found on the farm. They had hopes that many former Winchester "men" who went there in the future would continue the scroll. The good old school motto by William of Wykeham, "MANNERS MAKETH MAN," was carved at the top.

Two years later this board and two others, with over thirty names carved on them, were found and removed to Winchester College as an interesting relic of the Great War. Major Tuite-Dalton has probably been to inspect these mementos, or will see them in the near future. Vin. Ormsby, alas! can never do so. His body lies

in a soldier's grave in France, where he was killed in action while leading his brigade on the 28th of April, 1917.

Ormsby joined the first battalion at Almora in March 1890. He had a special call on the regiment, being a grandson of Major-General Sir Stuart Corbett, K.C.B., who commanded from 1828 to 1842 and was the next permanent commandant to Sir Robert Colquhoun. Moreover, before he joined, Ormsby had married a daughter of Col. R. E. K. Money, who was over twenty-five years in the 3rd Gurkhas. In the 3rd Gurkhas, too, were born his mother, his wife and his two children.

Brigadier-General Ormsby's death was more than tragic, in that he had commanded the 2/3rd all through a whole year in France and been constantly exposed to shot and shell. He was appointed to the command of the Sirhind Brigade in November 1915, but the order did not reach him until after he had sailed for Egypt with his battalion. In the following February he was given the 127th Brigade of the 42nd Division in Egypt and took it over to France in March 1917, where he met his fate the following month. Vin. Ormsby joined the 3rd with a great reputation both as a cricketer and a horseman. His feat in 1883 when in "Lords" XI was still fresh in men's memories. Winchester won, just on time, owing to a magnificent catch made by Ormsby in the deep field to dismiss the last batsman of the Eton eleven.

His was a charming character : brave, courteous, loyal and absolutely straightforward ; a soldier and a thinker, as well as a just and honourable man. During General Ormsby's less than three years of the Great War he was four times mentioned in dispatches and decorated with the C.B. His relations and friends, his regiment and his old school may well be proud of his memory.

On the 17th August Lieut. Grey Smith joined the battalion, and on the 20th Major A. B. Tillard left on appointment to the 4th Gurkhas as second in command. On the 28th August Lieut. Tyson-Tyson reported his arrival from the first battalion at Almora.

The 2/3rd Gurkhas were relieved in the front line by the Manchester Regiment of the Jullundur Brigade on the 1st September. But this did not mean billets, for during the first three weeks of the month the battalion was either in, or close up to, the front line in the neighbourhood of the trenches just north of Neuve Chapelle. The men were busily employed every night in improving the defences and preparing for a big offensive which, rumour had it, was about to take place.

Lord Kitchener inspected the 2/3rd on the 20th September and congratulated Colonel Ormsby on the magnificent unit he com-

manded and on the merit it had achieved during its fighting in France.

The same night a rehearsal took place of moving the brigade into a position of assembly for an attack. Only British officers, Gurkha officers and N.C.O.s were employed. The date of the coming attack was kept a dead secret, but rumours were rife and not far off the mark. Anyhow, it was correctly surmised that it would come off in the very near future.

For a few days before the 25th September, the battalion was billeted close up behind the trench system. There were orchards about which gave plenty of cover, and the country was open enough to hold hare. Everyone knows the effect on Gurkhas of the cry of "khargosh." On one occasion when a hare had actually got up between two of the 2/3rd billets, the noise and pandemonium were too much for a gunner soldier billeted in the vicinity. He rushed out into the street and, seeing a Gurkha quietly walking down it, shouted to him: "Hi, Johnny—what's up?" The Gurkha turned and, seeing consternation and alarm plainly written on the gunner's face, replied gravely: "Allemand." The soldier, unable to believe his ears, suddenly caught sight of a smile breaking out on the Gurkha's face. Realising that his leg was being pulled, a thing he had not conceived possible by an "Indian," he shouted to a pal, who had also run out on hearing the hullabaloo: "'Ere, Bill; this 'ere little black is trying to kid me." Let it be added that, all the same, the gunner thoroughly appreciated the joke.

On the 23rd September Lieut. Allan Macbeth—"Snooks," as he was always affectionately called by his brother officers—received orders for transfer to the 4th Corps for duty. He had joined the 2/3rd on its arrival in France as British interpreter. His knowledge of the country, the language and the people, had been of inestimable value to the unit all through. Added to this, his exceptional charm of manner, his good nature and his unceasing efforts to do everything he possibly could for the battalion, had so endeared him to all—British and Gurkha ranks alike—that his sudden removal was little short of a calamity. The more so as he had very efficiently performed the duties of quartermaster (owing to the shortage of officers), during the last six months.

We had been having a little fine weather in September, but on the 24th it changed and heavy rain once more set in. The trenches from which the attack had to be launched had been elaborately prepared, but had been dug very deep and very narrow. The result was that passage along them became slow in the extreme, owing to the mud and deep water. Indeed at places where the

sides fell in or any other stoppage occurred, the obstruction was complete.

At long last detailed orders were issued regarding the expected engagement, the motive and plan of which were as follows :

The Indian Corps near Neuve Chapelle, in conjunction with the 5th Corps, east of Ypres, and the 3rd Corps, near Bois Grenier, and the 2nd Division of the 1st Corps, near Givenchy, was to carry out a holding attack to assist the main operations, in the neighbourhood of Loos, by drawing off reserves of the enemy. If successful in its initial stages the attack was to be followed up, and its objective extended into a turning movement against the La Bassée defences.

The immediate objective was the enemy's line between Sunken Road and Winchester Road, and the establishment of a position from Mauquissart to the Duck's Bill.

The Meerut Division was detailed for the assault—the Garhwal Brigade on the right and the Bareilly Brigade on the left, with the Dehra Dun Brigade in Divisional Reserve.

This assault was to be preceded by a four days' bombardment and the explosion of a mine under the enemy's parapets on the left flank of the attack. Gas and smoke barrages were also to be made use of, if the wind was favourable. Owing to the uncertainty on this point an "A" and a "B" method of attack were drawn up, and the troops were to be prepared to carry out either *modus operandi* on word being passed up from brigade headquarters : "A" attack was with the aid of gas ; "B" attack with the aid of an intense artillery bombardment.

The disposition of the Garhwal Brigade was as follows : On the extreme right the 3rd Londons continued to hold the Duck's Bill. The assaulting troops were 2/3rd Gurkhas on the right, 2nd Leicesters in the centre and 2/8th Gurkhas on the left. The 39th Garhwal Rifles, in brigade reserve, held the "Home Counties" trench in rear of the centre.

Thus the right flank of the attack, the pivot on which the whole operation rested, fell to the lot of the 2/3rd Gurkhas.

Billets were evacuated for the march to the position of assembly at 7.30 p.m. on the 24th September, the fourth night of the hundred hours' artillery and trench mortar bombardment of the enemy's trenches. The route was via Tilleloy communication trench, which ran past the north side of "The Moated Grange."

The 2nd Leicesters had moved in front of the 2/3rd and, owing to congestion in the trenches, their tail blocked the Gurkhas' passage to their position of assembly for a considerable time. Thus it was not until 10.10 p.m. that the battalion was able to occupy its allotted

place. There was much to be done on arrival, and no one got any sleep that night. At 11.30 p.m. orders were received for attack "A," but this was subsequently altered to attack "B," and back again to attack "A," several times during the night.

At 4.45 a.m. a strong smell of gas was suddenly discovered at battalion headquarters. The gas alarm was at once given. The Germans had been shelling a good deal, and it was conceived that they had been using gas shells. It was learnt later, however, that the gas was due to the explosion of some gas cylinders in the Duck's Bill by a German trench mortar. This put out of action, besides others, an officer and eighteen men of the 1/3rd Londons, holding that projecting portion of trench on the right.

The moral effect of this incident was not favourable, as, apart from the fact that all the final preparations had to be made, and orders given in gas-masks, several of the 2/3rd had to be sent back gassed before the attack started.

It must be remembered that this was the first occasion on which the British used gas. The fact that our gas spread all over our own trenches proved that whatever wind there was, and it was barely perceptible, was in the wrong direction.

Two days prior to the attack the gunners had reported that they were unable to guarantee that the German wire in front of the right of the proposed attack had been cut. Col. Ormsby accordingly obtained permission to attack in greater depth, *i.e.* with one company in the front line instead of two companies.

It will be observed that there were some difficulties to contend with, yet the battalion mounted the parapet for the attack, full of confidence, at 6 a.m. The men were still wearing gas-masks, and the smoke and gas that had been discharged kept the whole vicinity of the trenches enveloped in a thick haze, through which it was impossible to see any distance.

Lieut. Bagot-Chester, who was commanding No. 4 D.C., led the way, closely followed by Lieut.-Col. Brakspear with No. 3 D.C. The German wire was gained with only a few casualties, but on the left front it was only in a very few places that it had been cut through. Both the Leicesters on the left and the 2/3rd rushed for these few gaps. The Germans, unharmed by our gas—which had damaged only ourselves—and not subjected to any intensive artillery bombardment, soon woke up to the presence of attackers on their wire. A furious rifle and machine gun fire was started, which mowed down the unfortunate men, struggling to get through the gaps. Little is known of the fate that befel Lieut.-Col. Brakspear and Lieut. Tyson-Tyson. Following close behind the first line, No. 3 D.C. bore slightly to the

right and must have come up against high uncut barbed wire entanglements. Here they tried to force a way through, but it was impossible, and these two officers, with many of their men, were mown down by the hail of bullets.

A few men, but very few, succeeded in gaining the German trench. Among these was Lieut. Wood of No. 4 D.C., who with only four men fought his way through the wire and into the trench, where they were all, except one, killed in a hand-to-hand fight.

The story of Lieut. Bagot-Chester's experiences is given fully in Merewether's *The Indian Corps in France*. He was indeed a most gallant officer, and had previously distinguished himself beyond measure with the scouts. In this capacity he had met with numerous exciting and daring adventures while rendering many valuable reports of the enemy's positions.

On the occasion now being recorded he was wounded when close to the German wire, and only escaped by lying the whole day in a shell hole, which he shared with his orderly, Rifleman Budhiman Gurung. Both were hit again and again while lying within fifteen yards of the wire, but managed with terrible difficulty to crawl back after dark.

No. 2 D.C., under Lieut. Fisher, was delayed in starting, owing to there being no room for them in the front line trench, which was blocked by some bomb and grenade detachments. By 6.30, however, they were well away, only to meet with the same fate as the preceding two companies, whose bodies strewed the ground. Lieut. Fisher, wounded in the face and arm, was unable to effect a breach in the wire. Finally the company dwindled away into a few scattered groups, those living taking refuge in shell holes.

In the meantime all was shrouded in mystery at battalion headquarters. It was impossible to see through the haze, and no message of any sort came back to report progress or otherwise. The adjutant was sent to the headquarters of the Leicesters to gain what information he could. Their C.O., Lieut.-Col. Gordon, was of opinion that a breach had been made in the German line, and that our troops were hard at work consolidating. But he confessed that this was only conjecture and that he had no authoritative report to rely on. It was clearly understood, however, that a gap existed between the Leicesters' right and the 2/3rd left.

On the Adjutant's return with this report, Subadar Bhim Sing Thapa, with A Company, was sent forward, at 7.30 a.m., with orders to fill the gap. This company too disappeared into the haze. Again battalion headquarters had to cope with the fog of war. Frequent patrols were sent forward, but none ever returned.

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The fact was, that as soon as any one got beyond the haze, he was confronted with concentrated machine gun fire from both flanks, the result being, he was either shot at once, or forced to lie flat down and remain so, unable to move hand or foot.

The number of patrols sent out reduced the strength of the only reserve left to a section or two of B Company, under Capt. Stone. At 10.30 these men were placed at the disposal of the O.C. the Garhwal Rifles, who had been ordered to make a fresh attack. This, however, owing to severe congestion in the communication trenches, never matured. A similar cause was accountable for the abnormal delay in the advance of the Dehra Dun Brigade. Original orders timed this for 10.30 a.m., but the brigade was not concentrated in position and ready to assault until 2.15 p.m. The operation was then cancelled.

These delays and blockages in communication trenches were due to the fact, already recorded, that the trenches were made far too narrow. The idea—and a sound one in many circumstances—was that narrow trenches afforded more protection from shell fire. The experiences of this battle proved that the disadvantages of narrow trenches outweighed the advantages, and the mistake was not repeated in future operations.

To return to the narrative. At 11.10 a.m. the first report from the front was received at battalion headquarters. This was a message from Subadar Bhim Sing Thapa to the effect that the attack was held up, that the enemy still held his position behind uncut wire, and that the British were enfiladed by machine gun fire from both flanks.

Thus ended the last big battle in which the 2/3rd took part in France. Although all ranks had fought with the utmost gallantry their task was an impossible one, for, against uncut wire and enfilade machine gun fire, no gallantry can prevail. Thirty-five 2/3rd Gurkha dead bodies were counted lying on the front of the German parapet ; the wire was, in places, piled with dead and wounded four or five deep. As already recorded, Lieut. Wood's small party fought its way into the enemy's trench, where all except one were killed.

Heavy rain began to fall about 3 p.m., and it seemed to have the good effect of somewhat reducing the enemy's fire. At 4 p.m. orders came to dribble men back from the front, a sound manoeuvre at times, but impossible here until after dark. When this took place the survivors, who had found shelter in ditches and shell holes, began to trickle in. A large number of wounded succeeded in crawling back to their unit, amongst them Lieuts. Bagot-Chester and Fisher.

Our casualties in the battle were :

Killed :	British officers	3	Lieut.-Col. W. R. Brakspear. Lieut. J. Tyson-Tyson. Lieut. T. P. Wood.
	Gurkha officers	2	Jemadar Sibbu Rana. Jemadar Padamdhoj Chettri.
	Gurkha ranks	95	
Wounded :	British officers	2	Lieut. W. G. Bagot-Chester. Lieut. G. T. Fisher.
	Gurkha officers	3	Subadar Dhanwar Thapa. Subadar Padambahadur Limbu, and one other.
	Gurkha ranks	126	
TOTAL		241	

At the conclusion of the operations the battalion had only three British officers left : Col. Ormsby and Capts. Stone and Tuite-Dalton.

Lieut. Grey Smith, who was acting quartermaster, was with the First Line Transport in rear.

It was in this battle that Rifleman Kulbir Thapa won the Victoria Cross. He was the sole survivor of Wood's party which had fought its way into the German trench. Although wounded, he succeeded in getting through the wire and charged right across the enemy's trench. On the far side he found a man of the 2nd Leicesters badly wounded. Although this man begged Kulbir to leave him and save himself, he refused to do so and remained with him all that day and throughout the night. Next morning there was a dense fog. Aided by this, Kulbir succeeded in bringing the wounded man through the German wire and deposited him in a shell hole. Not satisfied, he then went back and rescued a 2/3rd Gurkha, and, after that, another. Returning again to the British soldier, he brought him safely in to the trenches of the Garhwal Rifles. By this time it was broad daylight and he had to carry the wounded man most of the way under fire. The official account of these deeds will be found in Appendix 10, and it is interesting to record that the recommendation for the V.C. was most strongly supported by officers of the 39th Garhwal Rifles and one of the 2nd Leicesters.

For years there had been a strong camaraderie between the 1/39th and the 2/3rd, known amongst the men as the "old battalions," whilst the 9th G.R. and the 2/39th were called the new ones. The 1/39th were probably not unmindful of the episode of August 1897, when it was ordered on active service and transport failed. Sooner than see their comrades kept back one day longer than necessary, the

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men of the 2/3rd and 9th offered their services to carry the baggage to the railway terminus. This entailed a march of forty miles, half of which was done carrying a heavy load.

Evidence of the Germans' barbarity during this action is overwhelming. We have already learnt how they fired at and hit Lieut. Bagot-Chester and Rifleman Budhiman Gurung several times, while lying wounded fifteen yards from the enemy's line. Wounded men, who escaped by pretending to be dead, relate how, during the fog on the morning of the 26th September, parties of Germans left their trench and proceeded deliberately to shoot or bayonet the British wounded lying in front.

After the operations of the 25th September, the battalion remained holding the trenches, assisted by the Garhwal Rifles, until 2.30 p.m. on the 29th, when it marched to Calonne. Here reorganisation was at once taken in hand.

The following officers joined on the dates shown against their name :

2nd Lieut. H. J. D. Flynn	-	on 28th September.
2nd Lieut. R. A. Robertson	-	on 28th September.
2nd Lieut. M. C. O'Brien	-	on 30th September.
2nd Lieut. G. N. Storrs	-	on 4th October, with two Gurkha officers, ninety-eight other ranks, and five followers.
2nd Lieut. G. P. Cooke	-	on 4th October.
Major W. L. Dundas	-	on 5th October (rejoined after recovery from wound).
Lieut. W. H. Welman	-	on 13th October.

A short period of rest was enjoyed during reorganisation. It was at this time that orders were received for the amalgamation of the 2/3rd with the 2/8th Gurkhas, under the designation of "The Lansdowne Rifles." This was not at all a popular idea ; both commanding officers protested, and the order was subsequently cancelled.

On the 8th October the unit was ordered to hold itself in a state of constant readiness, as the Germans were attacking near Loos. Two days later it moved into the front line near Givenchy.

It was while holding this sector that Capt. A. H. Bald, who was brigade machine gun officer, was killed by a rifle grenade in the front line trenches. Affectionately known as "Punch," he was one of the most popular of all the officers. Beloved by both British and Gurkha ranks, the battalion deeply mourned his loss. Always in high spirits, he was invariably the life and soul of any gathering, and combined these qualities with a wonderful courage and great efficiency.



No. 2129 KULBIR THAPA, V.C.
OF THE SECOND BATTALION.



No. 4146 KARANBAHADUR RANA, V.C.
OF THE SECOND BATTALION.

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The 2/3rd were relieved from these trenches on the 19th October by the 2nd East Surrey Regiment. After four days' rest at Le Casan, the battalion moved to the same locality, in front of the Rue du Bois, as first occupied in October 1914. The line was a few hundred yards advanced, battalion headquarters occupying the old front, with the firing line, approximately, in the German front line trenches of the year before.

It rained almost continuously and the Gurkhas were employed day and night in repairing whole sections of the trenches which constantly collapsed. The divisional commander (Gen. Claud Jacob) made frequent visits, bringing with him, on one occasion, the C.R.E. to advise. This officer caused a good deal of amusement by asserting that by far the best remedy was to fill the sandbags always with *dry* earth. As it was raining in torrents and the officers and men were over their knees in water and mud, everybody laughed, including the G.O.C.

On the 28th of October the battalion was relieved by the 2/8th Gurkhas and moved into brigade reserve in the Rue de Berceaux and Rue du Bois, being employed by night in revetting and clearing communication trenches.

It was again relieved by the 2nd Gurkhas on the evening of the 2nd of November and marched to St. Quentin, remaining there that night. The following day it went with the brigade into corps reserve.

Lieut. Angelo joined on the 2nd of November.

On the morning of the 4th of November the whole Garhwal Brigade marched to billets in Thiennes and while there received orders to be in readiness to move shortly to the Near East. All officers on leave were recalled, and on the evening of the 7th of November the battalion entrained at Thiennes station for Marseilles. During the previous day and night all draught horses, heavy and light, as well as all equipment in excess of that authorised by the Mobilisation Tables, were returned to Ordnance. Entraining had to be done in the dark, as the train was two hours late in arriving.

After travelling via Vieille and Neuve St. George and Le Tiel, the battalion reached the town station, Marseilles, at 4.30 a.m. on the 10th November and detrained at once.

Three hours later the unit marched to the docks, four miles distant, and embarked (with the 2/8th G.R.) on s.s. *Chilka*, which sailed about 10 a.m. for Port Said.

Our first line transport was embarked on s.s. *Urlana* under the command of Lieut. Grey Smith.

In conclusion, as regards the Indian Corps in France, it should be mentioned that the supply of suitable reinforcements had been a matter causing the authorities grave anxiety for some time. The Indian system of reserves had broken down completely under the strain of a big war. The various expedients which were resorted to, such as drafting men from military police, or from other regiments which could not spare them, were plainly makeshifts only. The extensive recruiting and training in India, which were so useful later on, had not yet had time to take effect. The severe fighting at Neuve Chapelle and Ypres in May, followed by the desperate struggle of the 25th September, had caused the heaviest losses. Indeed the Corps was so reduced in strength by the end of September as to cause rumours to prevail that a change to another field of action was imminent. Some thought we were destined for the Dardanelles, others for Mesopotamia. When authentic tidings did arrive of our impending departure, it was hardly, therefore, a matter for surprise. At the same time the locality of the new theatre of war was kept secret. As a matter of fact, we were not all bound for the same destination.

Looking back on the time spent in France by the 2/3rd Gurkhas, the battalion may well be proud of its record. The casualties suffered were :

Killed : British, 12 ; Gurkhas, 242
Wounded : British, 7 ; Gurkhas, 575

or a total of 836 in one year's fighting. This alone shows the severity of the task. That it was well performed is proved by the long list of rewards given for deeds of valour. It must be remembered, however, that many valiant acts could never be reported. Of the brave deeds recorded only a few gained any reward.

In 1919 the writer of this history had occasion to correspond on a certain matter with the late General Sir James Willcocks. In his reply the General added at the end of his letter :

"As an ardent Gurkha, I know you will be glad to hear that, although I did not always think so, I have now come to the conclusion that the best of my troops in France were the Gurkhas."

When it was announced that the Indian troops had left France for "another field of action," General Hutchinson, the Colonel of the regiment, forwarded to Queen Alexandra's equerry, for her Majesty's information, some detail of the second battalion's services in France as regards casualties, mentions, honours, etc.

The reply, dated Marlborough House, 29th December, 1915, was as follows :

“ DEAR GENERAL HUTCHINSON,

I have read with the greatest interest the particulars relating to the services of my own regiment of Gurkhas, since the commencement of this great and terrible war.

The record is indeed a wonderful one, and while I most sincerely deplore the loss of so many officers, N.C.O.s and men, I feel intensely proud of the regiment which bears my name, and I trust you will convey to all ranks my high appreciation of their devoted and splendid services to their King and the Empire.

(Signed) ALEXANDRA.”



MARLBOROUGH HOUSE

29th December 1915.

Dear General Hutchinson,

I have read with the greatest interest the particulars relating to the services of my own Regiment of Gurkhas since the commencement of this great and terrible war.

The record is indeed a wonderful one, and whilst I most sincerely deplore the loss of so many officers, non-commissioned officers and men, I feel intensely proud of the Regiment which bears my name, and I trust that you will convey to all ranks my high appreciation of their devoted and splendid services to their King and the Empire.

Alfred

CHAPTER XX

THE GREAT WAR

THE SECOND BATTALION

SINAI AND WORK IN THE DESERT

THE detail and description of the eventful happenings to the 2/3rd Gurkhas in Sinai and Palestine come from the pen of its commanding officer—1916-1920—Lieut.-Col. C. S. Eastmead, D.S.O.

It is a piece of great good fortune for the whole regiment that a narrative of such interest and importance should have been related so ably by one who was actually on the spot. The good fortune is enhanced too by the fact that an officer of the amazing zeal of Lieut. R. L. Turner was at hand to give of his best as regards all the spade work of the Sinai period.

Lieut.-Col. Eastmead was serving with the first battalion at Almora when war broke out and remained with it until November 1915. He was then transferred to the second battalion, joining it at Suez Camp on the 31st of the following month. In February 1916 he was appointed to the 2/10th Gurkhas at El Shatt, but returned to the 2/3rd on 28th February as commandant, *vice* Ormsby given the 127th Brigade of the 42nd Division.

Before leaving Marseilles in the s.s. *Chilka*, commanding officers were warned that German submarines were very active in the Mediterranean. No escort was provided for the ship, nor had it any means whatever of defence. Lieut. Rennison mounted the machine guns on deck, to give what protection they could, and placed men on duty with them day and night. When the ship got to sea he fired some practice rounds, much to the consternation of the skipper. Fortunately, no submarines were encountered, possibly owing to very rough weather, and, after an uneventful voyage, Alexandria was reached on the morning of 16th November, 1915. On anchoring in the harbour, the vessel was ordered to proceed at once to Port Said. At the mouth of the harbour she struck the buoy-boom and got a wire hawser entangled in her propeller. This took some time to clear, and Alexandria was not left until four o'clock that afternoon.

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Port Said was reached at midday on the 17th, and the 2/8th Gurkhas disembarked at once. The 2/3rd followed suit next morning and by 11 o'clock was entrained for Kantara, its destination.

At Kantara, until the 1st December, the battalion was employed on drill parades, training and smartening up generally ; also taking part in occasional route-marches with the movable column. This tranquil routine was an agreeable change from work in the trenches in France, and the bright sunshine of Egypt soon banished the memory of the cold, wet and mud in which the unit had so long existed.

On the 2nd December the battalion took over some of the Canal Defences, relieving the 6th Jats in the posts Ballah—kilo. 50.8—Bridge Head—Spit Post—El Cap, on the east of the Suez Canal.

During the stay at Kantara Lieuts. Angelo and Grey Smith were appointed landing officers at Port Said, where they remained about three months.

On 31st December the battalion moved by train to Suez Camp. It was there that a draft of two Gurkha officers and a hundred other ranks from the depot, under Lieut.-Col. C. S. Eastmead, reported for duty with the second battalion.

Suez was crowded with troops. In addition to the various Indian units from France, there were British, Australian, New Zealand and Indian soldiers of every description from Gallipoli, which had just been evacuated. There were great meetings of old friends, with many a yarn of adventures in the different theatres of the war.

On 4th January, 1916, a draft, consisting of Lieut. Allanson, Subadar Gopal Rana and 203 Gurkha ranks, joined the battalion. A large proportion of this draft, which came from France, was made up of sick and wounded men, many of whom were quite unfit for any further active service, owing to broken fingers and thumbs, stiff joints, etc.

Rifleman Kulbir Thapa, V.C., was with this draft, and was promoted to naick on parade next morning, prior to the march to Kubri East.

At Kubri the battalion took over the post from the Gwalior Infantry. This was an uncomfortable place ; the soil is made up of Canal mud, and the rain which fell during the few days' stay made it very slippery and unpleasant.

On 11th January the 2/3rd marched from Kubri, eleven miles south, to Ayun Musa and joined the 20th Brigade,¹ under Brigadier General H. J. Watson. The march, through heavy sand, was rather

¹ Composed of 1/2nd and 2/3rd Gurkhas, the Garhwal Rifles, Gwalior Imperial Service Infantry and some Imperial Service Cavalry.



a trying one, as the Gurkhas were not then accustomed to this toilsome method of progression.

Ayun Musa, or Moses' Wells, is supposed to be the Elim mentioned in Genesis, to which Moses led the Children of Israel, after their halt at Marah (Birr Murr, the bitter spring), where the water was so unpalatable. There certainly are at Ayun Musa three score and ten (or more) palm trees, and there are none anywhere else on the east side of the Canal line. There are also twelve springs of water.

Some of these springs are curiously situated at the summits of small hills, and not in the hollows where one would expect to find them. This fact may be accounted for on the assumption that the hills were formed gradually by sand blowing on to the wet ground about the spring and adhering to it. The water of the springs is brackish and not very clear, but the Children of Israel were probably glad enough to drink it. Anyhow the Gurkhas were when the limited supply of fresh water from Suez failed to arrive. This real fresh water used to be sent out by boat and was pumped into a tank at the Quarantine station, situated on the shore, where brigade headquarters were established. From there the water was brought out to the troops by camels carrying "fantassis"—the Egyptian equivalent of our familiar "bantar." In rough weather the boat could not cross the bay from Suez, and everyone had to fall back on the local supply, which, besides being non-thirst-quenching, took a long time to boil and made execrable tea. The ration of firewood at this time was 2 lbs. per man daily. Attempts were made to get this increased, but without success.

It was said that Lord Kitchener, inspecting the Canal Defences shortly before the unit's arrival in Egypt, expressed the opinion that the troops, instead of defending the Canal, were using the Canal to defend themselves. Now, therefore, as it was thought probable that the Turks, freed by our evacuation of Gallipoli, would before long undertake a serious attack on Egypt from Palestine, an elaborate system of defensive works was commenced in the desert east of the Canal and coast. These works extended from Ayun Musa on the right to Kantara on the left. North of Kantara the desert had been inundated to such an extent that no attack above that point was possible.

The works were roughly in three lines. First came Gebel Murr, a rocky hill some nine miles east of El Shatt (another quarantine station on the Canal east of Suez), commanding the exit from the mountains of Northern Sinai, through the Mitla Pass. This was to be made into a small fortress, with other works supporting it. A second

line of works, of which Ayun Musa was one, was approximately three miles east of the Canal or coast. A third line, on the coast, or the Canal itself, consisted of posts such as Quarantine, El Shatt, Shallufa, etc.

The portion of these defences with which the 2/3rd was chiefly concerned was the south or right end of the line, and was known officially as No. 1 Sector of "A" Subsection, Canal Defences. This sector included (1) three front line works at Ayun Musa, the Plateau Position (or 198, as it was sometimes called), and Junction Post; (2) an intermediate position, about a mile in rear, and (3) a covering position on three sides of brigade headquarters at Quarantine.

The Ayun Musa trenches were begun by the 2nd Gurkhas on the right, the 39th Garhwal Rifles in the centre, and 2/3rd on the left. The last named battalion was required, in addition, to construct the 198 Position. The Imperial Service Infantry had the digging of Junction Post.

As the whole of these new Canal defences were constructed under what were practically peace conditions, with an abundance of material, they were very fine examples of field fortifications. The amount of labour expended on them was prodigious, and men of the 2/3rd contributed their full share. There was digging in every sort of soil, from shifting sand to solid rock; blasting and tunnelling; revetting and wiring; building aid posts, ammunition, water and ration stores, as well as dug-outs of all descriptions; laying innumerable telephone cables for communication between all parts of the defences—in fact, transforming that portion of the wilderness into a well fortified frontier.

For local protection cavalry patrols were pushed out by day some seven or eight miles towards the mountains and were supported by infantry standing patrols; while by night reconnoitring patrols from the infantry outposts searched the desert to the east, for two miles or so from the front line.

The weather at first was gloriously bright and cool, but towards the end of January there was a good deal of cold wind. Violent storms of rain occurred, tents were blown down, poles were broken, cooking was impossible. Indeed for a few days every one was most uncomfortable. By the end of the month, however, all was clear again, and the days soon began to get warm.

During the month Lieut. D. G. Wright and Lieut. N. H. Finglas joined the battalion. The former brought a small draft of eleven Gurkha ranks from France. Another small reinforcement of eight Gurkha ranks arrived from Lansdowne. These, with another draft

of 110 men from France, under Lieut. O'Brien, brought the strength up to over 1,000 men.

The garrison of Ayun Musa changed considerably during February. The 2nd Gurkhas and the Garhwal Rifles left for India, being relieved by the 58th Rifles and the Alwar Infantry. These two units were withdrawn on 29th February. Two field batteries, which had arrived on 30th January, were also withdrawn, leaving the battalion alone in the Ayun Musa and 198 positions, with a company of Renfrewshire R.E. and a troop of the Duke of Westminster's Dragoons.

Changes took place in the battalion too. As already stated, Lieut.-Col. V. A. Ormsby, C.B., was appointed a brigade commander and Lieut.-Col. C. S. Eastmead succeeded him in the 2/3rd Gurkhas from the 28th of February. Major W. L. Dundas relieved Col. Eastmead in the officiating command of the 2/10th Gurkhas, to which the latter had been appointed only ten days previously.

Glad as all were to know that Col. Ormsby's splendid services in France had at last been rewarded by his promotion to Brigadier-General, no one could help feeling sorry to say good-bye to his old commanding officer. In far-off Lansdowne, and since the unit's departure from that peaceful spot, so much had been gone through together. He it was who had led the battalion so gallantly during those eventful months in France. It was his care and forethought on every occasion which meant the well-being of all ranks. Therefore, it was only natural for the congratulations to be mingled with a feeling of very real regret at his leaving the regiment with which he had been associated for five and twenty years, and the battalion he had commanded so well for over five.

Early in March battalion headquarters were established at "Quarantine," and the British officers present were :

C.O. -	-	-	Lieut.-Col. C. S. Eastmead.
No. 1 D.C.C.	-	-	Capt. Stone (also commanding Right Half Battalion).
Adjutant -	-	-	Capt. Dalton.
No. 3 D.C.C.	-	-	Capt. Welman.
No. 4 D.C.C.	-	-	Lieut. Grey Smith.
No. 2 D.C.C.	-	-	Lieut. Finglas.
No. 1 D.C.C.	-	-	Lieut. O'Brien.
M.G.O. -	-	-	Lieut. Rennison.
No. 3 D.C.O.	-	-	Lieut. Robertson.
Quartermaster -	-	-	Lieut. Angelo.
No. 2 D.C.O.	-	-	Lieut. Storrs.
No. 4 D.C.O.	-	-	Lieut. Allanson.
Capt. Newton Davis, I.M.S.			

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One wing was at Ayun Musa, the other at the Plateau Position, 198. The sector appeared popular, for it was always being inspected by an avalanche of general officers. Corps Commanders, Divisional Commanders, Brigade Commanders and others came in a bewildering succession. At this time of year it was indeed an enjoyable excursion and an agreeable occupation to cross the bay by motor boat from Suez to Quarantine, ride out to the front line and along the defences, over the desert to Gebel Murr, back to El Shatt to meet the motor boat again, and so to Suez for luncheon.

By the middle of March the garrison of the sector had been reinforced by a regiment of Yeomanry (1st City of London) and a field battery (H.A.C.) as well as the 58th Rifles. Then orders came to stop digging and put every available man on to wiring the defences, which were now nearing completion. A report was received that the Turks were concentrating for an attack on the Canal. Hostile aeroplanes began to appear, and collisions between our cavalry patrols and small bodies of the enemy became frequent, so much so that the battalion was often called upon to supply patrols and covering parties to support, or act in conjunction with, the mounted troops.

The Canal defences were inspected on the 27th March by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, who was attended by the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief. He was shown the sights of Ayun Musa, including the big spring, which bubbled up in great style that morning. He was greatly struck by the deceptive appearance, as regards distance, of various objects in the desert that were pointed out to him. From Ayun Musa the inspecting party rode across to Gebel Murr.

By the end of the month battalion headquarters were again located at Ayun Musa, and a new post at Bir Mabeiuk was laid out by the C.O. and work on it started by H Company.

Brigade headquarters moved back to Quarantine about this time, and another Yeomanry regiment (County of London) arrived in Ayun Musa. The Renfrewshire R.E. left for "elsewhere."

The garrison of Bir Mabeiuk was increased to 200 rifles 2/3rd Gurkhas, with one machine gun, a squadron of Yeomanry and a section I.F.A.

On 17th April Capt. Stone and Subadar Major Bhim Sing Thapa took out sixty men from the garrison of Bir Mabeiuk to reconnoitre the Um Hamatha and Reina wadis, in the hills to the east. They left just after midnight and returned at 10 p.m.—a twenty-two hours' trek, with very little water. Both wadis were found to be simply beds of mountain torrents, very narrow, with precipitous sides, and so steep

and rough that Gurkhas had great difficulty in climbing over the massive boulders in the narrow gorges. The state of the men's boots on their return—literally cut to pieces by the sharp rocks—bore witness to the rough going.

On the 21st April one Gurkha officer and 184 Gurkha ranks of Burma and Assam Military Police—a splendid body of men—were transferred from the 2/3rd to the 2/10th Gurkhas.

Owing to unusual activity on the enemy's part, it was now decided to carry out simultaneous reconnaissances along the whole line of hills opposite the British positions. Three columns were originally detailed and an elaborate time table was prepared. But a conference of commanding officers at brigade headquarters brought to light many objections and complications. It was therefore decided to simplify the scheme and operate in two independent columns—a northern column of 500 rifles, under Major Lind, 58th Rifles from 198 Position, via Bir Mabeiuk, up the Raha Pass; and a southern column consisting of 365 rifles 2/3rd Gurkhas, 50 rifles Gwalior Infantry, brigade signallers and field ambulance, under Lieut.-Col. Eastmead, from Ayun Musa, via Bir Abu Tif and Bir Abu Gerad, to Bir Um Gurf. A squadron of Yeomanry was detailed to co-operate with the southern column as it retired from the hills on its return. The whole operation was to last four days.

The following British officers accompanied the southern column :

Lieut.-Col. Eastmead, Capts. Tuite-Dalton, Welman, Newton-Davis, Lieuts. Grey Smith, Robertson and Allanson of the 2/3rd Gurkhas; Major Bannatyne (brigade major), Capt. Coullie, I.M.S., Lieut. Stoddart, H.A.C., and Lieut. French, brigade signalling officer.

The column marched from Ayun Musa at 5 a.m. on 23rd April and reached Bir Abu Tif thirteen miles distant at 11 a.m. Our maps showed water at Bir Abu Tif, but there was no sign of it, and the Yeomanry had often searched for it in vain. Through the interpreter (a seedy-looking individual, most unsuitably dressed in a thick suit and aggressively new ammunition boots), Col. Eastmead asked the guide, "Where's the water?" Without a moment's hesitation the latter replied: "Here, and here, and here," pointing to various spots on the ground on which the party stood. Everyone was very sceptical, but digging was commenced. Sure enough, about four feet down was found water. A little brackish certainly, but cool. The other places indicated by the guide were soon investigated and water was found in them all. What a comfort this discovery of cool water was, only those who were there can realise.

Leaving Capt. Coullie and his ambulance men to work at digging

out the wells, a long night march was commenced, to strike the Wadi ¹ Gerad at the foot of the hills near the spring given in the maps issued. At 3.30 next morning the cliffs overlooking Bir Abu Gerad from the north were reached. The guide pointed out a place between two enormous rocks in the wadi bed as the spot where water could be found, but vigorous digging failed to disclose it. The sun was now well up, and the wadi was getting uncomfortably hot, so the search for water was abandoned and the column pushed on.

Away to the left was seen an almost perpendicular cliff, some 1,000 feet high, which Eastmead located with a good deal of satisfaction. According to the original scheme of operations this precipice was the Gurkhas' line of retirement. Actual observation now revealed the impossibility of the route—a case of careless map-reading on the one part and acute topographical eyesight on the other.

Traces of recent occupation were seen in more than one of the innumerable large caves which abounded on both sides of the wadi. The enemy had evidently got warning and had fled. A plethora of small ravines too afforded suitable points for ambushes. It was, in short, difficult country and dangerous to enter without careful picqueting. Mounted troops acting alone in such country would be exposed to grave risk. Yet our Yeomanry had advanced a considerable distance up this wadi. On one of these excursions Capt. Newton-Davis accompanied them, and, with longer experience, realised the danger of the venture. Two at least of their number had paid the penalty of their temerity. Their dead bodies were found in the advance and as decent a burial given them as time would permit.

At 11.30 a.m. a halt was called and water obtained by digging. Um Gurf, according to the guide, was still a short distance ahead, but he was not certain about water. In the afternoon the C.O. and Adjutant, accompanied by the Brigade Major, took out a small escort to reconnoitre Um Gurf, but found no water there.

At 4.30 next morning flanking parties for the return journey were sent out, and half an hour later the main body was on the move. Bir Abu Gerad was reached at 6.30 and Bir Abu Tif at 2.30 p.m. While the camels were being dragged and shoved up the cliff path, the water hole, begun the day before, was deepened, but no water was found. Just before marching off, however, the C.O. poked his stick down where the hole was deepest and found the tip was wet. So there was water at Bir Abu Gerad after all, but not easy to get at !

¹ A river bed.

With another start at the same hour next day the column reached Ayun Musa at 10.45 a.m. The total distance covered was forty-nine miles, but picquets and flanking parties had to do a good deal more.

The only useful result of the venture was the location of water at Bir Abu Tif, which might have been achieved more easily by allowing the first party of Yeomanry, which went in that direction, to take a guide with them.

On the 26th of April Capt. Stone returned, to hand over his double company before proceeding to join headquarters 9th Corps. This was preparatory to taking up the appointment of brigade major to Brigadier Ormsby, commanding the 127th Brigade of the 42nd Division, from the 13th of June, 1916.

The battalion moved to Quarantine on 15th and 16th May, being relieved at Ayun Musa by the 58th Rifles. Eight days later it marched to Gebel Murr, to relieve the 1/11th London Regiment, 54th Division.

Capt. Tuite-Dalton left on 29th May for six weeks' leave home, and Capt. Welman took over the duties of adjutant.

Gebel Murr is a rocky outcrop from the desert, about eight miles north-east of the El Shatt railhead. Whoever held it commanded the exit from the mountains. Before the battalion's arrival there had been complaints that the troops were slack in digging the defensive works it was so desirable to complete. Returns of work, allotted and completed, had to be submitted every day. The men laboured for five hours daily and, despite difficulties, worked so vigorously that by the 5th June the order calling for daily returns of work was cancelled. Before the end of the month the plans had been carried through and Gebel Murr created a "Gibraltar of the Desert."

The G.O.C. 20th Brigade inspected the post on the 12th of June and congratulated the battalion on the prodigious amount of work carried out. Now, as in the past and in the years to come, much was asked of the men, but they never failed one, and never will.

June is one of the hottest months in the Canal zone, and away on Gebel Murr, so many miles from the Canal into the desert, the heat of that month was very trying. Without doubt the hot wind of the "khamsin" had no difficulty whatsoever in making its way into the sandy hollow where the camp was pitched, but the cool north wind that was so refreshing on the Canal itself seemed unable to enter.

The shortage of water, too, was an additional hardship. Frequently the Gurkhas, with the thirst of a three-hour working shift on

them, had to wait for the camel convoy to arrive before a drop of water could be served out. There is no water at all on Gebel Murr. The nearest supply is at Bir Murr (Marah), three miles to the south, but this is no good for thirst, being unfit for human consumption. Our horses and mules had to water at this spring and even these animals disliked it exceedingly.

There was joy therefore in the camp when news came, on the 26th June, that the battalion would shortly be relieved by the Gwalior Infantry and move to El Shatt on the Canal. It marched on 1st July, and at El Shatt took over the duties not only of the Gwalior Infantry, but also of the 58th Rifles, who had been moved to Ayun Musa without a corresponding relief. The unit was responsible for the defences of both the north and south sections of this extensive post. In addition, 100 rifles, with two machine guns, under a British officer, were detached to construct and garrison a new intermediate post called 153.

The day the 2/3rd arrived at El Shatt Lieut. R. L. Turner, with a draft from the first battalion, reported for duty. Lieut. Turner by his industry, ability and initiative soon proved himself a very valuable asset.

At this period an attempt was made to drill in accordance with Infantry Training 1914—that is to say, to work by platoons, four per company, with four companies to the battalion. This caused many misgivings at first, but Lieut. Turner produced one day an ingenious chart, which showed, in the simplest manner, all possible movements in platoon, company and battalion drill. This was taken into use by all commanders with great advantage and helped to solve many knotty problems in the new manual. Much progress was not possible, however, as duties were too heavy to allow many men for parade. The men seldom got more than one night in bed. A battalion school was, however, instituted to enable N.C.O.s and men to work up for promotion examinations. These had fallen into abeyance, but were now re-established with good results later on.

The battalion was practised in scattering into “artillery formation” on the alarm “aeroplane over.” During an early route march one such alarm was raised and the companies duly scattered. A small silvery object at a great height was seen, apparently racing through the roseate clouds of early dawn. Field glasses made it appear like a tiny half moon. As this still remained overhead, one could only conclude that it was the clouds that were moving, while the “aeroplane” was stationary. Later in the day it was discovered that the vision was the planet Venus, which is visible in the day-time, but nobody knew it.

Ships passing up and down the Canal were always objects of much interest. Particularly noticeable were those taking labour corps to France—Chinese, Annamese, Indians, Zulus and many others. A French ship entering the Canal would be roused to enthusiasm by a cry of "Vive la France"; an Italian vessel would reply with cheers to a hail of "Viva Savoia."

Those were pleasant evenings, sitting in dreamy comfort outside the mess on the Canal bank, watching the lights of Suez, or the curious glare of an approaching ship, while the mess gramophone entertained the officers with "Teddy Gerard."

This uneventful routine continued for nearly two months, unbroken by any excitement except once. On the 20th July, at 6.30 a.m., two hostile aeroplanes appeared flying from the east at a great height. The whirr of their engines was followed by the swish of dropping bombs and the crash of numerous explosions. For a few minutes the enemy flew round, and then disappeared into the northern sky. The horse and camel lines had suffered severely; twenty men were wounded, of whom three died later, and thirty-five camels and ten horses were killed. Again, on the 7th August, two aeroplanes flew over the post and dropped a few bombs, which fell harmlessly into the Canal. They then passed on to Port Tewfik, where they attempted to destroy the oil tanks, but failed.

Lieut. Nariman, I.M.S., large-hearted, if small-bodied, became medical officer for a short time—while Capt. Newton-Davis was at home on leave—and was always thereafter a welcome visitor.

Major G. K. Channer joined the battalion from India on the 31st July and took over the duties of second in command. Lieut. Robertson left the battalion temporarily for Salonika, where he was employed on conducting duty. Lieut. Angelo, the quartermaster, went on leave to India and Lieut. Turner acted for him.

Lieut. O'Brien was appointed brigade bombing officer.

Capt. Tuite-Dalton, having returned from leave, was attached to Divisional headquarters at Port Tewfik, until he was appointed brigade major to Brigadier General Ormsby, commanding 127th Brigade, on the 25th of October, 1916. Stone became G.S.O. 2 54th Division from the following day and remained in this appointment until the 19th of July, 1917, when he was recalled to India.

On the 28th August the battalion marched to the El Shatt Railhead and relieved the Alwar Infantry.

Railhead was an uninteresting place, where the monotonous routine of clearing the trenches and wire of sand was broken only by a night march of the brigade over the desert, to practise the relief of

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Gebel Murr. Everyone was glad to leave it on the 18th September, 1916, when the 2/3rd returned to El Shatt to wait for a transport to take them to Tor and Abu Zenima, on the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, in relief of the 23rd Sikh Pioneers.

Orders were received on the 25th, and on the 27th the battalion was towed in two lighters to Port Tewfik, where it embarked at once on s.s. *Georgian*.

CHAPTER XXI

THE GREAT WAR

THE SECOND BATTALION

TOR AND ABU ZENIMA : BACK TO THE CANAL :
RAISING OF THE 3RD BATTALION : OFF TO PALESTINE

ABU ZENIMA and Tor are two of the most important places in Southern Sinai. At Abu Zenima, in the mountains that run down to the sea, there is a valuable manganese mine. Tor is the great international quarantine station for the northward flow of Mecca pilgrims. It is also a miniature seaport for Mount Sinai and the surrounding hills, which produce a small supply of charcoal, resin, etc., for export to Suez. At Mount Sinai is a monastery of the Greek Church.

The garrisons of the two posts in Southern Sinai were as under :

	<i>B.O.</i>	<i>G.O.</i>	<i>R. & F.</i>	<i>M.G.</i>	<i>Foll.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	<i>Mules.</i>
Tor - - -	5	8	347	2	49	10	58
Abu Zenima - -	3	7	318	2	26	4	20

Owing to the paucity of British officers, Lieut. Turner had to act as both adjutant and quartermaster, until the return of Lieut. Angelo from India.

It was part of the routine of the defence of the post to have standing patrols, mounted on camels, some miles to the north and east. Many of the Gurkhas became expert riders. A few sentry groups by day and a line of picquets by night, covering the water supply and buildings, with a company on inlying picquet, completed the defensive arrangements.

The quarantine station buildings occupy an area roughly 2,000 yards along the coast and 1,500 yards inland, the whole being enclosed by thick wire netting ten feet high. Wire also divides the area into separate compounds for the various classes of pilgrims. The hospital and a number of comfortable houses, residences of Government and quarantine officials, are situated outside the wire enclosure. Light rails, for push trolleys, connect up all these buildings with each other.

To the south, the small village of Gebail lies three miles distant

across the flat sand. To the north, there is flat sand, with the villages of Old Tor, New Tor and Mansher, all about half to one mile off. This plain is bounded on the north by some steep hills, Gebel Tor, rising to 800 feet, which come right down to the sea. At the back of these hills is the Wadi Hamam Musa, up which ran the desert back to Suez, with only one water-hole in about 100 miles.

Gebel Tor was the scene of the famous exploit of a wing of the 7th Gurkhas in the first year of the war. A Turkish force had ensconced itself in a deep hollow on the east side of the hill ; had reduced the Egyptian garrison to a state of passive resistance ; and had carried out a series of raids, destroying Government and Quarantine property. The 7th Gurkhas, arriving from Suez in the night, silently landed, crept along the shore, scaled the steep hills overlooking the enemy's position and at daylight annihilated the Turkish force. The 2/3rd used to visit the place sometimes when on a route march in that direction. Neat piles of cartridge cases on the rocks marked the positions from which the Gurkhas had carried out their shooting. A number of gruesome remains still lying about showed the deadly effect of their fire.

A lot of intelligence work was done at Tor and Abu Zenima. The agents, who used to travel as far as Jerusalem (or said they did), were continually going and coming with information, for which they were paid in golden sovereigns (British).

The Greek priests, who with their entourage lived by the church in Old Tor, were most hospitably inclined. One Sunday they invited Col. Eastmead, who was a Russian interpreter, to a service in their church, when the Archimandrite performed the service in that language for his benefit.

The Quarantine officials kindly placed furnished houses at the disposal of the British officers, who thus enjoyed the luxury of baths with water laid on, indoor sanitation, beds with spring mattresses, as well as electric light, which was installed everywhere, even in the men's quarters.

The armament of the post included two ancient Krupp guns, which were handed over to the charge of the machine gun officer. Lieut. Rennison trained two gun teams, but—perhaps fortunately—their services in action were never required.

On the 17th October H.M.S. *Hardinge* arrived at Tor with the Holy Carpet. With her came two ships full of Mecca pilgrims, who were disembarked for ten days' quarantine. These vessels sailed again for Suez on the 27th October. The Quarantine officials departed shortly afterwards, leaving the 2/3rd in sole occupation, with the exception of Mr. Speakman of the Public Works Department

who, with his wife and family, lived on the outskirts of the station to the south. From him was acquired much useful knowledge of the country and of the people. The officers, too, spent many a happy evening at the Speakmans' hospitable home.

On the 16th December, 1916, news came that the battalion would be relieved shortly. Rasmi Effendi, the Nazir of Tor, gave a farewell party in some newly laid-out gardens. On the 22nd and 23rd Abu Zenima and Tor were handed over to the 58th Rifles.

The comparatively small duties during these three months gave much time for training, and the battalion undoubtedly owed a great deal to this period ; also, to the enthusiasm with which Lieut. Grey Smith had returned from a course at Zeitoun.

The s.s. *Georgian* took the 2/3rd back to Suez, where Capt. Bagot-Chester took over the duties of adjutant. The short voyage was over in a few hours, and by 7 a.m. on the 24th December the battalion was once more in the familiar Canal zone. But the stay in Quarantine and Ayun Musa was a short one, for on 6th January the battalion marched to El Shatt and was conveyed thence in lighters up the Canal to Shallufa East, where it relieved the 4th Northamptonshire Regiment.

Great changes in the garrisons of the Canal Defences were now taking place. The 54th Division was withdrawn and sent to the Eastern Front, to which military interest had now shifted. The 42nd Division was also withdrawn and was sent to France. With it went Brigadier-General Ormsby and his brigade major, Capt. Tuite-Dalton, both of whom had been to see their old unit on its return from Southern Sinai.

On the 15th January, 1917, the battalion was split up. The left wing marched via Kubri to Halfway House, Darb el Haj and Crewe Posts, on the north side of Gebel Murr—to dismantle them ! It was disgusting work, pulling to pieces these fine defences, which had been constructed with such labour and care. The amount of material salvaged was not large. As soon as the revetment of the trenches was touched, they quickly filled up with the soft sand, and soon no trace of the work was visible.

On the 27th January news was received that a third battalion was to be formed by overdrafting.

This news was quickly followed by the arrival of a reinforcement from the Base Depot of two Gurkha officers, 356 Gurkha ranks and four followers, including one Gurkha officer and 100 men of the Assam Military Police. On the 3rd February another big draft, consisting of three British officers, two Gurkha officers, 434 Gurkha ranks and forty followers, arrived from India. The British officers

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were Major G. M. Glynton, Lieut. C. J. Daniels and Lieut. G. N. Simeon.

The Assam Military Police were at once formed into Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16 Platoons, thus becoming "D" Company of the new third battalion.

The organisation of the other companies was somewhat delayed and complicated by reliefs of garrisons in the various posts, and by an inspection of the double battalion by the G.O.C. Eastern Force, Major-General Dobell. However, by the 10th of February, the four new companies of each battalion were complete.

This organisation was carried out by dividing equally, between the new companies of the two battalions, Gurkha officers, non-commissioned officers and riflemen, including machine-gunners, signallers, buglers, pipers, armourers, mochis and other specially trained men. Companies were then brought up to full strength, or over, by men from the new drafts (volunteers as far as possible). In this manner the two battalions were identical in every respect as regards personnel, and the strength of each was 804 "Gurkha ranks."

No British officers had as yet been appointed to the third battalion, so each company of the 3rd was attached for training to its opposite number in the second battalion. The new drafts presented a very difficult problem, for their ignorance was sublime. Few of the men had any notion of even the rudiments of drill, some of them seemed never to have handled a rifle at all, and many of them had no idea of what was meant by aiming.

The Division at length called upon Lieut.-Col. Eastmead to allot the British officers for appointment to the 3rd battalion.

The following list gives the names of British officers present, in their order of seniority, and their allotment :

	2nd Battn.	3rd Battn.
Lieut.-Col. Eastmead - - -	1	
Major Channer - - - -		1
Major Glynton - - - -		1
Captain McSwiney - - - -	1	
Captain Bagot-Chester, adjutant		1
Lieut. Grey Smith - - - -	1	
Lieut. Finglas - - - -		1
Lieut. Daniels - - - -		1
Lieut. Simeon - - - -		1
Lieut. O'Brien, on leave to U.K.	1	
Lieut. Rennison - - - -	1	
Lieut. Angelo, quartermaster -		1
Lieut. Storrs - - - -		1
Lieut. Allanson - - - -	1	
Lieut. Turner - - - -	1	

Capt. Newton-Davis remained as medical officer of the second battalion, and Capt. Seddon was appointed to the medical charge of the third battalion.

These appointments were approved and confirmed, and were dated the 3rd February, 1917, which was the official birthday of the 3/3rd Gurkhas. Lieut.-Col. J. G. Edwardes of the first battalion was appointed in India as the first commandant, which is referred to later on when dealing with this new unit.

The 2/3rd Gurkhas now entered on a new phase, with four companies instead of the old double companies, and each Gurkha officer commanded a platoon. There was a new adjutant, Lieut. Turner, and a new quartermaster, Lieut. Allanson. The company commanders were changed on the arrival on the 25th February of Major H. D. Shaw, 1st Gurkhas, and Capt. Lemarchand, 5th Gurkhas. These two officers had been employed with Nepalese troops in India, under General Woodyatt, and were a very valuable reinforcement for training the new companies.

On the 5th March the third battalion left Shallufa, marching to Ferry Post, near Ismailia, for training purposes.

Stirring events were taking place farther north and the 2/3rd were not there. Pessimists declared no Indian unit would be employed in Palestine ; optimists were sure it was only a matter of waiting a little longer. Meanwhile the larger units had all been reorganised and dispatched elsewhere—British divisions to France ; all Indian troops to India. The 2/3rd and 58th Rifles were soon the only Indian army units remaining in Sinai and Egypt. Things being so, it was difficult to keep the men contented, when all their pals and relations in other regiments had sailed for Bombay. If only orders would come for Palestine !

Instead of that, on the 22nd of April an outbreak of plague appeared at Gurkha Post. A rat, dead from plague, was found at Shallufa. Extraordinary precautions were at once put in hand, including inoculation and a move into the desert.

These new camps, by the efficient work and strict discipline of the quartermaster, were kept free of the fly pest, which was dreadfully bad in the old posts with the trench latrines, previously used by British units. Lieut. Allanson saw to it that everything was incinerated, including all litter and animal droppings.

On the 10th May a case of bubonic plague was brought in from Geneffe and the patient died next day. There were no more cases, so the precautions had been effective. On the 30th May the battalion was declared free from infection and the quarantine was raised.

Capt. E. J. C. Ashmore, Lieut. C. F. B. Moggridge and Lieut.

W. E. Mannock reported their arrival to join the battalion on the 24th May, and on the same day all ranks heard with deep sorrow the sad news that their old commanding officer, Brigadier-General V. A. Ormsby, C.B., had been killed in action in France.

About this time names were required for inclusion in a dispatch. The following officers were recommended for reward on account of their unremitting zeal and devotion to duty, especially in connection with the reorganisation and training of the new battalions :

Major H. M. D. Shaw.
Lieut. H. L. Rennison.
Lieut. G. H. Allanson.
Lieut. R. L. Turner.

On the 22nd of June information was received from the 29th Brigade that the battalion would shortly be relieved by the 101st Grenadiers, who had been to Palestine and had returned. On relief, the 2/3rd was to concentrate at Shallufa West and at Serapeum and await entrainment for Ismailia, whence it would move, at an early date, to join the new 75th Division in Palestine.

So the wanderings in the Sinai Desert were ended and the battalion was off to the Promised Land. The optimists had been right after all.

Three days later the 2/3rd entrained at 8.15, and reaching Moascar at midday were played into camp at North Spinney, Ismailia, by the pipers of the 3/3rd. From this date the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade ceased to exist and the 2/3rd Gurkhas formed part of the 75th Division, 21st Corps. This division was made up of Territorial units recently disembarked from India, and of Indian Army battalions, etc., from the Canal Defences. The latter, viz. 2/3rd Gurkhas, 3/3rd Gurkhas, 1/123rd Outram's Rifles and 123rd Indian Field Ambulance were ordered to hold themselves in readiness from the 29th June to proceed to El Arish to join the new division, which was commanded by Major-General P. C. Palin, C.B., and was to consist of the 232nd, 233rd and 234th infantry brigades. The 2/3rd was attached temporarily to the 233rd Brigade (in which was the new 3/3rd), but had been posted to the 232nd, with the 1/5th Devons, 2/5th Hampshires, No. 229 M.G. Coy. and 232nd Light Trench Mortar Battery.

CHAPTER XXII

THE GREAT WAR

SECOND BATTALION

RAFA AND GAZA : THE ADVANCE FROM GAZA : BROWN HILL

THREE clear days at Ismailia gave ample time to complete all arrangements for going up the line, and on the 29th of June the battalion left Ismailia for Rafa. This was thirty miles nearer the front than the original destination, El Arish.

The strength on this date was :

British officers	-	-	-	-	-	13
Gurkha officers	-	-	-	-	-	15
Gurkha ranks	-	-	-	-	-	765

The journey was accomplished very comfortably, although in open trucks, and Rafa was reached at 2.30 and 4.30 next morning, 30th June.

On the 3rd July Major Dundas rejoined as second in command, after an absence of some sixteen months with the 10th Gurkhas. On his arrival, Major H. D. Shaw was transferred to the third battalion in the same capacity.

The guns, firing at Gaza, were clearly audible from camp at Rafa, especially at night.

As the Turks had made several air raids over the camp at this time, the first care was to dig "funk-holes" outside each tent large enough to contain all its occupants. On testing one of these, Major Shaw found one Gurkha crowded out. "There you are," said he ; "you see, the rest are safe, and you are killed. Now, come on, lads, make the trench a bit longer." "Yes, come on, lads," repeated the excluded one, "dig away. I cannot work, for I am killed."


During training, which the battalion carried out daily on its own, some evenings were devoted to night work. On one occasion, marching in perfect silence, the men walked over one of the Italian picquets, whose sentry quite startled every one with his cry of "Ferma! Chi va la." The necessity of these protective picquets so far behind

the front line was not very apparent, and they only disturbed the troops' rest at night by firing at grazing cattle and other animals, which naturally failed to respond to their challenge. It was interesting to be in camp with the Italians, who were a merry crowd, and looked very picturesque with their black plumes. Their bugle calls were most striking, especially the "reveillé," which was said to have been composed by Verdi.

As Lewis guns were soon to be issued to the unit, it was very necessary to learn how to work them. Capt. Ashmore was the only officer who knew anything about this weapon. He took a class of British and Gurkha officers, with a gun lent by the Somersets, and it was not long before the men were proficient. But there was no opportunity at Rafa for firing more than a few rounds for practice. The enthusiasm of the men can be judged by the fact that although parade hours for Lewis gun drill were very long, they were doubled by voluntary parades held by the Gurkhas themselves.

There was a good deal of discussion at this time regarding the weight to be carried in action by men of Indian units, which had now the same equipment as the British. Many people were doubtful as to whether Indian troops could fight, carrying the full load. A conference of brigade and battalion commanders was held at divisional headquarters at El Arish, when the weight agreed to was 55 lbs., made up as follows :

	lbs.	oz.
Clothing - - - - -	11	0
Rifle, etc. - - - - -	9	0
Bayonet and scabbard - - - - -	1	9
120 rounds S.A.A. - - - - -	8	6
Entrenching tool - - - - -	2	11
Haversack and extras - - - - -	1	10
Equipment - - - - -	3	11
Water bottle, filled - - - - -	4	7
Pack - - - - -	1	11
Cap-comforter - - - - -		4
Housewife - - - - -		3
Mess tin - - - - -	1	6
Rations - - - - -		15
Socks - - - - -		4
Soap - - - - -		3
Towel - - - - -		9
Iron ration - - - - -	2	0
Waterproof sheet - - - - -	3	8
Gas helmet - - - - -	1	8
Total - - - - -	54	13



Stanford's Geog. Estab. London.

The weight of the kukri, estimated at 2 lbs. 14 oz. was not included. The gas S.B. respirator, which was carried later on in place of the gas helmet, weighed 4 lbs. 4 oz., bringing the total to 60 lbs. 7 oz.

The question of a "mobile ration" was also discussed. It was foreseen that, in a rapid advance, it would be difficult to keep Indian troops supplied with their ordinary rations and firewood for cooking. They would therefore be at a disadvantage in comparison with their British comrades, who could manage for days on bully beef and biscuit, which are easily transported. Commanding officers of Indian Army units, after some discussion, agreed that a ration, consisting of biscuit, jam, sugar, tea, condensed milk, dried fruit and salt, would meet the case. The scale could not then be fixed, as the opinion of the medical authorities and of the men themselves had to be obtained. But the "mobile ration" as subsequently issued was on these lines and the scale fixed was very liberal.

While Lieut.-Col. Eastmead was away at El Arish, the battalion, under Major Dundas, marched on the 16th July from Rafa to Deir el Belah, the railhead, where it arrived at 6 p.m. and joined the 232nd Brigade. This was a good performance, for the march occupied most units two days. Contrary to expectation, based on past experience, the battalion was met near Belah by the Staff Captain, who had made every necessary arrangement—a foretaste of the mutual trust and friendship that was to exist between the 2/3rd and its brigade staff—a factor of the utmost value in the fighting that was to follow.

Next morning the men quickly set to work to dig themselves holes for shelter from the sun, and also from shells which, it was said, frequently fell in this area. A ridge on the east side of the bivouac was in view of the enemy at Gaza, but the distance, about seven miles, seemed to be too great for shell fire. Next afternoon, however, there was proof about being within range, for a shell burst over the camp, narrowly missing Lieuts. Rennison and Moggridge, and scattering all the horses, which were returning from watering. Several more shells came over, but none so near as the first one. After this, the 54th Division, in whose area the unit bivouacked, ordered a move from the then location [St. James's Park] to a site about half a mile farther forward. Here concealment was found, among grape vines and fig trees, in the garden of the ruined country house of the Governor of Gaza.

The situation on the Palestine front when the battalion reached the scene of operations was roughly as follows :

The Turkish line extended from the sea at Gaza to Beersheba. Gaza had been made into a strong fortress, heavily entrenched and

wired, offering every facility for protracted defence. From Gaza a series of strong localities—Sihan, Atawineh, Baha, Abu Hareira and Arab el Teeaha—about 1,500 to 2,000 yards apart—extended almost to Beersheba, which was also strongly fortified. This front covered a distance of about thirty miles, but as the enemy's lateral communications were good, he could quickly reinforce any threatened point.

The British front extended from the sea opposite Gaza to Gamli, about twenty-two miles to the south-east. Only the Sheikh Abbas Sector and the Coastal Sector, of which Samson Ridge was the key, were within striking distance of the enemy.

Two attempts to capture Gaza had failed. General Allenby, who had lately assumed command, was now starting his preparations for the operations of November 1917. As we subsequently learnt, he had decided to strike the main blow against the enemy's left flank, Beersheba, and in order to keep the Turks in doubt as to the real point of assault, an attack on Gaza was also to be made.

At this time a series of raids and bombardments were being carried out almost daily, to keep the enemy's attention fixed on the Gaza front.

The 232nd Brigade was holding Samson Ridge, a particularly lively portion of the line.

SAMSON RIDGE

During the four days' stay in St. James's Park and the Governor of Gaza's garden, the battalion was put through a gas course by the divisional gas officer. Up to date officers and men had only the old-fashioned gas helmets, which were not only very clumsy and uncomfortable, but also, it was said, of doubtful efficiency.

The cactus hedge is a noticeable feature in Palestine, and is an awkward thing in the way of an advance. An invitation was sent the battalion to watch an experimental demolition of a length of cactus hedge with gun-cotton. The noise of the explosion was impressive, but the effect was disappointing. A party of Gurkhas with kukris then demonstrated how one should deal with this formidable looking obstacle, and made a wide gap through the hedge in no time.

On the 21st July Lieut.-Col. Eastmead and Major Dundas rode up to Marine View, where the 232nd Brigade headquarters were established, to call on the new G.O.C., Brigadier-General H. J. Huddleston, D.S.O., M.C. From there they went on to Samson Ridge to see the line and arrange for the relief of the 2/5th Hants by the 2/3rd next day.

Battalion headquarters were situated about 500 yards in rear of the front line trenches on Samson Ridge. It also held Merioneth Redoubt, with two platoons.

The enemy's artillery were very active. Subadar Man Sing Basneth was slightly wounded on the 23rd, and neighbouring units suffered severely. There was practically no shelter from shell fire, the men being accommodated in small holes in the sand. An indent was therefore submitted to the R.E. for a quantity of sandbags and a start made on the 25th of constructing trenches on the sand. The brigade commander visited the battalion on the 25th and again next day, when he and the brigade major, Capt. Clutterbuck, were greatly astonished at the amount of work done. It was fortunate that these trenches were finished sufficiently for occupation in case of need, for that night the British artillery bombarded Umbrella Hill and a party of the Bedfords raided it.

Within three minutes of the commencement of our bombardment the enemy's guns opened fire and the 2/3rd had a great number of H.E. shells and more shrapnel over them. Although Merioneth Redoubt was a good deal knocked about and the new trenches hit more than once, the battalion escaped with only four casualties, one rifleman killed and three wounded. Without the shelter of the new trenches the men would undoubtedly have suffered very severely. Looking at the shrapnel bullets strewn on the sand next morning, one of the Gurkha officers remarked to the C.O., "Bakhra ko mailo jasto."

On the 29th July there occurred the mortification of seeing a British aeroplane, after being hit by an enemy shell, fall in flames into the sea. At this period General Allenby's air force was very weak, the machines being of an old type and much inferior to those used by the enemy. Moreover, the force had very few anti-aircraft guns.

Orders were received on the 1st August that the 54th Division, to which the 232nd Brigade was attached, would be relieved by the 53rd Division and withdrawn into general reserve. Next evening, C and D Companies were relieved by two companies of the 1/1st Herefordshire Regiment, while battalion headquarters, with A and B Companies, were relieved by the 1/5th Royal Welch Fusiliers. The battalion marched back by moonlight eight miles to a bivouac near a dry lake, close to Deir el Belah and within four hundred yards of the sea—a great boon this, as very little washing was possible on Samson Ridge.

Capt. E. Tuite-Dalton rejoined on the 21st August, from France, where he had been serving as brigade major of the 127th Brigade.

On the 25th August, Rifleman Lalbahadur saved Jemadar Bagbir Gharti from drowning. The Jemadar was bathing and had swum

out beyond the breakers when the swift current caught him and was carrying him away. Seeing his distress, Lalbahadur went to his assistance and, with great difficulty and at the risk of his life, succeeded in bringing the exhausted officer safely to land. It was a brave action, and was at once reported to the Royal Humane Society for reward.

After three weeks in general reserve¹, the battalion marched with the brigade by night to the head of the Wadi Reuben, in the "Dorset House" area. This was a short march of only seven or eight miles, but it tried the British troops severely, many of whom fell out. It is satisfactory to record that not one Gurkha did so.

On the 29th August orders were received for the 232nd Brigade to relieve the 155th Brigade in divisional reserve to the 52nd Division, and to be attached tactically to that division.

The 2/3rd had to relieve the 1/4th Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the move, which entailed a march of one mile only to an area near "Charing Cross," was made on the night of the 1st September.

The previous day Lieut. G. H. Ogilvie joined, on transfer from the 23rd Sikh Pioneers, and was appointed signalling officer to the battalion.

On the 11th September news was received that the brigade's own Division, the 75th, was coming up and would take over from the 52nd Division on the 12th and 13th. The battalion's share in this movement was the relief of the 1/4th King's Own Scottish Borderers in the Mansurah trenches, which was carried out on the night of the 13th September, without a hitch.

The 2/3rd now found themselves, for the first time since their return from France, holding front line trenches facing the enemy, but under conditions vastly more favourable.

The fire trench was good and well traversed ; communication trenches were also well constructed and deep ; support trenches were not completed.

The front line was held by A, B and C Companies from right to left, with D Company in reserve. In addition, each company had attached to it, for instruction, two platoons of the 1st British West India Regiment.

About 1,200 yards to the right, connected by barbed wire, was Whale Post held by 1 Company 1/5th Devons. About 250 yards on the left were Lee's Hill Trenches held by the 1/11th Londons (54th Division).

¹ Employed in training officers, conducting classes for N.C.O.s, etc. ; battalion given a graded course of route marching by the adjutant, which gave remarkable results later on.

The position could be enfiladed from behind Outpost Hill on the left and from Beer Trenches and the Atawineh Redoubt on the right, but the distance was too great for rifle fire. From the left, the enemy's works defending Gaza ran away in a north-easterly direction, at right angles to our front line, so that there was a gap in front of us extending from Middlesex Hill, the nearest point in the Gaza defences, to London Hill, on the enemy's right of his Beer Trench system.

The battalion night patrols discovered that this gap was occupied at night by a line of outposts, of which a post in the cactus garden apparently formed the central point. Sounds of digging in this cactus garden were frequently heard. On these occasions the artillery was asked to oblige with a few rounds to stop it.

Nothing of importance occurred during the unit's stay in Mansurah. It was relieved on the 9th October by the 58th Rifles, who were now included in the 75th Division and belonged to the 234th Brigade. The battalion marched back by platoons to the Wadi Simeon, 1,200 yards east of Dorset House, where the 232nd Brigade was located in reserve.

On the last day of the unit's stay in Mansurah it was told it had been selected to carry out a scheme, proposed by the 21st Corps. The idea was to mislead the enemy into the belief that an attack on Outpost Hill was contemplated from the direction of the Donga by Watling Street (to the left front of the Mansurah trenches). The line was to be advanced some 750 yards at that point, by constructing three lines of assembly trenches, connected by communication trenches with the Donga in rear, and defended by three small strong points. All trenches were to be three feet deep. The whole of the works had to be wired.

This meant digging 1,280 yards of trenches and putting up 700 yards of wire, for which the division suggested two nights should be allotted. Col. Eastmead, wondering what would happen the second night after the enemy had seen the work, decided to complete it in one night. For this, however, very careful preparations had to be made.

On the 11th October all officers attended a rapid wiring demonstration by sappers, and the work was practised assiduously, first in daylight and then in the dark. Distribution of tools, allotment of tasks and digging were also practised by night and in absolute silence. This was all in addition to battalion and brigade training, which was carried out with other units of brigade.

On the night of the 26th October, when the Donga scheme was enacted, every one was perfect at his job. The head of the first working party passed the starting point in the front line trenches at

6.30 p.m. and the whole work was completed by 1.30 a.m., when the covering party of the 1/5th Devons was called in.

In these seven hours 120 men fixed 700 yards of wire and 546 men dug 1,280 yards of trenches.


It was good work, and the battalion received congratulations on its performance.

About this time a distinct advance was very noticeable in all operations against enemy aircraft. Instead of worrying troops, unmolested, for $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours at a time, as they used to do when in Mansurah, their visits were much more hurried. This change was brought about by the arrival of a new British squadron, including some Bristol fighters, whose flights were watched with great interest. The supply of anti-aircraft guns too had increased, but their performances invariably called forth jeers of derision from the men. One of the British sausage balloons broke loose one day, the observer escaping in a parachute, and all the "archies" on the front opened fire in an endeavour to bring it down. The "sausage," however, drifted slowly away over Gaza, apparently unhit, and eventually sank into the sea and was towed in by a trawler.

During the next few days the bombardment of Gaza increased in intensity and was watched with much delight, especially on the night of the 31st October-1st November, when the third battalion carried out a most successful raid on Outpost Hill. The raiding party consisted of Captain Bagot-Chester, Lieut. Irwin and 197 Gurkha ranks. The enemy's casualties (excluding those in dug-outs which were bombed) were twenty-one killed and nine wounded. Those of the 3/3rd were two killed, three severely, and nineteen slightly wounded. The raiders captured eighteen prisoners, one machine gun, ten rifles and a great number of gas masks, etc. The 3/3rd received much *kudos* for this splendid performance and congratulations from brigade, division, corps and general headquarters. The raid is recorded in Chapter XXVI.

Another interesting night was that of 1st-2nd November, when the 52nd Division captured Umbrella Hill and the 54th Division attacked on the left at Sheikh Hasan, killing many Turks and capturing 450 prisoners.

Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill were again attacked just before midnight on the 6th-7th November. Little opposition was encountered and, on these points being captured, patrols soon discovered that the enemy was retiring. This news reached the battalion at 2.30 a.m. on the 8th when the brigade major, bursting into the C.O.'s dug-out, exclaimed, "The Turk's done a bunk! We move forward at 5.30."



The brigade concentrated in the Happy Valley at 7 a.m., but did not advance until three hours later. The 2/3rd came at once under shell fire from Tank Redoubt and had two men wounded before it reached the front line. In the Blazed Hill works was the 3/3rd battalion, who were on the point of leaving to join their brigade (233rd), which was pushing forward on the right. There was no time for more than a hurried greeting, exchange of news and a drink of water in the mess dug-out. This was lavishly decorated with pictures *à la Vie Parisienne*. Then we were off again, both battalions more or less together, under a rain of H.E. shells. Passing through the post there was some congestion of traffic : 2/3rd, 3/3rd, Hants and odd bits of transport. How everyone escaped being hit is a marvel. One big shell came down when no one could move in the crowd, landed in the parados close to many heads, but luckily failed to explode. The brigade crossed the front line by the Kurd Valley Road, and the advance was continued via the Plantation to a point near Ali el Muntar, which was the 2/3rd objective. During the afternoon there was a steady flow of men of other units, wounded by shell fire, but the battalion had only one casualty, in spite of heavy "crumping," particularly while the outpost companies were moving to their night positions.

Soon after midnight, the brigadier woke up the C.O. with news that two Turkish divisions in Beer Trenches were expected to attempt to recapture Gaza. A couple of additional Lewis guns were sent up to the outposts, and more frequent patrolling was ordered. Nothing happened, however, and the night passed quietly. So did the next day and night, which to everyone's surprise was spent in the same position. Several of the British and Gurkha ranks visited Gaza during the day. The place was in ruins. None of the houses (many of which had evidently belonged to well-to-do people) had any roof, and the streets (except the main one, which had been cleared for traffic) were full of débris from the buildings, demolished for the sake of the timber they contained. The enormous pits, made by shells fired by our warships, (especially one of the huge projectiles, a dud), were objects of great interest. A large building containing millions of exploded S.A.A. cases was said to have been a magazine which British aeroplanes bombed with great success.

The Turkish force, which had been holding on to the Tank and Atawinch systems, east of Gaza, retired during the night of the 7th-8th November. Our operations now became a pursuit, in which, however, the whole strength of the 21st Corps could not be employed, as it was impossible to keep so large a number of troops in supplies at such a distance in front of railhead. The 54th Division

had to remain behind and hand over its transport for conveying supplies to the two divisions (52nd and 75th) detailed for the advance.

On the 8th, while we remained halted at Gaza, the 52nd Division, on our left, moved northward along the sandy plain by the coast, and, assisted by Imperial Service Cavalry, secured a position at the mouth of the Wadi el Hesi. The capture of this position turned the Wadi Hesi line and prevented the enemy making any stand there. On the same day a brigade of Australian Light Horse from the right (Beer-sheba direction) effected a junction, near Beit Hanun, with the Imperial Service Cavalry.

The 75th Division was ordered to advance on the 9th November, with the 232nd Brigade as advanced guard.

The battalion marched at 11 a.m. for Beit Hanun—the old Turkish railhead which had been watched so often from Mansurah. By the roadside numbers of dead horses, piles of ammunition boxes, wagons and carts loaded with shells, gave evidence of the hurried retreat of the Turks. The hot march produced an overpowering thirst, which it was hoped to assuage at Beit Hanun. The enemy, however, had destroyed the pumping machinery of the deep wells, and bitterly was he cursed by the thirsty Gurkhas. In the afternoon it was found that one pump could, with considerable labour, be worked by hand, and a little water (about 160 gallons) was obtained. Owing to the prospect of water shortage ahead, this was all put into fantassis, so the men got none.

At 5 p.m. the march was resumed, and continued until bivouac camp at Deir Sineid was reached two hours later. Early next morning 200 gallons of water arrived in the fantassis left at Beit Hanun to be filled.

At 7 a.m. on the 10th November orders were received for the brigade, with a battery of South African Field Artillery attached, to advance to Es Suafir el Gharbiyeh—again as advanced guard to the division. Units were warned that they must be prepared to go short of rations and water. All weaklings were to be left behind, stripped of their commodities and returned to Mansurah. Thirty-five men of the battalion were weeded out. The brigade marched, with A and B Companies of the 2/3rd Gurkhas and a section of 229 Machine Gun Company, as advanced guard under Major Dundas.

At the beginning of this march there was about one pint of water on each man. By the irony of fate, a hot clammy wind sprang up and continued all this day and the next. It was soon realised how short indeed would be the supply of water. Half an hour's halt at Beit Jerjah enabled the Artillery to get some, but none could be obtained for the men before the march was resumed. Some 400 Turkish prisoners,

escorted by a few mounted Australians, were passed on the way. Clusters of enemy casualties, killed and wounded in encounters with our advanced cavalry and left on the ground, became more and more frequent.

There was no water to be had in Julis [a large village on the railway where the brigade had to halt some time], but all ranks were only too glad to resume the tramp, thirst or no thirst, to get away from the nauseating smell.

About 4 p.m. the brigade halted and closed behind a ridge overlooking our destination, Es Suaafir el Gharbiyeh, now about a mile distant. Late at night 160 gallons of water from the Field Ambulance were given the battalion, and were very badly needed. About sixty men fell out during the day, but all rejoined before nightfall. By midnight the animals had received no water for over forty hours.

Contrary to expectation the night was uneventful, and everyone was cheered by obtaining 450 gallons of water before breakfast next morning, the 11th, from a well in the village. A little later Allanson discovered water in an adjacent village for the thirsty animals, and about the same time the G.O.C. and C.O. found another well near by, with a hand pump, which villagers were impressed to work, much to their indignation.

None of the inhabitants seemed at all pleased to see us. There were no signs of distress, and sheep and cattle were plentiful everywhere.

During the afternoon the G.O.C. moved the brigade across to the west side of a Jewish colony, and men and animals had a good supply of water at last. On going round the outposts in the evening, the C.O. met the O.C. 1/4th Royal Scots, 52nd Division, similarly engaged. Some twenty-four hours later they met again under very different circumstances..

A severe thunderstorm at 1 a.m. on the 12th November washed many Gurkhas out of their bivouac and disturbed everybody's rest. The morning broke fine, however, and although the ground was muddy, it was pleasant to stroll about the colony. Many of the women and girls had donned quite fashionable looking costumes. The village doctor invited the C.O., Capt. Newton-Davis, and Lieut. Ogilvie to his house for a cup of tea. The men-folk sat at table while the women waited on them.

Among the latter was a girl of about eighteen who, to our surprise, spoke English quite well and said she had learnt it at school in Jerusalem. It sounded strange then to hear the Holy City mentioned casually in conversation. The "tea" turned out to be a decoction

of bits of dried figs. These people had not seen tea or sugar or potatoes for years, and the old Doctor was very pleased to have his substitute praised.

The pleasant party had to be broken up hurriedly, as Turkish shrapnel began to burst over the colony, causing a good deal of excitement. Some of the women set to work to scream with great violence, while others continued their bread-making unmoved. Many of the men began to rush about in a very aimless manner. On being told, however, that by sitting close under a wall they could not be hit by shrapnel bullets, some of them adopted this plan with great philosophy.

A South African field battery then appeared, galloping through the village and coming into action just beyond. Half the battalion was detailed as escort, taking up a position in front of the battery. Here they remained, in touch with the Turks and under fire, all day. Casualties soon began to trickle back to the "Aid Post" in the village.

At 11 a.m. news came that the 52nd Division on our left was to attack the enemy line running through Burkah and Brown Hill on the northern bank of the Nahr Sukereir. The enemy's resistance had considerably stiffened and he made a most determined stand on this position. Several assaults were launched and heavy fighting ensued. About 13.00 hours General Huddleston rode up to visit the artillery just referred to with its Gurkha escort. The brigadier, seeing that all was not going well on the right of the 52nd Division, obtained permission to send two battalions to co-operate. He selected the 2/3rd Gurkhas and the 2/5th Hants, and sent for the C.O.s, to whom he explained the situation.

Brown Hill was about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles north of the hill on which brigade headquarters were then established. What had happened was that this eminence had been attacked and at length taken by the 1/4th Royal Scots—the right unit of the 52nd Division—in the early afternoon. The Turks then made a successful counter-attack and recaptured the position, strengthening the defence by bringing up a number of machine guns.

General Huddleston, having received sanction to send up two battalions, issued his orders at 2 p.m. for a frontal attack on Brown Hill. The 2/3rd on the left were to direct; the 2/5th Hants to conform on the right.

The Gurkhas were soon ready and extended for the advance. Then followed an inordinate delay before the Hampshires moved into position. Bent on getting at the Turks, Eastmead climbed up to where the brigadier was sitting and reported the matter. He was simply told he must wait.

At long last the order to advance was given, and at 4.20 p.m. the attack was launched. B and D Companies of the 2/3rd formed the first line, followed at a distance of about 400 yards by A and C. Nothing could be seen of the 2/5th Hants on the battalion's right, so two platoons of C Company were detached to secure that flank during the advance.

In front, for over a mile, loomed an open plain, causing Major Dundas to direct the two leading companies to press on without firing. The 2/5th Hants on the other hand frequently halted to fire, with the result that the Gurkhas got far ahead of the other unit. Casualties were few at first owing to the splendid support afforded by the South African Artillery Brigade. Later, however, increasing darkness prevented the gunners giving much assistance, for it was most difficult to distinguish the Gurkhas from the Turks.

Before, however, the open ground was covered, a hail of machine gun bullets, followed by a regular barrage of shells, caused many men to fall, amongst those killed being Lieut. H. L. Rennison.

The advance continued, as steadily as it had commenced, up to within 200 yards or so of the summit of the hill. Here the attackers found some shelter in a deep nullah (the dry bed of the Nahr Sukereir) crossing their line. Here also were found the remnants of the 1/4th Royal Scots.

The two leading companies of the 2/3rd halted for a few minutes in the nullah to reorganise, covered by their own heavy Lewis gun fire and the gallant assistance given them by some machine gunners of the 52nd Division.

As the first lines of the two rear companies reached the nullah, the whole of the 2/3rd under command of Major Dundas, dashing out with a roar, charged the crest, accompanied by a handful of the Royal Scots.

The enemy did not wait, and there were few casualties in the actual assault. The sight of such an array of gallant Gurkhas with fixed bayonets and blazing eyes was too much for the Turk. A few brave souls indeed remained, fighting stubbornly to the last, to meet a soldier's death at the point of the bayonet. Two Lewis guns lost by the Royal Scots were recovered.

Meanwhile the 2/5th Hants were still some way behind and eventually connected up with the right flank of the 2/3rd at 8.30 p.m. The two platoons of C Company, 2/3rd, protecting the right flank during the advance, had been too far ahead of the Hampshires to keep connection, and later, in the darkness, lost touch with their own battalion. Fortunately the leading platoon commander sent forward a battle patrol, most gallantly led by Lance-Naick Ajudhe

Rana, which, being heavily bombed, discovered the enemy's new position. This gave a clue to the whereabouts of the 2/3rd and touch was regained without further loss.

The battalion's battle patrols having pushed forward well ahead, in spite of the rapidly approaching darkness, reported the Turks in full retreat. Consolidation of the position was therefore proceeded with unmolested, except for some machine gun fire from another ridge about 400 yards to the north-east. Brown Hill was heaped with dead bodies of the Royal Scots and Turks—many with the clothing blown off them from the continuous shelling by both British and Turkish guns.

Soon after this the G.O.C. arrived on the scene and congratulated the battalion on its fine exploit. He announced that the 2/5th Devons had been ordered up, and placed them at the disposal of Col. Eastmead. The latter suggested the Devons should take over the Hill, now that all seemed quiet, while the battalion withdrew to the wadi in order to reorganise. To this the G.O.C. agreed. In the morning the Devons discovered a quantity of machine guns cast away in the nullahs.

Battalion headquarters now withdrew to the wadi, where a signal station, in telephonic communication with brigade headquarters, had been established by our signallers.

Much had happened since the evening before, but in this bivouac was the O.C. 1/4th Royal Scots, Lieut.-Col. Mitchell, with an officer or two. The former said he had only about 100 men and no company officers left, so severely had his unit suffered in the desperate fighting of that day.

At 11.30 p.m. two companies of the 7th Highland Light Infantry, 52nd Division, came up on the left flank (which all this time had remained in the air) and thus secured it.

In this action the 2/3rd casualties were Lieut. H. L. Rennison and eight Gurkha ranks killed and forty-four Gurkha ranks wounded.

Lieut. Rennison's death was a very severe loss to the battalion, with which he had served since August 1915. He had always been machine gun officer, and the great success with which the Lewis guns were handled throughout the Palestine fighting was chiefly due to his energy and teaching. Invariably cheerful in all circumstances, he was a fine leader, filling his men with confidence, and inspiring in them something of his own courage and generosity. He was killed while leading B Company.

It would be difficult to find a more typical instance of an action carried out to a successful issue, so completely in accordance—from start to finish—with the principles of our training manuals, than

this affair of Brown Hill. It was an unqualified compliment to the very thorough preparatory guidance given to the 2/3rd Gurkhas by Col. Eastmead and his officers.

From all sides we hear the same story : the advance in artillery formation at long range from the objective, supported by the accurate shelling of the South African guns ; the opening out into lines of skirmishers on entering the machine gun zone ; the steady and persistent pressing forward of the Gurkhas, without firing, to a position from which the assault could be delivered ; the laying of the telephone wire by the signallers during the whole of the advance ; the reinforcement of the leading lines by those in rear at the conclusion of the fire fight ; and then the immediate rushing forward of the whole in the bayonet charge.

What with the direction of rifle and machine gun fire on the retreating enemy, the consolidation of the position won and the prompt pushing forward of battle patrols—the whole reads like an account of an 'exquisitely conducted peace manœuvre. Any soldier can easily imagine the gratification with which the commanding officer, in rear, witnessed this great performance ; also the joy with which he telephoned the news of his victory along the freshly laid line, in reply to the anxious inquiry from his brigadier.

Unfortunately the historian of the Royal Scots, in his account of the affair, has been misinformed of the actual facts, but this brilliant little action by a Gurkha unit had a much wider influence than any one ever contemplated. Owing to much misrepresentation and to fabulous rumours, so current in war time, a feeling undoubtedly existed at this period—latent and unexpressed—that Indian troops had not fulfilled expectations in France. The 2/3rd, by capturing Brown Hill that November afternoon on their own, and after the failure to do so by a British unit, did much to remove that feeling.

One cannot leave this small battle without giving an illustration of the way in which the brigadier had impressed the power of his personality on all ranks of the 2/3rd, without even being able to speak a word to the Gurkhas.

When, on this night, in the confusion and darkness and the expectation of imminent counter-attack, amidst the swish of machine gun bullets and the pitiful wailing of the wounded, the word passed from man to man, "Jarnal Sahab ayo, hamro Jarnal Sahab ayo," the effect was as though a battalion had come in reinforcement. If our General was there, the Turks had better look out for themselves.

CHAPTER XXIII

SECOND BATTALION—PALESTINE

FURTHER ADVANCES 75TH DIVISION—MESMIYEH—ABU SHUSHEH
THE BATTLE OF THE PASS—EL JIB—KIBBIAH

It was not until 1 a.m. on the morning of the 13th November, 1917, that the 1/5th Devons arrived at Brown Hill to relieve the battalion in the position it had captured. The relief was completed in half an hour and, after reorganisation, the 2/3rd marched back to a point behind brigade headquarters where it bivouacked.

During the 12th November, while the Anzacs and 52nd Division, with the battalion's help, were driving the Turks from their positions between the sea and Brown Hill, the Australian Mounted Division, away on our right, were experiencing hard fighting. Under pressure of a determined counter-attack by some 5,000 enemy they were obliged eventually to retire to a position about three miles east of Es Suafir. The gap between the 232nd Brigade's right and the Australian left was filled by the 233rd Brigade and one battalion 234th Brigade. On the night of the 12th November, therefore, the 75th Division occupied a position facing the Turkish line through Yasur—el-Kustineh—Tel et Turmus.

Long before the men had enjoyed half enough sleep the 2/3rd was roused with news that the division was going to attack at once, for the enemy had retired in the night to another rearguard position, Khurbet Sallujeh-Mesmiyeh, covering Junction Station.

Major Dundas was ordered to act as liaison officer to (*i.e.* virtually to command) the 2/4th Somersets.

The 232nd Brigade received attack orders as follows : 1st line, 2/5th Hants on right, 2/4th Somersets on left ; 2nd line, 1/5th Devons on right, 2/3rd Gurkhas on left.

The battalion marched at 8.15 a.m. according to orders, to move into its position in brigade, and nearly walked over the Somersets, who were not then up. This occasioned some little delay, but the brigade was soon on the move advancing on a line west of Yasur and quickly got engaged with the enemy, whose shells began to fall amongst the Gurkhas at 10 a.m. The advance, in "artillery

formation," was very slow—painfully slow it seemed to the 2nd line, which had nothing to distract its attention from those salvoes of shells, which burst in its midst with disgusting frequency.

The slowness of the advance was due to the opposition encountered by the 233rd Brigade on the right. The Turks defending Mesmiyeh put up a stubborn resistance, but after a stiff fight the village was captured at 11.30 a.m. and, for a short time, the advance was less slow. But the shelling grew heavier, and the nearer the lines approached their objective the more accurate it became.

The mission of the brigade now was to attack and drive back the enemy from a position he was holding at Kh. el Mukheizin. After advancing some distance, a message from the G.O.C. ordered Col. Eastmead to incline the battalion to the left and thus support the Somersets, and at the same time gain shelter from shell fire under cover of some low hills. While in this position of comparative safety the battalion was ordered to halt.

Glad indeed was everyone to be out of that zone of continually bursting shells, and to rest in this quiet spot where only an occasional missile fell amongst the men. After a short interval, however, the brigadier called up the C.O. on the telephone, saying, "The Somersets, in front of you, are held up. I want you to send in one of your companies to show them how to turn the enemy out with the bayonet." The C.O. chose for this duty Capt. Grey Smith's Company D.

This was indeed a test of leadership and a fine example of the spirit of soldierly devotion to duty which distinguished the battalion throughout the campaign. For days past the men had been marching and fighting, practically without rest and with little water. For the last forty-eight hours they had been continuously in touch with the enemy in operations, which included a lengthy assault and an all-day advance under heavy shell fire. And now, at a few inspiring words from their company commander, Capt. Grey Smith, they left their haven of shelter and, casting aside all equipment except rifles and bayonets, they swept forward to the assault as though it were the first fight of the campaign.

But the Turks did not wait. Finding the Devons working round their flank, they fled before D Company could reach the firing line.

By 4.30 p.m. all objectives had been gained by both brigades and units bivouacked in their battle positions, while the 234th Brigade pushed on to carry out the final phase of the operations—the capture of Junction Station.

At 10.30 p.m. on the 15th orders were received that the battalion would attack the line Sidun-Abu Shushah next morning.

C.O.s and adjutants met the G.O.C. at the outpost line at 5.45 a.m. on the 16th, when three points on the Abu Shushesh ridge, some four miles to the north-east, were given as the battalion's objectives. A start was made at 7 a.m., with one company advancing on each objective and one company in reserve. During the advance news was received that all the objectives had already been gained by mounted troops. It was known subsequently that the Yeomanry had been very successful the day before, and the number of dead horses on the ridge showed that the fight had been a stiff one. A field gun was captured near the village of Sidun.

The plain had now been left behind and the western border of "the hill country of Judæa" reached. Abu Shushesh (Gezer of the Scriptures) is a lofty, isolated ridge commanding the entrance to the pass which leads through the mountains to Jerusalem. The country about here has witnessed many a conflict between Israel and the Philistines, between the Maccabees and the Syrians and between Saladin and the Crusaders.

A message from the brigadier informed the C.O. that the unit was likely to remain in its present position for a fortnight. He also said he had seen the G.O.C. Division, who was very complimentary about the work done by the brigade and especially the 2/3rd Gurkhas.

That evening Capt. Tuite-Dalton rejoined, and information was received that, far from halting for a fortnight, the division would move east at 6 a.m. the following day, 19th, its ultimate objective being Bireh, nine miles due north of Jerusalem on the Nablus road.

The 232nd Brigade was to attack the Amwas-Latron line. As soon as the attack was successful, the 232nd and 233rd Brigade groups would march to Kuryet el Enab, the former leading.

At 7.30 a.m. the brigade advanced down the eastern slope of Abu Shushesh and across the level cultivated plain against the Turkish defences at Latron. These had been strongly held the evening before, when the Australians had been operating against them, but to everyone's surprise no shells came over. A nearer approach, and there was no rattle of machine guns or rifle fire. It was then realised that the Turks had evacuated the position. When reached and its strength noted, all were glad the enemy had decided not to defend the place.

Near the village the Jaffa-Jerusalem road was struck. The Turks had recently been remaking this road. They had laid a good foundation and had been using a steam roller.

To the right of the road stood a fine modern three-storied building, a Trappist monastery. As the brigade arrived, Arabs were busy looting it and had carried away almost everything movable. The monks had all fled or been taken away by the retreating army.

The local inhabitants reported that the Turks had been in occupation of the monastery for some time and had only evacuated it the previous night.

The place was now a sad scene of wanton destruction. A fine garden was ruined—young trees hacked down, pots and tubs containing flowers overturned and broken. Not a window in the vast building was intact. The large chapel, occupying the central hall, had been defiled and looted ; the marble floor was a mass of filth and strewn with broken lamps and vestments. What had been a very extensive library of ancient and modern books and manuscripts was utterly destroyed, the books being torn to pieces and the book-cases broken up for firewood.

Soon after 11 a.m. the 58th Rifles—who had joined the 232nd Brigade for picqueting duties—advanced to commence their work of securing the heights on both flanks of the road. As soon as they had reached their first objectives, the 2/3rd moved off in advance of the brigade.

So far the enemy had given no sign of their presence, but, when the leading party had gone about half a mile, they opened fire with 4.5 howitzers on the road.

By 2 p.m. the 2/3rd vanguard had reached Bab el Wad, the narrow opening in the main range, where the pass begins. From here onwards the road winds gently towards the summit for about five miles, with very precipitous cliffs on either side.

The passage of troops up that pass, even if only lightly held, looked what it was—a grave proposition. Those who had experienced the Pathan in his native hills looked once, and then again, and wondered. What sort of a show was the Turk going to put up ? He had been hustled more than a little during the past fortnight and had seldom waited for the bayonet before retiring from a position. But a few well-placed machine guns on those hills. . . . well, we should soon see !

The enemy were very busy shelling the road behind and searching the valley for the main body of the division. Rapid and continuous rifle and machine-gun fire from the front showed that the 58th Rifles were encountering serious opposition some 1,500 yards up the pass. Bullets began to spit on the rocks above the Gurkhas' heads and ricocheted on to the road in a very unpleasant manner. Most fortunately for the 2/3rd and for the success of the whole operation, the hill-sides from the route were so steep and broken with over-hanging cliffs that never at any time were the Turks able to get direct machine-gun fire on to the road. Troops could push on up the pass in safety so long as the high ground on the flanks was kept clear of the enemy.

About 2.30 the 58th Rifles were nearly absorbed on picquets. Their most advanced company was held up in front of a very strong position, astride the road, defended by several machine guns.

At 2.45 the G.O.C. ordered the 2/3rd Gurkhas (less A Company) to support the 58th Rifles and advance along the heights on the north side of the road. The 1/5th Devons were detailed to act similarly on the south side of the road.

At 3 p.m. B, C and D Companies left the road and commenced their ascent. The going was extremely difficult, in places the rocks were perpendicular, and a way round had to be found. The heavily laden men, used to hills as they were, found it very trying—especially the Lewis gunners with their guns and ammunition.

This battle gave us a practical demonstration of the superiority of the Lewis gun over the Maxim as a regimental weapon. The section of the Machine Gun Company, attached, was unable to keep up even with battalion headquarters, and during the advance up the pass were unable to bring their guns into action at all.

On gaining the summit the situation was as follows. Immediately in front, a weak company of the 58th was holding a ridge running at right angles to the pass. Some 600 yards to their front the enemy, with several machine guns, was holding a parallel but rather higher ridge.

The formation of the ground on these hills to the left of the road materially assisted defensive action by the Turks. Each ridge to which they retired was slightly higher than the one from which they had been driven. Moreover, the eastern slopes of the ridges were steep and rocky, and therefore difficult to descend quickly, while the western slopes were of a more gentle gradient, which was suitable for grazing fire from machine guns and artillery.

D Company now came up to reinforce the firing line. While leading his company forward and advancing to meet Capt. Tuite-Dalton to get his orders, Capt. Grey Smith was killed by a shell which fell between them.

A heavy fire was opened on the enemy's position. Capt. Dalton asked that the machine guns might be sent forward to assist in gaining superiority of fire. But the machine gunners, unused to hill work, could not get there : mules were impossible on the steep slopes and man-handling was unsuccessful.

Eventually, accurate rifle and Lewis gun fire began to tell. The enemy's resistance slackened and a frontal attack by all three companies of the 2/3rd was launched, covered by C Company of the 58th Rifles, whose commander, Major Waller, had been severely wounded.

This attack was entirely successful, and the new position was captured just as it was getting dusk, and with the darkness came heavy rain and driving mist.

At this juncture permission was obtained to withdraw the battalion to the road, provided sufficient men remained on the heights to hold the position won. The C.O. decided to leave D Company and two platoons of C. Capt. Tuite-Dalton volunteered to remain on the hills throughout the night in command of this force, to which was added the company of the 58th Rifles on the ridge behind and one company 2/5th Hants, which had come up in the hollow between the two ridges.

The cold that night was intense. The men, wet to the skin, were employed in consolidating their position by building sangars, and in frequent patrolling.

Meanwhile the remainder of the 2/3rd (less A Company escort to the artillery) made their way down to the road with many a tumble over slippery rocks in the dark. Up on the hills inter-communication was quite good, but down on the road it seemed as though pandemonium reigned supreme. It had been reported early in the day that the road was mined in places. This proved incorrect, but the Turks had blown it up very effectively every quarter of a mile or so. Working parties of the 3/3rd Gurkhas had filled in the breaches so quickly that no delay was experienced in moving up the road, but now the whole route was one solid mass of traffic unable to get forward.

The 233rd Brigade had come up in support of the 232nd and were sitting on the roadside. The road itself was crowded with a congested mass of guns, limbers, ambulances and the brigade transport. Vainly endeavouring to pass through, this way or that, were ration parties, men carrying up ammunition, tools and water, stretcher bearers, dispatch riders and mounted officers, wounded and prisoners. Nobody knew where any one else was or how things were going. Add to this, a slippery road with horses down, and a number of kicking mules and you have the Jerusalem road on that famous night.

A place was found for the men by the cliff north of the road, and the C.O. and adjutant went to report to the G.O.C. The 232nd Brigade headquarters were established in a large cave, cut out of the mountain side. This cave had a narrow doorway and had apparently been used as a stable for some hundreds of years. Scattered about the floor were many badly wounded officers and men, who were being tended by a medical officer. The G.O.C. and his staff were busily engaged in receiving and sending messages. In one corner were the brigade signallers with their telephones and buzzers. Leaning against the wall, or prone on the floor, were officers and

soldiers, of all ranks, attempting to snatch a few minutes' sleep in the comparative warmth of the cave. The whole place was lit up by an acetylene lamp belonging to the signallers. The penetrating smell of iodoform defeated even that of the stable refuse and wet human beings. Still, it was better than outside in the rain, so the C.O. and adjutant squeezed in among the others and at once fell into the sleep of utter exhaustion.

Stretcher parties that night had a very bad time. It was impossible to take a wounded man on a stretcher from the high ground down the cliffs to the road. An attempt was made to find a path back over the hills to the mouth of the pass. This resulted in one of our parties (Capt. Newton-Davies with six men) running right into some forty Turks, with a machine gun, who were trekking down towards the plains. This was rather disturbing, as they were more than a mile behind our position. What became of these Turks has always been a mystery. The next day they were reported as still travelling over the hills in a westerly direction.

About midnight the sound of bombing, up on the left, meant that Capt. Tuite-Dalton's force was again engaged. Later on, it was known that the Turks had tried to surround and capture an advanced platoon of his, but had been skilfully driven off by Havildar Randhoj Gurung. Rifleman Makhan Sing Thapa displayed great ability on this occasion by taking his Lewis gun forward and bringing a very effective fire to bear on the advancing Turks. Capt. Dalton withdrew the platoon, however, as he thought its position insecure.

The noise of the bombing and the discomfort of being walked over by an apparently endless stream of messengers roused the battalion staff from their uneasy slumber and the two went out to see their unit and make sure that everything was in order for the next day's work.

It was still raining and bitterly cold even in the valley. The officers got into touch with all the companies and, a little later on, found the transport, under the indefatigable quartermaster, Lieut. Allanson. A glorious find this was, as both of them were able to get great-coats from their saddles. Lieut. Allanson, under the shelter of a limber, made them a cup of cocoa, which at that time was worth untold gold. Warmed and comforted, they lay down on the road beside a dead mule and slept till nearly dawn.

In the early morning the Turks were found to be still holding the same positions in front. And Subadar-Major Bhim Sing Thapa was sent forward with A Company. He surprised the enemy and drove them off the next two ridges.

This attack produced a great volume of machine-gun fire from the

front and from the right, where the enemy were in a strong position by the village of Saris, across the pass.

It was evident that the enemy must be driven from this position, south of the road, before the advance on our side of the pass could be continued.

Orders were now received for the battalion to halt until this had been accomplished, while the 2/5th Hants and 58th Rifles developed an attack on the enemy's position close to Saris. The 233rd Brigade began to pass through at 8 a.m.

The fighting round Saris was very severe and the enemy was not driven from this position until 11 a.m. when the 2/4th Somersets, under Major Dundas, carried the main position at the point of the bayonet, capturing 100 Turks, two machine guns and a field hospital.

At the same time the 3/3rd Gurkhas captured a ridge about half a mile east of Saris.

The 2/3rd Gurkhas were now ordered to resume their advance along the hill to the left of the road, with the Devons on the right, between the battalion's right flank and the road.

While the two battalions were climbing from the road to their positions on the hilltops, Subadar-Major Bhim Sing Thapa, with A Company, again engaged the enemy in front of him, drawing heavy shell and machine-gun fire. But the unit's Lewis gunners were too much for the Turks. Naick Chandra Sing Gurung played a conspicuous part in this fight. Bringing his gun into action and keeping it going in spite of its being struck by a piece of shell, he succeeded in silencing a Turkish machine gun and forced it to withdraw under cover of the fire of another machine gun. This too he silenced, killing five of the crew, whose bodies were passed in the advance.

This vigorous action of A Company enabled the Devons to come up on the right without any trouble.

Facing the battalion now, but somewhat to the left front, was a high ridge, strongly held, from which the Turks were able to bring a galling fire on to the lower hills.

The left flank of this position, the one closest to the 2/3rd, was covered by other ridges nearer to Kuryet el Enab, but the right flank appeared to be in the air. Col. Eastmead decided to feint in front and turn the enemy's right.

The result was entirely successful. On the approach of the flank attack the Turks were forced to retire. As they retired they ran into a company of the 3/3rd under Lieut. Finglas, which had advanced from below Saris and thus came in at right angles to the enemy's line

of retreat. Twenty-seven prisoners were captured, including four officers, one of whom was a battalion commander.

Information was now received that the objective was Kuryet el Enab, which was eventually assaulted and carried by the 233rd Brigade, just before darkness set in. The battalion's casualties in this two-days' battle were Capt. M. Grey Smith, four Gurkha ranks killed, and twenty-two wounded.

Capt. M. Grey Smith (known always as "Purple Jones," the name of his Oxford days) had been with the battalion since the 17th August, 1915, when he joined in France on transfer from the 57th Rifles. He was a magnificent leader, filled with a fine courage, which inspired a rare devotion in his men. The unbounded generosity of his nature had endeared him to all his brother officers, who, together with the other ranks, felt his loss most deeply. For his splendid work at Brown Hill on the 12th November he would have been recommended for the Military Cross had he lived.

During the night the 75th Division issued orders that next day, 21st November, 400 rifles 2/3rd Gurkhas, 400 rifles 1/5th Devons, two sections of the 229th Machine Gun Company and a detachment R.E. would march to Kutundia, under command of Lieut.-Col. Eastmead. They would be employed as baggage guard to the division as far as Kutundia, where they would halt and entrench themselves, and the divisional baggage would be taken forward from there to Bireh by two battalions of a forward brigade. The time of absence was unknown, but would probably be at least ten days. All "crops" were to be left behind at Kuryet el Enab.

This little force was called the 232nd Brigade "Composite Force," and Lieut. Turner was appointed Staff Officer.

The morning of the 21st broke fine and clear, and every one was astir early, making preparations for the new advance.

Capt. Ashmore was detailed to remain with the unfit men, also Lieut. Ogilvie, who was suffering from dysentery. Capt. Tuite-Dalton commanded the battalion, with Capt. Lemarchand and Lieut. Moggridge in command of the right and left wings respectively. Subadar-Major Bhim Sing Thapa was appointed adjutant, while Subadars Nawal Sing, Dalbir, Gamar Sing and Balbir were the four company commanders.

At 8.45 a.m. the Turks started heavy shelling, but thanks to Capt. Tuite-Dalton's foresight in moving the battalion to lower ground, below a steep cliff, the men escaped all loss except three Gurkhas wounded with the transport.

It was not until 2.45 p.m. that the two brigades ahead had made sufficient progress to allow the composite force to make a start. The

route was the old Roman road towards Biddu. It was little better than a goat track, and the 600 camels in single file advanced with difficulty and were soon strung out in a line nearly two miles long. Two camels and two drivers were lost from shell fire. It took two hours for the head of the column to reach a high ridge overlooking Biddu, some $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles north-east of Kuryet el Enab.

From the top of this ridge, standing on the very ground from which the Crusaders first saw the city of their dreams, was caught the first glimpse of Jerusalem. Seen that afternoon, in the light of the setting sun, it looked indeed a Golden City, set on the summit of a bare rocky hill, with its high walls and domes bathed in light.

There was little time, however, to admire the view. A fierce battle was raging in the valley below, and on the ridge beyond. Our troops were in possession of Biddu, a mile ahead, which was being heavily shelled, and were attacking Nebi Samwil. The latter is a great landmark. Standing on an isolated hill, nearly 3,000 feet high, is a large mosque with a high minaret which covers the reputed grave of the prophet Samuel.

To advance the baggage column any farther was dangerous and useless. The composite force therefore bivouacked, with all transport (less ration camels sent forward after dark), on the high ground, where an abominably cold night was spent.

At dawn on the 22nd the force was set to work to make a road for the camels round the western side of the hill, where there was shelter from shell fire ; and at 9 a.m. information came that the G.O.C. 233rd Brigade was commanding the " Advanced Force " consisting of his own unit and the 234th Brigade, and the 232nd Brigade composite force. An advanced guard was already moving beyond Nebi Samwil (which had been captured during the night) to El Jib, Nebala and Kutundia. On the occupation of the last-named place, the whole force would push on via Rafat to Bireh.

About noon the composite force was assembled near El Kubeibeh, in reserve, awaiting orders to advance further. The 2/3rd spent the morning improving the rough track across the hills, which enabled the South African Field Artillery to get their guns across eventually. The divisional commander was up between Kubeibeh and Biddu, watching the operations in front, and it was apparent that the programme was not working out smoothly, but no news could be obtained of what was really happening.

At 3.35 p.m. an order came for one battalion of the composite force to be sent forward immediately as brigade reserve to a spot south of Beit Izza. It was to take with it as much reserve S.A.A. as possible. The 2/3rd Gurkhas were detailed, and as all transport

camels were soon afterwards sent to their brigades, the composite force, as such, ceased to exist.

Leaving the monastery of El Kubeibeh on the left, the 2/3rd proceeded along a deep nullah in the direction of Nebi Samwil. Heavy firing could be heard ahead and shrapnel was bursting in every direction. A constant procession of wounded passed, coming in from the firing line, and the news was that our losses had been severe. At 4 p.m. the battalion reached the head of the nullah, its destination, and proceeded to bivouac.

Shortly afterwards information was received that in the day's fighting the Turks had made three desperate attempts to recapture Nebi Samwil, all of which had been successfully beaten back. At the same time our troops had been unable to make any progress in the direction of El Jib.

That night could hardly be described as pleasant. All knew they were "for it" in the early morning. All knew, moreover, that the Turks held strong positions and had an abundance of artillery support. Everyone realised too that, considering the absence of roads and the kind of country recently advanced over, the British artillery could hardly be expected to give material assistance.

At midnight the G.O.C. 233rd Brigade issued orders for an attack on El Jib and Nebala to commence at 7 a.m. next day. First line : Wilts on the right, 1/5th Somersets on the left ; 2/3rd Gurkhas in reserve.

The 23rd November was again fine and clear. There was no sound of firing. At dawn the C.O. and adjutant climbed a small hill to the left to receive final orders for the attack and to have the objectives pointed out. Here it was learnt that the Wilts would take no part in the attack, which was to be carried out by the Somersets, whose objective was El Jib, followed by the 2/3rd whose mission was Bir Nebala.

From the hill from which the reconnaissance was made, a wide plain stretched eastwards for some 2,500 yards. At the far end the ground rose, first gently then steeply, to a ridge some 300 feet high, on which were situated the villages of El Jib on the left and Bir Nebala about half a mile to its right. The plain was bounded on the left by the slopes leading down from Beit Izza, then held by the 52nd Division. At about half-way these slopes ceased and the plain was more open to the left. Some low hills to the left of El Jib were said to be held by hostile machine guns. These were fairly distant from the line of advance. On the right the plain was bounded by the ridge which led up to and beyond Nebi Samwil, and was held by our troops. The enemy were said to be holding El Jib and Nebala in no great force.

The Somersets were ordered to lead and they began their advance at 7.30. The 2/3rd followed, moving slightly to the right of the Somerset's line of direction. When the attackers were clear of the hills the enemy opened fire with shrapnel and H.E. Then came a regular barrage from both field guns and howitzers. The pressing forward of the battalion under this trying shell fire was magnificent, the men moving as steadily as if on parade.

Very shortly many began to drop and as soon as the leading wave got beyond Nebi Samwil, a fury of machine-gun fire broke out from the western slope of the ridge, which was supposed to be in our possession. At the same time the fire from the left redoubled in volume. The two battalions were thus enfiladed from both flanks. In addition, the Turks, lining the terraced fields of El Jib, opened a heavy frontal fire.

The first wave simply withered away, a few survivors finding what cover they could behind rocks, of which there were fortunately a goodly number scattered about. As each succeeding wave reached this bullet-swept area, the same thing happened, and thus the attack died away within 700 yards of its objective.

One of the first of our casualties was Capt. Lemarchand, who was commanding the leading company. He was hit in the stomach and very badly wounded. The adjutant, Lieut. Turner, was hit in the thigh, just as battalion headquarters reached the fatal zone. Jemadar Chame Thapa was killed, and Jemadar Tilbir Thapa severely wounded. The "other ranks" also suffered heavy losses.

The Somersets fared no better. A few of their men were reported to have reached the lower slopes of El Jib, but they never came back.

The survivors of both battalions remained pinned to the ground all day. The 2/3rd Lewis gunners made gallant efforts to reply to the enemy's fire, but all attempts were immediately met by concentrated fire in return, from numerous guns which could not be located. The Lewis gunners, indeed, soon headed the list of casualties. Any movement at once drew a storm of bullets, nor did the guns cease to shell the attackers the whole day. Without artillery support the latter were helpless.

The havildar major, Man Sing Mal, who had gallantly bandaged Lieut. Turner and other wounded men, was himself hit, leaving the C.O., with some runners and signallers, as sole representatives of the headquarters section. Search was made for the field telephone, which the Somersets had been laying during the advance, but not until the evening was it discovered, far behind. A situation report was therefore sent to the brigade by runner.

This gallant runner, Rifleman Aniram Chattri, returned safely

with a message from 233rd Brigade headquarters, saying that, as the 1/5th Somersets could not advance on El Jib owing to the precipitous slopes, the 1/5th Devons were being pushed up to attack El Jib direct. One company 1/4th Wilts was being sent to support the 2/3rd in its attack on Nebala after El Jib had fallen.

The message added that the attack by the 1/5th Devons would clear up the situation, and after the fall of El Jib the G.O.C. would like to speak to the C.O. on the telephone. From this it was most apparent that the brigade had not in the least grasped the seriousness of the situation.

The attention of all was now drawn to the advance of the 1/5th Devons in their attack on El Jib. As all watched them advancing towards the forward position held, their men were so steady and their lines so straight that it seemed almost as if they might possibly gain their objective.

Then they came under the artillery barrage, followed by that terrible enfilade machine-gun fire. Every Lewis gunner did his best to keep down the enemy's fire, but it was still impossible to locate those guns. They roared a hail of bullets on the Devons and made them swing to the left and seek cover. Human effort could do no more, still it was a most gallant attempt.

There was nothing for it but to sit tight and wait for darkness. The hours dragged on and the day seemed unending. At last, at 4 p.m., the 233rd Brigade appeared to have realised the situation, for a message for the 2/3rd came, saying : " You, 1/5th Somersets and 1/5th Devons on the West of El Jib, are held up by enfilade M.G.s on Nebi Samwil. Fire of mountain battery has been directed on these, and division has been told that battalions cannot move backwards or forwards until these M.G.s are driven out by an attack down Nebi Samwil slopes. Please take such cover in your present position as you can, and remain there."

No attack was made, however, down the slopes of Nebi Samwil, nor did the mountain battery open fire.

At dusk the brigade sent orders for a retirement, " covered by the Gurkhas." This was a great relief. The Wilts Company was deployed to secure the left flank and the Somersets and Devons then withdrew. By 10.30 p.m. the last of the wounded that could be found had been sent back, and the battalion returned to the same bivouac as on the previous night.

In this action before El Jib the fighting strength of the battalion was not more than 350 of all ranks. Of these the losses were, Jemadar Chame Thapa and ten Gurkha ranks killed, while Capt. Lemarchand, Lieut. Turner, Jemadar Tilbir Thapa and sixty-three Gurkha ranks

were wounded—total casualties 77, or 22 per cent. The British battalions engaged, Devons and Somersets, and the company of the Wilts had equally heavy casualties.

It was a severe blow to the unit to have the adjutant, Lieut. Turner, *hors de combat*. In all the operations since the advance from Gaza, the successful achievements of the 2/3rd were largely due to his powers of organisation and his unfailing energy.

The attack on El Jib and Bir Nebala was resumed next day, the 24th November, by the 52nd Division, supported by artillery. After capturing these places they were to go on to Kutundia, and the 2/3rd was ordered to occupy El Jib.

All the morning the Gurkhas watched battalions of Scotsmen filing along the precipitous ground past their bivouac area. The enemy evidently knew, or guessed, the line of advance, for the area was persistently shelled. As was also the track along which camels, laden with wounded in "cacolets," had to pass. Soon the sound of firing proclaimed that the 52nd Division was engaged and large was the wonder as to their progress in that fateful valley.

In the afternoon came the news that this attack also had failed. The new division had not been able to advance as far as the penetration of the day before.

It now became evident that the Turks had brought the victorious advance to a standstill within a few miles of Jerusalem. All hope of reaching the objective, Bireh, would have to be abandoned for the present.

The 75th Division had now, after participating in the capture of Gaza, fought its way forward for sixteen strenuous days, during which it had advanced over fifty miles. It was therefore no matter for surprise when orders came that the division was to be withdrawn for a short period to reorganise and refit. Although the final objectives had not been reached, important results had been achieved in the capture of the pass leading to the Judæan Plateau, and of Nebi Samwil, the key to Jerusalem. The 75th Division, from this time forward, adopted the "key" as its emblem. The badge was blazoned on all vehicles, etc., in commemoration of the exploit.

It is interesting to note here that El Jib and Bir Nebala were never captured from the direction of the previous attempts. After the fall of Jerusalem (which was attacked from the west and south-west, and not from the north-west) on the 9th of December, the 60th Division, which relieved the 75th, advancing northwards, captured Kh. Adaseh, a hill one mile east of Nebala on the 28th December, and subsequently "occupied" El Jib and Nebala.

At 9.30 p.m. on the 24th November the battalion marched from

its bivouac area near Beit Izza to its own brigade at Kuryet el Enab, where Major Dundas rejoined after his detachment to the 2/4th Somersets. On the 27th of November El Mughar was reached and the 2/3rd remained there until the 1st December, when the 232nd Brigade moved north to another El Kubeibeh, a village just north of Yebna, and a week later to Ramleh.

Meanwhile the 2/3rd received orders to take up positions in the line then occupied by the 2/4th Norfolks and two companies of the 1/8th Hants on the 9th of December. In a further forward movement of the 232nd Brigade on the 11th of December the battalion's share was the capture of Budrus and Sheikh Obeid Rahil.

The number of British officers with the battalion, exclusive of the medical officer and quartermaster, was now reduced to four. To help matters Lieut. Grant from the 123rd Outram's Rifles and Lieut. Harrison from the 3/3rd were lent from their units. Lieut. Hook from the 2/4th Somerset Light Infantry and eight British "observers" were also attached to the battalion.

A fresh advance was ordered for the 15th December: the 232nd Brigade to take up the line, Kibbiah Ridge (2/3rd Gurkhas)—Dathrah (2/5th Hants)—Ibannah (58th Rifles).

A battle position for brigade headquarters was built on Sheikh Obeid Rahil, and the ground was carefully reconnoitred for concealed approaches, so as to enable the brigade to concentrate near Budrus out of sight of the enemy.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 14th the 2/3rd attack on Kibbiah Ridge (half-way between Budrus and Kibbiah village) was launched in accordance with the brigade plan. It proved an easy victory. The enemy were surprised and fled, under cover of the Kibbiah defences, after hurling a few bombs. One man was badly wounded, but he was the only casualty.

The G.O.C. now asked the C.O. if the capture of Kibbiah village could be successfully undertaken by the 2/3rd. The place appeared to be strongly held, but after a personal reconnaissance Col. Eastmead decided that it could be taken from the Turks without much trouble. His report proved to be quite correct, for, with the assistance of good covering fire by artillery and machine guns, the battalion gained its objective before noon.

The 16th December was spent in consolidating, but next day the unit got orders to return to Beit Nebala for one night and then relieve the 58th Rifles on Ibannah Ridge.

A vexatious order, published at this time, made a C.O. liable to trial by court martial if any horse or mule belonging to his unit was tied to an olive tree. On the very day this order was promulgated,

one of the 2/3rd drivers committed the dire offence. A shell caused the rear mule, of his string of three, to shy and displace its load. The driver could not possibly adjust the fallen load while still holding the bridle of the leading mule, as the three animals walked round and round in circles, as is their aggravating habit. He therefore did the obvious thing—tied the leader to a tree (an olive tree as it happened), fixed the load in a minute and proceeded on his way. This took place under the very nose of the A.Q.M.G., who was forced to admit that the driver could not have acted otherwise. The C.O. was not called upon to face a court martial.

A large draft joined the battalion on the 18th December, 1917. This consisted of Lieut. Ogilvie, four G.O.s, 198 Gurkha ranks and three followers. It was made up of furlough men, returned sick and wounded, and a new draft from the depot. This last lot gave immense trouble as the recruits were entirely untrained. Fortunately the period of active hostilities was over for the time being, but such a large number of recruits, together with their instructors, all struck off duty at one time was extremely inconvenient.

On the 22nd December Lieut. Grant and Lieut. Harrison were relieved by Lieut. McKay and Lieut. Carberry of the 58th Rifles and rejoined their own units.

On the 28th December the 2/3rd was relieved by the 1/4th Wilts of the 233rd Brigade and marched back to Haditheh, where it bivouacked on some rocky ground south-west of the village. Lieut.-Col. Eastmead was placed in command of the divisional reserve. This consisted of the 2/3rd Gurkhas and the 1/5th Devons, and was employed in road-making between Ludd and Beit Nebala.

At Haditheh all were cheered by the return of Capt. Turner. On the 29th of December Capt. Cuscaden and Lieut. Murray joined the battalion from the 101st Grenadiers.

CHAPTER XXIV

SECOND BATTALION IN PALESTINE

EL KEFR AND THE ADVANCE TO ABUD : BENAT BURRY :

MOGG RIDGE : THE WADI BALLUT

FOR the first half of January 1918 the battalion remained at Haditheh, and on the 17th relieved the 1/4th D.C.L.I. up in the line again at Kibbiah. Meanwhile Lieut. W. H. H. C. Brodie reported his arrival on the 7th, and on the 25th January Lieut. F. Barter, V.C., Lieut. C. J. W. Lillie, and Lieut. A. B. Barltrop joined the battalion, with a draft of one Gurkha officer, sixty-seven Gurkha ranks and seven followers from hospital. On the 2nd of February Capt. Ashmore rejoined from hospital, and a draft of 100 men arrived from India. On the 26th of this month, too, the joyful news came through that leave to India had been opened. Ten per cent. of the strength were to have three months' leave.

On the 6th of March the 3/3rd Gurkhas relieved the 2/3rd on the line between Shakbah and Kibbiah, and on the 7th the attack on Abud was carried out. There was little resistance and, after a night march to the position of assembly and an advance at earliest dawn, the village was occupied by the 2/3rd at 6.35 a.m. The line when consolidated was two miles in length, with Abud in the centre. The extremities linked up with the 1st Leinsters of the 10th Division on the right and the 1/5th Devons of the 232nd Brigade on the left.

On the 10th a company of Germans was seen on a hill to the north-east of the 2/3rd position. The artillery was at once informed and opened fire on them. It transpired subsequently, from a prisoner, that eight Germans were killed or wounded before they could take cover. At this time several small parties of Turks became surprisingly active. Their bold advance was explained later on by a prisoner, who stated that the Germans had ordered the Turks to go and occupy Abud, which—so they said—had already been retaken by themselves. The Turks paid dearly in trusting their German masters, for their small force suffered severely.

On the 11th the 3/3rd relieved its sister battalion which then concentrated below Abud, ready to advance the next morning.

The battalion's orders were to advance on the 12th March to the line Kurnet es Sinobar—Mughair Ahmed—Benat Burry, while the 2/5th Hants, on the left, were to occupy Deir Kulah and Kh. el Arak (between Deir Kulah and Benat Burry). The brigade was moving northward. The 10th Division on the right was facing north-east, so the further the advance the more exposed became the right flank. This constituted a continual source of anxiety throughout, and special measures to secure the weak flank were always necessary.

The battalion gained its intermediate objectives without serious opposition, but about 8.30 a.m. a shortage of wire prevented communication with the artillery. The attacking line was then severely enfiladed by a nest of machine guns on the right. Although the division was asked for the battalion to be put through to the heavy artillery immediately, there was considerable delay, because the "Q" staff insisted on sending first a message regarding a ceremonial parade for the Duke of Connaught. After this the map reference was given to the gunners and the machine guns silenced. A little after 10.30 a.m. the 2/3rd again moved forward. By midday both Mughair Ahmed and Benat Burry had been secured after some stiff fighting.

The advance on Benat Burry was most ably conducted and elicited unstinted praise from the corps commander downwards. The Turks captured there included five officers, four N.C.O.s, over sixty others, together with a large quantity of arms, ammunition and bombs. A strong Turkish counter-attack was successfully repulsed, with considerable loss to the enemy.

The leave party for India had been left behind at Abud when the battalion advanced into action on this day. It consisted of four Gurkha officers and ninety-eight Gurkha ranks, who joined the first line transport. An enemy aeroplane came and bombed the 1st line, causing many casualties—amongst them Jemadar Kalu Gurung and two men of the leave party wounded.

The captured ridge, after consolidation on the evening of the 12th March, was occupied by the 2/3rd until the 19th *idem*, when the unit was relieved by its third battalion. As companies were relieved they marched to a bivouac area near Kh. Baraish, about half-way between El Lubban and Deir Ballut.

The 2/3rd Gurkhas had now been in the line continuously for nine weeks and had suffered 249 casualties. Moreover, since the advance from Gaza, there had been no facility for training. Up to the end of the month, therefore, intensive training was the order of the day, although on the 16th a small deputation proceeded to Ramleh to be presented to H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught. His Royal Highness

personally congratulated the deputation on the gallant services of the battalion during the winter operations, and requested the Corps Commander to publish an order to that effect.

On the 22nd March Capt. Cuscaden and Lieut. Murray left the battalion to rejoin their own unit, 101st Grenadiers. All ranks were indeed sorry to lose these officers, who had put in three months' excellent work with the 2/3rd.

On the 2nd April Major-General Palin, commanding 75th Division, presented the ribbons of medals for "immediate" rewards for gallantry in the field. The C.O., Adjutant and a party of thirty-two N.C.O.s and men, under the Subadar Major, witnessed the presentation of the following :

Military Cross—Lt. F. Barter, V.C., for gallantry at Benat Burry ;
Jem. Budhibal Thapa—Benat Burry ; Sub. Damar Sing Gurung
—Rentis.

I.D.S.M.—2348 Lce. Nk. Dalbahadur Gurung—Benat Burry ;
3891 Lce. Nk. Jamar Sing Gurung—Benat Burry.

Important results were now anticipated from a further forward move. It was supposed that the 75th Division would break through the enemy's line north of El Kefr on the Subih Ridge. Then, by a rapid move across the front of the 54th Division (on our left), toward Kalkilieh (eleven miles north-west of Subih), get behind the Turkish line and cut their communications, while the 54th Division and the cavalry, on the coastal plain, advanced. The final result of such an operation would be the destruction or capture of a large portion of the Turkish army.

Whether such intentions had been formulated by the Commander-in-Chief does not, however, concern this narrative. It is sufficient to say that on the 9th April the 75th Division was ordered to secure the general line Berukin—Kh. Fakhakhir—Subih Ridge—Arara—Rafat—Three Bushes Ridge.

The 2/3rd's objectives were (1st phase) to secure the line Sheikh Nafukh—El Kefr, and (2nd phase) the line from Mogg Ridge to Subih Ridge.

The first objectives had been carefully reconnoitred by the C.O. and Company Commanders from Sh. Kauwash and from Mughair Ahmed, and positions of deployment had been selected on Kefr Hill.

The battalion marched in the dark from its bivouac area up the Wadi Ballut and thence in single file up a steep hill track to Kefr Hill. It was a difficult climb in the darkness and it was impossible to avoid making some noise as the men scrambled up the rocky hillside. This

noise was evidently heard by the enemy, for Verey lights were sent up from Sheikh Nafukh and a few shots were fired. But for the fact that a German battalion was at the time taking over the El Kefr position from a Turkish regiment (who probably wished to get their relief completed as soon as possible) more attention would doubtless have been paid to the Gurkhas.

At 5 a.m. our artillery bombardment commenced. One battery of 6 in. howitzers started by shelling Kefr Hill, on which the battalion was then deployed, but soon lengthened and joined in with the rest in shelling the actual objectives. The momentary disarrangement of the first line, due to the shelling, was soon rectified. At 5.5 a.m. the battalion advanced to the attack.

This was completely successful, and a marked feature of the day was the hasty retreat of the Germans from various positions as soon as the Gurkhas got to close quarters.

About 6.30 a.m. a company of the 2/5th Hants reached Sheikh Nafukh and, passing the right of the 2/3rd, advanced to attack Toogood Hill. In crossing the ridge the company suffered severely from shell fire and was brought to a standstill not more than fifty yards in front of the battalion by the intensity of the enfilade machine-gun fire from Toogood and the Necklace. The unit had lost all its company officers. The company commander, after being wounded three times, was killed by a shell.

Another company of the 2/5th Hants was seen advancing up the Necklace. The 2/3rd Lewis gunners and riflemen, whose fire had been directed on Toogood and the Necklace since their first arrival at their objectives, now redoubled their efforts in order to cover the advance of the Hants. With this assistance the Necklace was at length captured after a severe struggle.

The enemy's artillery fire was incessant and the number of 5.9 shells which burst round the battalion headquarters was amazing. This was accounted for by the discovery, at about 10.30, of a German soldier, with a telephone, still concealed in Kefr village. After the capture of this man, the 5.9 shells ceased to worry battalion headquarters in their position behind the village, but were directed against more conspicuous portions of the line.

At 1 p.m. orders were received for the 2/3rd to conform to the movements of the 1/4th Wilts. Owing, however, to some discrepancy between the actual configuration of the ground and that shown on the maps, this advance did not materialise as expected. It was not until 4.30 p.m. that Lieut. Barter, who had been sent across to the Wilts to find out what was happening, returned with this explanation.

The second phase of the operations was then postponed until the

following day. Toogood Hill was still untaken, and the battle continued. About 3.30 the enemy's artillery fire slackened. This was a great relief. With their excellent observation from Furkah on the right and from Arara on the left, the German F.O.O.s had been able to place their shells with extreme accuracy, and the incessant bursting of these projectiles on the rocky ground had made things almost unbearable.

At last, about 5 p.m., another company of the 2/5th Hants, advancing from the Necklace, succeeded in driving the enemy from Toogood Hill and in holding it. Berukin and Tin Hat Hills, on the right, had also been captured. Orders to consolidate were therefore issued.

On the left Rafat and Three Bushes had been taken by the 233rd and 234th Brigades without serious opposition.

The failure to secure the objectives of the second phase had not been communicated to the people with the first line, and Lieut. Allanson, in accordance with his instructions, brought his transport, with rations and water, up the Wadi Arak. Here they soon came into full view from Mogg Ridge, and a heavy fire from artillery and machine guns caused many casualties before Lieut. Allanson could extricate his column from this dangerous situation. This he did with great skill and coolness and, retracing his steps, took the rations, etc., up to Kefr via the tortuous Wadi Ballut—a toilsome journey, which was only concluded at midnight.

Next morning, 10th April, the advance was continued. The battalion's objective was Mogg Ridge. When this had been secured, the Devons were to pass through and secure Subih, to the north-west of Mogg Ridge.

This objective was a long hill (about 1,500 yards long) with gentle slopes on the near side. The eastern and higher end was rocky ground, full of crevices which afforded unlimited natural cover, and commanded the whole of the southern slope to the westward. The central portion of the ridge was broken ground, covered with scrub ; and the western or left end was open ground, with some terraced cultivation. The top of the ridge was flat to a depth of about fifty yards, and the whole of this flat top was commanded by the higher Subih ridge behind it. None of this information, however, was available at the time, and was only acquired by costly experiment.

The Germans on Mogg Ridge were evidently quite prepared for the advance, which commenced at 6 a.m. Shelling began before there was a move at all and every kind of rifle and machine-gun fire was turned on the Gurkhas as they advanced down the rocky slopes

towards the Somerset Wadi. It was a long advance of quite a mile, and the going over the rough boulder-strewn ground was necessarily slow. Every movement was distinctly visible to the enemy and very deadly was his fire. The machine guns of the 229th Company, under Lieuts. Statham and Fitton, provided good covering fire from Kefr and Sheikh Nafukh, but this had, of course, to cease when the first line, pushing doggedly on in spite of the devastating fire, reached the top of the ridge at about 7.10 a.m.

To advance over the flat top, defended on the further side by numerous machine guns, was impossible. But the impossible was attempted again and again. Lieut. Moggridge, preparing to charge across this open space with his two leading platoons fell riddled with machine-gun bullets. Two men who attempted to pull him back under cover fell beside him severely wounded. Later on, when Lieut. Barltrop arrived with D Company, he succeeded in getting Lieut. Moggridge carried back a short distance, but it was impossible to carry him back to the aid post, as there were no stretchers, and moreover it was useless, for he was mortally wounded and died shortly afterwards.

Lieut. Barter, V.C., advancing with Jemadar Budhibal Thapa, M.C., and a few men of B Company, found himself confronted on the flat top by a German machine gun only forty yards distant. Budhibal had sworn that he would capture one of these weapons. The little band immediately charged, but in a moment they were all shot down and killed, with the sole exception of Lieut. Barter, and he only escaped by falling down and feigning death. He lay there, unable to stir, within thirty yards of the enemy, until about 12.30 p.m., when No. 4145 Rifleman Karanbahadur Rana, by the gallant action for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross,¹ knocked out the German machine gun and rescued his company commander.

Lieut. Barltrop was now the only British officer left with the firing line. The three companies were by this time very weak by reason of the heavy casualties, and could advance no further. At the eastern end of the ridge (outside the limit of the 2/3rd objective) the enemy established one or more machine guns, which enfiladed the line from the right. Any ground giving cover from these guns was under fire from other machine guns on Gurkha Hill and Susieh. No useful covering fire could now be afforded by the artillery or the machine guns at Kefr, owing to the difficulty of observation. There was nothing for it but to hang on and wait for reinforcements. So there the Gurkhas remained under the brow of the hill, huddled together in small groups wherever they could find a little cover. In

¹ See Appendix 10.

some places they were so close to the enemy's position that the Germans were able to hurl down bombs on them and to use their trench mortars very effectively.

News of this precarious situation reached battalion headquarters at 10.40, when a headquarters runner, No. 3548 Rifleman Setu Pun, after twice running the gauntlet of shot and shell, returned with a situation report from Lieut. Barltrop.

The unit's reserve was now on its way and in addition a company of the 58th Rifles was ordered forward in support. The commander, Lieut. Grey, was severely wounded, and the company advanced under the subadar major. A company of the 2/5th Hants was also sent up to the assistance of the 2/3rd.

At 11.15 communication by telephone was established between the firing line and battalion headquarters. The laying of the cable, under direct observation of the enemy, over at least 1,800 yards of boulder-strewn ground, every inch of which was under fire, was a most noteworthy feat. Time after time was the wire smashed by shell fire and as many times repaired by the gallant signallers, one of the most conspicuous of these being No. 3241 Rifleman Nain Sing Chattri.

Shortly after midday Lieut. Barter, rescued from his desperate situation under the German machine gun, took command of the firing line. In his report to battalion headquarters he stated that there were about 100 of the 58th Rifles alongside him. Many of the men were so close to the Germans that they could not move without being shot down, and it was impossible to get in touch with them.

About 1 p.m. orders were issued for the 2/5th Hants to secure the ridge, with the support of the Gurkhas and men of the 58th Rifles already on it. In accordance with this plan, two companies of the 2/5th Hants advanced at 2.5 p.m. (under cover of a twenty minutes' bombardment) to push forward by the right of the firing line and secure the commanding eastern end of the ridge.

The bombardment caused some casualties amongst the Gurkhas, who were so close to the enemy line. It had ceased long before the Hants reached the ridge. This attack therefore failed. The two Hants companies numbered only about fifty and 100, respectively, by the time they came up on the right of the 2/3rd.

Their commander, Major Beaman, and Lieut. Barter decided that one more attack should be made. Co-ordinates for a barrage were given and the barrage was registered. Zero was fixed at 4.15 p.m. and the bombardment lasted twenty minutes. It was a feeble bombardment (for the gunners were getting short of ammunition) and

not at all what the attackers had hoped for. At its conclusion the attacking troops pushed forward.

Simultaneously with this advance the Germans put down a heavy barrage of trench mortars. As the assaulting troops gained the flat crest they were met by a hail of stick bombs, under cover of which the Germans counter-attacked in force and broke through the line in several places. A gallant stand was made for a short time, but group by group the assailants, finding they were being surrounded, were forced to give way. Soon the whole line, or what was left of it, was in full retreat down the hill and back to the Berukin-Kefr Ridge, but the British artillery and machine guns were able, fortunately, to prevent the Germans from following up the retirement. The poor, weary little Gurkhas were organised on the Kefr position by the acting adjutant, Lieut. Ogilvie, as they came in.

A spare company of the 58th Rifles took over part of the Gurkha line; 2/3rd headquarters were moved to the south of Kefr village.

At night the 1/4th Welsh Regiment (60th Division) arrived, to take the place of the 2/3rd. The relief was completed at 4 a.m. Two hours later the battalion marched back to the old bivouac in the Wadi Ballut, south of Mughair Ahmed, to rest.

The casualties during the two days, 9th and 10th April, were :

Killed :	Lieut. C. F. H. Moggridge. Subadar Wazir Gurung. Jemadar Budhibal Thapa, M.C. 48 Gurkha ranks.
Wounded :	Lieut. W. H. H. C. Brodie. Subadar Major Bhim Sing Thapa, M.C., I.O.M. Subadar Damar Sing Gurung, M.C. Jemadar Dhanbir Thapa. 179 Gurkha ranks.
Missing :	5 Gurkha ranks.
Total, 239.	

Capt. Ashmore rejoined on the 10th April from the 3/3rd Gurkhas and took the place of Capt. Tuite-Dalton, who left on the 9th April to be second in command of the 3rd Battalion.

On the 12th April Lieut.-Col. Eastmead returned from leave home and resumed command of the battalion.

It had been rumoured that, after the strenuous work of the last few weeks, the 2/3rd were to enjoy ten days' rest. Very welcome news, for rest was badly needed, but the battalion never got it.

On the 16th April Capt. Turner rejoined from Alexandria, his leave to England having been postponed owing to the shortage of British officers with the battalion.

On the 17th the 232nd Brigade relieved the 159th Brigade in the

area Tin Hat-Berukin-El Kefr, with the 2/3rd on the left in the Kefr Ridge position, where it relieved the 1/4th Welsh Regiment.

The following message was received from the brigade on the 18th April :

“No. G.S. 2979. The Commander-in-Chief (General Allenby) visited this area yesterday and asked the brigadier to express his thanks and appreciation to all ranks of the 232nd Brigade on the excellent work performed by them under the most trying circumstances during the recent operations. The G.O.C. also wishes to add his thanks to the brigade for the fine show they put up in the face of great difficulties.”

The consolidation of the line gained was now ordered, but was no easy matter. The 2/3rd portion, extending from the west of Toogood Hill, due north of Sheikh Nafukh, to the head of the Wadi Arak, was held at first by eight posts in rough sangars. The ground was rocky, with deep fissures between the rocks, and there was very little soil. The joining up of the isolated posts to form a fire trench was a difficult task, as was also the provision of communication trenches. The erection of wire obstacles on such uncompromising ground seemed at first impossible, but was eventually carried out. All this work had to be done at night, as the line was in full view of the enemy on the opposite ridge. By day, the men were withdrawn to bivouac areas under cover, the line being held by sentry groups only. The enemy adopted a similar procedure ; no one was visible by day, but patrols reported sounds of energetic digging every night. Frequent displays of Verey lights and bursts of machine-gun fire showed that the enemy were on the *qui vive*.

Patrols under Lieut. Ogilvie brought in large quantities of arms, equipment and material from the former headquarters of the 3rd Company, 702nd German infantry battalion, just below Kefr, on the north side. German caps, great-coats and waterproof sheets were eagerly seized on by the men as trophies. An exceptionally uncomfortable folding chair, with the German title painted on it, adorned the officers' mess. Zeiss field-glasses, superior to British, were in great request. Stick bombs were, for a time, preferred to those issued, as being easier to throw and exploding with a louder bang. Of the Verey lights there was no question—the German variety being infinitely superior—and all those collected were retained as long as possible.

The days at Kefr passed quietly enough, but not the nights. The ruined village contained countless myriads of voracious fleas. No danger whatever here of finding a sentry asleep.

Work was strenuous for the reduced numbers. On the 24th of April, 1918, and inclusive of sixty-one men attending classes at

Zeitoun, the strength of the battalion was only eight British officers, nine Gurkha officers and 358 other ranks.

The medical officer at this time was Capt. Calleya, R.A.M.C., who took Capt. Newton-Davis' place on the 8th April. The latter was greatly missed by every one in the battalion, for his influence with both officers and men had been great and extended far beyond the special sphere of his duties. He had been with the unit in the old France days, having joined at the Rue du Bois on the 19th May, 1915, when the "pukka" medical officer, Major Stanley, was invalided. From that time, except for a short absence on leave, he had served with the 2/3rd continuously, ever devoting himself to its welfare and never sparing himself.

On the 26th April Capt. M. C. O'Brien rejoined from Zeitoun, where he had been employed as instructor of bombing, and, after one or two unimportant moves, the battalion was posted to its old position at Benat Burry on the 3rd of May.

On the 10th May the Turks shelled Rafat very heavily, whereupon the O.C. 1/4th Wilts (then holding the place) asked Col. Eastmead over the telephone for help in providing cover for his unit. His battalion had suffered severely that afternoon, losing two officers and many men.

The 2/3rd were already supplying one whole company nightly for work in Rafat. The number was now doubled and, with the assistance and under the direction of their friends of the 10th Company (2nd Q.V.O. Sappers and Miners), the Gurkhas very soon improved the defences of the post.

Rafat village formed a pronounced salient in the line and seemed a useless place to hold ; it certainly was far from being a safe spot, and it offered no advantage for observation purposes over the higher Deir Simaan Ridge behind. Moreover, it was a good $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the 2/3rd bivouac ; and seven miles of marching, in addition to many hours of hard work, was no joke on those hot nights. The snoring of the Wiltshiremen, sleeping while the Gurkhas did their work, increased every one's irritation. Loudly and deeply was Rafat cursed on the weary homeward tramps in the early mornings, after the long nights of toil.

Lieut. O. J. White, Lieut. T. M. Collins, and Lieut. Nawab-ud-Din, I.M.S. (vice Calleya), joined on the 11th, 14th and 29th May respectively.

On the 18th May Major Dundas left on ten days' leave to Cairo, but did not rejoin the battalion for a long while, as on the 26th he was appointed to the command of the newly raised 4/11th Gurkhas. This battalion was formed from personnel contributed by the four

Gurkha units serving in Palestine, each supplying one company. The 2/3rd received orders to supply a full company, but on the C.O. pointing out that, in view of the recent reorganisation in the preceding year, it would be fairer for the 2/3rd and 3/3rd each to contribute two platoons, this plan was approved. On the 23rd May, Lieut. White, Subadar Budhibal Thapa, Jemadar Dhanraj Gurung and seventy-three Gurkha ranks, from No. 5 and No. 6 Platoons, with four followers, left to join the 4/11th Gurkhas.

The battalion relieved the 1/4th Wilts in Rafat on the 29th May and remained there three weeks. During that time an immense amount of work was done to strengthen the defences of the salient. The Turks evidently regarded these improvements with equanimity, so long as they were confined to the village defences ; but an attempt to construct a small post by the mosque Sheikh Ahmed et Tawil, to the west of the village, did not meet with their approval, for they soon blew it to pieces with 5.9 shells, damaging the mosque in so doing.

On the 18th June the battalion left Rafat without having had a single casualty during its three weeks' occupation of the post. The unit was relieved by its third battalion and marched that night to a cool and shady bivouac in the Wadi Zerka, where there was abundance of water for bathing and washing clothes. At Wadi Zerka it was reinforced by two Gurkha officers and 157 Gurkha ranks of the 2/8th Gurkhas. These men had been attached to the 51st Sikhs for nearly a year and were delighted to be among their own folk again.

The 10th of July saw the 2/3rd in divisional reserve at Rentis, where three British officers joined as reinforcements, viz. : Lieut. P. E. Burrows, M.C., and Lieut. L. E. Teague on the 2nd, and Capt. A. F. Dobbs on the 6th July ; while on the 9th Capt. S. M. Hepworth, I.M.S., relieved Nawab-ud-Din.

On the night of the 10th July the battalion relieved the 1/4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry in the former's old position at El Kefr, its place at Rentis being taken by the 123rd Outram's Rifles.

The battalion was now holding nearly 2,000 yards of frontage, from its old right flank, north-east of Sheikh Nafukh, to Cornwall Hill, on the west of the Wadi Arak. Patrols went out every night to reconnoitre the enemy's line from Mogg Ridge across the Wadi Somerset to Gurkha Hill. Search was made for Lieut. Moggridge's body, but without success, although several others of the 2/3rd dead were found.

On the 13th July a race meeting was held somewhere in the Coastal Sector and was attended by the divisional and brigade commanders, who left their next senior officers to act for them. Lieut.-Col. Eastmead was therefore in temporary command of the brigade.

Reading quietly in the brigade headquarters tent, he noticed after a time that the shelling in front of the 233rd Brigade was unusually prolonged and severe. In response to an inquiry from that brigade came the reply, "Rafat is being attacked." The 232nd Brigade was at once ordered to "stand to."

It was known that the 3/3rd was in the Rafat salient, and Col. Eastmead was anxious to learn some details, but no further information could be got out of the 233rd Brigade.

Next day the 2/3rd heard that thousands of shells had been fired into Rafat and a determined attack by infantry had been made in the evening. The 3/3rd had repulsed this attack with great gallantry. They had lost six killed and thirty-five wounded, but had inflicted very severe losses on the enemy. Communication during the action had been impossible: all the telephone wires were cut; there was too much dust for visual signalling; and all the pigeons had been killed by shellfire.

The Division were inclined to belittle the importance of this attack until, later on, the actual enemy orders for the capture of Rafat came into our possession. A detailed account of the attempt is given in Chapter XXVII, and a translation of the German orders will be found in Appendix 5, to show how thorough were the enemy's preparations, and that he regarded the attack on Rafat as an event of importance.

The following message regarding the Rafat action was subsequently received from the brigade:

"On the evening of the 13th July, the enemy, after a heavy bombardment, attempted to attack Rafat, but, on reaching within 100 yards of our front line, they were driven off by our machine-gun and artillery fire. About 6,000 shells fell in the Rafat position, causing forty-one casualties—six killed and thirty-five wounded—in the 3/3rd Gurkhas.

The G.O.C. 232nd Brigade wishes all ranks to be informed that it was due to the splendid work done by the 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles and other battalions in building trenches and dug-outs that so few casualties were caused by so heavy a bombardment."

Lieut. T. B. Middleton joined on the 19th of July, and on the 8th August Major A. F. Inglis, 1/1st Gurkhas, who had been second in command for one week, left the battalion on transfer to the 1st Kashmir Rifles.

The line was reorganised on the 10th August, consequent on the amalgamation of the 1/4th Wilts and the 2/5th Hants, and the battalion, less C Company (Kefr defences), moved into reserve at Benat Burry and at once started training. Two days later, a working party of 150 men was sent to Berukin for work on a road for guns. Capt. O'Brien was in command of this detachment.

The 75th Division now called for volunteers from the 2/3rd and 3/3rd Gurkhas for operations in the Hedjaz under Capt. Scott-Higgins, late of the 3/3rd Gurkhas. No details were given as to the nature of the employment. Indeed, the whole affair was kept so strictly secret that it was somewhat difficult to explain matters to the men. Thirty men were required from the two battalions. Seventeen N.C.O.s and men volunteered from the 2/3rd. The work they performed, mounted on camels, was very good, and an account of their adventures under Bimbashi Peake is referred to again in the next chapter. The matter is also mentioned by Lawrence in *Revolt in the Desert*. The party left on the 13th August, and nothing was heard of them until they rejoined, four months later.

On the 14th August Capt. Kenny, Lieut. Man and Lieut. Baker joined the battalion from the 2/5th Hants; and on the 18th eight sergeants from the same unit joined as instructors. Before the end of the month the number of attached British instructors had increased to twelve and proved themselves very useful.

On the 17th August Capt. Turner rejoined from leave to the United Kingdom and again took over the duties of adjutant from Capt. Ogilvie, who remained signalling officer.

On the 23rd August, 1918, the 233rd Brigade relieved the 232nd. With this relief the 2/3rd's sojourn in the Judæan hills came to an end. The last four and a half months had been a somewhat inglorious period of hard digging. From the time the Gurkhas had buried their own and the German dead who fell in the actions round Kefr, to the last finishing touches on the gun-road at Berukin, a day rarely passed without pick-and-shovel work.

The campaign against the "Gurkha hat," which had been going on for a long time, was actively renewed during this summer of 1918. Indents for new ones were met with the statement that they were unobtainable—this at a time when Colonial troops were wearing similar hats all over the world. Nor was it the only time opposition occurred, as will be seen later on in Chapter XXVIII, but, as regards the Palestine front, one significant fact emerges.

After a request to the Colonel of the regiment had proved abortive, Mrs. Eastmead, with amazing courage, made a personal and direct representation to the Colonel-in-Chief, Queen Alexandra. What exactly happened then is of course unknown to the unit, but shortly after this appeal the position became stronger and eventually indents were complied with.

Long periods of inactivity in a campaign are sometimes the cause of curious suggestions, *e.g.* someone on the divisional staff, at this time, evolved a remarkable scheme whereby men in the front line, far

removed from bathing facilities, might enjoy an occasional bath. A small hole having been dug in the ground and lined with a waterproof sheet, each man of a platoon or section was to pour into this receptacle a half-pint or so of his daily water ration, when he found he could spare it. When sufficient water had been collected, one lucky individual was to bathe in this accumulated result of his comrades' self-denial.

The battalion was solemnly ordered by the division to test this ridiculous proposal. Subsequently its originator, undeterred by an adverse report, had to be convinced by ocular demonstration that a small quantity of water left in a shallow receptacle on a dusty hill-side not only gets exceedingly dirty but quickly evaporates in a hot climate. Secondly, that increased cleanliness must be sought by some other method than bathing in the libations of one's thirsty comrades.

CHAPTER XXV

THE SECOND BATTALION IN PALESTINE

(Continued)

PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEW OFFENSIVE AND THE GREAT DAY:

KANTARA : PORT TEWFIK, AND THE RETURN TO INDIA

ON the night of the 23rd August, 1918, the 2/3rd marched back from Benat Burry to Junction Wadi, near Rentis, and the next night down to the coastal plain.

Here at Deir Tureif, near Beit Nebala, the brigade was concentrated for training and was composed as below :

1/4th Wilts.
72nd Punjabis.
2/3rd Gurkhas.
3rd Kashmir I.S. Infantry.
232nd L.T.M. Battery.
229th M.G. Company.

Towards the end of the month a draft of one Gurkha officer and forty-one Gurkha ranks from the Depot, and a very fine body of 168 Gurkha ranks from the 2/10th Gurkhas, joined the battalion.

The 2/5th Hants had been disbanded on the 17th August, and the 2/4th Somerset Light Infantry and the 1/5th Devons had left for France at the end of May.

The time at Deir Tureif was a strenuous one and the weather very hot. During this, as in other periods of training, special attention was paid to decentralisation. All possible contingencies were thought out and every officer fully practised, with his men, in arrangements to meet them. It was this forethought and "bandobast" which were mainly responsible for the very remarkable smooth working in the battalion.

On the 7th September the C.O. and three officers proceeded to Castle Bridge, in rear of the 3rd Division, to learn all about the Coastal Sector, and particularly that part of the line from which the 75th Division would eventually attack on the great day. Before returning to Deir Tureif most of the party took the opportunity to visit Jaffa. It was strange to go so soon from the warlike neighbourhood of the

front line to a peaceful town, with its inhabitants moving about the streets, doing their shopping, etc., as if there were no such thing as a war on. The house of Simon, a tanner, where St. Peter stayed, was occupied as a naval signalling station.

On the 15th September all surplus kit was dumped at Wilhelma, and preliminary arrangements for the forward move were completed on the 16th. The nucleus left behind had with it the necessary N.C.O.s, some signallers, some instructors, three Gurkha officers, Capt. O'Brien and Lieuts. Teague and Baker.

A day or two before the final concentration for the great attack, the Commander-in-Chief, General Allenby, visited the divisional area and saw all the brigade and unit commanders. He briefly explained the plan of campaign, exhorted us to do our best, and said that, with any luck, we ought to roll up the Turkish Army and capture 30,000 or 40,000 prisoners. How far the event surpassed these expectations everybody knows.

To withdraw two cavalry divisions from the Jordan Valley and to concentrate in the Coastal Sector, in addition to its normal garrison, the 75th Division, the 60th Division (from the 20th Corps) the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade, two brigades of mountain artillery and eighteen batteries of heavysiege artillery—all without the enemy's knowledge—was a most noteworthy feat. Its successful accomplishment, in secret, was chiefly due to the ascendancy attained over the enemy's aircraft by the British aeroplanes. All through the summer the latter's increasing superiority had been noted with much satisfaction, and recently quite a number of the enemy's machines had been shot down within sight, until it was quite a rare occurrence to see a hostile aeroplane.

Numerous groves of fruit trees behind the line afforded dense cover, and full use was made of them in concealing troops. Strict discipline in confining men to their prescribed areas and the thoroughness with which the troops carried out the orders regarding concealment, were also important factors in maintaining the secrecy with which the concentration was carried out.

After dark on the night of the 17th September the battalion marched from Deir Turcif to Mulebbis and bivouacked in orange groves about a mile north of the village. Special instructions were issued regarding precautions to be taken to render this a veritable "concealed bivouac." No fires were to be lighted; solidified alcohol was to be used for any cooking that was necessary. No lights were allowed except in the signal office. Special police, provided with binoculars and whistles, were stationed to signal the approach of hostile or doubtful aircraft, and every man was to remain absolutely

still until the "all clear" was given from battalion headquarters. Horses were watered by bucket.

The march of about ten miles through thick dust and over loose sand was a trying one in the heat, but only two men fell out, and these rejoined at the new bivouac. Lieut.-Col. Eastmead had been suffering severely from dysentery for some days, but with amazing pluck and determination had carried on. For this march he had been supplied with a motor car, borrowed from the division by the brigadier, in hopes he could remain at duty. Next day, however, being completely prostrated, he was reluctantly compelled to retire to hospital, and the command of the battalion devolved on Major Ashmore.

At 7 p.m. on the 18th September the battalion marched from the bivouac to the point of assembly behind the front line, on the left of the Hadrah Road. This point was reached at 10 p.m. when the brigade was formed up in two lines of masses :

First line : 2/3rd Gurkhas ; 1/4th Wilts.

Second line : 3rd Kashmir I.S.I. ; 72nd Punjabis (Wilts and Punjabis on the right, Gurkhas and Kashmirs on the left).

That evening at dinner old Sadi, the cook, was asked how often he had provided dinner for the officers before the battalion went into action since it first landed in France. With tears in his eyes the old man replied : "Many, many times, Sahib, and many, many Sahibs have never returned."

The troops were now allowed to lie down, to get some sleep if they could, but excitement kept most of the men awake, and the constant whine of snipers' bullets and the frequent crash of bursting shells were not conducive to slumber.

At 2.30 a.m. on the eventful day, 19th September, all got up and drank from a water supply, arranged by the brigadier. Every man was thus able to start with a full water-bottle.

At 3.15 the battalion left the point of assembly for the front line and, passing through gaps cut in our own wire at 3.55—just as the moon sank below the horizon—the unit formed up on the tape line at 4.20 in two lines of half-companies in file.

The divisions detailed for the main attack had now all taken up their positions. These, numbering from the right, consisted of :

French Contingent	in our old lines north of Wadi Ballut.
54th Division	in foothills by Mejdal Yaba.
3rd Division	in Coastal Sector.
75th Division	in Coastal Sector.
7th Division	in Coastal Sector.
60th Division	in Coastal Sector.

Three cavalry divisions, the 5th, 4th and Australian, were massed

behind the left flank, ready to dash forward as soon as the infantry had broken through the Turkish lines.

On the right of the 232nd Brigade were the 2nd Dorsets of the 3rd Division, and on its left the 1/152nd Punjabis of our 234th Brigade. The 233rd Brigade was in divisional reserve.

The objective of the 75th Division was to break through the Tab-sor defences, immediately in front. Then to push on, as quickly as possible, beyond the Et Tireh defences, which were to be consolidated.

Zero hour had been fixed for 4.30 a.m.—half an hour after the moon had set.

Four minutes before zero hour, the first wave of the first line stepped forward into the darkness. The great advance had commenced.

Then the bombardment began, a veritable inferno of noise and dust. Many of our guns were so close behind, and the screaming shells passed so closely overhead, that the effect was bewildering. Momentarily the whole line was checked from sheer amazement at the astounding din.

Arriving at the enemy's first line exactly on time, just as our barrage lifted, the wire was found to be intact. This was an unpleasant moment, for machine guns were chattering on either flank. But the wire was cut through at once by means of the special cutters, fixed on rifles, and the entrenchments were rushed with hardly a pause. The enemy's resistance was feeble, as most of this line had been evacuated. Some five officers and fifteen men were captured in dug-outs.

The Gurkhas pushed on without delay to the enemy's second line. Here stout opposition was encountered, and three strong points in this line were only taken after determined fighting.

In the capture of the first of these Capt. Burrows was killed, leaving Subadar Nawal Sing Rana in command of A Company.

At the strong point encountered in the centre of our line, the fighting was most stubborn. Here Capt. Ogilvie was wounded. This post was attacked in front, and on the right, by rifle grenadiers, directed by the O.C. On the left, a party with a Lewis gun, led by the adjutant, Capt. Turner, went manfully forward, while the rear was threatened by some men from B and C Companies. These were led by Subadar Dalbir Gurung, assisted by a Jemadar and some men of the 1/152nd Punjabis. Capt. Turner, with his party, charging through the wire, captured the post, together with some ten officers and sixty men.

The third strong point was more to the left, and was captured by Jemadar Gane Gurung and men of D Company. Here thirteen officers and twenty-four men were taken prisoners.

Meanwhile the rest of the battalion had pushed forward and caught up our barrage on the enemy's third line, which was taken without much opposition, one officer and twenty-three men being captured.

At this moment the rising sun, appearing huge and crimson through the dust and smoke of battle, disclosed an army broken and defeated. To the north the whole rolling plain was plastered with its fragments. In one area was transport, feverishly limbering up ; in another stranded hospital wagons ; here, a gun-team, caught in a storm of bullets, lay around the piece they would never draw again. Men, on horses or on mules, galloped wildly away ; men on foot, singly or in bunches, plodded slowly northwards—too tired to hasten, as their victors were too tired to pursue. All looked expectantly for the cavalry to burst in on the rear of the rout—but looked in vain, for the mounted troops had been assigned another task. Even now, far away on the left, could be seen their leading files topping the rise. Many an empty saddle, but, nothing daunted, the troopers held steadily on the long trek, which was to bring them behind all the Turkish forces.

From the enemy's third position the battalion advanced in practically one line and was much mixed up with men of the 152nd Punjabis and 123rd Rifles, units of the 234th Brigade on the left. Some further resistance at two more strong points was easily overcome, with more prisoners captured, and the advance continued.

By this time the Gurkhas had got well ahead of the Wilts on the right (at times almost running into our own barrage), and Capt. Dobbs, crossing the so-called Hadrah Road (an almost invisible track), captured another strong point with a regimental headquarters, consisting of ten officers, forty men, six wagons and two chargers, ready saddled.

Yet another line of works gave more opposition and yielded more prisoners, besides thirty-two mules, which were taken from underground dug-outs.

The battalion now inclined to the left and tried to get back to its own boundaries. The Wilts came up level with the Gurkhas on the right, and a running fight was kept up into Miskeh, the Turks being driven from position to position by the 2/3rd Lewis guns, which did splendid service. A machine gun and two field guns were captured and a number of prisoners taken.

It was 7 a.m. when the battalion passed through and round both flanks of Miskeh, taking more prisoners in the village. Artillery was seen from here in rapid retreat, and the Lewis guns opened fire on them at a range of 2,500 yards but failed to stop them.

From Miskeh the advance became very slow. The Gurkhas were greatly exhausted with the rapid advance and the going was very heavy and fatiguing. Units, moreover, had become so mixed up that it became imperative to reorganise. The O.C. therefore ordered a halt at about 8 a.m. on the far side of Miskeh, and succeeded in collecting some 250 men of the 2/3rd, but a portion of the battalion had gone on with the Wilts, who were now just ahead of the 2/3rd.

At this halt the men lay extended behind a little rise. As some looked back towards Miskeh a fearsome sight suddenly met their vision. From the ridge behind, just reached by a battalion of a supporting brigade, rose column after column of black smoke, mingled with earth, stones and bits of human bodies. Directed by an aeroplane, quartering the field of battle, the British heavies were shelling the British supports. The 2/3rd signals were of no avail, and every moment the Gurkhas expected the guns to lengthen on to them. Most fortunately, the O.C., S.A.F.A. Brigade, had ridden forward and was able to get back a message in time.

The halt to reorganise was a very short one, and by 8.30 the Gurkhas were advancing against a line of entrenchments south-west of the village, from which the enemy were successfully dislodged.

Formidable works about Et Tireh were strongly held by the reserves of the Turkish XXIIInd Army, who offered a stubborn resistance. The struggle that ensued to dislodge them involved probably the hardest fighting of that day.

Further progress, indeed, now became difficult and slow. Heavy machine-gun fire from a position on the left enfiladed the left flank and prevented it from making any headway for some time. The right worked its way gradually forward, and after a prolonged and severe fight, the enemy's last position on the west of Et Tireh was finally captured by a mixed force of Gurkhas and some 100 of the 152nd and 72nd Punjabis (who were without an officer), under the leadership of Capt. Barter, V.C.

This position was captured at 10.30, and consolidation was started at once. Lieut. Middleton, with sixty men, worked his way through the gardens, which surrounded the western side of the village, to secure a defensive position on the northern side. As this party arrived level with the northern boundary of the village they met with heavy machine-gun fire from a redoubt about 500 yards in front of them. This redoubt, with some advanced works, was still held, but was beyond the limit of our objective. Its speedy evacuation by the enemy, after his crushing defeats elsewhere, was looked upon as certain.

About 1 p.m., however, every one was astonished to see some 400 Turks issuing from these works and advancing with great bravery to make a counter-attack. They were quickly dispersed by an extremely accurate fire of the 4.5 howitzers of our S.A.F.A. friends and three machine guns of No. 229 M.G. Company, under Lieut. Statham. The machine gunners had performed an almost incredible feat in bringing their guns up all this way by hand, and their presence at this crisis was of incalculable value.

The scattering of their counter-attack broke the last of the Turks' resistance and they retired, leaving us in possession of the strong positions which they had defended so resolutely. Their dead, lying thick on the ground, showed with what desperate courage they had fought.

The capture of Et Tireh concluded the fighting, not only for that day, but as far as the 75th Division was concerned, for the whole war. While the 3rd, 7th and 60th Divisions swung round to the right and advanced in the direction of Samaria, the 75th Division came into corps reserve and remained near Et Tireh.

The battalion formed an outpost line from the north of Et Tireh westward, joining up with the 152nd Punjabis of the 234th Brigade.

The estimated number of enemy casualties on the 2/3rd front, exclusive of prisoners, was over 200. Some 350 prisoners were taken by the battalion, and a high proportion of these were officers. Other captures by the Gurkhas during the day's fighting included

2 Howitzers.
4 Field guns.
2 Machine guns.
12 Automatic rifles.
30 Mules.

The 2/3rd casualties were :

				B.O.	G.O.	Gurkha	Ranks	British	Total
Killed	-	-	-	1	—		13	—	14
Died of wounds	-	-	-	—	—		2	1	3
Wounded	-	-	-	1	3		78	1	83
Missing	-	-	-	—	—		32	—	32
<hr/>									
Total	-	-	-	2	3		125	2	132

The number of missing was at first given as 74, but a great part of these were with other units. For instance, two of the 2/3rd Lewis gun sections, still man-handling their weapons, continued advancing with the 7th Division towards Tul Keram until the evening !

The casualties among the officers were :

Killed : Capt. P. C. Burrows, M.C., commanding A Company.
 This promising young officer had been with the battalion
 only $2\frac{1}{2}$ months, during which time he had shown great
 ability and proficiency as a company commander.

Wounded : Capt. G. H. Ogilvie, M.C. Jemadar Harak Sing Gurung.
 Subadar Ane Thapa. Jemadar Sarda Sing Gurung.

On the 20th September the battalion remained in the outpost line to the north and west of Et Tireh, where a large quantity of booty was collected in and around the village. Corps reserve was a disappointment, but, considering that the 75th had been continuously in the line for months without a rest, it was only natural that the fresher divisions should proceed with the breaking down of the last organised resistance of the enemy. This was accomplished by the next day, 21st, after which no infantry action of any importance took place.

On this date the 3/3rd relieved the 2/3rd in the outpost line, and the battalion started the dull work of clearing the battle-field from Tireh to the sea-shore. After another bout of outpost duty from the 23rd to the 26th, the battalion changed from salvage work to road-making on the 27th September, on which date Lieut. Matheson, 2/5th Hants, joined the unit.

Nine men, who had become detached during the actions on the 19th, rejoined on the 28th. They had been carried forward, after the capture of Et Tireh, and had attached themselves to Gurkha battalions of the 3rd and 7th Divisions, with whom they remained until all the fun was over. During the fighting of the 19th-20th, Major Newton-Davis (then commanding an ambulance in the 7th Division) was trying, in the dark, to locate his units. Being quite uncertain as to whether he was amongst the British or the Turks, he was astonished and relieved when his challenge was greeted with the cry, "Hāmro dāktar, Sāhab."

On the 30th September the brigade marched to Kakon, and continued in a northerly direction as far as Haifa (Mount Carmel), which was reached on the 23rd October. The district between Liktera and Haifa is very malarious, and the 2/3rd suffered severely, as did all other units employed in this area. During the month the following were evacuated to the Field Ambulance :

British officers	-	-	-	-	-	1
Gurkha officers	-	-	-	-	-	1
British ranks	-	-	-	-	-	3
(Sergt. Gritt died at No. 26 C.C.S., Ludd, on 26th.)						
Gurkha ranks	-	-	-	-	-	207
Followers	-	-	-	-	-	5

The majority of these were suffering from malignant tertian malaria, and there were many deaths. Warning had been given of the virulent malaria in this district, but, without warning, the swarms of mosquitoes would have suggested it. Despite all precautions taken in selecting bivouac sites as far removed as possible from mosquito-breeding areas, and in choosing when practicable eucalyptus plantations, in sealing up unused wells, and in strict attention to men sleeping under such nets as were available, the insects were so numerous that it was almost impossible to escape infection. Every hospital, from the front to Cairo, was soon filled with malaria patients of all ranks from Generals downwards.

Lieut. Godfrey joined on the 14th October, and on the 18th Capt. Allanson rejoined from hospital and resumed the duties of quartermaster and transport officer.

Early in the month congratulatory messages to General Allenby from the King, the Duke of Connaught, War Cabinet and many others were published in orders. The following message in Hindustani was sent by General Allenby to all ranks of the Indian Army in Palestine :

HAZUR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SAHIB BAHADUR APNI FAUJ KE TAMAN DARJE KE JAWANON KO GUZASHTA HAFTE KE KARE KARNAMON KE LIYE APNI PASANDIDGI AUR SHUKRIA IRSAL KARTE HAIN. IN KARNAMON KA NATIJA SATWIN AUR ATHWIN TURKI FAUJON KI, JO HAMARE MUQABIL THIN BAMAI TAMAM SAMAN JANG KE, BARBADI HUI. DUNTYA KI TAWARIKH-I-JANG MEN AISI MUKAMMIL FATEH SHAID KISI FAUJ NE KABHI PAYI HOGI.

E. H. H. ALLENBY,
General, C.-I.-C.

26th September, 1918.

At noon on the 31st October hostilities with Turkey ceased and the great Palestine campaign was ended.

The move southward began on the 9th November, when the battalion marched from Haifa to Athlit and, on the following days, to Fureidis, Kerkur, Tul Keram and Kalkilieh, which was reached on the 13th. At this time the unit was so reduced by malaria that the marching strength of Gurkha ranks was only 364. The route was a very trying one, and it was a relief, therefore, when it was decided to rail the battalion from Kalkilieh to Ludd on the 14th, while the transport marched by road, empty.

At Ludd, Major Glynton, who had been G.S.O.2 to the Division, joined from hospital and took over command of the battalion from Major Ashmore, D.S.O., M.C.

Her Majesty Queen Alexandra sent, through Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I., the Colonel of the regiment, a signed

photograph of herself to Rifleman Karanbahadur, V.C., and asked the General to "convey her sincere congratulations to this rifleman on his gaining the highest distinction for valour that it is possible to obtain."

Now that hostilities had ceased, and the need of their services was not as urgent as it had been in the times of stress and tribulation, the number of British officers posted to the battalion was remarkable, as shown in the following list of names with dates of joining :

27th October, Lieut. C. J. Morris, 3/9th G.R.
and Lieut. A. C. Gundry.
28th October, Lieut. M. H. McMurtrie.
Lieut. J. Armstrong.
7th November, Lieut. A. F. C. Crosse, M.C.
18th November, Capt. W. D. G. Batten, 2/3rd G.R.
19th November, Lieut. J. E. Read, 1/4th G.R.
Lieut. J. Moffatt, 1/6th G.R.
20th November, Lieut. C. H. Boucher, 2/2nd G.R.
23rd November, Lieut. G. R. Hunter, I.A.R.O.
8th December, Lieut. R. Booth, 37th Lancers.

When the C.O., Lieut.-Col. Eastmead, rejoined from hospital at Ludd, on the 27th November, he found no less than 23 British officers in the mess (exclusive of the medical officer) and of these eleven were new ! It was no easy matter to find employment for so many, especially as most of those newly joined knew no word of Hindustani or Gurkhali.

On the 30th November Major Ashmore and Lieut. Barltrop visited the ground in front of El Kefr, where the desperate fighting of the 10th April had taken place. On the hill named after the officer who had died so gallantly there, they found the bodies of Lieut. Moggridge, Subadar Wazir Gurung, Jemadar Budhibal Thapa, M.C., and some thirty Gurkhas who had been killed on that day. It was a melancholy satisfaction to know that these at length received decent interment at the hands of their own comrades. The site of the graves was marked, so that the bodies could be transferred to the large cemeteries which have since been established.

On the 4th December the battalion left Palestine, moving in two trains from Ludd to the base at Kantara, where it encamped south of the Ducidar road. Some idea of the extent of the Kantara camp may be formed from the distance of the 232nd Brigade camp from the Canal—4½ miles—and yet it was far from being on the outskirts ; the Indian Base Depot alone (of which an old comrade of the 2/3rd, Capt. R. A. Robertson, was adjutant) accommodated at times no less than 18,000 men.

On the 12th December the party of one Havildar and sixteen

Gurkha ranks referred to in the last chapter and who had volunteered for special service in the Hedjaz, rejoined, safe and sound. Later on Col. Eastmead met Bimbashi F. G. Peake, of the Egyptian Army, under whom the party served, and obtained from him an interesting account of the adventures of this little detachment in the Bimbashi's own words, which is in possession of the battalion.

On the 26th December Capt. F. Barter, V.C., M.C., was invalided to England, after a long illness in hospital.

On the 7th January, 1919, the battalion had another move in the direction of India, to Port Tewfik. Here, owing to the very limited space available, the camps of the 2/3rd and 3rd Kashmir Rifles were in a cramped position on the sandy bank of the creek, running up to Suez. Parades on such rough ground were impossible, so the battalion utilised, as far as possible, empty spaces on the wharves of the Suez Canal Company. The French employees of the Company were very suspicious, not to say frightened, of Gurkhas and, for the first day or two, kept their houses securely locked all day, so that the place seemed uninhabited. But confidence was quickly restored, and it was soon a common sight to see French children and Gurkhas in consultation over problems in simple arithmetic, which the men were wrestling with on slates. Soon it became a matter of some difficulty to keep the little ones off the "parade grounds." The pipes and drums invariably conducted their practice surrounded by an admiring crowd, not only of children, but of adults also, who did not seem to be overburdened with work.

Lieuts. Moffatt and Middleton with Subadar Harak Sing Gharti and sixty Gurkha ranks, were detailed for escort duty to prisoners of war and sailed in s.s. *Abbassieh* to Yanbo and other Red Sea ports on the 21st January. They returned on the 29th, and sailed again on the 31st January, making a third trip later on. The men were subsequently employed, under Subadar Harak Sing Gharti, on police duty in the Prisoners of War and Transit Camp at Suez.

During January the following officers left the battalion :

Capt. M. C. O'Brien, to India, on demobilisation	on 12th January, 1919.
Lieut. G. R. Hunter, to 75th Divisional Education Camp - - - - -	on 6th January, 1919.
Capt. A. F. Crosse, M.C., to Demobilisation Camp, Kantara - - - - -	on 17th January, 1919.
Lieut. A. C. Gundry, to 1st Garrison Bn., King's Regt., Cairo - - - - -	on 17th January, 1919.
Lieut. D. McMurtrie, to Demobilisation Camp, Kantara - - - - -	on 17th January, 1919.
Lieut. J. Armstrong, to 1st Seaforths - - - - -	on 21st January, 1919.
Lieut. F. Godfrey, to Hyderabad Lancers - - - - -	on 21st January, 1919.

On the 18th February Lieut. F. C. Man, who had just returned from a trip to Cairo and Luxor, was taken ill and removed to No. 36 Stationary Hospital, Suez, suffering from pneumonia. To every one's great grief he died there on the 21st February. The sudden death of this popular officer was keenly felt by all ranks. In the six months he had been with the battalion a very high opinion had been formed of him as one who could be trusted to get through any difficult job. Moreover, his sterling qualities and unassuming disposition had endeared him to officers and men alike. He was buried with military honours in the Suez Cemetery. All the officers of the 2/3rd and of many other units, attended the funeral, as well as a great number of Gurkhas.

During February the undermentioned officers left the battalion :

Capt. W. D. Batten, for political employ, on the 6th.

Capt. J. N. Luthra, I.M.S., on transfer to 2/154th Infantry, on the 10th.

He was replaced by Asst. Surgn. B. O. Holmes.

Lieut. J. Moffatt, on transfer to 1/50th Kumaon Rifles, on the 12th.

Lieut. J. B. Middleton, on transfer to 1/50th Kumaon Rifles, on the 12th.

Early in March all the British N.C.O.s (sergeant instructors) were withdrawn and sent to join the 1/4th Wilts. They had a great send-off, being played to the railway station by the pipe band, and accompanied by nearly the whole battalion. The heartiness of the cheers given them as the train steamed away was some indication of the cordial relations that existed between them and the Gurkhas.

Farewell orders were naturally much in evidence at this period, and there are two extracts from letters that must be given *in extenso* in the text. This, because of the joy they must have given to the recipients and the pride with which any one connected with the 3rd Gurkhas will read them. The first is an extract from a letter dated Assiut, 18th May, 1919, from Brig.-General H. J. Huddleston¹ C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., commanding 232nd Brigade, 75th Division, E.E.F., to Lieut.-Col. C. S. Eastmead, D.S.O., commanding 2/3rd Q.A.O. Gurkha Rifles :

" I am not a very good hand at expressing my thanks, but I hope you understand how more than grateful I am for everything you and your battalion did while we were together.

From Brown Hill on November 11th to our last fight in front of Tireh the battalion did not miss a single fight in which the brigade was engaged—not only that, but on nearly every occasion it was the most heavily engaged unit of the brigade. They always did what I asked them to do, and generally a great deal more, and, whatever they were doing and whatever was happening elsewhere, I knew your part of the show was all right, and I need not worry about the result.

¹ Now (1927) a local Major-General commanding the troops in the Soudan.

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Nothing ever gave me more pleasure than the V.C. awarded to your battalion last year.

I cannot express my feeling and affection for the 2/3rd in words.

Ever yours,

HUBERT J. HUDDLESTON.

Please remember me to everybody. I hope Bhim Sing is all right again."

The second—also an extract from a letter—is from Capt. W. Clutterbuck, M.C., late brigade major, 232nd Infantry Brigade, to Capt. G. H. Ogilvie, M.C., dated 23rd October, 1919 :

"There never was and never will be a regiment like them (2/3rd G.R.), and we were all such a happy family. . . . I hear the 232nd Brigade has broken up. I'm very glad, as since the 2/3rd went it never has really been the 232nd Brigade."

An advanced party under Major Glynton embarked from Suez Docks for Bombay on the 11th of March, and the battalion sailed in the Orient liner *Ormonde* on the 16th *idem*. The G.O.C., 75th Division, with some of his staff, came down from Kantara, lunched at the Sinai Hotel, Port Tewfik, and had tea on board on the 13th after the unit had embarked, but General Palin did not see the battalion as a whole. He asked Col. Eastmead to thank every one for all the 2/3rd had done while with the 75th Division.

To the very deep regret of all ranks, Brig.-General Huddleston was away in Cairo when the embarkation orders came, and could not come to wish the 2/3rd "Good-bye." Capt. Clutterbuck, however, the popular brigade major, turned up. It was with a feeling of real sorrow that he was bidden farewell, thus severing the last link of the battalion's connection with the 232nd Brigade.

The relations between the brigade and the 2/3rd had always been of a most cordial nature, and were founded on the mutual respect and affection that only good work can inspire. As soon as the battalion came under his command in July 1917, the officers recognised that in General Huddleston they had a leader far above the average. With no previous experience whatever of service with Gurkhas (or any other troops of the Indian Army), still, it was soon felt that he understood Gurkhas and could be trusted implicitly. The feeling of confidence that this trust inspired and the excellent spirit that prevailed in the battalion were enormous assets in times of stress. The Gurkhas, one and all, had an immense admiration for the "General Sahib." They were very proud of the fact that he selected two Gurkhas of the battalion as personal orderlies.

Capt. Clutterbuck was an ideal brigade major, with a keen, sympathetic and cheerful disposition which no hardship could daunt.

Throughout the whole time, Capt. Radley maintained that spirit of helpfulness which had so impressed the officers of the 2/3rd when he was first met as staff captain at Bela. It was to his resourcefulness the battalion owed much of its comfort. He was greatly missed after he was wounded on the 19th September.

Lieuts. Matheson and Baker came with the unit as far as the ship, and then returned to Kantara. Capt. Wadia, I.M.S., joined on board as medical officer.

On the *Ormonde* were also the 110th Mahrattas and a few details. Amongst the latter were Major-General Sychoff, who had commanded a Cossack cavalry division, and his A.D.C., Capt. Semenchenkoff. These officers were on their way to Vladivostok to join the army of the unfortunate Admiral Koltchak.

It was a calm and uneventful voyage, with the usual routine of drill, sports and competitions, but on reaching Bombay on the 26th of March, 1919, the 2/3rd received the shock of their lives. All hope of a speedy return to their beloved cantonment was rudely shattered by an order to entrain that afternoon for Shahjehanpur.

The disappointment felt on receipt of this unexpected order somewhat dulled all appreciation of a message of welcome from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as well as any enjoyment of the welcome prepared for us by the Women's Branch of the Bombay Presidency War and Relief Fund. The men were marched into a large shed on the quay, furnished with long tables, and there regaled with fruit, lemonade and cigarettes. The officers were most kindly welcomed and entertained by Lady Knight and other ladies of the Committee. Each officer was presented with a silver matchbox holder, rather inappropriately inscribed "Farewell."

Shahjehanpur was reached on the early morning of the 29th March. Here the battalion received an enthusiastic welcome from the 4/11th Gurkhas, under Lieut.-Col. Dundas. The pipe band from the 2/3rd Depot and the band of the first battalion from Almora, met the unit at the station and played it to its new lines.

It was learnt on arrival that the battalion would be located in Shahjehanpur until its "demobilisation" was complete, but several days passed, and, in spite of much anxiety to get on with the work, no orders or instructions could be obtained. A private letter to Simla at length produced them.

In spite of the heavy amount of digestion these demobilisation orders demanded, all the arrangements were completed at last. Men had been divided into various categories for leave; trains had been detailed to convey the different parties; indeed, everything seemed favourable for an early return of headquarters to Lansdowne, when

suddenly, before a single man could be moved, these hopes were dashed to the ground by the outbreak of "unrest" in India.

On the 18th of April, 1919, half the battalion was hurriedly moved to Moradabad, a platoon was sent to picquet the railway station; guards were posted on bridges, escorts were provided for all trains between Mogul Serai and Saharanpur; and troops were detailed for "internal security."

Eventually the unrest died down. Then an attempt again was made to proceed with the demobilisation—to be frustrated this time by the necessity of supplying many drafts to units engaged in the Afghan War.

It was about this period that the last members of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers left the battalion. Lieut. Collins returned to his post in the Indian Police. Capt. Turner was invalided home.

Only those who had experience of I.A.R. officers in the Great War can judge of their value to the Empire. Col. Shaw has a few words to say about them in the next chapter, and it is no exaggeration to assert that, without their capable and gallant services, Indian Army units would have been in a sorry plight. Battalions (*e.g.* the 2/3rd) were often officered entirely (bar C.O. and perhaps adjutant) by members of the I.A.R.O., and the 2/3rd owed much to men of the type of Turner, Grey Smith, Allanson, Rennison, Moggridge, Robertson and others. Many of them had held responsible positions before joining up, acquired the military instinct with amazing facility and proved themselves most competent, brave and loyal officers. To many of them, sad to record, it entailed the supreme sacrifice.

The men's discomfort was increased by the fact that for a long time no suitable clothing could be obtained. The Gurkhas were still in the thick winter clothing issued in Palestine. This seemed all the more unreasonable, as an Army clothing factory was situated in Shahjehanpur. To the credit of this establishment be it said, however, that it certainly came to the rescue when the battalion had to dispatch a party to England at twenty-four hours' notice, to participate in the Peace Celebration.

A member of this party was No. 4146 Karanbahadur Rana, V.C., who received the Victoria Cross from His Majesty the King at Buckingham Palace.

In September 1919 the 2/3rd were detailed for service on the North-West Frontier. This order was subsequently cancelled. A certain number of the men were granted well-deserved furlough, and the remainder of the battalion was moved to Lahore Cantonment, with a detachment at Ferozepur.

In February 1920 Lieut.-Col. W. L. Dundas, D.S.O., succeeded

Lieut.-Col. C. S. Eastmead, D.S.O., in command of the battalion. Under him it returned at last, in April 1920, to Lansdowne, after an absence of over five and a half years.

It is convenient here to call attention to the contents of the following appendices to be found at the end of this volume :

Appendix 3. 2/3rd list of awards for France, Egypt and Palestine.

Appendix 4. 3rd Echelon statement of 2/3rd battle, casualties and deaths from disease in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, including British officers, Gurkha officers and Gurkha "other ranks."

Appendix 11. Dedication of War Memorial in St. Mary's Church, Lansdowne.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE THIRD BATTALION IN PALESTINE

As already referred to in Chapter XXI, it was on the 27th January, 1917, that the second battalion received the news that a third battalion was to be formed in Egypt by overdrafting. The official birthday of the new unit was the 3rd of February, 1917.

In the same chapter is also mentioned the method decided on by Col. Eastmead for this formation ; a plan admitted, on all sides, to have been a most generous one. In fact the second battalion gave of its best, to ensure the new unit commencing its career under the most favourable conditions possible.

The names of the British officers have also been detailed. There was some delay over their appointment, as it was expected higher military authority would post them. Finally, as stated before, the division stepped in and called on Col. Eastmead to make the allotment himself. But the military authorities in India had already selected Lieut.-Col. J. G. Edwardes of the first battalion to be the new commandant. After relinquishing the post of senior supervising officer to the Nepalese contingent at Dehra Dun, he took over command at Ismailia in March 1917. Two months later, however, the command of the first battalion, then at Kohat, became vacant. Lieut.-Col. Edwardes succeeded Lieut.-Col. A. C. Hickley on the 22nd of June, and his second in command, Major G. K. Channer, was appointed commandant of the 3/3rd, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-Col.

The Gurkha officers, with the company to which allotted, were as below :

Subadar Major Harising Bura	-	-	B
Subadar Gopal Rana	-	-	A
Subadar Kharaksing Gurung	-	-	A
Subadar Karansing Thapa	-	-	B
Subadar Durgamoni Thapa	-	-	C
Subadar Haribaran Thapa	-	-	C
Subadar Jamansing Rai	-	-	D
Subadar Randhoj Rana	-	-	D
Jemadar Gumansing Gurung	-	-	A

Jemadar Mansing Rana	-	-	-	A
Jemadar Damarsing Gurung	-	-	-	A
Jemadar Bahadur Thapa	-	-	-	J. Adjt.
Jemadar Mane Gurung	-	-	-	B
Jemadar Mansing Rana	-	-	-	B
Jemadar Gamarsing Thapa	-	-	-	B
Jemadar Dalbir Thapa	-	-	-	C
Jemadar Mohanlal Gurung	-	-	-	C
Jemadar Jabar Bahadur Gurung	-	-	-	D

On 24th February the separation of the two battalions was completed, and on 5th March the 3/3rd marched out of Shallufa for Ferry Post.

The two battalions were now spread out along the Canal in company posts. The record of this period is given in Chapter XXI, and is practically the same for both units, including the outbreak of plague in April. Lieut. G. H. Thomas joined about this time, as well as two I.A.R.O. officers from the 10th G.R. in Burmah (Lieuts. C. Russell and H. G. Lock). Major Glynton was appointed G.S.O.2 to the new 75th Division, and Lieut. Simeon an instructor at Zeitoun, neither of whom ever returned to the battalion. As Major Dundas rejoined the 2/3rd on the 3rd of July, Major H. D. Shaw was transferred to the 3/3rd as second in command.

The 3/3rd had shared the feelings of the second battalion as regards participation in the Palestine campaign. Hope and despair held the day alternately, for while it was felt that the fighting qualities of the Gurkha would certainly be wanted, it was realised that there would be a strong desire to keep in garrison on the Canal units conversant with the work required.

In the meantime the new battalion, having completed what was possible of its individual and company training in the first four months, was contemplating a more advanced stage. Then, on the 22nd of June, orders were received with much joy for both battalions to concentrate at Ismailia for service in Palestine. The composition of the new division (75th) is given at the end of Chapter XXI.

The two Gurkha battalions reached Rafa together on the 30th of June, and up to the 18th of August the 3/3rd were very busy completing their training. On that date the 233rd brigade moved towards Belah, camping that night a few miles beyond Khan Younis. It was a very distressing march, through hot and heavy sand, and the 3/3rd officers were rather ashamed of the large number of Gurkhas that fell out. However, in the evening the brigadier (The Hon. E. Colston), accompanied by his brigade-major (Capt. Wright), assembled all senior officers for a "talk." In his address he stated

that the only battalion of the brigade to arrive in anything approaching the condition of a fighting unit was the 3/3rd.

Next day the march to Belah was completed, the battalion being allotted a bivouac site in a wonderful grove of trees, only a mile and a half from the sea. This was a most pleasant spot, with the sister battalion within two thousand yards. For many a long day the short stay of five days at Belah was remembered by all ranks as the most delightful time spent in Palestine.

The next move, a week later, was to the Apsley House area and was the first introduction to front line trenches. On the 12th of September the brigade took over the Apex area, which was followed by plenty of duty in redoubts and heavy fatigue work for the battalion at night in the strengthening of the defences. On the 15th of September it suffered its first casualties in the shape of three men hit by shell fire when returning from a fatigue party down a communication trench.

On 20th September there was a feint attack by the enemy on the front line of the Apex trenches in order to draw our fire. A very pleasing instance of good discipline was apparent on this occasion. A platoon of A Company was in the centre of the first line trenches, with British troops on either side returning the enemy's fire. But A Company's standing instructions were that no man was to let off his rifle until definite orders to open fire were given. These instructions were strictly obeyed. An amusing part of this little affair was the great disinclination shown by all the young soldiers, in this their first experience, to put their heads over the parapet in order to fire. It was also manifest that a weak spot was to be found in the great dearth of experienced non-commissioned officers and old soldiers.

Lieut. Daniels was evacuated "sick" to the Field Ambulance on 21st September and did not return to the battalion.

On 7th October the 3/3rd was relieved by the Dorsets, and returned to the Apsley House area where it remained only a week, for in the middle of October the brigade moved back into the line on the left of its former position, the battalion taking over the front line trenches in the Blazed Hill area.

2nd Lieut. Armitage joined the battalion on the 22nd October, and Lieut. Mannock, from the 2/3rd, on 1st November, 1917.

As part of the general scheme to keep up the pressure on the enemy on this part of the line, during the turning operations around Beer-sheba, the battalion was detailed to conduct a raid on Outpost Hill with one company, on a date to be fixed later.

Outpost Hill was a strong enemy advanced redoubt, well wired

and with a somewhat sinister reputation, a previous attempt on it by the Highland Light Infantry having failed.

For this special raid, a composite company was formed, of a platoon from each company. The whole unit was placed under the command of Capt. Bagot-Chester, with Lieut. Irwin to assist him, and was sent back for a few days' practice on dummy trenches, near brigade headquarters. On the night of 31st October/1st November, after efficient wire cutting by our artillery, the raid on Outpost Hill took place. The operation was a brilliant success.

Filing through the position of the 1/4th Wilts, on the right of the 3/3rd trenches, the Gurkhas formed up in a small wadi in front of the Wilts' wire. The signal for the play to begin was a salvo from the heavy artillery on to Outpost Hill. This salvo landed between the would-be raiders and the Wilts' trenches ! Fortunately, no damage was done, and the rest of the proceedings went like clockwork. Hugging the "creeping barrage" put down by our artillery, the company got through the opposing wire and into the enemy's trenches, almost before the occupants were aware of their presence.

The whole programme was carried out to the letter, many enemy were killed, some by bayonet and kukri in the trenches, but more by bombs thrown into the dug-outs in which they had taken refuge.

Eighteen Turkish prisoners were brought back to the 3/3rd lines, as well as a Lewis gun previously lost by the Highland Light Infantry.

For this brilliant little affair the following "immediate rewards" were subsequently given :

Capt. Bagot-Chester	-	-	-	-	M.C.
Lieut. Irwin	-	-	-	-	M.C.
Subadar Jamansing Rai	-	-	-	-	I.O.M.
No. 1985 Havildar Kharke Pun	-	-	-	-	Bar to I.D.S.M.
No. 3861 Naick Deodas	-	-	-	-	I.D.S.M.
No. 3930 Lance Naick Jitman Sahi	-	-	-	-	I.D.S.M.
No. 2479 Rifleman Nare Chettri	-	-	-	-	I.D.S.M.

The moral effect of this success on the Gurkhas was very marked. Previously, all that had been seen or heard of the enemy was his artillery fire, which had caused a few casualties, without any opportunity of retaliation as a battalion. There had been no actual clashing of patrols. The only opportunity for a scrap had occurred some time before, when, possibly owing to no British officer being out with the party, the chance had not been taken.

The good look the men had at the prisoners brought in enabled the Gurkhas to realise that in physique, arms and equipment there was no question as to where the superiority lay.

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Altogether the success could not have come at a more opportune moment, *i.e.* immediately before the big advance.

Preparations for the great advance were now approaching completion. There was to be no transport for extras, so all surplus stores and kit were collected and sent back to a dump at brigade headquarters. The Gurkhas just had what they carried, and the British officers the same, plus a greatcoat and anything else they could get on to their chargers. All ranks were in Indian khaki drill.

During the night of 1st/2nd November, the 52nd Division (on the left) attacked Umbrella Hill and took it, thus keeping up a strong pressure on the Gaza Defences.

On the night of the 6th/7th the 233rd Brigade attacked and took Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill. This attack was carried out by the 1/4th Wilts Regt. and 1/5 Somerset Regt. with little loss, and was completely successful.

A large patrol of the 3/3rd followed the battalion headquarters of the 1/4th Wilts to Outpost Hill, from which place it was to proceed north-west to clear up the situation on the Plantation and the Maze, *i.e.* to discover whether the Turks there had retired or not.

This patrol consisted of eighty men, selected from A Company, under the command of Major H. D. Shaw.

Immediately the headquarters of the 1/4th Wilts reached Outpost Hill the patrol reported to Lieut.-Col. A. Armstrong, the C.O., and asked permission to proceed. A good instance of the strong "camaraderie" between the units of the brigade occurred here. Col. Armstrong said to Shaw: "I don't like your job, but remember, if I hear you are in trouble down there, orders or no orders, Generals or no Generals, I'll have a company of Wilts lads down to your help at once."

After clearing the Outpost Hill wire, the patrol got into attack formation and proceeded by compass bearing towards the Plantation trenches.

The night was very dark and became absolutely pitch black among the small trees of the plantation. Scouting was impossible under these conditions; moreover, it would have taken too long. The only method of carrying out orders was to proceed in attack formation until the trenches were struck and on arrival to assault at once.

This was done to three successive trench systems only to find them all empty.

Nerves were in a high state of tension at the start, as is always the case in an attack and never so much so as at night. But assaults into empty space soon tickled every one's sense of the ridiculous. By the time the third lot of deserted trenches were "assaulted" the Gurkhas,

as usual, at once expressed the humour of the situation. The whole patrol entered the trenches with a laugh.

Reports were sent back reporting progress from each trench, but, owing partly to the black darkness and partly to the fact that the Wilts' headquarters was now on the move, these reports never reached Col. Armstrong.

As the furthest objective was now reached, the patrol consolidated its position to await dawn.

At dawn, the patrol became a detachment, D Company under Capt. Bagot-Chester having arrived in support.

At about 9 a.m. this detachment received orders to effect a junction with its battalion, south of Ali el Muntar Hill, and moved off accordingly. On arrival at the rendezvous, it was found that the Turks were putting a good many shells on to the Ali el Muntar-Middlesex Hill range from the east, so the detachment took cover in the old Turkish trenches to await arrival of the battalion.

As a matter of fact, owing to above-mentioned shelling, the orders to the two support battalions (2/4th Hants and 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles) had been changed. Instead of passing over the range of hills, they were diverted to the west, to pass through the Plantation and outskirts of Gaza.

Information as to this change, though sent out, never reached the detachment.

The 3/3rd continued its march until it reached its new objective north-east of Gaza (south-west of Fryer Hill) where it halted. It was, therefore, the first unit of the 75th Division actually to pass through part of Gaza town.

Soon after noon, seeing movements of troops northwards, through the Plantation below, and unable to regain touch with the battalion; also hearing heavy firing north of Ali el Muntar, Major Shaw became convinced that some orders must have gone wrong. His first endeavour, therefore, was to locate the battalion. D Company was sent towards the stream of troops in the Plantation, while the original patrol of eighty, skirting Ali el Muntar to its west, proceeded in the direction of the firing on Fryer Hill.

On the southern slope of this hill, battalion headquarters of the 1/5th Somersets and of the 1/4th Wilts were found. The men of these battalions, on top of Fryer Hill, were being heavily engaged by enemy rifle fire, so the patrol was placed at the disposal of the senior of these two battalion commanders.

Just as Col. Armstrong was wiring to brigade headquarters for sanction to make use of the patrol for an attack, the brigadier arrived in person. Very shortly the Turks showed signs of retiring, and the

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patrol was sent back to join the battalion bivouacked north-east of Gaza, where D Company had already arrived.

All battalions in the division were now ordered to reduce strength to 500 for the forward move, transport being very limited. The remainder of the men were to be left at Gaza for the present. In the case of the 3/3rd, Lieut. Irwin was left in charge of these men.

On 10th November, the 233rd Brigade marched to Berbera, twelve miles north of Gaza ; on the 11th, seven miles on to Gharbiyeh ; and on the 12th, four more to a position on a ridge a mile and a half south-west of two villages, Tel et Turmus and El Kustineh, held by the enemy. On all sides there were signs of the hasty retreat of the Turks, but nowhere was it possible to establish contact with the enemy.

On the left, the 232nd Brigade was evidently engaged, and firing in that direction continued till after dark.

The 3/3rd line of outposts was on the left of the brigade frontage. During the early part of the night, communication was established with the right unit of the 232nd Brigade.

After dark, orders were received for an attack by the 233rd Brigade the following morning.

The 1/5th Somersets and 1/4th Wilts, after taking Turmus and Kustineh, were to concentrate against Mesmiyeh.

The 2/4th Hampshires and the 3/3rd were to rendezvous south of Mesmiyeh and, pushing through, were to capture the ridge north-west of that village.

Soon after dawn, the villages of Turmus and Kustineh were occupied without opposition, but Mesmiyeh was stubbornly defended. It was not until 10 a.m. that the 3/3rd, lying behind Kustineh, received orders to proceed to an assembly position south-west of the village.

The Turkish gunners must have been watching Kustineh, for as soon as A Company started to debouch from the village they put down a heavy barrage of shrapnel and high explosive.

A Company shook out into artillery formation and lay down, while B Company followed suit. As soon as B Company was in position on the left of A, the two companies advanced 500 yards and dropped, while C and D Companies debouched from the village and got into position behind them.

The full battalion then advanced to the assembly position and lay down. The barrage continued during the whole manœuvre, which was conducted as steadily as on parade.

The men could not have been better in hand, and their behaviour in this their first experience as a battalion under fire was a revelation and a source of much satisfaction to the C.O. and all his officers.

Steel helmets had not been issued to the troops at this period of the campaign, but, as ever, the Turks' shrapnel burst much too high in the air to be really effective.

At the point of assembly the main barrage ceased, though a heavy battery, firing from a long distance away on the right flank, continued to send over salvoes of four at regular intervals throughout the long halt of about three hours in this position. A very small high velocity gun also continued to send over single shots, but, fortunately, owing to the 3/3rd open formation, these did little or no damage.

Meanwhile the orders to the Gurkhas were to lie low, but they could see from their position that the fight for Mesmiyeh was by no means yet over. The Wilts and Somersets had indeed got into the village, but a vast extent of cactus hedge on both flanks appeared to be still in the enemy's hands.

At 14.30 hours the 3/3rd received orders to push on to the village. The 2/4th Hants had been long due to come up into position on the right, but there was no sign of them.

Two companies of the 3/3rd were pushed through the village and took up positions on the north and north-east edges. One company, in reply to a call for assistance from the Somersets, went off to the latter's support in the cactus east of Mesmiyeh.

The enemy were now retiring, and after dark the battalion was concentrated just outside the northern edge of the village.

Owing to the open formations adopted, and to the great steadiness of all ranks, the casualties throughout the day were very light, two killed, thirty wounded. One mule had the nose cap of a shell embedded in its forehead, but continued to work for two days till he could be evacuated. Water was very scarce.

For three days the advance continued—at first northward and then, as regards the battalion, to the south-east, for on the 16th of November the Gurkhas found themselves at Kezazeh, on the right flank of the brigade line, where they remained the next two days.

Much trouble was experienced during the halt at Kezazeh in keeping open telephonic communication with brigade and division, owing to the villagers continually cutting the lines. Drastic action became necessary after futile warnings, and the incarceration of the headman in the 3/3rd quarter-guard had the desired effect immediately.

On the 17th of November the divisional commander paid the battalion a visit, and stated that a prolonged halt was probable near Kezazeh, but that the 3/3rd might have to make a short detour to the left of the brigade line.

On the 18th, orders were received to be prepared to move at a moment's notice, the division being for Jerusalem.

After nightfall, orders came to march at 04.30.

At 06.00 on the 19th the 233rd Brigade concentrated one mile east of Junction Station and marched behind the 232nd and 234th Brigades towards Latron.

Apparently strong resistance was not anticipated, and it was hoped that, while a brigade picqueted the hills on one side of the road, the remaining two brigades would reach Enab on 19th, whence they would diverge on 20th, one going east to Jerusalem, while the 233rd went north-east to Bireh. The third (picqueting) brigade would then concentrate at Enab.

Strict orders against looting in Jerusalem were received from G.H.Q., and it was stated that any unauthorised person, officer or man, found within six miles of the holy city would be liable to be shot. As it turned out, this was a strictly accurate statement of fact—the Turks doing the shooting.

The 233rd Brigade had a long halt of over five hours at Latron, and it was evident that the picqueting of the hills was being strongly opposed by the enemy.

At 14.30 the column moved forward from Latron, in artillery formation, and at dusk reached Rab el Wad, at the mouth of the pass, and pushed on into the defile.

Two miles farther on it came to a halt. Shortly afterwards orders were received to return to Wad, as the picqueting could not be completed owing to strong opposition.

The greatest confusion reigned in the pass in the dark and rain, the road being absolutely blocked with infantry, guns and transport.

The 3/3rd now received orders to repair the seven or eight breaches in the road (caused by the Turks having broken the culverts) before returning, so that it was not until 21.30 that the bivouac area was reached. It was a rain-soaked field, and a most uncomfortable night was passed, sitting or standing in the mud, every one soaked through, and without greatcoats or blankets.

At 07.30 on the 20th, the 233rd Brigade left Wad and entered the defile again in columns of route, the 3/3rd leading. Order of companies, B, A, C and D. At the top of the pass, about two and a half miles beyond Wad, the brigade halted. It was still in the defile, and just short of where the pass opened out into the hill tops between Saris and Enab.

From this point, artillery, machine gun and rifle fire could be plainly heard, making it quite evident that a battle was raging at the

exit of the defile. Then orders came for the battalion to double forward and act under orders of the G.O.C. 232nd Brigade.

The situation appeared to be that the 232nd Brigade was holding the exit from the pass, including Saris. The Turks had counter-attacked and retaken that village, but the unit which had been driven out was holding on to the ground just outside the village and was preparing to retake it. The 232nd Brigade having no further troops available, the 3/3rd had been lent to it.

A and B Companies were at once given objectives, in the shape of a hill and col occupied by the enemy, and started off at best pace. Both attacks were immediately successful, a few enemy holding on until bayoneted, and the rest streaming off along a prominent spur, which stretched away north-east. Unfortunately, the race for positions had been too hot for the Lewis gunners to keep up, otherwise the retiring Turks would have been much more severely punished.

Leaving two platoons of A Company on the col, under Lieut. H. G. Lock, to protect the right flank, Major Shaw joined B Company, under Capt. Russell, and decided to occupy the spur over which the Turks had retreated.

This spur was about 500 to 600 yards long. The Turks had disappeared over the far crest and it was obvious that they would endeavour to rally. Equally obviously, the seizing of this spur was a necessary preliminary to any attack on the main Enab position. So it was a case of the sooner the better, before the enemy resistance could be organised.

The advance was therefore pressed on at full speed over the open ground along the spur. The far end was reached just in time, as the foremost attackers arrived on the crest about ten or fifteen yards before a body of Turks which, rallied by a Turkish lieutenant-colonel, was returning to occupy the crest.

The "Charge" was at once ordered, and the Turks, surprised and outnumbered, threw down their rifles and put up their hands. The Gurkhas passed through them at "high port," without injuring a single Turk.

The men were rapidly thrown into positions along the spur in a line facing the Enab position, getting good cover amongst the rocks and boulders.

Heavy machine gun fire now burst out from the Turks on the Enab ridge. One gun was directed on the group of prisoners, who immediately begged permission to move under cover behind the spur. This was at once accorded. Soon afterwards these prisoners, numbering just over fifty, were sent back to battalion headquarters, under escort of one runner and two wounded men.

The conduct of Capt. C. Russell throughout the operation was remarkably fine, and this gallant officer's name would most certainly have been submitted for an "immediate award" had he not been killed in action two days later at Nebi Samwil.

In the meantime C Company (under Capt. N. Finglas, I.A.R.O.) had been directed to support A and B Companies' attack from the head of the pass.

Seeing that by this time their assault on the original hill and col had been successful, Capt. Finglas took his command half left to prolong that flank into the valley. This made a connection with the 2/3rd on the next hill.

By this time Saris had been finally captured by our troops. The defending Turks, being denied their original line of retirement by the advance of the 3/3rd, had retreated eastwards across the deep valley. The 232nd Brigadier now came up, to plan the assault on the Enab position itself.

For this purpose the Somersets and the Wilts of the 233rd Brigade were lent to the 232nd, and ordered forward to take up assault positions on the ridge. The Somersets arrived first and took up their place. While they were awaiting the arrival of the Wilts a heavy fog settled down over the Enab position.

The opportunity to get over the open valley under cover from view was too good to be lost, and Brigadier Huddleston ordered the Somersets to assault without waiting for the Wilts.

The enemy was keeping up a heavy machine gun and rifle fire on to the top of the ridge, but the Somersets leapt forward into it, on the command, and were soon lost to view in the fog.

It was now about 4 p.m., and the 2/3rd assaulted Enab simultaneously from a hill away on the left.

The enemy refused to await the bayonet and fled, the village and ridge of Enab being thus taken without a pause.

The 3/3rd now received orders to move on and bivouac in Enab. It soon got dark and there was some confusion, but eventually the brigade units straightened out into a line of bivouacs on a ridge south of the village and overlooking it. During the night the second line transport arrived, as well as Lieut. Irwin and the rest of the battalion, left behind at Gaza. The transport of the whole brigade was parked on and near the road on the ridge below the 3/3rd bivouac, adding greatly to the congestion on the ridge.

At about dawn on the 21st of November orders arrived for a further advance that day.

The 233rd brigade was to pass the starting point on the road above the village at 08.30.

At about 07.00 the enemy began to put over some shells. At first these fell in or about the village ; then over the bivouac ridge, near a portion of the road on which the transport was moving. Finally, about eight o'clock, the congestion must have been spotted, for the Turkish guns were switched on to it and started rapid fire.

The 233rd Brigade was just about to move towards the starting point and suffered severely, especially the Wilts. A portion of that battalion was drawn up in the courtyard of a stone building. Unfortunately, the whole ridge was stony and without cover. Although the Gurkha casualties were officially rendered as two killed and fourteen wounded, it was really impossible to calculate them, as the battalion went straight to the slaughter of Nebi Samwil on the following day. Of the British officers Major Shaw was severely wounded in the thigh, and Lieut. Irwin was wounded in the head and shoulder. Both were evacuated. Lieut.-Col. Channer was hit in the head, slightly, but was able to carry on ; Lieut. Storrs was also slightly wounded, but also carried on.

The shelling continued till about 08.30, by which time the brigade had got off the ridge on to the starting point and was evidently lost to view of the enemy guns. The move forward then commenced and was continued as far as Biddu, where a halt was made from midday to sundown, when the battalion received orders to support an attack by the 234th Brigade on Nebi Samwil.

On the 22nd at 01.10 the 3/3rd occupied the Nebi Samwil position unopposed. At 08.00 the enemy attacked under cover of heavy artillery fire, and further events occurred as follows :

THE DEFENCE OF NEBI SAMWIL

22nd Nov.

- 08.00. Enemy's attack endeavoured to envelop the left flank, where was B company on left of the mosque with C in support. The left flank was now prolonged by moving up the supporting company. This held the enemy in check for a time, but soon it was found necessary to reinforce the firing line with the whole of the reserve company.
- 10.00. As small-arm ammunition was running short and heavy casualties were steadily increasing from enemy's artillery, the line was withdrawn to a position nearer the mosque.
- 13.00. One section of No. 231 machine gun company under Lieut. Scott arrived and both machine guns were mounted in the upper storey of the mosque, whence they rendered invaluable assistance in checking the enemy's advance.
- 14.00. A company of the Hants was sent up to support the left flank.
All day from 08.00 the mosque had been heavily shelled and the greater part of the roof was blown in. The stones and débris

fell on the wounded Gurkhas, who were, in consequence, moved into the cellars with much difficulty.

15.30. Enemy artillery bombardment became more intensive, one machine gun being put out of action by a direct hit. The situation now became very critical and the complete envelopment of the position was only stayed by local counter-attacks and the timely arrival of further small-arm ammunition.

18.00. At about this hour a large body of Turks surrounded the mosque under cover of darkness. The remaining machine gun was moved to corner of courtyard, but enemy bombers working close up, under cover of the wall, compelled its retirement. The C.O. now ordered a counter-attack. With a small party left to protect the precincts of the mosque, the main body debouched from the back of the mosque and attacking the Turks on the flank drove them back with considerable losses at the point of the bayonet and kukri.

The enemy retired on to a lower terrace where they incurred further casualties from rocks hurled down on to them from above.

At this stage a company of the 8th Scottish Rifles arrived to the relief of the Gurkhas and, passing through the battalion, forced the Turks still farther down the hill.

According to previous orders, the 3/3rd then reformed behind the position and withdrew to a gully, 800 yards in rear, where it bivouacked for the night. Our casualties were :

Captain C. Russell, I.A.R.O.	} killed.
Sub. Jaman Sing Rai	
Jem. Jabar Bahadur Gurung	
Lieut.-Col. G. K. Channer, slightly wounded, remained at duty.	
Jem. Man Sing Rana (died of wounds, 24th Nov., 1917).	
230 "Other ranks," casualties.	

Orders had been received twice during the day to hold on at all costs, and, despite heavy casualties, this was achieved.

Capt. C. Russell, who was killed at Nebi Samwil, leading one of the many counter-attacks necessary to maintain the position, was a fine example of the very best type of the Indian Army Reserve officer (I.A.R.O.). Headmaster of a college in India when war broke out, over age, and with every possible domestic tie to keep him at home, he refused to see anything but the great issue involved in the War. Getting over the barrier of age, he joined up and succeeded in getting sent to a fighting front. From the day of joining the 3/3rd he turned his talents to improving his military knowledge and to learning the language of the men. The battalion lost in him a good soldier and a very gallant gentleman.

This is a good opportunity of referring to the work of the Indian Army Reserve officers with the 3/3rd.

It would be insufficient to say that they did a full share of the work of officering the battalion. They did far more than that. It would be fairer to say that they, together with some very gallant boys from Sandhurst, Quetta and Wellington, fought the unit from start to finish.

From Nebi Samwil (22nd of November, 1917) to the day when the battalion was disbanded in 1920, there were never more than two "pre-war" regular officers with the 3/3rd; and for considerable periods there was only one.

Handicapped as these I.A.R. officers were in most cases, by lack of knowledge of the Gurkha language and an absence of professional grounding in military lore, they readily adapted themselves to existing conditions. Indeed, it was these Indian Army Reserve and the very young officers, constantly changing through casualties, who brought the battalion with such credit through the fighting of 1917 and 1918 in Palestine, and in 1919 through the difficult and exasperating duties connected with the riots in Egypt.

These are the words of Col. H. M. D. Shaw, written in 1927, and contained in a narrative of the record of the third battalion, from which the Editor has compiled this portion of the regimental history. Indeed, by far the greater part is exactly as indited by the above-mentioned officer. Nor was his task an easy one, for the 3/3rd records were destroyed by a fire in Lansdowne soon after the disbandment of the unit. Moreover, Col. Shaw, when asked to undertake this narrative, was a more than busy staff officer, with no opportunity for writing, except at night.

Col. Shaw commanded the 3/3rd from the 30th of December, 1917—when Lieut.-Col. G. K. Channer was evacuated sick—until the disbandment of the unit in 1920. It is exactly like his retiring nature and generous spirit to give the entire credit to his officers. But it is only fitting to place on record the facts regarding his own share in the brilliant achievements and undoubted efficiency of this young battalion.

In a letter from India to the historian, dated the 15th of November, 1927, Major E. G. T. Tuite-Dalton of the second battalion—than whom, from his former position as second in command of the 3/3rd, there could be no better judge—writes as follows :

"Colonel Shaw's narrative is a brief statement of facts, ably represented, but, naturally, no mention is made of himself where it could be avoided. He rightly gives a great deal of credit to the I.A.R. officers who helped us to win through. But what I think should also be recorded—and it is what all the officers who served with the 3/3rd would most wish recorded—is that the guidance, help and unfailing patience with which

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Colonel Shaw led his battalion through its most difficult periods, was a great factor in the successes experienced. We all loved Colonel Shaw. For that reason, if for no other, we did our level best to please him.

The responsibility of a Commanding Officer in command of untrained, however gallant and willing, lads, is a strain, which must be experienced to be understood.

It means that the Commanding Officer has to be constantly and almost continuously moving round the various companies in the front line, encouraging, advising and directing operations, which theoretically should be carried out on the initiative of the company commanders themselves. At every turn he was appealed to for answers to problems which could only be solved by personal investigation. A good tactician, with a charm of manner, complete unselfishness and entire disregard of personal danger, he was at once a wonderful example and encouragement to those who had the good fortune to serve under him."

CHAPTER XXVII

THE THIRD BATTALION IN PALESTINE (*Continued*) AND IN EGYPT

THE battalion remained all the 23rd of November in the gully, where it had bivouacked the night before, awaiting orders. It was subjected to severe enfilade artillery fire, and, amongst others, Capt. Bagot-Chester was wounded. He remained at duty, however, until the 25th, when it was absolutely necessary he should be removed to the field ambulance.

Then followed many moves forward, with little fighting for the 3/3rd, until the 26th of March, 1918, when the unit was at Mughair Ahmed, having relieved the second battalion in the first line. But, before recording a further advance, it is necessary to give certain details about happenings to officers, etc., during this period.

<i>Evacuated to field ambulance, or left the battalion, etc.</i>		<i>Joined the battalion, etc.</i>	
1917		1917	
23rd Nov.	Capt. Seddon, I.M.S., sick.	27th and 28th Nov.	Cpts. F. Helm and E. Scott-Higgins (latter evacuated sick after a fortnight) and Lieut. K. H. Harrison, all I.A.R.O.
25th Nov.	Capt. Bagot-Chester.		
1st Dec.	Lieut. Mannock, danger- ously wounded when supporting, with his company, the 2/4th Hants, heavily engag- ed on the 1st of Dec. He had two bullets in his chest and never re- joined.	12th Dec.	Capt. Doraisamy, I.M.S., and left again on the 2nd March, 1918.
		17th Dec.	A draft of five G.O.s and 149 other ranks, from Suez Depot.
23rd Dec.	Subadar-Major Hari Sing Burathoki retired and succeeded by Subadar Kharak Sing Gurung.	25th Dec.	On Xmas day 1917 the Commander-in-Chief conferred the Disting- uished Service order on Lieut.-Col. G. K. Channer and his ad-

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*Evacuated to field ambulance,
or left the battalion, etc.*

Joined the battalion, etc.

1917
30th Dec. Lieut.-Col. Channersick
and never rejoined.
The command taken
over by Major H. M.
D. Shaw.

1917
jutant Lieut. G. N.
Storrs, in recognition
of good work done by
the battalion during
the advance from Gaza
and Nebi Samwil.

29th Dec. Major Shaw rejoined
from field ambulance.

31st Dec. Capt. R. L. V. Fleming
and Lieut. F. Wal-
shaw, I.A.R.O., from
the 101st Bombay
Grenadiers, but left
again on the 16th Feb.
1918.

1918
1st Jan. Capt. Storrs, sick. Lieut.
Harrison appointed
adjutant.

1918
9th Jan. Lieut. G. W. Thomas.
4th G.R. Lieut. W.
F. Patton, 1st G.R.

11th Jan. Capt. Finglas, leave to
India.

25th Jan. Lieut. Irwin rejoined.
Lieuts. C. J. Knowles
and K. N. Fraser,
I.A.R.O.

26th and 28th Jan. Capt. Bagot-Chester and
Lieut. Lock rejoined.

1st Mar. Capt. Seddon, I.M.S.,
rejoined.

13th Mar. The City of London
Yeomanry arrived in
Abud, where was then
the headquarters of
the 3/3rd.

Orders for a further advance on the divisional front with the 233rd Brigade on the left and the 234th on the right were received on the 26th of March.

The battalion objectives were Hills 1257 and 1263. On the left of the 3/3rd the 1/4th Wilts was to occupy the Deir Simaan Ridge. On the right of the battalion the 234th Brigade was to occupy El

Kefr village and the spur to its north-east, the whole of the new divisional front running on a line roughly east and west.

The 3/3rd, under the command of Bagot-Chester (in the absence of Shaw, who was away and not due back till the following day), advanced across the Wadi Arak after dark on the 27th of March and occupied the two hills with very slight opposition. As soon as the alarm was given, however, the enemy started to shell both hills, and this was kept up during consolidation. The whole surface of the tops of these hills was found to be almost solid rock. The only cover that could be prepared was a mixture of digging into clefts and sangaring with stones, as on the Indian frontier, with the great difference that, in view of the enemy's artillery, concealment was imperative from daylight observation.

B Company discovered a deep cleft, a short distance down the slope of Hill 1263, running along the whole northern face and bending round the north-east face. This helped them. D Company were not badly off on Hill 1257, but the positions of C and A Companies were very bad. It was not possible to improvise any cover whatever on the flat hill top where they were. Consequently they were obliged to crowd on to the south edge of the plateau and amongst the rocks which extended a short way down the slope.

Battalion headquarters was placed a short way up from the wadi bed.

Spasmodic shelling was kept up by the enemy during the time consolidation was proceeding.

At about 10-00 hours Major Bagot-Chester and Lieut. Armitage were both severely wounded by shell fire on Hill 1263 while supervising the consolidation of B Company. Several other casualties occurred amongst the Gurkha ranks. All were got back down the Wadi Arak to Wadi Ballut.

Major Bagot-Chester died during the night.

For hours D, C and A Companies had felt nervous as to what was happening on the battalion's right, as the fighting in the neighbourhood of El Kefr did not appear to progress. However, matters in that direction had quietened down as the night passed. No warning messages came through, so the situation as revealed at daylight was a very unpleasant surprise.

Hill 1309 was occupied by the 232nd Brigade, but the whole of the village in front was in the enemy's hands and machine guns in the northern portion of the village soon opened fire on to the positions on Hill 1257. These guns took all three companies in reverse, at a range varying from 1500 yards in the case of

D Company to 1000 yards in the case of A. All the supporting elements of these companies were immediately forced into cover of the boulders which fringed the crest, cooking was suspended and communication with the rear was completely cut off during daylight.

Several casualties occurred and A Company Commander, Capt. Lock, was severely wounded. Command of the company devolved upon Lieut. Patton.

A fortunate fold of the ground just concealed battalion headquarters from enemy observation in Kefr, but any movement five yards up the hillside from headquarters immediately drew fire at a range of about 1300 yards.

Such was the situation found by Col. Shaw when he returned to battalion headquarters about midday on the 28th of March. The whole battalion was in the front line and pinned to the ground, no movement being possible without drawing fire from the front, or from Kefr. The Adjutant, who had been left to establish battalion headquarters and communications during the night had, naturally, only a vague idea as to the actual positions of companies. Both the acting C.O. and his intelligence officer, who had located the companies, had been evacuated before dawn. All four companies were in telephonic communication with battalion headquarters, but the maps issued were so faulty that company commanders could only locate their positions very vaguely.

Col. Shaw, after arranging with the brigade commander that a company of the 1/4th Wilts would be sent to the nullah immediately east of Hill 1278 to come under his orders as a reserve, decided on a visit of inspection. The left unit (D) was reached about 16.30 hours, then A, after dusk and finally B on Hill 1263. As a result, the following redistribution was ordered and carried out before dawn :

A Company (less one platoon left at the disposal of C Company commander) was withdrawn and located in support line, in the Wadi Emir, south by west of Hill 1263. C Company, plus one platoon of A, was distributed over the positions previously held by A and C Companies, avoiding several shell trap areas as discovered by the previous night's experience.

On the 29th at 09.00 hours, an enemy attack developed along the whole of the battalion front. This was accompanied by shell fire and was supported by machine gun enfilade fire from both flanks, that from Kefr being especially galling.

The attacks on the company fronts were held without much difficulty, but bodies of the enemy succeeded in penetrating into the ground between B and D, up the shallow boulder and bushcovered valley between these companies.

When the enemy was reinforced, B's position, entirely lacking depth, became precarious. A, with its three platoons, was ordered to drive out the Turks and take up a line linking up B and D. At 14.00 hours this was successfully accomplished, the enemy retiring at once.

The fighting seemed to be over, but at 16.00 hours firing recommenced on the right flank and a local enemy attack developed against D. This attack was repulsed, though a party of the enemy, outflanking the right of the position under cover of the Kefr machine guns, penetrated a considerable distance. A counter-attack, led in person by Capt. Helm, at once pushed the Turks back.

But it was now obvious that the position held by C Company on the right flank could not be maintained without heavy and constant losses. The ground to the north-east of this company was covered with scrub. It was not possible to conceal the location of the right flank positions from the observers in Kefr. Consequently every enemy attack was able to approach in the scrub to within bombing range, while the defenders were subjected to a devastating covering machine gun fire in flank and in reverse, from Kefr and a hill to the north-east of that village. It was not until this covering fire ceased, for fear of hitting the attackers in the scrub, that our men could rise up sufficiently to throw bombs.

Counter-attack, too, under these conditions, was quite impossible. The situation was explained to the brigade commander during the night of 29th/30th and permission was asked to withdraw the right flank to where D Company was located on Hill 1257, thus bringing this flank more into line with Hill 1309, the left portion of the 232nd Brigade.

After discussing the question with General Palin, the brigade commander begged the battalion to try to stick it out in its present position. He maintained that any surrender of the northern portion of the long 1257 Hill to the enemy would place the left flank of the 232nd Brigade on Hill 1309 in a similar predicament to that of the present right flank of the 3/3rd.

This settled the matter and the question of retiring its right flank was never again raised by the battalion.

During the night of 29th/30th, battalion headquarters joined the reserve company (1/4th Wilts) in the Wadi Emir.

On the 30th, Capt. E. J. C. Ashmore, M.C., lent from the second battalion, joined the 3/3rd and took over the duties of second in command.

The casualties for the four days (27th to 30th) amounted to about

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sixty Gurkhas in addition to the three British officers already mentioned.

That afternoon at 15.00 hours C Company was attacked again, the enemy employing both rifle fire and grenades. He was supported, as always, by his Kefr machine guns. Exactly the same thing happened the next day at the same hour. Both attacks were repulsed, but it was found necessary to reinforce this unit by another platoon from A Company to replace casualties.

From the 2nd of April to the 9th inclusive the whole position was persistently shelled, but attacks did not always develop.

On the 8th, Capt. Tuite-Dalton joined from the second battalion and took over the duties of second in command from Capt. Ashmore, who rejoined his unit the following day. The next night the Wilts Company returned to its own battalion.

Another forward move on the whole divisional front had been in preparation for some time. The initial advance had been timed to start at dawn on the 10th April.

On the 233rd Brigade front the 2/4th Hants, on the right, were to pass through the 3/3rd position and capture Subih Ridge. On the left the 1/5th Somersets were to take Rafat village and Arara Hill. As a preliminary measure, to allow the Hants a clear spring-off from the 3/3rd position, the latter unit was ordered to occupy a small feature about 250 yards in front of C Company known as Hill 6, at dawn.

After that the battalion was to sit tight until the Subih Ridge was taken. It was then to concentrate and rendezvous in the main Wadi (north of its existing position) as brigade reserve, and await orders.

In discussing the plans for the next day with Col. Shaw on the telephone that evening, the brigadier finished with the words, "Well, your battalion has had a rotten time of it these last ten days, but your troubles will be over at dawn to-morrow."

10th April. At dawn a platoon from D company occupied Hill 6 without opposition. The 2/4th Hants passed up the Wadi Emir to the attack a few minutes later, but the men came at once under heavy fire from concealed machine guns and the advance was brought to an immediate standstill.

The left of the attack, over Hill 1263, did not even reach the cleft in which the 3/3rd front line was located. The right of the attack, between Hills 1257 and 1263, got very little beyond A Company's first line.

At about 09.00 hours the brigadier, having heard of the state of affairs on his right, called on the 3/3rd for an effort to assist the advance of the Hants. He asked for an attack to be made on Hill

1227 (then known as the Pimple) from the company facing it (D Company).

Accordingly, at about 09.30 hours, 2nd Lieut. Thomas, commanding D Company since Major Bagot-Chester's death, attacked with his remaining three platoons. The attack was swept away by machine gun and rifle fire and the three platoons were practically annihilated. A few wounded men only crawled back that night after dark. 2nd Lieut. Thomas was himself killed in this very gallant but hopeless effort.

About noon the forward platoon of D Company on Hill 6 was shelled by our own corps' heavy artillery, who had not been informed that this feature was in our occupation. It was only after the C.O. had been put into direct telephonic communication with the corps' "heavies" that we were able to stop this firing. Meanwhile the unfortunate platoon had suffered heavily.

At 12.30 hours the battalion was called on to send one company as a reinforcement to the 1/5th Somersets, who had taken Rafat village and Rafat Ridge (1089) to the north-east of the village, but had been held up in front of Arara. A composite company had to be formed from such units as could be withdrawn in daylight. B Company could not move, except under cover of darkness. The two platoons of A at the head of the valley were similarly immobile. D Company had ceased to exist. There only remained C Company, with the two platoons of A, on the extreme right.

The advance of the 232nd Brigade had relieved the tension on the right flank. This made the last-named units available. At 13.30 hours C Company (less two platoons), with the two platoons of A, set off on their mission. Major Tuite-Dalton was in command, and was accompanied by Capt. Helm.

After moving round the south of Deir Simaan ridge, this composite company joined the Somersets, and Major Dalton received orders to attack the Pimple (Hill 1227) from the direction of the Rafat Ridge and report to O.C. Somersets the distribution of our own and the enemy's troops. At the same time the O.C. pointed out that the Arara and Subih ridges were still held by the enemy, while nests of machine guns covered the whole of the Wadi Ikba and its slopes from those ridges as well as from the Pimple.

This was rather a tall order, as there was no cover whatever in the wadi, and the attack would mean an advance of one and a half miles in daylight across the front of an enemy in position.

On Major Dalton representing these facts to the brigade the order was cancelled.

At dusk the remaining two platoons of C company were

moved from their position in 1270 to reinforce Hill 6, which the brigadier required to be held at all costs during the night. Kefr, being now in the hands of the 232nd Brigade, made this change possible.

At 21.00 hours the brigadier called on the battalion for still another effort, and that was to attack the Pimple during the night, as this hill had held up the whole line of attack during the day. He said, further, that he was unable to return the detached company under Major Dalton for this venture, as it had already received orders to advance up the Wadi Ikba by night and maintain touch between the Somersets and the 3/3rd. The C.O. of the latter was not to accompany the attack, which would be launched at 01.00 hours. Under its cover the 2/4th Hants would reform and be prepared to continue their advance on to Subih Ridge at dawn.

In all, six platoons were available, by withdrawing the whole of B from Hill 1263. This unit and A (less two platoons) were collected in the valley between Hills 1257 and 1263, under Capt. Irwin and Lieuts. Fraser and Patton.

At 01.00 hours the little force advanced to the attack, which failed. Two further attempts were made. Both failed. The enemy was in force, was prepared, and was well dug in and wired. Lieut. Patton was last seen on the defenders' wire. Subadar-Major Kharak Sing and Jemadar Manbahadar Gurung—both of A Company—were killed.

One hour before daylight, the platoons were ordered to withdraw and the remnants of the battalion were rapidly redistributed for defence by day. Major Dalton's company had done all it could and was retired at dawn under cover of Rafat Ridge.

The 10th of April, 1918, is never likely to be forgotten by those of the 3/3rd concerned. The whole day's fighting was a very severe test of discipline and endurance, from which the battalion emerged with the greatest credit.

It occurred at the end of an exhaustive period of nearly a fortnight's fighting—that is, from the 27th March to the 9th of April. During all this time the 3/3rd had been subjected to constant attacks and had to remain continually on the alert. The strain, as regards the right flank, had been especially severe, taken in reverse, as it was, by the enemy machine guns at Kefr.

The casualties on the 10th were approximately :

Killed and missing :	2 British officers.
	3 Gurkha officers.
	47 Gurkha "other ranks."
Wounded (sufficiently to be evacuated) :	
	2 Gurkha officers.
	93 Gurkha "other ranks."

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Two British officers, suffering from shell shock and the intense strain of the fortnight, on top of former wounds, had to be evacuated to field ambulance a few days later.

The total casualties for the whole period, 27th of March to 10th of April inclusive, were approximately :

Killed and missing : 3 British officers.
 3 Gurkha officers.
 85 Gurkha " other ranks.
Evacuated to field ambulance, wounded :
 4 British officers.
 4 Gurkha officers.
 165 Gurkha " other ranks."

All slightly wounded men were kept for treatment by Capt. Seddon and remained with their companies or at battalion headquarters. This was necessary, as long as the fighting continued, owing to the urgency of the position of affairs. These men were not counted as casualties.

Lieut. Patton, who was returned as " missing, believed killed," was known a few days later to have been found on the enemy's wire at dawn and taken prisoner. He was eventually sent to Constantinople and released at the end of the war.

In the death of Capt. (Acting Major) W. G. Bagot-Chester the battalion, and the regiment, lost an officer impossible to replace. It is difficult to express on paper what his presence meant to the battalion. He was certainly one of the very best regimental officers in the Indian Army. Severely wounded with the second battalion in France, and wounded again with the 3/3rd at Nebi Samwil, his one idea was to get back to the battalion and his beloved D Company. The Gurkha ranks thought there was no one like him. As Col. Shaw says : " One loves to feel that his subaltern, and the bulk of his company who followed him across the border line so soon afterwards, found him awaiting them with his ever cheery smile, and, as always, a lien on the best bivouac site for his own unit."

2nd Lieut. G. W. Thomas had only been with the 3/3rd for three months. During this time he had impressed every one with his quiet, serious nature and his devotion to duty. He had the makings in him of a first class soldier. He went to his death heroically and steadfastly, without any fuss. It seemed as if he knew that his attack was in the nature of a forlorn hope, the last resource of the brigadier. All the time, his one thought was for his Gurkhas, before he took them over the top.

In recognition of the work done by the 3/3rd in this area during those fourteen days of fighting, Hill 1227 was officially named

"Gurkha Hill," and Hill 1263, on which battalion headquarters had been situated, was called "Shaw Hill," a recognition for the C.O. The appearance of these names on the revised editions of maps was a source of great satisfaction to the 3/3rd.

Immediate awards of the M.C. were given to Capts. Helm and Fraser, both I.A.R.O. Col. Shaw was awarded the D.S.O. in the next half-yearly honours list. Capt. A. Seddon, I.M.S., was mentioned in dispatches.

On the 11th the whole advance was abandoned. Such gains as had been made were consolidated, but, as regards the 233rd Brigade, the only ground gained was Rafat village and ridge by the 1/5th Somersets on the left. Both these were at first consolidated, but it was found that the holding of the ridge would entail an undue loss in casualties, owing to its position and approaches being dominated by Arara Hill. In consequence, the ridge was evacuated after a few days, but the village was strengthened, because it was the only foothold obtained on the north side of the big nullah. Hence the decision to hold it at all costs, and this is mentioned here, as the 3/3rd was affected by it a few weeks later.

It should be mentioned that the capture of El Kefr village and of the spur to its north-east by the 232nd Brigade completely altered the whole state of affairs as regards the 3/3rd's position. It was now possible to locate the bulk of the unit on the reverse slopes, holding the forward positions lightly by day, as observation posts only, and sufficiently strongly by night to guard against surprise.

There were now a lot of casualties of both sides lying in "No Man's Land," in front of the 3/3rd centre and right. With permission of the corps commander, Col. Shaw wrote a non-committal note to the Turks opposite suggesting a mutual burying of corpses. The note ran somewhat as follows :

"It will probably be of mutual benefit to both sides if we arrange to bury our dead under a flag of truce."

An abortive attempt was made to get this note across, under a white flag, on the evening of the 11th, but no answering signal was made by the Turks.

On the 12th, however, another attempt was made with success. The Turks waved a flag in response, accepted the note, and sent a message to the effect that an answer would be given the following day, if sent for at the same hour. On the 13th, accordingly, out went two men again and received a written reply. This stated that a burial party, under a Red Cross flag, would be respected, and made conditions of time, etc. : "That no men of either side were to cross

the other's wire, and that the English papers were not to state that the Turks had asked for a truce, as was done in Gallipoli."

On the afternoon of the 14th, Capt. Seddon, I.M.S., took out a burial party and buried a number of our dead, amongst others Lieut. Thomas. He also brought back a verbal message from the Turks that Lieut. Patton was captured and was "quite all right."

Subsequently this was proved to be correct by a letter received by the commanding officer from Lieut. Patton in Constantinople. He explained how he had found himself on the enemy's wire alone, all the men near him having been shot, that in the dark he lost his bearings, and dawn found him again on the enemy's wire, whence escape was quite impossible. He had been taken in and well treated.

The action of the Turks opposite to the battalion was perfectly fair and correct throughout this little "flag of truce" episode. Their act in giving information regarding Lieut. Patton was generous.

On the 13th of April Lieut. Black, I.A.R.O., and Lieut. MacLeod, 1/1st K.G.O. Gurkha Rifles, joined the 3/3rd.

On the 15th Lieut. G. J. Knowles, I.A.R.O., and the following day Capt. Irwin, were evacuated sick. As before referred to, these casualties were the direct result of overstrain, from continuous fighting since the 27th of March. Both these officers had been previously wounded in the war—Knowles in the spine, severely, in Gallipoli; in addition, Irwin had been torpedoed in the Mediterranean. They had been in the front line continuously throughout the whole time, but both refused to leave until the fighting was over, and the arrival of Lieuts. MacLeod and Black enabled them to be relieved.

On the 15th of April the battalion was relieved by the 1/4th Wilts and moved into bivouac a thousand yards lower down the Wadi Emir.

The next day a very welcome reinforcement arrived in the shape of a full company of the 1/9th Gurkha Rifles under Capt. R. W. Russell and Lieut. G. E. R. Hartigan, which had arrived in the divisional area as reinforcements for the Gurkha battalions. In view of the 3/3rd recent heavy casualties this company was posted to it intact. Its strength was two British officers, four Gurkha officers, 240 Gurkha "other ranks" and seven followers. The battalion absorbed it as a unit and, to avoid confusion, it was christened E Company. The remnants of the old D Company were transferred to A, B, and C.

This was a wonderful stroke of luck for the battalion. By the arrival of this fine company, together with details of reinforcements of sick and wounded men returned from field ambulance, the 3/3rd

at once became over one thousand strong and a finer fighting machine than it had ever been. Such a reinforcement of 240 trained men, fully organised as a company, was an unheard of piece of good fortune in those later days of the war.

On the 17th of April the 3/3rd moved into bivouac behind the Wadi Ballut and next day began to construct a second line of defence, working by night. But this was only for a week, as on the 25th the battalion, relieving the 1/4th Wilts, returned to the Shaw Hill position—but not under the old conditions, for, except for some desultory shelling, there was nothing doing.

As a matter of fact, at this period, affairs in Palestine were stagnant. Our own army was busy with its reorganisation, consequent on the dispatch of British troops to the Western front and their replacement by Indian Army units. Three British divisions, the 52nd, 54th and 74th, left Palestine *en bloc*, and were replaced by the 3rd and 7th Indian divisions from Mesopotamia. The remaining four divisions, viz. the 10th, 53rd, 60th and 75th, were reorganised so as to give one British battalion and three Indian infantry battalions to each brigade. In the 75th Division there was already one Indian battalion in each brigade, and the 233rd now retained the 1/5th Somersets and received the 29th Punjabis and the 2/154th Indian Infantry Regiment in place of the 1/4th Wilts (transferred to the 232nd Brigade) and the 2/4th Hants, ordered to the Western front.

The Turks, too, during this period, strange to relate, seemed quite content to live and let live, so that the months of May and June 1918 on the 75th Divisional front were comparatively uneventful.

During May Lieut. J. Clark, R. Kessane and A. C. Sheehan, all I.A.R.O., joined the 3/3rd. On the 23rd two platoons, of a total strength of one hundred and one Gurkhas, under the command of Lieut. Kessane with Subadar Parme Thapa and Jemadar Surbir Thapa, left the battalion for the 4/11th Gurkhas. This new unit was then being raised by Temp. Lieut.-Col. W. L. Dundas of the second battalion, from drafts furnished by all Gurkha units in Palestine. The men of the 3/3rd two platoons were mainly the remnants of the old "D" Company, including its casualties who had rejoined from hospital since the early April fighting.

After a few unimportant changes of location, between the 25th of May and the 18th of June, the 3/3rd relieved its second battalion in the Rafat area on the latter date. Mention has already been made in this chapter of the fact that, during the otherwise abortive actions of the 10th of April, the 1/5th Somersets captured the Rafat village and ridge; that the latter was abandoned a few days later on account of its domination by the Arara Hill, still in possession of the

enemy ; that, as regards the village itself—although in the same category of being threatened by Arara—the decision was that it should be held, in spite of its hopeless position, and considerably strengthened. This resolve was doubtless taken because it happened to be the only footing gained north of the Ikba Wadi along the whole front of the 233rd Brigade.

In Chapter XXIV Col. Eastmead had given his views on this matter, recording not only the part taken by the second battalion in the consolidation of the post in May and June, but also the eulogy bestowed by the 232nd brigadier on the manner in which the work was carried out. He also refers to the affair of the 13th of July, when Rafat was so vigorously assaulted by the enemy, and mentions the misapprehension of the 75th Division, in the first instance, regarding the magnitude of this attack.

The isolation of the position, as well as the fact of its being so dominated by the high hill Arara, less than a mile to the north-east, invited a counter-stroke by the enemy. This was fully recognised by the higher authorities, and every effort was made to put the area into a thorough state of defence. This area was confined to a triangle of hill-side, at the apex of which was the deserted village of Rafat, while the base ran along the Wadi Ikba for a length of about 1,500 yards.

Sandbags and other stores were lavishly supplied. The garrison was changed every fortnight. Two light trench mortars with British personnel were allotted to the post and placed in the village. All units in their turn worked hard at improving the defences. Communications from the area back to brigade were perfected and included two separate telephone cables, a field wireless set, visual signalling (helio and lamp) ; finally, two carrier pigeons were released daily to the divisional loft from the battalion headquarters.

The weakness of the position lay in the fact that besides being under direct observation from Arara, the rocky nature of the soil made digging almost impossible. All the defences (including those in the battalion headquarters and reserve area) on the southern slopes of the hill must therefore have been accurately known to the enemy from direct and air reconnaissance. Another weakness was that the ground immediately north of the village was terraced, thus affording good cover for the assembly of an attacking infantry to within 100 yards of the perimeter.

Such was the position at Rafat when taken over by the 3/3rd on the 18th of June.

After a preliminary visit to the area, the C.O. had a consultation with the brigadier. As a result of this, and on account of the unusual strength of the battalion (1050), an important change was made in

the disposition of the garrison. Recognising that, on account of the conditions already explained, the area formed a shell trap, it was decided to hold the defences with three companies only, locating the fourth company on the south-west slopes of Deir Simaan Ridge in rear.

On the 25th of June the battalion was informed that, owing to the vast changes taking place throughout the division, it could not be relieved for another ten days. On the 8th of July further orders were received that it was still inconvenient to replace the 3/3rd with another unit.

Meanwhile, during this period, there were a few changes amongst the officers : Capts. Seddon, I.M.S., and Helm were evacuated to field ambulance. Major Dalton rejoined and resumed command of A Company, after three weeks' absence with bacillus dysentery. Lieut. H. Davis joined the battalion for duty. Temporary medical charge of the battalion was taken over by Capt. I. L. Clark, R.A.M.C.

On the 13th of July the Rafat position was heavily bombarded and attacked. During the morning there was intermittent shelling from guns, ranging in calibre from 5.9 to field artillery. There were a few casualties, but no great damage was done. In view of after-events this was evidently ranging fire from the artillery of the Turkish Corps to our front as well as that of the " heavies " of the corps in the next sector towards the coast. A sharp look-out was kept, but no signs of any infantry attack developing were seen.

At 14.00 hours enemy artillery activity ceased and all was quiet for a time. At 17.15 an intense bombardment was opened chiefly on to the village and the battalion headquarters and reserve company area and was maintained without cessation until 18.20. It was by far the most severe battering with shell that the battalion had ever experienced—even exceeding, according to Major Dalton, any gruelling the second battalion had been subjected to in France. Seen from the main ridge to the south, the whole area remained a pillar of dust and smoke throughout the period. Artillery officers, watching from the rear, estimated that anything between 4000 and 6000 shells must have fallen within the defences during the bombardment. To the defenders, sitting huddled in their dug-outs, the number of shells seemed to approximate millions.

The wireless mast was hit very early, and both pigeons were killed in their dug-out. Visual signalling was out of the question owing to dust and smoke. Telephone wires were cut at once, but, by dint of most intrepid repair work carried out by the signallers, one of the brigade cables was maintained in working order throughout. The behaviour of the battalion and company runners was beyond praise

in every way, for they kept up internal communication the whole time, all company telephone wires having been cut beyond repair.

About 18.15 the bombardment was lifted from the village to the battalion headquarters and reserve company area. A few minutes later, sentries in look-out posts on the fringe of the village reported enemy infantry advancing from the north-west, shortly afterwards from the north-east, and finally up a ravine a little west of north.

Although on receipt of this information the bombardment was still in full swing, orders were at once issued to man the defences. It was at this sudden juncture that Subadar Nain Sing on the right of A Company and Jemadar Bhagatbir Thapa on the left, together with the men of their platoons, behaved so splendidly.

Most worthily did they uphold the highest traditions of the regiment during the war. Without the slightest hesitation, and carrying their Lewis guns, bombs and ammunition, these two Gurkha officers and their men dashed forward to the outer defences and soon repulsed the advancing infantry with a steady, relentless fire.

About 18.30 the artillery bombardment ceased, and Col. Shaw, having received news of the situation by runner, hurried up with a supporting company. He found the situation well in hand, Major Dalton quite confident, and the Gurkhas thoroughly enjoying the pastime of firing down from the defences on to the advancing Turks.

It soon got dark. The enemy made spasmodic but faint-hearted efforts to continue the attack until 21.00 hours, when some ineffectual attempts at bombing closed the offensive. Movement and conversation on the part of the Turks could be heard until 23.00 hours as they removed their casualties. Meanwhile the Deir Simaan Company had been brought up, the killed and wounded evacuated, and the defence reorganised.

Subadar Nain Sing and Jemadar Bhagatbir Thapa's names were put forward for "immediate awards," but the application was rejected. The reason is probably to be found in the misapprehension formed by the division, at first (as already mentioned), regarding the importance of the engagement. The divisional intelligence summary, published a day or two after the action, merely recorded that a demonstration against Rafat was easily repulsed by our artillery and machine guns.

The British artillery was undoubtedly of assistance in repelling the Turks' offensive, especially the left barrage asked for, but the machine guns were all posted on the main positions on the ridge in rear and could hardly have touched the attacking infantry up the forward slopes to the Rafat defences.

It is possible that the absence of the divisional staff that day at the

Coastal Sector race meeting, as mentioned by Col. Eastmead in Chapter XXIV, may have affected the completions of the intelligence summary. At all events, the subsequent capture of the enemy attack orders (Appendix 5) for the 13th of July opened every one's eyes. They prove conclusively that not only was it a determined effort by a Turkish Corps to capture Rafat, but also that this carefully planned enterprise was given the assistance of all the guns of the neighbouring formations which could be brought to bear on the village.

The enemy's one chance of success was an immediate lodgment. This was defeated at its inception by the coolness and gallantry of the two Gurkha officers mentioned and their platoons.

The 3/3rd losses were fifty-two killed and wounded, all from shell fire. These numbers do not include those who were slightly wounded and not evacuated to the field ambulance.

After the Rafat attack on the 13th of July there are some moves of the battalion to record and some changes amongst the officers.

On the 21st of July Capt. Clark, R.A.M.C., handed over medical charge to Capt. J. K. Nariman, I.M.S. The next day Lieut. Black was evacuated to the field ambulance.

On 30th July the battalion was relieved at Rafat by the 58th Vaughan's Rifles, and took the place of the 1/123rd Rifles in the second line. Three days later Lieut. J. Kingston was attached for temporary duty as signalling officer.

On the 10th of August the battalion moved to Rentis, and next day to Deir Tureif.

Two days afterwards the experiment of attaching officers and non-commissioned officers of British infantry, for instructional purposes, was applied to the 3/3rd. In Chapter XXIV reference has been made, with remarks by Col. Eastmead, to a similar attachment of 2/5th Hants' instructors to the second battalion. The 3/3rd received Lieuts. V. F. Gaby, R. C. Chissell and J. H. Spencer, with fourteen British N.C.O.s, all from the 2/4th Dorsets, which was in process of being disbanded.

The battalion was very fortunate in obtaining an exceptionally good type of N.C.O., every one of whom worked well and willingly till his day of demobilisation came. As for the officers, they became enthusiastic 3rd Gurkhas, and one, Lieut. Gaby, actually accompanied the battalion back to India and remained with it until disbanded.

Another change of doctors took place on the 21st of August, Lieut. Young, R.A.M.C., taking over temporary medical charge vice Capt. Nariman. The next day the 3/3rd marched during the night from Deir Tureif to Rentis, and on the 27th moved to a bivouac area in the divisional reserve.

Lieut. R. Hall reported his arrival on the 30th, and the same day Capt. Seddon, I.M.S., rejoined once more, relieving Lieut. Young. But, two days later, Capt. Seddon left the battalion for No. 137 Indian Standing Hospital and was succeeded by Capt. Banerjee, I.M.S.

This was the last the 3/3rd was to see of Capt. Seddon in Palestine. It had been known for some time past that he was too senior, and too able a doctor, for the unit to hope to retain his medical services much longer.

Capt. Seddon had been with the 3/3rd throughout all its fighting from Gaza to April 1918, and it was his departure more than anything else that made all ranks realise that the fighting career of the battalion must indeed be nearly over. All officers will bear witness to his untiring care for them, and none more readily than Major Dalton, with whom Capt. Seddon sat up all one night, when the former was in his worst throes of bacillus dysentery. As for the Gurkhas, their one desire was to remain under his treatment in the front line and not be sent back to field ambulance.

A good doctor and of an imperturbable nature in every circumstance, the battalion had been very fortunate to secure his services as medical officer during all its times of stress.

On September the 1st Major Dalton was again evacuated to the field ambulance, and on the 4th the 3/3rd moved from divisional into brigade reserve, relieving the 2/154th Infantry.

The next day the unit took over from the 29th Punjabis in No. 3 Section, Right Sub-sector. Here it remained eight days, and on relief on the night of the 13th by the 26th Punjabis, marched back to Rentis.

Although the battalion knew it not, this was its first step in the big movements that were to concentrate an overwhelming force in the Coastal Sector for the final advance against the Turks. There had indeed been indications for some time past that great events in the near future might be expected, but the secret had been well kept and the regimental officer, at any rate, knew nothing for certain. Then the relief of the 3/3rd that very night by a battalion of the 10th Division clearly demonstrated that some very special enterprise was afoot.

On the 14th the battalion marched to Deir Tureif, near Beit Nebala, and the next day all senior officers of the division, including battalion commanders, were paraded to meet the Commander-in-Chief. At this conference Lord Allenby explained the situation and informed the 75th Division of its role in the coming advance.

Two days afterwards, starting at 20.00 hours, the 3/3rd marched

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north-west to Mulebbis, and on the 18th left there for its rendezvous. By special orders, every possible precaution for concealment during the day was taken.

Unfortunately the 233rd Brigade was in divisional reserve. Not that this damped the spirits of the 3/3rd. Experience, up to date, had taught all ranks that there should be plenty doing before the end came.

On arrival at its rendezvous the battalion rested for three hours. Zero hour was still an unknown quantity. This preliminary rendezvous was about a mile behind the front line.

The night was a perfect one, cool but not cold, with a fine moon which set about an hour before dawn. In the absolute silence that reigned it was difficult to realise such a big concentration was going on all round us, that in a short time an army would be in motion to attack.

There was no artillery preparation previous to zero hour.

At about 03.00 hours orders arrived fixing zero hour at 04.30 hours, and at 04.00 hours the battalion was got into its formation for the advance, all units in rear conforming.

It was very dark now, the moon having set.

At two minutes to zero hour the British artillery fire opened, and at zero hour the 3/3rd advanced in artillery formation. Turkish guns too were now in full blast, and it was not possible to hear anything but the artillery. At the same time, all knew that there was a big machine gun barrage helping the forward troops, and it was certain that the Turks' trenches must be ablaze with rifle and machine gun fire.

It was now dawn and getting lighter every moment, yet there was nothing to be distinguished ahead but dust and smoke.

Immediately in front could be seen the shells of a Turkish barrage falling exactly in the route of the 3/3rd, but just as E Company, the left leading unit, was about to enter it, the barrage ceased and the men walked on unharmed.

When the 3/3rd reached its first rendezvous, forward of the original front line trenches, and the next battalion of the brigade came up on its left, both these units witnessed a very stirring sight. This was the dash forward of the British field batteries going up in support of the front line.

Then wounded men passed back, reporting that the first system of the Turkish trenches had been completely smothered by our leading infantry, and had been taken with small loss. Enemy prisoners came along too, batch by batch, escorted by walking wounded.

After a long halt of over an hour orders came to advance, and every one thought the time had come, but it was not to be. The enemy had been overwhelmed, and the brigade advance became a long route march in two lines of companies, in column of route, ready to shake out quickly into looser artillery formation should necessity arise.

The battalion finally halted at Miskeh where, during the afternoon, the cavalry passed through to continue the good work.

On 31st October a telegram arrived to announce that an armistice had been concluded with Turkey.

The young bloods of the battalion arranged a striking pyrotechnical display that night with the aid of surplus Verey lights—to such effect, indeed, that the brigadier and his staff arrived in person to inquire whether hostilities had been resumed and, incidentally, to join in the revels.

The rest of the history of the 3/3rd can be told in a few words. Demobilisation commenced throughout the army. The battalion drifted back by easy stages towards Egypt, with a view to embarking for India when its turn came.

Kantara was reached on 5th January, 1919, and things looked well for an early return to India. An advanced party, indeed, under Tuite-Dalton, had already sailed. 18th March was given out as the date on which the battalion itself would leave Kantara for embarkation at Suez. Then, on the 17th, sinister rumours began to circulate as to the internal state of Egypt. The unit was warned that it might yet be diverted into the interior to help to suppress rebellion.

On the 18th, at an hour's notice, the battalion was entrained and moved at 16.00 hours towards Zagazig, with orders to drop platoon picquets at certain vital points along the railway. After dropping two of these platoon posts, the train was halted in open country as soon as it became dark, and picquets were posted round the train for the night.

Before dawn the rails some distance ahead were cleverly tampered with by the rebels, with the result that soon after it resumed its journey next morning at dawn, the train was partially derailed. Several men were injured, but fortunately no one was killed, as the engine was moving very slowly at the time. After considerable delay a relief train arrived, and the battalion, having been transhipped, proceeded on its way, posting platoons as far as Abu Akdar railway station and establishing battalion headquarters at Tel-el-Kebir.

The 3/3rd was responsible for the whole area between Ismailia and Zagazig. No mean task, for the district was thoroughly out of

hand when the battalion arrived. Several trains were derailed, and almost every one that steamed through the area was shot at from the crops bordering the line.

Extensive patrolling along the railway, night and day, checked the depredations to a large extent, but there could be little doubt about the inhabitants becoming emboldened by our passive action. In fact they soon laughed at the many threats and proclamations issued to them day by day.

On the evening of the 24th March, in broad daylight and within a few hundred yards of the post at Abu Akdar, Rifleman Bhim Sing Rana of the 3/3rd was murdered on his post, while doing sentry duty over a culvert.

At daybreak the following morning Col. Shaw conducted an inquiry on the spot. Having ascertained that the murderers belonged to the neighbouring village of Shabnath, he gave the headman orders to produce them at once, or his village would be burned to the ground. The omdah (headman) acknowledged that he knew the murderers and that they were in the village, but, after shilly-shallying for two hours, refused point blank to give any further assistance.

The village (which had meanwhile been cleared of all its inhabitants, who were herded outside, the men being separated from the women and children in case firing became necessary) was then set fire to and demolished in an orderly and systematic manner, the mosque alone being spared.

This drastic but necessary action had an immediate and magical effect on the whole area. No more trouble whatever was experienced and perfect order was maintained. When at the end of May the battalion left the district, internal peace having been restored throughout Egypt, it went away with the proud record of having re-established and maintained order in its area without having killed a single inhabitant.

There followed a long and, for the Gurkha ranks especially, a wearisome spell of garrison duty in Egypt. For some months the battalion was split up between Port Tewfik (Suez) and Port Said and then concentrated at Ismailia.

In December 1919 the battalion sailed from Suez for India, and on landing was located at Shahjehanpur. At that station disbandment was commenced in March 1920, and was completed in September, at Lansdowne.

Soon after the battalion arrived in Shahjehanpur, and before disbandment commenced, it was inspected by Brigadier-General C. N. Macmullen, commanding the Bareilly Brigade.

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As this was the last official function in which the 3/3rd took part, a copy of the inspection report is given below :

REVIEW REPORT ON THE 3/3RD GURKHA RIFLES, SERVING IN THE NORTHERN COMMAND, FOR 1919-20.

*Inspected by Brigadier-General C. N. Macmullen, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanding Bareilly Brigade.*

General Observations :

“ This unit is in process of disbandment and the men are on War leave. The battalion made a very great impression on me when I inspected it. The parade work was really good and was due to the fact that the unit is properly organised, from Section Commander to Commanding Officer. It was a treat to see so well organised a unit, with such good non-commissioned officers and Indian officers.

As it stands at present, I formed the opinion that it is probably in the first rank of Indian units on present form.

N.B.—The above is from my inspection of the unit immediately on its return from overseas in January.”

A list of honours, awards and “ mentions,” for all ranks of the 3/3rd, will be found in Appendix 6.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE FOURTH BATTALION

ON the 1st of October, 1916, there was raised at Rawalpindi by Major B. U. Nicolay of the 4th Gurkhas—then Assistant Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief—a battalion of Gurkhas, which was designated :

1st Reserve Battalion Gurkha Rifles.

It was one of the first extra units raised by the Government of India for the Indian Army during the Great War, and was composed of complete emergency companies from the following units :

2/2nd K.G.O. Gurkha Rifles.

1/3rd Q.A.O. Gurkha Rifles.

1/5th Gurkha Rifles F.F.

1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

The men from the first three battalions were mainly Magars and Gurungs, but a considerable number were Thakurs and Chetttries. In the 1/6th Company were some Rais and a few Limbus.

Each company consisted of 225 Gurkha ranks, and they became respectively A, B, C, and D Companies of the new battalion.

The following officers joined with them :

- | | |
|------------|---|
| A Company. | Major W. B. Bailey (appointed Right Wing Commander). |
| | 2nd Lieut. G. L. Field, I.A.R.O. (appointed Quartermaster). |
| B Company. | 2nd Lieut. W. A. M. Ferguson, I.A.R.O. |
| | 2nd Lieut. J. C. Kelly, I.A.R.O. |
| C Company. | 2nd Lieut. G. J. Knowles, I.A.R.O. (appointed Adjutant). |
| | 2nd Lieut. H. J. L. Phillips, I.A.R.O. |
| D Company. | Major D. R. H. Jackson (appointed Left Wing Commander). |
| | Medical Officer : Lieut. N. H. Vakil. |

Major Nicolay took over his new unit on the 3rd of October, the

date of the arrival of the 1/3rd Company from Kohat. On the following day the battalion was complete, and Subadar Kirparam Bisht, 1/3rd, and Jemadar Kumbsing Gurung were appointed officiating subadar-major and jemadar-adjutant, respectively. The former, however, only held his post a few days, as on the 9th he rejoined his unit and was succeeded by Subadar Kharaksing Rana, M.C., of A Company.

The battalion was encamped close to the Arsenal, and settled down at once to hard work and the effort of making a good whole out of four groups a little critical of each other. The Gurkha officers and N.C.O.s of A, C, and D Companies had seen service in France, Gallipoli and Egypt; the instructors sent with C and D were a particularly well trained selection. In fact, these two companies, as they stood, were ready to go overseas as reinforcements to their own units. B Company had the best material, in the ranks, and recalled to one's mind a pre-war company of Central Nepal Magars and Gurungs.

The minimum length of service of the men was one year. There were no recruits. Each company had in a marked degree the *esprit* of its parent battalion—a wonderful aid to the fashioning of a new unit.

The unit shortly left 'Pindi for the Malakand, where it arrived on the 30th October, relieving the 38th Dogras.

The following month 2nd Lieut. R. C. Molesworth from R.M.C., Sandhurst, and 2nd Lieut. F. W. Oliver, I.A.R.O., joined the battalion.

On the 5th of March, 1917, information was received that the unit would be relieved on the 28th *idem* by the 41st Dogras and leave for Kohat the next day. This caused the divisional commander at Peshawar (Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Campbell, K.C.B., D.S.O.) to hasten his inspection, which took place on the 7th and 8th of March. The General expressed himself as very pleased with the work carried out, especially with the spirit and dash shown by all ranks in the field on the second day.

Kohat was not reached until the 7th of April. The next day the left wing under Major Jackson proceeded to Thal, the right wing meanwhile occupying Chamberlain Lines and relieving the 38th Dogras for the second time. Capt. G. S. Brock, I.M.S., now became the medical officer.

After its arrival in Kohat British officers literally poured in on the 1st Reserve Battalion Gurkha Rifles. On 24th April, 2nd Lieuts. K. H. Harrison and R. E. Cooper, both I.A.R.O. On the 18th of May, Lieut. F. Barter, V.C., from the 3rd R.W. Fusiliers, and on the

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18th of June, Lieut. D. N. Pitcairn, from the 9th Bn. Gordons ; then, in two months, from the 29th of June :

2nd Lieut. T. B. Middleton, from Wellington Cadet School, on 29th June.

Capt. T. M. Morton, 5th Bn. (Special Reserve) Royal Irish Rifles, on 9th July.

Lieut. F. H. Lewis, 3rd Bn. (Special Reserve) Royal Welch Fusiliers, on 4th August.

Capt. D. T. Cowan, M.C., 3rd Bn. (Special Reserve) Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, on 5th August.

2nd Lieut. R. T. Mills and 2nd Lieut. F. W. Gray, I.A.R.O., on 17th August.

2nd Lieut. H. Davis, 1/4th P.A.O. Somerset L.I. (T.F.), on 24th August.

2nd Lieut. W. L. Armstrong, I.A.R.O., on 26th August.

2nd Lieut. G. F. Berkeley, Probationer, I.A.R.O., on 29th August.

These officers were, without exception, keen, but the language question was an enormous difficulty—increased by the fact that youngsters were being transferred continuously, after some months with the battalion.

Amongst the units stationed at Kohat, when the 1st Reserve Battalion Gurkha Rifles arrived, was the 1st Battalion 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles, with Major C. H. A. Tuck in temporary command. Major Nicolay [gazetted Lieut.-Col. in July], and the whole of his unit, received a most cordial welcome from the old 3rd. On the 9th June, 1917, the 1st Reserve Battalion received its new designation of *4th Battalion 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles*, under Army Department letter No. 47874-1 A.G., dated 30th May, 1917. It was peculiarly fitting that this should have happened when the oldest and the newest battalion of the 3rd were together in the same garrison. The event was duly celebrated in conjunction.

Kohat was now very hot, but the Gurkhas stood it well—mainly due, probably, to a brigade order, issued in May, that all ranks from *reveillé* to retreat were to wear the "Cawnpore helmet."

The fourth battalion had to mourn its first officer casualty on the 28th of September, when Lieut. J. C. Kelly, I.A.R.O., died suddenly of blood poisoning.

On the 8th of October, 1917, the left wing returned from Thal, and the battalion now hoped it would shortly get a chance of active service *somewhere*. It was very strong, full of officers, and had been raised over a year. Instead, however, it received orders on the 9th of November to be prepared, at a moment's notice, to relieve the 94th Russell's Infantry at Nowshera. This did not come off until the New Year, but it was blow number one.

Shock number two was received on the 3rd of December, in the

shape of orders to prepare a draft of two hundred ranks to reinforce the second battalion in Palestine.

On the 19th of December the G.O.C. Kohat had a farewell parade and thanked the 4/3rd for their good work and their excellent behaviour. Two days later the draft for the second battalion entrained and consisted of Capt. G. J. Knowles and Lieut. F. Barter, V.C., Subadar Budhibal Thapa and Jemadar Sherbahadur Gurung, sixteen N.C.O.s and 182 riflemen.

The battalion reached Nowshera on the 1st of January, 1918, and officers still continued to arrive. During January, February, March and April the following joined :

January 1918

2nd Lieut. W. A. Simpson, on 16th January.

2nd Lieut. L. S. Rusby, on 22nd January.

2nd Lieut. W. R. James (Temp. Com. I.A.), on 24th January.

2nd Lieut. A. H. S. Taylor, Prob. I.A.R.O., on 25th January.

Capt. H. A. Barker and 2nd Lieut. S. W. Game, I.A.R.O., on 26th January.

Lieut. N. R. Satpute, I.M.S. (Temporary Commission), was attached on the 31st of December, 1917, until 22nd January, 1918, when Lieut. A. Noble, I.M.S. (T.C.), took over medical charge.

February 1918

2nd Lieut. U. McG. Greer and 2nd Lieut. R. F. Hall, on 15th February.

Lieut. O. C. Jones, on 26th February.

On the 2nd of February, Lieut. T. W. Oliver was ordered to Mesopotamia.

March 1918

2nd Lieut. J. C. Kerr, on 3rd March.

Lieut. R. H. Hurst, on 4th March.

2nd Lieut. F. C. M. Forward, on 21st March.

Major V. H. Roberts, I.M.S., took over medical charge of the battalion on 21st March, vice Lieut. A. Noble, I.M.S., proceeded on service overseas.

April 1918

2nd Lieut. T. Logan, on 2nd April.

The officers considered it was now time to establish a pipe band, so on the 18th of April eighteen pseudo-pipers proceeded to the 1/9th Gurkhas for instructional purposes.

From the month of May British officers began to vanish away, including Major Jackson, deputed to take over the depot of the

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4/11th Gurkhas at Shillong. The loss of this officer of experience was much felt.

With so large a number of British officers it was, of course, inevitable that there should be frequent changes. Details of these in a history, as they occur, being somewhat tiresome, an effort will now be made to group together the arrivals and departures of a few months, *e.g.* :

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1st, 5th and 6th June, 1918 (respectively). | Lieut. Game transferred to 2/81st Pioneers ; Lieut. Davis and 2nd Lieuts. Middleton and Hall left for service overseas ; Lieut. Cooper went to R.A.F. |
| 1st July, 1918. | Lieut. Phillips transferred to S. & T. Corps. |
| 10th July, 1918. | 2nd Lieut. A. R. Mercer joined. |
| 30th July, 1918. | Lieut. Hurst departed as quartermaster to 4/11th G.R. Depot. |
| 1st Aug., 1918. | Lieut. F. E. French arrived from the second battalion. |
| 8th and 30th Aug., 1918. | 2nd Lieut. Rusby and Lieut. Forward transferred to 2/123rd Outram's Rifles. |
| 9th Aug., 1918. | Lieut. Mills departed to join R.A.F. in Egypt. |
| 4th Sept., 1918. | Lieut. Barker, to the Nepalese Contingent at Kakul. |
| 11th Sept., 1918. | 2nd Lieut. James, overseas, to the third battalion. He took with him Subadar Puran Ale, Jemadar Dhansing Ale and 123 Gurkha ranks. |
| 15th Sept., 1918. | Lieut. French, to Simla, as temp. staff officer to Inspector of Infantry, Northern. |
| 2nd Oct., 1918. | Lieut. Lewis, to 1/144th Infantry. |
| 4th Oct., 1918. | Lieut. W. A. M. Ferguson, joined, from the 3/5th G.R. |
| 8th Oct., 1918. | 2nd Lieut. A. E. St. J. Adams, joined, from the 6th R. Fusiliers. |
| 22nd Oct., 1918. | 2nd Lieut. T. R. Hurst, joined, from R.M.C., Sandhurst. |
| 6th Nov., 1918. | Lieut. Knowles retired, ill health. |
| 28th Nov., 1918. | 2nd Lieut. F. W. Whitehead, joined on first appointment. |
| 9th Jan., 1919. | 2nd Lieut. Greer to Rangoon for the Kuki operations. |
| 10th Feb., 1919. | Lieut. C. N. Daniels, joined on first appointment. |
| 15th Feb., 1919. | Sub. Indarjit Thapa Temp. Sub.-Major. |
| 5th March, 1919. | Lieut. Simpson, to 1/4th Border Regiment. |
| 1st April, 1919. | Sub. Partiman Rana, Temp. Sub.-Major vice Indarjit relieved. |
| 5th June, 1919. | Capt. Morton returned, and 2nd Lieut. Scott, joined at Dakka, from 1/3rd, with a draft. |

During the remainder of the year 1918 the battalion continued to receive very satisfactory reports. Whether these emanated from the divisional or the brigade commander, the inspector of infantry or the supervisor of physical training, etc., three points were always

stressed : firstly, that the physique was very good ; secondly, that training and administration were thoroughly well organised ; and, thirdly, that there was plenty of dash. What more could one want ?

Then came the armistice, signed at 5 a.m., under the terms of which hostilities ceased at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of the year 1918. Fighting in the Great War had finished ; fighting for the 4/3rd had yet to begin.

Demobilisation was now the order of the day. The cold porridge of service in peace time after the excitement of the War, with its ever possible eventualities, may be distasteful to some, yet a great number of our Indian soldiers were quite willing, even anxious, to stay on. But Army Headquarters at Simla were in a tremendous hurry. Early in 1919 the authorities issued their orders for the demobilisation of Indian units with somewhat feverish haste, and without due regard to all the factors that required consideration. They were probably very sorry for it a little later, but, be that as it may, by the 7th of March, 600 of the fourth battalion had been disbanded.

At Nowshera, on the 8th of March, 1919, a brigade order notified that, from the 15th *idem*, pugris would be taken into wear by Gurkha units and the wearing of felt hats discontinued until further orders. This was only another of the periodical attempts to put Gurkhas into pugris—the reason advanced this time being that felt hats were no longer obtainable—but in less than two months the unit was mobilised for Afghanistan, and the men received pith hats.

In April the battalion received orders to move to Kakul on the 12th. This was a camping site about two miles from Abbottabad, and had recently been vacated by the Nepalese Contingent. General Climo ordered a farewell parade, and addressing the unit thanked all ranks for their good and loyal work while under his command. One last communication from the Nowshera brigade caused much satisfaction. It was General Climo's congratulations, on a report from the Northern Command N.C.O.s' school, received after the battalion's departure. The words were :

“The best results were those obtained by the students of the 4/3rd G.R.”

In the winter of 1918 political agitators were extremely active everywhere in India, especially at Amritsar, in the Punjab. Every measure of Government, such as attempts to control prices and commandeer stocks for the needs of the army or people, at reasonable prices, was seized on for misrepresentation. Then came the publication of the Rowlatt Bill in January 1919. This was a measure, advised by the Rowlatt Committee, to enable Government to deal with seditious movements more speedily than by ordinary law, and

was rendered necessary owing to the Armistice and the approaching lapse of the Defence of India Act—the D.O.R.A. of India. Its introduction gave the extremists the very opportunity they were looking for, namely, an excuse to combine—a favourable juncture, to focus their anti-Government agitation on a particular measure.

The Bill was passed in March 1919, and was a signal for that violent and unprecedented agitation all over India, with which Government had been threatened in the native press and on many a platform. Gandhi's passive resistance movement came next, and was followed on the 30th of March by the outbreak at Delhi, the April disturbances in Lahore, and open rebellion at Amritsar and elsewhere.

On the 3rd of May the 4/3rd were required to find detachments for four small stations in the hills between Abbottabad and Murree. On the 6th *idem* the battalion was ordered to mobilise. The threatening attitude of Afghanistan had created a serious situation on the North-West Frontier. The unit formed part of Major-General Andrew Skeen's third infantry brigade of the First (Peshawar) Division, the whole of which was now mobilised.

The third brigade's rendezvous was Kacha Garhi, an embryo base half-way between Peshawar and Jamrud, at the foot of the Khyber Pass—not a delectable spot, with its unfinished railway sidings and incomplete pipe water supply. The first and second brigades were concentrating at Landi Kotal.

The battalion reached Kacha Garhi at 09.00 hours on the 9th of May, to be followed later by the 2/1st and 3/11th G.R. The British unit of the 3rd Brigade (The Yorkshire Regiment) was still required to remain in Peshawar itself, for political reasons, but joined up at Landi Kotal on the 13th. Distant and intermittent artillery fire could be heard. The Afghans were in position at Bagh Springs, between Landikhana and Landi Kotal, refusing to retire to their own territory.

On the evening of the 9th, orders were received to march at 03.00 hours to Ali Musjid in the Khyber Pass, distant thirteen miles—the scale to be field service, all surplus baggage and tentage being dumped at Kachi Garhi. No place being safe, the 3/11th were detailed to remain there on guard. The troops of the poor brigadier, therefore, were reduced to two weak battalions.

The 4/3rd led the column and reached Ali Musjid at 09.30 hours on the 10th of May. The next morning at 03.00 the attenuated brigade moved on to Landi Kotal and became the reserve to the troops fighting for Bagh Springs. It was not called upon to take any other part in the action, which was quite successful, and afforded a

very interesting spectacle during the day. In the afternoon the 4/3rd was told to take over the block-house and other picquets surrounding Landi Kotal, maintaining them until the following day, when the 2/1st came on in relief.

On the 13th the battalion was attached to its old brigade, the second. The latter marched at 05.00 hours, to cover the advance of the cavalry division to Loe Dakka, supported by the first brigade. The duty of manning the heights on both sides of the route was entrusted to the 4/3rd, from near Hast Shah post to the big hills enclosing the exit to the Dakka plain. Before hurriedly vacating Hast Shah the Afghans actually signalled to the column with British signalling flags. The Gurkhas moved very well. The cavalry passed through the protecting troops about midday, and the 4/3rd reached Landi Kotal again at 21.00 hours, after a really good day's work.

On the 19th of May the battalion moved to Dakka, together with the 3/11th. The two units arrived at 13.00 hours and bivouacked in an extremely dusty camp in the vicinity of Fort Robat. At this date the heat was very great, and the dust and flies were like a plague.

On the following morning the battalion took over the following picquets : Sikh Hill, Green Hill, Black Hill and Khurd Khyber. In view of the recent fighting these picquets were commanded by British officers and had strong garrisons. Green Hill, the key to the defence, was held by a garrison of one B.O., two G.O.s, and one hundred Gurkhas.

On the 5th of June the battalion formed part of a column to collect supplies at Hazarnao. All heights commanding the route, up to and in the vicinity of the village, were picqueted by the 4/3rd. Hazarnao was the most western point reached by the force operating from Landi Kotal during the operations against Afghanistan. The column was commanded by Lieut.-Col. Wickham, K.D.G.s, with the advance guard, picqueting and retirement under Lieut.-Col. Nicolay. The advance guard consisted of two squadrons K.D.G.s, one section "M" Battery R.H.A., and 4/3rd G.R., less two companies. The start was at 04.30 hours, and the return was 17.15 hours. It was a hot day, but the men worked well, only three falling out.

On return to camp a strong and very welcome draft of two British, four Gurkha officers and 180 other ranks was found within the perimeter. This helped to swell the depleted ranks of the battalion.

In this campaign artillery fire was considerably employed to keep down sniping after dark. It was usually effective in silencing these pests, but did not prevent them opening fire from some other cache

the next evening. Night after night, during June, the camp was disturbed by these snipers, but it was the only offensive action taken by the Afghans.

The atmospheric conditions prevailing at this time were very unpleasant. They were caused, besides the heat, by an extreme dryness and constant dust storms, lasting many hours. On the 13th of June, however, the 3rd Brigade moved to Camp Sherabad, a mile west of Robat. This site was practically on the brink of the River Kabul, was far less dusty, and much cooler.

A fortnight later Capt. Morton had a successful little affair when picqueting with his company for the daily cavalry reconnaissance. The Afghans lay in wait for the horsemen and opened a heavy fire. Morton dashed up with his unit, less picquets; advanced against the enemy; silenced him, after a short fire fight; withdrew at the double, and regained his normal position without further incident. Result, encomium from the divisional commander.

The new brigadier (Brigadier-General R. Taylor, C.M.G., D.S.O.), coming to take over the 3rd Brigade on the 30th of June, very nearly failed to arrive at all. At divisional headquarters—now at Dakka—his car driver was given a general direction to Sherabad. The man took the main road instead to Jellalabad through the Khurd Khyber Pass. When not far short of Girdhi, Brigadier Taylor got suspicious and had the car turned round. Lucky for him that he did, for on another occasion, through a similar mistake, a car was captured by the Afghans.

The 4/3rd remained in Afghanistan until early in September, and had the honour of being the last unit to quit Afghanistan, for on it fell the duty of covering the withdrawal of the 3rd Brigade from Dakka to Landi Kotal. With much foresight and prevision the withdrawal from all distant picquet positions round the perimeter had been previously rehearsed and carefully timed. As the frontier warrior is always on the watch, other units carried on their usual routine parades with a good deal of ostentation. The result was that on the real day these withdrawals were made so rapidly that there was no incident whatever.

Later on, however, a warm five minutes did occur, from a quarter whence the cavalry had experienced trouble frequently and about which they gave timely warning. It was a snipers' position, in the hills running down to the River Kabul from the Khyber Pass direction—that is to say, to a flank and in the direction of the withdrawal.

On the whole it was perhaps a blessing in disguise, for it taught a very valuable lesson in visibility to all concerned; a lesson too,

which bore fruit with much effect on a future occasion. To explain : these snipers would probably have been silenced easily enough but for the fact that, although the sun was up, the hills were in deep shade, and nothing whatsoever could be seen of the Afghans because of the sun behind them.

With the exception of this incident the withdrawal proceeded normally as far as the entrance to the Khyber Pass, when the peace area had been penetrated.

The 4/3rd reached Abbottabad on the 19th of September, 1919, after an absence on active service of rather more than four months.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE FOURTH BATTALION

WAZIRISTAN : MAHSUD OPERATIONS : THE WANA COLUMN DISBANDMENT

AFTER some four months' rest at Abbottabad, the battalion received orders, suddenly, to mobilise for service in Waziristan, to join the force operating under Major-General S. Climo. The Mahsud Waziris ¹ had put up a notable resistance to Major-General Skeen's advance up the Tank-Zam, and reinforcements were required for a further advance.

The 4/3rd left Abbottabad on 24th January, 1920, having then a strength of six British, twelve Gurkha officers and 562 other ranks. The latter figure included a draft of 200 provided by the 1/6th Gurkhas. At Dera Ismail Khan, on the 26th of January, five more British officers joined.

The battalion was allotted to the 67th Infantry Brigade, then at Sorarogha, which was reached on the 4th of February, the brigadier (Brigadier-General A. L. Lucas, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O.) meeting the battalion in the nullah below the camp.

During the day's march the Ahnai Tangi was encountered, the scene of desperate fighting a few weeks previously. This and other features left no doubt whatever, in the minds of all experienced in mountain warfare, regarding the very formidable nature of the country of the Mahsuds.

¹ The Mahsuds and the Darwesh Khel tribes are both Wazirs, but the former are quite distinct from the latter and inhabit a different part of the frontier. The actual boundary lines between the Mahsuds and their neighbours (the Darwesh Khel on the one side and the Bhattanis on the other) are difficult to describe without a very accurate map.

Kaniguram is the most important centre in Mahsud-land, inasmuch as all serious political questions are there discussed by Mahsud jirgas (councils). Very few Mahsuds, however, live in Kaniguram, which is inhabited by Ormars, who are traders with a language of their own, and do not claim a common descent with the Mahsuds.


Makin is the chief village of the Mahsuds, who are divided into three main divisions, viz. : *Alizai*, *Shaman Khel* and *Bahlolzai*. These are subdivided as follows :

Alizai into *Shabi Khel* and *Manzai*.

Shaman Khel into *Khaili Khel*, *Chihar Khel* and *Gallishai*.

Bahlolzai into *Spingi*, *Ahmad Khel*, *Nana Khel* and *Band Khel*.

All these subdivisions have numerous sections or branches, e.g. The *Abdur Rahman Khel* are a branch of the *Nana Khel* subdivision of the *Bahlolzai* main division.



Stanford's Geographical Establishment, London.

On the 12th of February the 67th Brigade joined the Derajat column headquarters at Piazza Raghza, where forward operations towards the Mahsud's capital, Makin, were now in hand. The rule was to place permanent picquets ahead of the force on the line of advance selected. This did not, however, prevent sniping, of which there was a considerable amount, causing some casualties.

On the 15th of February the 4/3rd was detailed to provide two permanent picquets of a strength about double that of ordinary camp picquets in an outer line of defence. The first was composed of one British and one Gurkha officer with sixty Gurkhas ; the second of one G.O. and forty other ranks. During the day's operations the battalion lost one killed and three wounded while building a sangar, and four wounded when attacking a ridge. The next day, on account of sniping opposition to the advance of the column, the village of Malikshai was destroyed. The result was a peaceful night without a single shot.

When the brigade was in camp at Tauda China on the 17th of February, a detachment from the battalion was sent out to collect wood from the ruins of the above village. While D Company covered the operation, A carried out the fatigue work. About 14.00 hours messengers came in from D to say that a number of Mahsuds, having collected in a nullah, came on in attack. D chased them up the nullah and had cornered a dozen or more in a tower. C Company was sent out at once as reinforcement.

Meanwhile, A Company, having heard rumours of a fight, downed tools and, moving by a covered way, got to within two hundred yards of the tower.

C and D Companies then opened a heavy fire on the objective. Under cover of this, two platoons of A, gallantly led by Capt. N. G. Hind (attached from the 2nd Gurkhas), charged the structure at best pace.

Having reached some houses at the foot of the tower, this party returned, from loopholes, the enemy's fire at a range of only twenty yards, a third platoon, now reinforced, taking up a position thirty yards away on the left flank.

Leaving the duel to carry on, Capt. Hind and one rifleman then attempted to climb the tower with the idea of dropping a bomb through a loophole on to the defenders. Sticking bayonets in the crevices of the stone base, the perilous ascent began, but when about half way up, Hind was severely wounded in the knee and fell.

The next moves in the drama were (1) the evacuation of Hind, and (2) the retention in the village of one platoon, with Lieut. B. S. Mould (from 1st Gurkhas) in command.

Mould was not for sitting still. Getting a door in one of the houses forced open he had a bomb thrown in. But the house was empty, except for a dog. The men lit some straw, which enabled them to see their way about. Another door was found, leading under the tower.

Havildar Dhane Gurung broke this open and hurled a bomb through the aperture. Mould followed, leading his party, and almost at once they came under fire from above. Nothing daunted, however, the Gurkhas made draught holes in the ceiling, collected straw and wood, set it alight and emerged. Two more houses were then fired in the same way.

Sappers had been requisitioned, but it was considered too late to send them out from camp. Up to this time there had been about half a dozen casualties amongst the 4/3rd. Orders to withdraw were now received from the brigade.

The first wounded man was sent back assisted by two others, one of whom was killed and the other wounded within a couple of yards of emergence from cover. Further attempts to evacuate wounded met with the same result. Messengers, endeavouring to get to camp, were hit. Eventually Jemadar Babesur Gurung got through. He actually managed to return, too, with orders to Mould from the C.O., to remain until dusk.

When it began to get dark the party withdrew, evacuating all the casualties with the exception of two dead Gurkhas left behind. The total losses during the day were : seven killed and twenty-eight wounded, including one British officer. Of the four stretcher bearers carrying Capt. Hind, three were killed. The survivor was recommended for an immediate award. The conduct of all stretcher bearers throughout the day was magnificent. Both Capt. Hind and Lieut. Mould received an immediate award of the Military Cross.

On the 18th of February Capt. T. M. Morton again rejoined the battalion from the 2/25th Punjabis and took over command of "B" Company. The next day the 4/3rd, with the help of a section of Sappers and Miners and a company of the 34th Sikh Pioneers, constructed a strong permanent picquet on Tree Hill. The work was completed by 10.00 hours and a garrison of one B.O. (Capt. S. R. Macdonald, from 1st G.R.), three G.O.s and seventy Gurkhas were left in occupation.

On the 21st of February a draft of 101 Gurkhas arrived from the 1/3rd, bringing the battalion strength up to 696 other ranks. At 18.00 hours Tree Hill picquet reported that twelve Mahsuds were bringing in eight Government rifles, and adding that these cunning fellows had taken advantage of the conversation to cut the wire up to

the picquet. This post took in six days' supplies on the 22nd February without incident, but, on the following day, when the garrison was changed, there was a scrap, the battalion losing three killed and four wounded.

Operations in the South Makin area continued until the end of the month. On the 29th of February it became necessary to remove the surplus stores from Tree Hill picquet, preparatory to withdrawal, as the force was about to move down the Tank-Zam. This made the enemy very suspicious and particularly active in the vicinity of the picquet that night. So much so, that Capt. Morton, the commander, was required to report on the situation every two hours up to 03.15 hours.

After dusk heavy sniping from all sides caused two casualties, and artillery fire was opened to ease the situation. At midnight Morton reported the enemy active and noisy ; one Mahsud shouting out in English :

" We will come back and shoot you."

04.00 hours was the scheduled time for the withdrawal. At 03.15 hours a message came through from the picquet saying it would start off as soon as the moon was down. As a matter of fact the evacuation did take place at 04.00 hours, without the Mahsuds knowing anything about it, and the men were back in camp by 05.00 hours. This performance earned warm commendation from General Skeen.

During the month of February 1920 the battalion casualties were :

Killed :	18 Gurkhas.
Wounded :	1 British officer.
	1 Gurkha officer.
	37 other ranks.

—
Total : 57

The column was at Dwa-Toi on the 1st of March, and on the 3rd started for Kaniguram, which was reached on the 6th. The only opposition was occasional sniping. While the column was generally employed in picquet construction and escort duty, the political officers busied themselves with the terms of a peace settlement and the collection of rifles. The Mahsuds seemed really in a mood to submit.

On the 30th of March, 1920, Lieut.-Col. Nicolay rejoined at Kaniguram from leave, and Major Ogilvy was transferred to the 2/5th G.R. as second in command.

Some punitive operations in the Upper Baddar Toi, continually postponed on account of inclement weather, commenced on the 6th of April, by the forward move of a column under General Skeen, of

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which the 4/3rd formed a part. The object was the coercion of the Abdur Rahman Khel, a division of the Mahsuds inhabiting villages around Giga Khel, some fifteen miles away. A bivouac within striking distance of the objective was reached without incident, although the country was somewhat difficult.

The next day the battalion was in reserve, but was called up to the vicinity of the villages just before noon and helped the sappers and pioneers to rush and demolish two towers. It was then detailed to cover the withdrawal of the brigade, which commenced at 14.00 hours.

The tribesmen, as usual, followed up the retirement closely, which was none too easy on account of precipitous hill-sides, a formidable cascade, and the elevation. At 7,000 feet and over quick movement is always difficult. Although the rear-guard kept the enemy well in check most of the time, there were some hand-to-hand encounters costing the rear party five casualties. One Gurkha was attacked by four of the enemy, but cut down three with his kukri. The fourth bolted away. The battalion reached camp about 17.00 hours, having lost four killed, one missing (believed killed), and eight wounded.

Early the following morning (8th April) from Sinha Tizha, the 4/3rd covered the withdrawal of the column on its return march to Kaniguram. Absorbing the outer line of defence was an anxious time. A hidden enemy kept up a continuous fire, and it was known that batches of them were lying doggo in close country, near the picquets, awaiting their opportunity.

When the column was well started, the signal came to withdraw from Sinha Tizha and the most distant exposed picquet was ordered in. No sooner was the sangar evacuated than two men were hit. Without any hesitation the picquet commander, realising he must suffer heavily, returned to his sangar, and covered with his fire the two wounded Gurkhas. These struggled on alone and eventually reached the perimeter.

At the same time Major Farfan, R.A., seeing what was wanted from a distant position, opened fire with a mountain gun, making perfect practice in the vicinity of the exposed picquet. The withdrawal signal was then repeated, and the picquet came away, and with it the other picquets on the same ridge. All reached the perimeter without further casualty.

The battalion then commenced its own retirement by half companies, and, under distant sniping fire, managed to gain the high ground some two miles in rear. There for the time being its duty was ended. The C.O., however, had been ordered to command the rear-

guard flag, and with the adjutant, Capt. Middleton, and the runner party (about eight men), accompanied the retirement of a flank guard of the 2/9th Gurkhas, until the declivity to the Baddar Toi gorge was reached.

There a halt had to be made, as the exposed river bed was not clear of camels belonging to the column. A small party of tribesmen got within twenty yards of the flag, and the leader of this party—a very brave man—was actually within five yards of it when killed. The incident closed with a good deal of firing and much movement of troops, but not in sufficient time to give a possible effective counter-stroke. At 16.00 hours all the troops of the column were in camp at Kaniguram.

The 4/3rd casualties for the day were three missing (believed killed, one being Capt. Middleton's orderly with the runner party), and four wounded.

These operations, and the demolition of all towers in the vicinity of Kaniguram, closed the activities of the Derajat column. At the same time there was a greatly improved demeanour noticeable amongst the Mahsuds.

On the 17th and 18th of April the column moved back to Ladha, where the battalion remained over a month. During this halt (12th of May) a draft of two G.O.s and one hundred other ranks brought the strength of the 4/3rd up to 730 in the field.

Then came a move down the line to join the 68th Brigade at Kotkai. Piazza Raghza was reached on the 21st of May, Sorarogha on the 24th, and Kotkai on the 25th. Bad weather delayed matters considerably. On the afternoon of the 21st there occurred an exceptional hailstorm of two hours' duration, which stampeded the transport and caused much damage. The hailstones were an inch in diameter.

The days soon began to get really hot, but the blockade had been raised, and the first Mahsud convoy reached Kotkai on the 30th of May. The tribesmen accompanying it were unarmed.

The battalion was now transferred from the 68th to the 43rd Brigade and joined the latter at Piazza Raghza on the 16th of June, with Col. Nicolay as acting brigadier and Major Bailey as officiating commandant.

With the exception of some co-operation with the 67th Brigade towards Makin on the 10th of July, the battalion's duties were confined to picqueting and road escorts until the 1st of September. On that date the brigade, now designated the 21st, moved its headquarters to Sorarogha, and on the 18th of the same month Brigadier Loch took over the command.

On the 20th of October the battalion proceeded to Palosina, between Jandola and Kotkai, picking up *en route* a large draft of one British, two Gurkha officers and 213 other ranks, all being recruits of that year. These were to replace men due for demobilisation. Three days later the 4/3rd moved to Sarkai Raghza (Jandola), having been selected for service with the Wana column, which was about to concentrate on this point, for a move to Wana.

Wana Column, 1920-21

The battalion's new brigade was the 24th, commanded by Col. O. C. Borrett, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., and its concentration was completed on the 30th of October, 1920, by the arrival of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment. One of the first orders issued was that of the 2nd of November, to the effect that officers and men were to be dressed alike.

The same day, owing to so many men of the 4/3rd being demobilised, a company from the 3/11th Gurkhas joined the battalion and completed the latter's strength to eight British, twenty Gurkha officers and 742 other ranks. In order to keep this company intact, under its own officers (Capt. Sheppard and Lieut. Wray), C Company was scrapped and the men transferred to A, B, and D; while the new unit became C Company, 4/3rd. But for administration purposes it remained a fifth company.

The column was commanded by Major-General W. S. Leslie, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., and moved to Chagmalai (five miles from Jandola) on 12th November, preparatory to undertaking the passage of the Shahur Tangi. This is one of the most formidable defiles on the North-West Frontier, with very precipitous sides, narrow gorges and execrable track. The only advantage to troops essaying its transit is that the ground is so extremely difficult that even the tribesmen are unable to move with any degree of rapidity.

On the 13th this Tangi was reconnoitred and penetrated without incident, the 4/3rd forming the advanced guard. Permanent picquets were established and one gun located in the most advanced post. This arrangement was maintained throughout the whole advance to Wana with much advantage.

The next march was to Haidri Kach on the 15th of November; with again no opposition until the new camp was reached. Then snipers opened fire, but were dealt with at once. Although the perimeter had all been allotted to units by 11.00 hours, the rear-guard under Major Bailey did not arrive until ten and a half hours later. The reason was that 2,900 camels, carrying supplies, formed part of the rear-guard commander's charge. Many of these animals became

afflicted with night blindness in the Tangi and hundreds of them had to be individually man-handled out of it.

Sarwekai was reached on the 18th of November. There the column remained until the 16th of December, when it formed camp at Dargai Oba, the next point in the advance where there was any water fit for drinking purposes. Not that this was a big supply; indeed, it was so limited that the water ration was reduced on the 18th to half a gallon per day per head for all purposes.

The same evening Col. Nicolay was summoned to column headquarters and the scheme of operations for the next day was discussed.

It was explained to him that the water question was a very acute problem in the advance. The usual supply at the next post of Tanai was said to have been cut off by the Waziris. The column commander had, therefore, decided to make a determined effort on the morrow to reach the Wana Toi at Karabkot (afterwards, in early April, called Roghakot), where there was an ample supply.

Several hundred Waziris were known to be in the vicinity of Tanai and parties of tribesmen had been plainly visible, sngaring the hills ahead of the existing permanent picquets of the column.

About two miles from the camp at Dargai Oba the road, then running due west, bifurcated just short of the Nagundi Post. The southern branch passed Tanai Post, the northern traversed the Granai Mara Narai defile. About two miles beyond Tanai the two branches joined and formed the main Wana road.

Col. Nicolay was told that the Granai Mara Narai route had been adopted and that he had been selected to command the advanced guard, which would consist of :

One section mountain artillery.

The mounted and dismounted units of the South Waziristan Militia.

The 4/3rd Gurkhas.

The starting hour was discussed and, based on the experience gained in the retirement from Dakka the year before, fixed at 07.00 hours.

Operation orders were then issued, and on the 19th of December the vanguard under Capt. Morton passed the starting point, below Knut picquet, at 06.30 hours. The militia mounted infantry had already been detailed to watch the plain east and south of this picquet.

The O.C. advanced guard issued his attack orders verbally at 07.11 hours, the artillery came into action, the remainder of the

militia moved across a plain to the north-west, and the advance then proceeded according to plan.

At 07.50 hours a sharp burst of enemy fire opened on the leading lines of a company of the 4/3rd advancing up the slopes below Point 3962, south (that is, left) of the line of march. Waziris had been observed on the skyline of this ridge. But they were now taken in flank, and at 08.00 hours the leading unit reported the occupation of the position.

Meanwhile the mounted infantry, having returned from the plain, had made good their second objective, which was a low feature north of the route and some 500 yards short of Point 3962 on the other flank. This was at once taken over by a company of the battalion, which also secured a further hill on this northern side, called the Hump.

With all arms, and an occasional plane, pounding away at the tribesmen, the latter got fairly rattled, and it did not appear as if the passage of the defile would present much difficulty.

Up to this time the advancing troops had all the advantage of visibility. As mentioned in the withdrawal from Dakka in 1919, the Afghans scored amazingly on that occasion by semi-darkness and a rising sun. Col. Nicolay had never forgotten this lesson, and, with the situation reversed this day, took full advantage of it. By moving his troops at best pace all the early morning, they gained their objectives rapidly and with practically no casualties.

The A.G. Commander, by brushing aside all opposition and advancing by bounds, had the key position of the "Castle" in his hands by 10.00 hours. This secured the forward advance up the defile. Some hundreds of the enemy were now observed on the Black Ridge. This position was on the left flank of the advance, across the Sanzala Algad, and some two miles from it. Other parties of tribesmen were retiring in a northerly and north-westerly direction.

By 10.40 hours the four companies of the battalion were expanded and holding the four main positions of Pt. 3962, N. Ridge of Sanzala Algad, "The Hump" and "The Castle." A message was sent to the main body for more troops, and at 11.30 hours the command of the A.G. was taken over by Lieut.-Col. Gordon of the 2nd Norfolks.

The battalion received very high commendation for its performances this day. The hospitals had been warned to expect a hundred casualties. At the expense of only two, a strong hostile position had been turned and the advance to the much-needed water-supply at Karabkot had been assured.

Col. Nicolay has always considered that the success of the operation was due to :

- (1) Early hour of the start, with full advantage taken of favourable visibility.
- (2) Quick moving infantry.
- (3) Good supporting artillery fire.
- (4) Enemy's loss of moral, owing to (2) and (3).
- (5) Close co-operation of an aeroplane, whose action in dropping bombs and firing its Lewis gun gave the A.G. commander immediate indication, by sound, of where the tribesmen were lurking.

Karabkot was reached, without any further opposition, in the early afternoon and camp formed on the Wana Toi.

On the 22nd of December the column moved on to Wana, with Col. Nicolay again in command of the advanced guard. Permanent picquets had been posted well into the formidable Michin Baba defile. Only once during the advance was a rifle shot heard.

The Wana column now settled down to a period of road protection duties and training for warfare suitable to more open country. There was some talk of further operations in the vicinity of the Durand line, but these did not mature.

To the regret of all ranks Major W. B. Bailey left the 4/3rd on the 26th of February, on appointment as second in command of his own battalion of the 2nd Gurkhas. He had been with the new unit for over four years and done much to establish its good name on the North-West Frontier. So good an officer and so cheery a companion was sadly missed.

On the 16th of March the battalion formed part of a force returning to Sarwekai (column headquarters) via Tanai. As an experiment, a post was now formed at the latter place and Karabkot and Dargai Oba abandoned, thus saving a day in the convoy journey between Sarwekai and Wana.

No sooner had the 4/3rd come to anchor at Sarwekai than the tribesmen became very active at various spots on the line of communication between Jandola and Wana—most evidently a systematic attempt to destroy the camel transport by sniping. On the 31st of March a convoy of seventy camels lost ten animals killed and eighteen wounded, as well as four mules and a horse killed and four Gurkhas and four sarwans wounded.

Early in April matters got worse. A considerable "lashkar" collected in the Wana-Tanai sector. This closed the Michin Baba defile above Karabkot. Communication was also severed with Wana, where gun ammunition was already becoming exhausted.

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A mobile column was sent out under Col. Nicolay on the 7th of April, with orders to reopen communication. His troops were :

One section No. 35 mountain battery.

One section machine guns.

2/41st Dogras.

4/3rd G.R.

Signalling and medical details.

En route to Tanai to pick up the first three units, the convoy moving with the 4/3rd was badly sniped during the descent to Dargai Oba. Several camels were killed before the tribesmen were dispersed, but all the loads were recovered and there was no further incident.

Next morning at 05.00 hours the column moved on and reached Karabkot Tower at 07.45 hours in a heavy mist. A new permanent picquet was formed *en route*, and advantage taken of the obscurity to reconnoitre the enemy positions above Karabkot. They were found to be abandoned, and were at once utilised as fresh permanent posts.

Touch was obtained with troops from Wana at 10.30 hours. The ammunition convoy was passed through. Then camp was formed by the 4/3rd and the remaining troops—less the mountain battery section—returned to Tanai.

Col. Nicolay's mobile column, having fulfilled its mission, was broken up. The 4/3rd remained in location at Karabkot, henceforth to be known as Roghakot.

Rising very conspicuously and abruptly from the Wana Toi is the formidable hill of Michin Baba, the defile of which has already been referred to. Sniping occasionally took place from its summit. Therefore, it became almost a custom for units on road picquet duty to work over the top, on the look-out for enemy movement. This seemed to influence the actions of the tribesmen considerably, as they became very quiescent, so much so, that there was some danger of troops losing their sense of caution and suspicion. On the North-West Frontier an area may seem absolutely peaceful, when there is really no peace. An "incident" may occur at any moment.

The column commander rode over from Sarwekai on the 1st of May to be a spectator at a small surprise operation. Its object was to locate a "lashkar," haunting the defiles above Minchin Baba. Col. Nicolay was in command, and the troops at Wana and Dargai Oba (re-established on the 10th April) co-operated. There was no fighting, but the day brought good results : firstly, the knowledge that it was feasible to carry out very rapid movement in hot weather ; secondly, the tribesmen were so surprised, by the sudden concen-

tration of troops and their speedy evolutions in a little known area, that another section threw in their hand at once.

"Chipau" parties were frequently sent out at night by the 4/3rd, to surprise any batches of the enemy prowling round to surprise the Gurkhas. One night a little party of the battalion ran into a body of Wazirs bivouacked in a nullah close to camp. The Gurkhas opened a sudden and rapid fire and then charged. Unfortunately, it was a bivouac of "friendlies," who had camped near the perimeter for protection. Several cattle were killed, besides many "friendlies" being wounded—amongst them, it is regretted to state, at least one woman. The survivors were brought into camp, well looked after, and given handsome compensation by the political officer. Their pals showed their displeasure by sniping the camp for the next few nights. Good sometimes comes out of evil. So with this unfortunate incident. It put the fear of God into the Wazirs to know that the Gurkhas did not move about in daylight only.

The battalion remained at Roghakot until the 1st of October, when it moved to Wana. During August and September Major Gouldsbury was acting commandant, as Col. Nicolay was absent on leave, and later in command of the Wana column. On the 6th of October a draft of two Gurkha officers and 109 Gurkha other ranks joined the 4/3rd from the 2nd Q.O. Corps of Guides, to bring the unit up to strength, in the event of a withdrawal from Wana being contemplated.

On the 9th of November, 1921, secret orders were received for the evacuation of Wana. On the 29th the column headquarters arrived there to conduct the withdrawal, which was fixed to commence on the 1st of December, for all troops on the Jandola-Wana line.

Advantage was taken of the interval, between the receipt of orders and the move, to examine carefully the area each company would be required to traverse. Then every unit rehearsed the action to be taken on the final day. The battalion commander's suggested dispositions were all agreed to by the O.C. column, with the exception of the position of one company, at which friendly criticism was aimed. As it eventuated, this unit occupied an area on which the success of the whole withdrawal depended.

The keep of the fort at Wana had been repaired and on the 30th of November, 1921, was handed over to the political agent, Major Parsons, and his 200 khassadars. That night sniping recurred. Hostile Wazirs had collected. They appeared to know all about the withdrawal.

It was wet and misty on the morning of the 1st of December. Companies destined for distant positions moved off very early in the

dark, followed by A and C, with battalion headquarters, at 06.15 hours. D Company, under Capt. Macdonald, had to make good the location which had been criticised, and traversed a circuitous route via a permanent picquet, and not as rehearsed. This meant working along a stiff ridge to reach the unit's objective, and, until nearing the summit, nothing whatever was seen or heard of the enemy. While two platoons occupied commanding positions, the remainder advanced towards the crest in dead silence. Suddenly the leading platoon came upon a body of Wazirs, about forty strong, busily preparing a sniping position.

The encounter was at close quarters, but the leading section commander and two men were hit at the first burst of enemy fire. Then came a ding-dong, hand-to-hand fight, resulting in the retirement of the tribesmen, at the double, to commanding ground just above. Thence they put in heavy fire, but the leading platoon reorganised, assaulted and secured the summit, with the loss of one havildar killed and one non-commissioned officer and five men wounded. Intermittent, but not serious, sniping continued, until the Wazirs finally withdrew altogether and ceased to molest the column for the rest of the day.

This little surprise was of some further advantage. A considerable force of the enemy on the opposite flank of the withdrawal seemed a good deal impressed—that is to say, that although they remained watching all the day, they were entirely inactive as regards aggression.

The eventual withdrawal of D Company required care and might have been a ticklish business ; but the enemy had been hard hit, and had lost some important men ; he was too cowed to follow up, and there was no trouble.

The column reached Sarwekai on the 5th of December, having fallen back systematically through prepared areas, and having evacuated everything from all permanent picquets and posts. The hardest task the battalion was called on to perform was as reserve to the column on the withdrawal from Dargai Oba to Sarwekai.

From the 6th to the 17th of December Col. Nicolay was left in command at the latter post ; and ordered then to withdraw the garrison to Haidri Kach. Thence the column carried on, and Jandola was reached on the 20th of the same month.

A telegram was awaiting the 4/3rd at Jandola announcing the "immediate award" of the I.D.S.M. to Jemadar Arjun, Havildar Sunaram, and Rifleman Jashbahadur, all Gurungs, for bravery in action on the first of December during the withdrawal from Wana.

On Christmas Eve, 1921, the battalion left Jandola (and the now demobilising Wana column) for India and disbandment. It said

farewell to Col. Borrett and his command with much regret. Efforts had been made on all sides to induce the authorities to retain the 4/3rd G.R. as a permanent unit of the Indian Army, but to no purpose.

Before leaving Tank on Christmas Day a most complimentary letter was received from the Waziristan Force Commander, in which Major-General Matheson said some very nice things, and expressed great regret at the unit's departure from Waziristan and its disbandment.

The 27th to 29th were spent at Mari Indus, whence the first battalion's draft returned to Almora and that of the 2nd Guides to Mardan.

Abbottabad was reached on the last day of the year and a very warm welcome accorded by Col.-Commandant E. R. P. Boileau and all units in the station, particularly the 1/6th. The battalion's strength was eight B.O.s, seventeen G.O.s, 450 other ranks, the names of the British officers being :

Lieut.-Col. B. U. Nicolay, commanding.
 Bt. Major C. A. Gouldsbury, second in command.
 Capt. D. N. Pitcairn.
 Capt. S. R. Macdonald.
 Lieut. U. McG. Greer.
 Lieut. B. S. Mould, M.C.
 Lieut. T. R. Hurst, adjutant.
 Lieut. V. L. Misselbrook, quartermaster.

On the 4th of January, 1922, orders were received from A.G. India that the battalion was to be reduced to cadre strength (four B.O.s ; three G.O.s ; twenty other ranks) by the 16th of February and to be totally disbanded by the 16th of March, 1922. These dates were observed.

The last ceremony in which any of the 4/3rd took part, was its representation at Delhi on the 17th of February, 1922, by

Subadar-Major Dhanraj Pun, M.B.E.
 Havildar-Major Gangabir Ale.
 Lance-Naick Kharaksing Thapa, I.D.S.M.

This was on the occasion of the visit to India of H.R.H. The Prince of Wales.

Very few men of the battalion joined other Gurkha units—only sixty-four all told. Thanks to the excellent work done by the depot commanders—latterly Capts. Cowan and Morton—the accounts were closed without difficulty and with funds well in credit. This most desirable result was due also in a large measure to the very efficient assistance given by the head clerk, Jemadar Azad Khan.

He had worked unsparingly throughout the whole five years of the unit's existence. A deep debt of gratitude is owed to the O.C. 1/5th for providing so valuable a man.

With the sanction of army headquarters a portion of the surplus funds was devoted to the purchase of a two-handled silver trophy—to be presented by all ranks of the 4/3rd, on disbandment, to each parent battalion, as an inter-company cross-country-relay-race challenge cup. On each cup was engraved the letter and original unit of the disbanded company, and on the pedestal the names of the British and Gurkha officers of the 4/3rd on formation.

Thus ends the story of the Fourth Battalion 3rd Q.A.O. Gurkha Rifles. It speaks for itself and is indeed a record of which Col. Nicolay and his officers may well be proud. The honours and awards are given in Appendix 9. The casualties amongst "other ranks" sent to the second battalion in Palestine were forty-nine. The losses in the Afghanistan and Waziristan campaigns were 122, including one British and two Gurkha officers wounded. Not the least achievement was the reputation established in Waziristan, of never once having been ambuscaded—unique, perhaps, amongst Indian units of the Wana Column.

Col. Nicolay has been at great pains to chronicle, most ably and accurately, the history of his battalion, and it is from his words that this narrative has been compiled.

CHAPTER XXX

THE SECOND BATTALION

April 1920 to December 1927

N.W. FRONTIER : BACK TO LANSDOWNE : LIEUT. BHIM SING THAPA :
MOVE TO THE KHYBER : THE CENTENARY BALL

AFTER its long-deferred return to its own station in April 1920, and the very warm reception accorded it by the 39th Garhwal Rifles, by the 3/3rd, and by its own depot, the 2/3rd spent the summer at Lansdowne, demobilising. There was indeed much to be done, for there were many arrears. But by the end of the autumn most of them were polished off; demobilisation was complete; leave men had rejoined, and the Gurkhas attached to the 4/11th, as well as the transfers to the now disbanded 3/3rd, had all returned to headquarters.

The next excitement occurred at the end of November 1920 in the shape of orders to be prepared to move at an early date for service on the North-West Frontier.

DARDONI AND DATTA KHEL

By the end of 1920 the battalion had reached Dardoni and joined the 7th Brigade. It then settled down for many months to the usual routine of pretty heavy convoy and permanent picquet duties. In March 1921 there was the immense satisfaction of winning the Pennell football challenge cup at Bannu. During the summer a considerable amount of training was carried out.

In November 1921 the Datta Khel column was formed, under the command of Col.-Commandant H. E. Herdon, C.I.E., who had taken over the 7th Brigade a month previously. The troops composing it, including the 2/3rd, moved on the 26th of that month to Miranshah fort. The battalion was under command of acting Lieut.-Col. R. C. Duncan, vice Lieut.-Col. Dundas, on sick leave, and the other officers were :

Acting-Major G. H. Paget.
Capts. G. H. Allanson (Adjt.).
C. H. Boucher.

Cpts. W. B. O. Fox.
 C. J. Morris.
 E. W. Langlands.
 D. McEachran, I.M.S., and
 H. J. A. Simpson.
 Lieuts. H. A. Skone.
 K. G. Harrison.
 G. A. Ballinger, and
 P. S. Day.

The next day Mahomed Khel was reached, and the perimeter camp was heavily sniped that night. The 2/3rd escaped losses, except amongst the camels and mules. The morning afterwards the unit assisted in some operations to establish a permanent picquet on the Spinchilla Pass. On the 30th the brigade moved to Datta Khel via this pass, reaching its destination without incident.

On the 4th of December A and B Companies, with a Vickers gun section, were deputed to return to Mahomed Khel. A week later (11th December) Major Paget, with A Company and two machine guns, moved out from Mahomed Khel to picquet the road as far as the nearest foot-hills of the Spinchilla Pass.

The 9th Gurkhas passed up to Datta Khel, and the 2/69th Punjabis reached the plain on the way down, both unmolested. When the rear company of the latter was some three hundred yards clear of these foot-hills, the 2/69th halted on the road, in fours. The furthestmost picquet of the 2/3rd was then being withdrawn, covered by the machine guns in position. It had actually reached the bottom of the hill, when suddenly a heavy fire was opened on it by the tribesmen from both flanks.

The M.G.s got a target at once in the shape of an enemy party on a hill some thousand yards to the west. A Company took up a position in a nullah close to the road, facing either flank. The O.C. 2/69th told Major Paget he would retire, and take up a position in rear to cover the withdrawal of A.

After an interval of about fifteen minutes Major Paget commenced to fall back. Meanwhile the enemy was closing in from three sides and putting in a more effective fire. As is so often the case, it was wellnigh impossible to locate his marksmen, using smokeless powder, in broken ground, and taking advantage of every boulder and every bush. Casualties mounted up, and a party of tribesmen, catching the retreating machine guns at close range, put one of them out of action.

Thus encouraged, the enemy became bolder still and threatened to interpose themselves between the Gurkhas and the 2/69th. It was manifest that the further withdrawal must be at best pace.

Major Paget meanwhile had been killed and Capt. Morris was in

command. He soon found that the Punjabis' covering position was so far back—about two miles—that touch with them had been lost. Parties of the tribesmen were here, there, and everywhere, and the Gurkhas had to retire fighting hard on every side. There was nothing for it but to abandon the dead and wounded.

Eventually the survivors reached the Punjabis' position, which was close to Mahomed Khel Camp, and were able to reform.

It is most gratifying to record that the gallant conduct of all ranks of the 2/3rd was beyond praise. The circumstances could hardly have been more trying. It was subsequently discovered that the enemy were—for them—in great strength ; probably at least six hundred. It was also ascertained that they suffered heavily, including amongst those killed their leader, the notorious raider Turia. The battalion casualties were :

Killed, twenty-three, including Major Paget ; wounded, nineteen.

For the remainder of December 1921 and during January 1922, the 2/3rd was employed in helping to build a new fort for the militia. On the 15th of December Major Tuite-Dalton rejoined from leave and took over command from Major Duncan. On the 4th of January Lieut.-Col. Dundas returned from sick leave and resumed his duties as commandant.

The brigade left Datta Khel on the 28th of the following month, reaching Dardoni on the 2nd of March without incident. There the 2/3rd remained during the summer and until the close of the year 1922.

RAZMAK OPERATIONS

The battalion ¹ left Dardoni on the 30th of December, 1922, and, marching to Thal in Tochi, moved with the main force to Asad Khel the next day and on to Tamre Oba on the 1st of January 1923. This place had been selected for the establishment of a new camp. The 2/3rd's immediate task was to build, and garrison, four camp picquets.

The next week was spent in constructing and occupying road picquets, providing covering parties, a move to Razani, and reconnaissance. From all these it was evident that a feature called Forest

¹ 700 strong with fourteen B.O.s and eighteen G.O.s. Although little more than a year had elapsed since the formation of the Datta Khel Column, there were many changes as regards British officers—Dundas and Colenso (the latter from the 7th G.R.) were C.O. and second in command. Boucher was adjutant and Skone, quartermaster. A Coy., Capt. E. M. West and 2nd Lieut. E. H. Garland ; B, Capt. G. E. R. S. Hartigan, M.C., and Lieut. C. L. Trafford ; C, Capt. Simpson and Lieut. P. S. Day, M.M. ; D, Capt. A. B. Barltrop, M.C., and Lieut. A. H. Woodhouse ; while Capt. H. R. Cursetji, I.M.S., was medical officer.

Ridge dominated any forward move to the Razmak Narai. Being the key to an advance, the brigade commander decided to establish three strong picquets on this ridge, situated at a height of 8,200 feet above sea level and 2,800 feet above Razmak.

It fell to the lot of the battalion to build and occupy these posts. Work was commenced on the 9th of January, and very arduous it proved to be. The hill-sides were particularly steep. Frozen snow covered the slopes, making the carriage of stores over them a task of much difficulty.

C Company found the garrisons, with Capt. Simpson and Lieut. Day in the main picquet, situated on the highest point. To this post was also allotted a trench mortar and two Vickers guns.

On the 10th of January the battalion scaled the Forest Ridge again, to complete the construction of the picquets. Parties of tribesmen attempted to work round both flanks of this densely wooded hill, and there was some firing. Nevertheless, the building of the picquets was completed by 14.15 hours and the battalion—less C Company—withdrawed to camp, having lost two Gurkhas killed. Among the enemy casualties was another well-known marauder.

A really bad spell of intensely cold weather now set in, with heavy snowstorms day after day. It was bad enough in lower lying camps ; on exposed elevations such as Forest Ridge—now named Alexandra Ridge in honour of the battalion—it was withering. But worse was to come, for, on the 23rd of January, the brigade moved to Razmak Narai in falling snow, which continued all day long. The camel transport did not reach camp until 21.30 hours. The battalion was directed to move via Alexandra Ridge with about two feet of snow on the top. Immediately on arrival in camp the Gurkhas had to set to work building picquets for the outer line of defence. This kept the men warm, but proved a very difficult operation in blinding snow, with the frozen ground as hard as iron.

On the 4th of February the 7th Brigade, advancing from Razmak, joined up with the 9th Brigade at Tauda China, the whole force being under Major-General Matheson, commanding in Waziristan. The battalion, less A Company, formed part of the advanced guard under Lieut.-Col. Dundas. Tribesmen snipers were very active all day. Men of C Company cut off the retreat of one party and bayoneted two of them. Just before reaching camp, enemy snipers had a modified revenge by wounding both Simpson and Day. Both were evacuated to D.I.K. general hospital.

The two other notable incidents on this move were, firstly, the close and very unwelcome attention received by C and D Companies from the machine guns and artillery of the 5th Brigade,

necessitating a hasty bolt to cover, until the firers could be warned ; secondly, the heavy casualties suffered by the Welch Fusiliers in the afternoon and evening from the tribesmen's attack on Split Hill.

Next day the battalion's task was to establish a permanent picquet on a precipitous hill-top 2,000 feet above Tauda China village. The mission was completed and camp reached again at 17.15 hours.

After some days spent in a very thorough destruction of villages, the remainder of February 1923 passed without incident except rain, snow and general discomfort. The Gurkhas were employed on convoy duty and working on the new cart road.

On the 12th of March, 1923, the 7th Brigade left Tauda China for New Razmak, distant six miles. Some sniping occurred, as usual, but there were no casualties in the 2/3rd. On the 20th, the first battalion arrived at Razmak to relieve the second—a weird place for a reunion after over twelve years. The two battalions had never come together since the Delhi Durbar of 1911.

The very next day, just as the first battalion had taken over all picquets and duties from the second, a S.O.S. message came in from a sapper called Ross to say he was being attacked in the Tauda China and had casualties. In one hour both battalions were on the spot, two miles from camp, and helped Capt. Ross and his escort to reach Razmak without any further loss.

Col.-Commandant H. E. Herdon, C.I.E., issued a special 7th Brigade order at Camp Razmak on the 21st of March, 1923. This special order of the day conveyed the brigade commander's very high appreciation of the military qualities displayed, invariably, by all ranks of the 1st Border Regiment, the 2/3rd Gurkhas and the Tochi Scouts, who were leaving the brigade. Col. Herdon added that he felt a proud man to have had such efficient, well-disciplined and willing units under his command, and that he bade them farewell with deep regret.

The second battalion marched out of Razmak on the 31st of March, 1923, *en route* to Bannu to entrain for Lansdowne. On the march two delightful compliments were received. Firstly, at Idak, the G.O.C. Kohat district, General Jacob, came to bid farewell, and said very nice things about the good work done by the battalion during the recent operations. Secondly, a telegram was received from General Birdwood, commanding the Northern Army, thanking the 2/3rd for its splendid services and wishing it good luck.

Lansdowne was reached on the 4th of April, 1923, after an absence of over two and a quarter years. The Royal Garhwal Rifles gave the battalion a splendid reception, but the rejoicings were

marred by receipt of the sad news that Lieut. P. S. Day, M.M., had died of his wounds in the hospital at Dera Ismail Khan.

As noted at the end of Chapter XXV, the unveiling of the War Memorial to the British officers of the battalion who died in the Great War is detailed in Appendix 11. It was unveiled by Lieut.-Col. W. L. Dundas, D.S.O., in St. Mary's Church, Lansdowne, on Sunday the 10th of June, 1923, and all officers in the garrison were present.

From November 1923 to February 1924 the 2/3rd carried out battalion, brigade and divisional training, as well as individual and collective field firing, near Roorkee and Najibabad. On the 28th of February Lieut.-Col. C. H. A. Tuck, C.I.E., succeeded Lieut.-Col. W. L. Dundas, D.S.O., as commandant, the latter's four years' tenure having expired. A year later (24th of February, 1925) Major J. E. Colenso was appointed second in command to Lieut.-Col. Tuck, having joined the 2/3rd, from the 7th Gurkhas, at Dardoni in 1922.

During the remaining months of the year 1924 four events stand out as being of particular interest :

1. In the *Gazette* of India, dated the 30th of May, Lieut.-Col. Dundas was awarded a brevet colonelcy, and Capt. H. J. A. Simpson the military cross—both for distinguished service in connection with the 1921-23 military operations in Waziristan and with the Razmak Field Force.

2. The usual visits of inspecting officers took place, and their reports were invariably excellent.

3. On the death of the regimental colonel (General Hutchinson), the following cable was received on 25th November from Her Majesty Queen Alexandra, Colonel-in-Chief, 3rd Gurkhas :

“I deeply regret death of General Hutchinson and as Colonel-in-Chief offer to all ranks of my regiment sincere sympathy.

ALEXANDRA.”

4. Lansdowne has always been liable to very violent thunderstorms and fatalities have occasionally occurred for some years. On the 10th of December, 1924, during one of these storms, Naick Jagat Sing Thapa, when on duty in the quarter guard, was struck by lightning and killed instantaneously. Two more men were struck in the office, but recovered. Others were stunned temporarily.

Unlike the old days, up to shortly before the Great War, the first and second battalions, at Almora and Lansdowne, respectively, now moved down to the plains for training, every winter. During the final decade of the last century and the first decade of this one, such moves were almost the exception. Early in 1925 the second battalion

went into camp at the new cantonment, Delhi, together with the 1st Welsh Regiment and 3rd Garhwal Rifles, the whole forming the 18th Infantry Brigade. There was some very strenuous training, including command manœuvres. The unit returned to Lansdowne again on the 2nd of March.

The 17th of the same month marked the severance of Lieut. Bhim Sing Thapa's connection with the battalion after twenty-nine years' service in the regiment—with a record, moreover, so gallant and so meritorious that it can hardly have a parallel in the Indian Army.

In his farewell orders to this officer, Lieut.-Col. Tuck bore witness to his intelligence, his industry and his prowess, from the time he joined as a rifleman in 1896 to the day he handed over his duties as quartermaster in 1925. The C.O., in conclusion, expressed his confidence that all ranks, while deeply regretting his departure, would join with him in wishing Lieut. Bhim Sing Thapa every success in his new appointment as commandant of infantry in the imperial service troops of the state of Jaipur. A few days later the foremost newspaper in India, *The Pioneer*, printed the following leaderette :

"The retirement of Lieutenant Bhim Sing Thapa, M.C., I.O.M., quartermaster of the 2/3rd Gurkhas, marks the termination of the regular service of a very gallant officer. Lieutenant Bhim Sing Thapa joined the 3rd Gurkhas in 1896, and his first experience of active service was with the first battalion in Waziristan five years later. Having been promoted Jemadar in 1913, he proceeded in 1914, with a draft of the first battalion of his regiment, to join the second battalion in France. He served in France, Sinai and Palestine from October 1914 to April 1918, when he was severely wounded. He became subadar-major and fought in all the big battles in which the battalion was engaged, was four times mentioned in dispatches, and won the Military Cross and the Indian Order of Merit. In addition, recognition of his specially distinguished services was forthcoming in the award of a King's commission and a jagir. Lieutenant Bhim Sing's father and grandfather were Subadars in the 1/3rd Gurkhas, the latter fighting in the Mutiny, Bhutan, Afghanistan and Burma. The fourth generation is represented in the regiment, for Lieutenant Bhim Sing's son (Mahiman Thapa) is now a Jemadar in the second battalion. This exceptional record of military service is one of which the family has every right to be immensely proud."

The 2/3rd barracks at Lansdowne—to which reference has been made in Chapter X—were, in 1893-94, the last word in barrack building ; so much so that all details were published in a pamphlet by the quartermaster-general's branch and issued for the edification of other people. But they were built mainly by unskilled labour, and over twenty years of exposure had tested them severely. Moreover, a higher standard of comfort was now required. In 1923-24, therefore, they were condemned and a total reconstruction recommended

at a cost of ten lakhs of rupees. Rather a different matter to the Rs. 57,000, which was the total outlay in 1893-94 for :

- (a) Eight two-storied barracks for single men.
- (b) One single barrack for the band.
- (c) Quarters for 160 families.
- (d) Quarters for 16 Gurkha officers.
- (e) Quarters for 40 followers.

The work of reconstruction of these buildings on the old sites, in what was now named "Queen's Lines," was commenced in December 1924 and continued during the whole of 1925.

On the 1st of October, 1925, the battalion moved to the Khyber. It arrived at Landi Kotal on the 7th and relieved the 2/9th Gurkhas there the same day. Four days later the King and Queen of the Belgians, when visiting the Khyber, walked through the 2/3rd lines and spoke to both British and Gurkha officers.

Early in 1925 the officers of the second battalion decided to utilise a portion of the balance of the Centenary Fund (Rs. 4,475) in the purchase of a bell for striking the hours of the quartermaster. This bell was to serve a double purpose, that is to say, not only be a centenary commemoration, but also a war memorial to all ranks of the 2/3rd.

The design was very skilfully conceived by Mr. F. Morton Crookes and the work carried out, to every one's satisfaction, by the Army and Navy Stores. Major Colenso, being at home at the time, looked after the matter and informed the writer, amongst others, when the bell was on view ; also the department housing it. A visit to Victoria Street, however, disclosed the fact of a crowd round a prominent window on the ground floor, gazing at the memorial and making remarks that were most complimentary both to the designer and the unit. Major Colenso was to have taken the bell to Sandringham for inspection by Queen Alexandra, but, unfortunately, Her Majesty was too unwell for any interview.

Shortly afterwards—the 23rd of November, 1925—the end came, to the great grief of all ranks of both battalions. Col. Edwardes, who was in London, dispatched a telegram of condolence to the King's equerry, in the name of the regiment, and received an immediate acknowledgment—as also happened in respect of a very beautiful wreath which he had dispatched to Windsor on the 27th of November.

At the funeral on the 27th, the following six past and present officers of the regiment attended, and marched in the procession from St. James's Palace to Westminster Abbey : Major-Generals Sir W. L. G. Beynon and Nigel G. Woodyatt, Col. J. G. Edwardes, Lieut.-Col. A. H. R. Dodd, Majors J. E. Colenso and G. W. P. Money.

The memorial bell, having arrived in India early in 1926, was unveiled at Landi Kotal on the 18th of February by the brigade commander. Col.-Commandant Loch, in his address, very aptly remarked that to his mind it was "most happily chosen, and well fitted by its beauty of design, clearness of tone and portability, to serve at all times to remind you, from day to day, of the great sacrifice made by those of all ranks, being members of your unit, who gave their lives for King and Cause in the Great War of 1914-1918."

At the request of the officers of both battalions Major-General Sir W. L. G. Beynon, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., who belonged to the 3rd Gurkhas from 1890 to 1909, was appointed colonel of the regiment on 16th March, 1926, vice Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I., deceased.

Garrison duty, at either Landi Kotal or Landi Khana and Bagh, was the role of the second battalion that winter. After being re-armed with the short M.L.E. rifle, Mark 111, it spent the summer of 1926 at Bagh. In spite of the heat the men kept remarkably well, except for some sand-fly fever.

While at Landi Khana the unit received the new Army Instruction revising the peace establishment of all Gurkha battalions. The news that the new organisation consisted of four active and one training company of recruits, with the necessary staff, was viewed with great satisfaction. It was noted that the training companies' role would be to provide trained men for their battalions ; also that, for the present, Almora and Lansdowne would be the stations for the first and second battalions' new venture ; but that in war time the training companies of each group would amalgamate and form a Gurkha group centre.

In March 1927 the second battalion received a telegram from Burma that Capt. Edward Maxwell West, serving with the Eastern Battalion of the Burma Military Police, had been killed in action when in command of a column on the Triangle Expedition.

The brave son of a brave father, killed with the first battalion in Tirah, his loss was greatly felt by all ranks. In a telegram to His Excellency the Governor of Burma, the Inspector General of Police wired : "Please convey to relatives of Capt. West my deep regret at the death of a very gallant officer, a great gentleman and a fine sportsman. I mourn his loss as a friend."

The second battalion arrived at Bareilly on the 21st of October, 1927, for collective training. On the 8th of November it was joined by the first battalion, the two units being camped alongside one another on the Maidan, with a combined officers' mess.

On the 9th of December, 1927, during the Bareilly "week," the officers of the regiment gave a Centenary Ball at the Club. The Great

War having precluded the possibility of any centenary celebration in 1915, and active service, somewhere, having stood in the way later on, this first opportunity was seized on at once. The ball was in fancy dress, all the officers of the 3rd appearing in a uniform copied from that worn by Lieut. Sir Robert Colquhoun in his picture. Six recruit boys and a drummer, utilised for handing programmes, etc., wore replicas of the orderly's kit in the same picture and described in the appendix on dress and equipment. The hostesses were dressed in frocks of the 1815 period, said to have been extremely becoming. About 200 guests attended.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE FIRST BATTALION

August 1914 to November 1918

KOHAT AND IRAQ

WITH the exception of detail regarding officers and drafts to the second battalion and other units, nothing has been chronicled regarding the first battalion since events dated 1913.

The difficulty under the old system of two battalions of a Gurkha regiment being mobilised at the same time—especially during the monsoon—has already been explained in Chapter XIX. As a matter of fact, in August 1914 the first battalion, being in the Bareilly Brigade, did receive orders to mobilise, together with the remainder of the 9th (Meerut) Division. Shortly afterwards this was cancelled, as A.H.Q. ruled against both battalions of a Gurkha unit proceeding overseas.

The 1/3rd was therefore taken out of the Bareilly Brigade and replaced by the 29th Punjabis. When, however, that unit was side-tracked to East Africa the 2/8th G.R., from the Garhwal Brigade, took its place. The first battalion at the same time received orders to complete both the 2/3rd and 2/8th to war strength. As stated before, drafts for this purpose left Almora on the 16th of August—strength eight G.O.s and some 420 other ranks.

Month after month Lieut.-Col. Hickley and those left behind laboured continuously, training and dispatching officers and recruits. Some hundreds of men of the Burma Military Police were also attached to the battalion, before being drafted to various units. Office work was stupendous, what with batch after batch of recruits, the recording of casualties and rewards, the difficulties of detail concerning transfers, settling the estates of the deceased, compiling returns and calculating balances of pay. It is creditable, therefore, to note that the reports of the commander-in-chief, divisional-area and brigade commanders, as well as other inspectors, were mainly very satisfactory for the next three years.

As regards those who—as it were—passed through Almora, the

honours and rewards, the names of the various officers and their casualties, appear in other pages of this work, as do the strength and detail of the various reinforcements.

On the 18th of February, 1916, the 1/3rd moved to Kohat, North-West Frontier Province. It then proceeded to Hangu and the Samana outposts in October and returned to Kohat in February 1917.

Lieut.-Col. A. C. Hickley vacated the command on the 1st of June of that year, after twenty-seven years' service with the first battalion. Major C. H. A. Tuck was appointed temporary commandant, until the arrival of Lieut.-Col. J. G. Edwardes at Kohat on the 3rd of July, 1917.


The following October, by which time it appeared to the officers that the unit was firmly anchored at Kohat, orders were received to mobilise—1200 strong. On the 1st of November a draft of 365 from the depot at Almora helped in this matter, and nine days later 1200 new pattern 1914 rifles arrived. Some musketry practices were rushed through, and the battalion embarked on H.M.T. *Elephanta* at Karachi for Basra on the 22nd of November, 1917—strength, B.O.s thirteen, G.O.s twenty, other ranks 1178.

The 1/3rd arrived at Basra on the 26th and, much to the men's delight, were re-armed with the short rifle. Next day the unit moved about twenty-one miles up river, in barges, to Nahr Umr. There it remained ten days employed in building a protective "bund" against floods. An average of about 900 men worked daily for six hours, in which time it was found each man accomplished a task of thirty-one cubic feet. The Labour Corps alongside only managed a mean of eleven cubic feet per man in an eight-hour day.

The next journey, up river, was to the advanced base at Bagdad, reached on the 17th of December, 1917. There the battalion joined the 53rd Infantry Brigade of the newly formed 18th Indian Division at Iron Bridge Camp on the Khurr Canal. Brigadier G. A. F. Sanders, late R.E., was in command of the brigade, the other units being 1/9th Middlesex, 1/89th Punjabis, and the 1/7th Gurkhas.

After a brief period of training the battalion crossed the Tigris and camped on the outskirts of Bagdad at Jilani. Eighteen days were occupied there in more digging—this time, the construction of a railway embankment for the new line to Bakuba.

A reconcentration at Iron Bridge Camp on the 29th of January, 1918, was followed on the 4th of February by a move to Museyib in relief of the 45th Sikhs. This town is situated on the Euphrates, forty-one miles south of Bagdad. Immediately on arrival a new C Company was formed in place of the old C left behind at Bagdad, as the 1/3rd's contribution to the newly raised 2/11th Gurkhas. As a



matter of fact, however, this company, with Major C. A. B. Hamilton and Lieut. Molesworth, was picked up again by the battalion in May, on its way through Bagdad. It did not actually join the 2/11th until September 1918.

On the 12th of March, 1918, the assistant provost marshal of Nejf—Capt. Marshall—was murdered just outside the town, which is situated on the right bank of the Euphrates fifty miles south of Museyib and seven west of Kufa. It is a large and holy city standing on commanding ground, surrounded by walls, and containing in its midst the tomb of Ali, surmounted by a golden dome. Of all the Shiah tombs this is the richest.

A refusal on the part of the inhabitants to produce the assassins necessitated a blockade, for which a detachment of the 1/3rd, consisting of one and a half companies, under Capt. G. W. P. Money, with Lieut. McKay Forbes, was detailed. On arrival at the scene of action on the 25th of March, the detachment took over a sector of the line from the 10th Lancers the same evening. All round the city a ring of picquets was formed, which moved nearer and nearer to it every day. The food and water supplies were cut off, and no Arab was permitted to enter or emerge.

The inhabitants contented themselves with firing from the city walls and from lofty mounds adjoining, especially the Huwaish mounds, outside the southern gate. As the days passed and the blockade appeared to be ineffectual, it was decided to capture these mounds. In the early morning of the 7th of April three platoons of the 1/3rd, led by Lieut. McKay Forbes, carried out a very successful assault, including the capture of an Arab standard. When the 1/9th Middlesex took some similar mounds the following day, the blockading circle was practically identical with the walls of the city, and the Arab resistance lessened daily. Lieut. McKay Forbes and Subadar Chitrabir Thapa were specially mentioned for their skilful leading and gallantry in this assault.

The remainder of the battalion arrived at Nejf on the 11th of April, to find the chief occupation was raiding and the investigation of underground quarters with which the whole city was infested. There were found numerous wretched, but quite innocent, Arabs suffering terribly from thirst. This was reported at once, and, besides arrangements for fifty donkey loads of water to be taken daily into the city, certain refugees were allowed out. Talking of donkeys, a white one was captured by a Gurkha picquet and christened Nejf. It was found extremely useful in the many treks the battalion made later on. By the 3rd of May all the criminals named had been handed over and the blockade was raised the next day.

The 53rd Brigade now moved north, and the battalion, after marching to Kufa, was carried across the left fork of the Euphrates on the 6th of May. Three days later it reached the railhead of the new Bagdad-Hilla railway, entrained, passed through Bagdad and detrained at Beled, a station south of Samarra, at 10 p.m. The following day it marched six miles to Akab and crossed over to the left bank of the Tigris. Here, in the angle made by the confluence of the Tigris and the Adhaim, it settled down in camp to train hard for the winter offensive, holding, with one company, a portion of the elaborately constructed covering position.

By the end of September 1918 the activities of the general staff denoted an early move. Then came that appalling epidemic of influenza which created such havoc amongst the troops, both in India and in Mesopotamia, that many units—amongst them the 1/3rd—had much difficulty in finding sufficient men for ordinary regimental guard duties.

Together with a portion of the brigade, the battalion moved to Beled on the 8th of October, although the Gurkhas were still extremely weak. Movement, however, seemed most beneficial, for after two long marches on the 9th and 10th, Samarra was reached on the latter date with the effects of the influenza almost obliterated. A five days' halt, however, was welcome enough, and then three long marches more found the 53rd Brigade concentrated again at Tekrit on the 18th of October.

It should be explained that north of Tekrit lies the Jabel Hamrin Range, a formidable barrier, right across the Tigris route. There is only one opening, namely, at the Fahtah Gorge, where the river has forced a passage through the hills. It was known the Turks had spent all the hot weather in strengthening this position.

Operations commenced on the 20th, the battalion moving out of Tekrit at 10 p.m. Halting just before dawn, it lay in bivouac during the heat of the 21st, moving on again at dusk. The same method was adopted on the following day. When the 53rd Brigade moved forward on the evening of the 23rd, to relieve the 55th, engaged in preliminary operations in front, the rumour that the enemy had withdrawn was confirmed. The 53rd received orders to halt, while the other two brigades moved on to the Fahtah Gorge.

The Turk had got clean away, crossing to the right bank by a bridge unspotted by the British 'planes. On the 24th the battalion marched through the gorge and several miles beyond, where the 53rd Brigade spent the night. Next morning early, the brigade continued the advance with emergency rations only and soon came under shell fire from high ground on the right bank. It was the

1/3rd's baptism, and although the target was an ideal one for the enemy, the effect of their shells was nullified by the extreme softness of the ground.

Men who had been in France, *e.g.* Subadar Dalkesar Gurung, treated the shelling with complete indifference. To the remainder, there was a general feeling of relief when the battalion reached the Lesser Zab and was ordered to dig in. Only three casualties had been sustained. At 3 p.m. the 1/7th Gurkhas came up on the left and crossed the Lesser Zab unopposed. The 1/3rd followed, fording the river with linked hands. On reaching the high ground on the right bank, both battalions halted and bivouacked, finding their own outposts. The emergency ration had been consumed and nothing more came that night.

On the 26th of October came food, coupled with most persistent rumours of the impending capitulation of Turkey. Everything assumed a roseate hue. When, during the day, orders were received to extend the existing outpost line, it was considered more than probable that the advance northward was suspended. Fighting was still progressing on the right bank, but on the left there was no enemy.

Next day, however, at 8.30 a.m., to every one's surprise, orders came to move forward at once. General Cassels, commanding the 11th Cavalry Brigade, making a wide detour, had crossed the Tigris and dug himself in athwart the Turks' line of retreat near a place called Huwaish. As his force was being heavily shelled, the 53rd Brigade was detailed to go to his assistance by a forced march.

The start was at 10 a.m. At 2.30 a.m. the next morning (28th) touch was established with one of Cassels' patrols. By 4 a.m. the brigade reached a point two miles from Cassels' left. The battalion had accomplished a march of thirty-three miles on short rations and under most trying conditions (for constant halts had been necessary to check direction), but not one Gurkha fell out.

The enemy made no attempt to cross to the left bank of the Tigris, as expected, and at daylight the 1/3rd moved into a shallow nullah. At 6 a.m. the Turks spotted the brigade machine guns and opened artillery fire at close range from a cliff across the river. With the advantage of commanding ground, the Turkish guns—which could be seen with the naked eye—shelled the batteries attached to the 53rd Brigade out of each position in turn, and the fire did not slacken until 10 a.m. The battalion sustained several casualties, especially amongst the animals, which it was impossible to hide.

At 11.30 a.m. D Company, under Lieut. Dodd, moved forward to try to locate two enemy howitzers on the far bank and became a target for the hostile artillery. Nevertheless, this unit

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managed to inflict casualties on the Turkish gun teams. At noon, another company under Capt. Money went out to a small hill on the river bank to watch a ford. Both these companies maintained their positions under continuous shell-fire throughout the day. When the 1/9th Middlesex advanced to the river bank at 5 p.m. and joined up on Money's left, all fear of the Turks crossing the ford was removed.

Just after midnight, the 1/3rd received orders to cross the Tigris and join Cassels. A ferry had been constructed a few miles further north, and with its assistance the battalion was concentrated on the cliff head, north of Huwaish, at General Cassels' headquarters, by 7 p.m. on the 29th of October, 1918.

Orders for an attack were issued early on the 30th. At 7.30 a.m., however, on account of white flags raised by the Turks, the battalion was sent forward, with the 1/39th Garhwal Rifles on its right. Not a shot from the enemy. The only British firing was of a desultory kind, for some hours, at hordes of Arabs, who appeared from nowhere, to gather what spoil they could lay their hands on.

The battlefield bore eloquent testimony to the fierce attempts made by the Turkish army to escape. Dead and dying lay about everywhere. Seven hundred Turks were collected and sent back; while, to the south, long columns of men could be seen wending their way to surrender to the other division. During the night of the 30th-31st of October the Turk had destroyed his guns.

On the 1st of November, 1918, the 1/3rd left the 53rd Brigade and moved forward to form the line of communications for General Fanshawe's Mosul Column. Posts were established at Hammam Ali, Shura, Qaiyarah and Hadraniyeh, with battalion headquarters at Qaiyarah. Turkish barracks were occupied at all posts, and a recaptured river steamer accommodated headquarters—all very acceptable after bivouacking for a month. After the armistice, the line being extended further south, one company took over the garrison duties of the railhead, Sherghat.

For the final operations against the Turks, Lieut.-Col. J. G. Edwardes received the D.S.O. and Capt. G. W. P. Money the M.C.; Subadar Dalkesar Gurung, Subadar Chandrabir Thapa, and Jemadar Tulbir Pun were awarded the I.D.S.M. In addition, Capt. L. Monier-Williams, Capt. L. W. McKay-Forbes, Lieut. J. R. Dodd, No. 4026 Rifleman Parmanand Thapa, and No. 4295 Rifleman Karbir Rana, were mentioned in dispatches, the names of Subadar Chitrabir Thapa, and No. 4701 Rifleman Jhusia Pun being added later.

CHAPTER XXXII

FIRST BATTALION

February 1919 to July 1921

POST-WAR PERIOD IN IRAQ

THE period immediately after the armistice was an extremely monotonous one for the men. Daily convoys between the various posts necessitated escorts, and the roads were as often as not a foot deep in mud. In the posts themselves life was not without its attractions. The destruction of hundreds and hundreds of Turkish bombs, by casting them into the Tigris, gave the men a plentiful supply of fish. Hammam Ali possessed a hot sulphur swimming bath, and Qaiyarah, with its German exploited oilfield, was always interesting. But, nevertheless, it came as a relief when orders were received to move south to rejoin the brigade at Tekrit, which was reached on the 1st of February, 1919.

Everything seemed to denote peace. A habitable camp was formed ; training programmes prepared ; officers and men engaged for the duration of the war were demobilised ; the 1/9th Middlesex left for England, and leave parties were allowed to depart. Then, in May, the South Kurdistan trouble broke out.

A Sheikh Mahmoud suddenly instigated an armed rebellion and imprisoned several political officers in the town of Suleymaniah, close to the Persian border. This necessitated a move into the country in the shape of two columns, one via Kirkuk and Chamchamal, the other from Bagdad by way of Kingerban. Major-General T. Fraser was in command of the operations.

The 53rd Brigade formed part of the former column, and the battalion entraining at Tekrit on the 27th of May, 1919, detrained, after three hours, at Baiji. Thence a march of ten miles took it to Fathah Gorge, where it arrived at 4 p.m. after the hottest of hot marches along a road deep in dust. But this was not all. Orders were received later in the evening to man-handle the transport carts across a bridge 400 yards long in the dark. This operation took most of the night.

The following day at 5 a.m., the march was resumed to a camping ground across the desert, by name Uthmaniyah, said to be fifteen miles away. After five hours' marching there was no sign of the destination and water bottles had run dry, but were refilled from a supply carried on a motor lorry. Two hours more, and still no river to mark the halting place. Water bottles were again empty, and the little Gurkhas, the majority having had no rest at all since Baiji, began to fall flat down on their faces as they marched.¹ The transport was sent on ahead, but the men were prostrated. The situation, indeed, appeared quite serious, but was saved by the arrival from Uthmaniyah of some lorries and a water cart, driven by a British gunner. The day's march had been close on twenty-five miles.

The next day's halt, on the Zab, put the men right, and they did the eighteen miles required of them on the 30th of May without flinching. Many of them, however, were taking no risks and carried their chaguls filled with water, as well as their bottles, although the route ran along the river throughout.

On the 31st a start was made at 2 a.m., and water reached eight hours afterwards. In the early afternoon General Morris, commanding the 55th Brigade, arrived from Kirkuk and explained the situation. The garrison of Chamchamal was surrounded. Two columns sent to investigate had not been heard of since departure.

Half the battalion was rushed at once into Kirkuk in lorries. The other half got six miles further on foot and then halted. The Kirkuk news was that the 32nd Lancers had been surrounded at Kara Anjir. Verbal orders followed for an early start next morning, the 1st of June.

Starting at 3.45 a.m., the Gurkhas pushed on, the first six miles by lorry and then on foot. Soon after noon touch was established with the beleaguered, when it was learnt that the Kurds had retired during the night.

On the 3rd, A Company, under Lieut. Holworthy, together with one company 48th Pioneers, experienced a little excitement. They marched out from Kara Anjir five miles towards Chamchamal to try to salvage the remains of an army transport cart convoy, ambuscaded by the Kurds, in a gorge, a few days before. These two companies were heavily engaged by the enemy and obliged to fight a rear-guard action back to camp, pursued by the Kurdish cavalry to within a thousand yards of the picquet line. There were a few casualties, and the brigade-major, Capt. King-Salter, was killed.

¹ A not uncommon incident, which has happened in Baluchistan in cases of severe marching in extreme heat without water.—Ed.

Chamchamal was relieved on the 6th of June and there were some small local operations during the next few days, but the most startling occurrence was the discovery of two mutilated corpses in the water supply and just upstream from the Kara Anjir camp.

The battalion moved forward to Chamchamal on the 17th, the enemy having concentrated at the Bazyan Pass. General Fraser had now arrived and decided on a frontal attack the next morning by the East Surreys and 85th Burmans, with the 1/3rd in reserve. The Kurds were heavily defeated, Sheikh Mahmoud wounded and captured, and the rebellion squashed.

On the 20th of July the battalion returned to Kirkuk, and three days later, as part of Tuck's force,¹ moved in five marches, via Altun Kupri and Erbil, to Dera.

The reason for this excursion was to show troops in the district of Rowanduz during its evacuation by the assistant political officer, because of its inaccessibility. The area lies in the Kurdish mountains, close to the Persian border and some ninety miles east of Mosul. It had been overrun by both Russians and Turks during the war to such an extent that all supplies were practically non-existent. But communications were so difficult that rationing troops by supply convoys was impracticable.

The authorities were faced with two alternatives: firstly, to relinquish direct political control over Rowanduz altogether, as troops could not be maintained there; secondly, to retain control by moving the A.P.O.'s headquarters twenty miles west to Batas, whence he could exercise it, and at the same time be within easy communication of both Mosul and Erbil. They chose the latter. But for the evacuation and the removal of Government property troops and transport were necessary.

On the 6th of August a detachment, consisting of two troops 32nd Lancers and a company and a half of the 1/3rd under the command of Capt. Money, left Dera for Rowanduz. The first night was spent on the edge of the Harir plain, in which Batas is situated; the second, at the entrance to the Rowanduz Gorge.

This defile is ten miles long and was the scene of former disaster to the Russians. A mountain torrent rushes along the bottom, and the further an advance is made, the grander is the scenery. Money's column traversed its length on the 8th of August. Picqueting precautions were duly carried out, but no one was at all sorry that the opposition was *nil*.

¹ Colonel Edwardes was away on three months' leave in India and during his absence Major Tuck commanded the battalion. His force consisted of the 1/3rd, two troops 32nd Lancers, one section field battery and one section M.G. Coy.

Having completed its duty of collecting all Government property, disarming the local levies and destroying surplus ammunition, the little column returned by the way it had come. A slight detour was made to Batas, where the A.P.O. was installed and the cavalry dropped there as his escort.

On the 14th of August, 1919, Tuck's force was sent to Erbil, at the urgent request of the politicals, as the A.P.O. there was in danger of his life. Its arrival eased the situation considerably.

The next event occurred on the 19th of August, when a mixed column under Capt. Money's command left Erbil for the Rania district, lying some seventy miles to the east. This little force was composed of two troops 32nd Lancers, one section No. 50 Indian Mountain Battery, one section No. 239 M.G. Company and the 1/3rd, less C and D Companies. Col. Edwardes rejoined on the march, but left again very shortly to take over command of the brigade.

Like the venture to Rowanduz, this was the first time troops of the British Empire had ever been seen in Rania. This fact, the diversity of the country traversed, and the grandeur of the scenery, made the moves full of interest. A remarkable phenomenon of Kurdistan is the tendency of rivers to force their way at right angles through mountain ranges. On the 24th of August the column camped at Derband, six miles from Rania, on the banks of the Lesser Zab, where there was a further instance of this gorge formation.

Nothing of much interest occurred at Derband, and the column returned to Erbil on the 20th of October, 1919.

Then came work for another punitive detachment. Two political officers were murdered by Kurds at Bira Kapra, near the Greater Zab and a hundred miles north-east of Mosul. A column was formed of 45th Sikhs, 1/3rd and 1/10th Gurkhas under Lieut.-Col. Stapleton, C.M.G. Hence its designation, "Stapcol." The troops concentrated near Aqra, where Col. Edwardes rejoined, and reached that place on 24th November.

Four days later the column passed through Bira Kapra, which was empty, and camped near the right bank of the Greater Zab. The advance had been both arduous and difficult, over two parallel ranges of very precipitous hills, each of which was responsible for a horrible night without either food or kits. There was no opposition to speak of, simply some sniping. The men's work consisted mainly of marching about and burning villages. After the 5th of December the column was broken up and the 1/3rd, moving via Mosul, reached Shargat ¹ on the 16th *idem*.

¹ Called in the Indian Army List "Sharqat."

The news at Shargat was far from reassuring. It was considered pretty certain that trouble, which had originated at Dair-az-Zaur on the Euphrates, would spread. There was much counter-marching. A few hours after arrival at Shargat the battalion received orders to return to Mosul. It started next morning, but at the first stage—Hadraniyah—these orders were cancelled and the unit returned to Shargat. One company was detailed to guard a camp of a thousand Turkish prisoners.

On the 4th of January, 1920, the battalion—less the prisoners' guard—railed to Baiji and sent off to India one hundred demobilised Gurkhas. Duties at Baiji included night guards over the railway station and adjoining dumps, while musketry, and the construction of anti-hot weather accommodation, kept every one busy during February and March. It was in the middle of the latter month that the brigade-major, Capt. D. Macdonald, M.C., was murdered by Arabs while out alone on a reconnaissance.

Owing to the Kurds attacking a cart convoy near Aqra and carrying off some mule drivers, the battalion railed to Shargat on the 5th of April. The following day two companies under Capt. Money, with Lieut. Holworthy, marched via Mosul to Kharjawa close to Aqra. Here they joined a punitive column under Col. Sarel, 11th Lancers. The other units were the 11th Lancers and 1/39th Royal Garhwal Rifles. The column was designated "Sarcol."

There was the usual destruction of villages, with more than usually heavy fire from the Kurds on retirement. "Sarcol," reaching Aqra on the 19th of April, remained there ten days and experienced continuous, torrential rain—extremely unpleasant, with no tents, until some caves were discovered.

Meanwhile the negotiations with the Kurds were continued and resulted in all the captured drivers being returned and suitable reparation made. The column then dispersed, and the 1/3rd was concentrated once more at Baiji by the 8th of May, 1920.

The work of the two columns "Stapcol" and "Sarcol" earned the general service medal (Kurdistan and Iraq) with clasp "Kurdistan."

The next event was the Arab rebellion, which broke out while the battalion was at Baiji. Owing to cart convoys on the Mosul-Shargat road being raided in June 1920, and posts sniped, the 1/3rd was sent up again to take over from the 13th Rajputs at Qaiyarali and Hadra. Two months of very arduous work followed, in the shape of marches of from twelve to seventeen miles every day, in the middle of the hot weather. The Arabs, however, refrained from any further raids, and in August, on relief by the 106th Hazara Pioneers, the battalion moved back to Shargat.

Throughout the Arab rising of 1920 the battalion was commanded by Major Tuck, as Col. Edwardes was on leave and did not return until October. The former, in addition, was O.C. Southern Section of the Line of Communication stretching from Hadraniyah, south of Mosul to Beled, south of Samarra. The headquarters of this line of communication section and of the 1/3rd were at Shargat, which was the railhead for Mosul.

In his dual capacity Major Tuck held a position of much responsibility. His task not only included the duty of keeping open the line of communication between Bagdad and Mosul, but of guarding the vast dump of rations and stores at Shargat. Various detachments up and down the line were particularly successful in keeping open communications and dealing with Arab raids. Only once, for a week or so, on the occasion of a train being derailed, was the line interrupted.

This speaks well for the resource, ability and conduct of the officers and men of the battalion. Major Tuck was the recipient of messages from his immediate superiors expressing indebtedness for the efficient manner in which he had administered Shargat and all his section. Government rewarded him with a Companionship of the Indian Empire.

About the end of August and up to the 11th of September, 1920, Arab tribes of various strength made several attacks on the line of communications, notably at Samarra and Beled. For gallantry and resource on these occasions Major E. T. W. Macausland was made an officer of the British Empire, Capt. L. A. Foster was awarded the Military Cross, and Havildars Lile Thapa and Mitralal Thapa, the Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

The battalion spent the remainder of the year 1920 and the first half of 1921 in Shargat, protecting the railway and part of the road northwards towards Mosul. Nothing very exciting occurred, and in June 1921 the 1/3rd left Iraq and returned to India—strength, eight British, thirteen Gurkha officers, and other ranks 594.

A special 18th (Indian) divisional order of the day, No. 14, dated Mosul, 6th of June, and a special 53rd Indian Infantry Brigade order of the day, No. 2, dated Shargat, 9th of June, 1921, both speak in very eulogistic terms of the services of the 1/3rd and are amongst the battalion records. At Bagdad on the 13th of June the Commander-in-Chief, Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force, took advantage of the unit's presence in Bagdad, when passing through, to address the officers and men. After referring to their integrity and fine fighting qualities, he thanked them for their good services in Mesopotamia.

Almora itself was reached on the 22nd and 25th of July, 1921, where a fitting welcome awaited both officers and men after an absence of four years.

The General Officer Commanding the United Provinces District lost no time in communicating to the battalion a hearty welcome on its safe return, coupled with the appreciation and thanks of the Government of India and the Commander-in-Chief, on the good work done and services rendered while absent from India on field service. He added : "The record of your services in Mesopotamia, up to the final overthrow of the Turkish forces in 1918, and lately in Kurdistan and during the Arab rising in 1920, is one of which you may well be proud. Throughout the whole period the greatest determination and devotion to duty has been displayed by all ranks, and you have upheld the confidence and trust placed in you by your King-Emperor and country."

CHAPTER XXXIII

FIRST BATTALION

1921-1927

N.W. FRONTIER AND BACK TO ALMORA

As will be seen in Appendices 17 and 19, giving a list of commandants and a list of British officers, there were a good many changes shortly after the return of the battalion to Almora from Mesopotamia. Lieut.-Col. Edwardes relinquished command on the 31st of October, 1921. Lieut.-Col. Shuttleworth was appointed in his place on the 1st of November, but for one day only, as his services could not be spared from the Army of the Black Sea. Consequently, Brevet Lieut.-Col. D. G. Ridgeway was made commandant from the 2nd of November, 1921.

In the last month of the year the unit was selected to proceed to Delhi for H.R.H. The Prince of Wales' visit, but owing to a few cases of influenza the move was cancelled. The advanced party, consisting of Capt. A. C. Ewen, Jemadar Bhim Sing Thapa and forty Gurkha ranks had, however, left Almora and therefore remained on at Delhi. They were employed as a special guard at the Kashmir Gate, on each official occasion of the Prince passing through it. The battalion was also represented, in addition, by the subadar-major, one jemadar and forty Gurkha other ranks.

Early in 1923 (7th of January) the 1/3rd entrained at Bareilly with destination Bannu, for service on the North-West Frontier. After joining the 5th Infantry Brigade, it took over the new post at Asad Khel and remained there until the 18th of March, 1923.

The next move was to Razmak where, as already recorded, it met the second battalion on the 20th of March and took its place in the 7th Infantry Brigade. There the duties mainly consisted of the provision of covering parties, to protect the men working on the pipe water supply for Razmak camp.

On the 5th of May, when withdrawing from the lower slopes of Shuidar, Lieut.-Col. Ridgeway was severely wounded and one rifleman was killed.

Just a month later (6th June), also during a withdrawal, Rifleman Gokul Thapa of D Company was mortally wounded, carrying a sequel as disastrous as it was unusual. An enemy bullet passed through his haversack which was loaded with rifle grenades. On arrival in camp, when the wounded man's equipment was placed on the ground, one of the grenades exploded. This scattered the remainder in every direction, killing four men and wounding sixteen more, all of D Company.

One of the casualties, No. 4005 Lance-Naick Harakbahadar Gharti, received an immediate posthumous award of the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class, for a most brave and gallant action. Noticing, while his comrades were attending to the men injured by the first bomb, that a second was lying on the ground, smoking, he rushed out from cover, where he was entirely safe, and attempted to pick it up and throw it over the parapet. As he touched it the bomb exploded, killing the gallant fellow instantaneously.

During the remainder of the year 1923 the battalion moved out of Razmak twice on reconnaissance and protective duty, without meeting any opposition. There was nothing much doing, indeed, until the 1st of June, 1924, when the 1/3rd, as part of the Razmak movable column, marched down the Takki Zam to Jandola. Thence, via the Shahur Tangi to Sarwekai, which was reached on the 7th of June. After a halt there of one day the column returned by the same route, arriving at Razmak on the 14th *idem*.

The outing was an unpleasant one, both on account of the great heat and the persistent sniping experienced by day and in camp at night. Moreover, no tents of any kind were taken, and the Gurkhas were limited to ten pounds of kit per man. On the 11th of June, when acting as rear-guard, the battalion was attacked between Jandola and Kotkai, having the quartermaster havildar and two Gurkhas severely wounded. Altogether the casualties were one killed and twenty-one wounded, in addition to many animals victimised.

It is worth mentioning that *officially* Waziristan became a peace district from the 1st of April, 1924.

From the 24th of July to the 4th of September, 1924, the battalion formed part of a force sent out seven miles from Razmak to Tauda China, for repairs to road bridges.

It was during this undertaking that a most cowardly and treacherous attack on three men of a 1/3rd picquet, posted in very close country, was made by a party of Khassadars.¹ These tribesmen, employed by

¹ Tribesmen employed by Government to maintain order and administered by the politicals. They provide their own weapons, ammunition, equipment, clothing, etc., and live in their own homes. The idea was to give lucrative employment to the tribal young bloods and check their raiding propensities. The plan has been largely successful. They

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Government, and actually at the time picqueting an adjacent hill, were able to approach the Gurkhas under the protection of the special distinguishing flag with which some Khassadars were provided when on duty. The murderers, waiting until they were at close quarters, opened fire suddenly, shot down the three unsuspecting Gurkhas, collared their rifles and bolted. Two of their victims were killed outright and the third left for dead.

On the 12th of September, 1924, with Lieut.-Col. Dodd in command, the battalion brought off a successful affair in the shape of a move by night to surround a village, five miles away. The opposition was slight and there were no casualties, but one Wazir was killed and a rifle captured. In the village itself were arrested three men concerned in an attack on British officers two months before, and five rifles were found and confiscated. The politicals were very pleased, and the district commander congratulated all concerned on the way the little show had been planned and carried out.

A month later, when General Matheson relinquished command of the Waziristan district, he wrote a particularly nice letter of farewell to the 1/3rd. After pointing out that the unit had been for twenty-one months incessantly engaged in columns, picqueting and road protection duties, under active service conditions; and after regretting the loss of thirteen Gurkha other ranks killed or died of wounds and disease and one British officer and twenty-four Gurkhas wounded, the district commander said he could not speak too highly of the manner in which the above duties had been carried out. General Matheson, in conclusion, expressed himself as especially pleased with the fine spirit always displayed, congratulated the battalion on its high state of efficiency, and declared that it had set a fine example to everybody.

The only other event of importance in 1924 was the battalion's victory in the Climo football cup competition, open to all Indian troops in the Waziristan command.

In January 1925, while still at Razmak, Col. D. G. Ridgeway was appointed A.A. and Q.M.G. Lahore district, with effect from the 3rd of April following, but to join at once in an officiating capacity. This left the command of the battalion vacant from the latter date, and it was given to Bt. Lieut.-Col. A. M. Mills, D.S.O., of the 1/4th (P.W.O.) Gurkhas. He did not, however, join at once,

have taken over a great deal of road protection and similar work. Provided regulars are within reach to give them a backing, they have been found to be, generally, quite reliable. They are provided with a brassard to wear on the arm (and in some areas given a distinctive flag). But as they often forget to wear the brassard, and as, anyway, it is quite invisible at a distance, these Khassadars, occasionally, have been shot at by mistake.—Ed.

being in officiating command of his unit, and Major A. G. Stone, having relinquished his staff appointment, became temporary commandant.

The following month, the battalion was selected to furnish the Viceroy's and C.-in-C.'s guards at Simla, a matter of two British officers and 200 Gurkha officers and men.

In the same month (April 1925) the *Gazette* of India notified the award of the Distinguished Service Order to Col. D. G. Ridgeway, for distinguished service in Waziristan, while the following, for meritorious work, were mentioned in despatches :

Bt. Lieut.-Col. A. H. R. Dodd.

Captain C. E. Gray.

Jemadar Parsai Gurung.

No. 843 Rifleman Maniraj Bura.

On the 9th of April, 1925, the battalion was relieved at Razmak by the 3/11th Sikh Regiment and arrived at Almora on the 26th of the same month. In his farewell message the commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade expressed his deep appreciation of the proficient and cheerful manner in which all work had been carried out, however irksome and however great the discomfort. He assured the 1/3rd that he could confidently assert that no battalion of pre-war era surpassed it in training and efficiency.

On the 9th of October, 1925, General Sir George Barrow came over from Naini Tal to unveil in the little church at Almora a memorial tablet erected by the battalion as a tribute to the twenty-three British officers of the regiment who were killed, or died, during the Great War, 1914-1918. Their names are given in Appendix 11, which describes a similar memorial service at Lansdowne in June 1923.

Col. Mills left the battalion on the 22nd of November, 1925, to officiate as commandant of the 2/4th Gurkhas. Major Stone was again put in to act. When Col. Mills was made permanent C.O. of the 2/4th on the 1st of February, 1926, Bt. Lieut.-Col. A. H. R. Dodd was appointed in his place to the command of the 1/3rd.

From the return of the battalion to Almora in April 1925 to the end of 1927, when this history closes, the usual routine work was carried out, with the normal winter training camp at Bareilly or elsewhere.

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It is interesting to record that the composition of the 1/3rd on the 15th of May, 1927, was as below :

Gurungs	-	-	-	-	-	-	379
Magars	-	-	-	-	-	-	419
Khas	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Newars	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Other Gurkhas	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
Local enlistments	-	-	-	-	-	-	112
							<hr/>
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	940

The remarks of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command, on the annual inspection report of the battalion for 1926-1927, make a very appropriate ending to this chapter :

“ A thoroughly serviceable battalion, well trained ; *esprit de corps* of a high order ; men happy and all justifiably proud of the battalion to which they belong.”

APPENDIX I

COPIES OF CERTAIN LETTERS OF INTEREST DATED
1815 TO 1818, TOGETHER WITH A LIST OF WORKS
ON NEPAL, ETC., WHICH WILL WELL REPAY PERUSAL.
THE SPELLING OF NAMES, ETC., HAS BEEN LEFT AS
GIVEN IN THE ORIGINALS.

*From THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
To THE HON'BLE EDWARD GARDNER,
Commissioner of Kumaon.*

Dated, TUTTYGHAR, 11th June, 1815.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch dated the 1st instant.

Adverting to the considerations stated in the last paragraph of that despatch, the Governor General is pleased to authorise you to entertain as Provincial troops for service in the Hills a proportion of Gorkahs, or Nipalese, especially such as have families resident in Kumaun and Garhwal. With regard to the number to be admitted into our service, you will please consult the Commanding Officer in Kumaun, by whose opinion jointly with your own the decision must be guided.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

J. ADAM,

Secretary to the Government.

*From THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
To THE HON'BLE E. GARDNER,
Commissioner of Kumaon.*

Dated, FORT WILLIAM, 20th October, 1815.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 29th ultimo, relative to the duties and footing of the Provincial Battalion under the command of Sir Robert Colquhoun, and to inform you in reply that you have rightly conceived the nature and duties of that corps which is to be considered as similar in all respects to other corps of the same description with this exception, that as occupying a Frontier it

will not be subject to the operation of the General rule by which those corps are to be commanded by Invalid officers.

His Excellency the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council entirely approves of your suggestion that with reference to the sphere of its local duties extending from Sreenugger to the Kali, the Headquarters should be in a central position, and I am accordingly directed to signify to you the authority of His Lordship in Council to select an eligible spot for the cantonments of the Corps in the vicinity of the civil station, particular regard being paid to the salubrity of its situation as being essentially connected with the efficiency of the troops. With reference also to the position of the cantonments in a military point of view it would be proper that you should avail yourself of the knowledge and experience of the officer commanding in Kumaun and I am accordingly directed to desire that the spot in question may be fixed on in communication with Lieut.-Col. Adams.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) J. ADAM,
Secretary to the Government.

From THE COMMANDER,
Kumaon Provincial Battalion
To THE HON'BLE EDWARD GARDNER,
Commissioner of Kumaun, etc., etc.

Dated, CHOUPUKHEEA, 5th December, 1815.

SIR,

I beg to state to you that since the Kumaun provincial battalion has been stationed at Choupukheea I have made every exertion to raise recruits but have almost entirely failed, having been only able since the corps left Almora to enlist twenty men,—although I have sent out several parties under native officers and have also gone out myself, every endeavour in this neighbourhood has proved unsuccessful.

Hereafter when we are in a more settled state, and the inhabitants of the district can see the advantages of the service, I have no doubt the difficulty will cease and they will gladly avail themselves of it, at present there are several reasons for their unwillingness to enter.

They see the ragged and uncomfortable state the men composing the battalion are in, the pay they have received having in general been expended in liquidating old debts, with accumulated interest, but the principal reasons I imagine are, their great aversion to being fixed at Choupukheea, the dread of being posted at the Ghauts and above all the difficulties they see our men reduced to in procuring food, being forced to wander all over the country in search of it ; this is of course evident to the inhabitants of every village in the district.

These causes however cannot operate at a distance, and as I am informed there are a number of men in the district of Srinagar who are willing to enter the service but do not like to undertake the journey with the chance of being rejected, I propose, should you approve of the measure, detaching Lt. Wight for the purpose of recruiting in that district.

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I should not trouble you on this subject, but (although I do not consider the corps in its present state as fit for service) as the troops of Kumaun are under marching orders, I do not feel authorised to detach a European officer without your sanction, with that of Col. Adams, to whom I have forwarded a copy of this letter.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) R. D. COLQUHOUN, Lt.,
Commander Kumaun Provl. Battalion.

*From THE COMMANDER IN KUMAON
To THE HON'BLE EDWARD GARDNER,
Commissioner in Kumaun.*

Dated, ALMORA, 11th January, 1816.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date and under the circumstances therein mentioned I entirely concur with you on the propriety of recalling the provincial corps to Almora, where its headquarters has been already fixed.

2. As, however, a party of irregulars may be thought necessary at Choupuckkea, agreeable to the recommendation of Colonel Nicolls, and it might not be altogether prudent, until the ratification of peace is officially proclaimed to withdraw our guards from the different ghauts on the banks of the Kali, unless the Goorkha commander should make a corresponding movement, it strikes me it would be as well to leave a party, for the present of 200 of the men who came with Jaikissun. On being favoured with your opinion on the suggestion I have ventured to make, I will issue the necessary directions for the march of the corps to Almora with the above exception, should the measure meet your approbation.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) ADAMS, Lt.-Col.,
Commander in Kumaun.

*From THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
To THE HON'BLE E. GARDNER,
Commissioner of Kumaun.*

Dated, FORT WILLIAM, 2nd March, 1816.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 4th ultimo on the subject of constructing lines for the provincial battalion, and to acquaint you in reply, that the Governor General in Council is pleased to authorise their construction as proposed. Sir Robert Colquhoun conforming to the directions of Major Penson under whose superintendence the Cantonments are to be constructed, and with

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whom he will accordingly correspond on the subject as occasion may require.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

J. ADAM,

Secretary to Government.

From THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT

To G. W. TRAILL, Esq.,

Acting Commissioner in Kumaun.

Dated, FORT WILLIAM, 13th July, 1816.

SIR,

I am directed to transmit to you the enclosed copies of a letter from the acting Civil Architect at Tuttyghur, under date the 22nd ultimo and of the reply which I have been instructed to address to that officer, and to desire that you will make an immediate advance to Sir Robert Colquhoun of Sunwat Rupees 8,000 on account of the Lines to be constructed for the provincial battalion and to pay to him such further sums as shall be certified by the Acting Civil Architect to be necessary for the completion of the work, reporting such payments for the sanction of His Lordship in Council.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

J. ADAM,

Secretary to the Government.

Enclosures.

1. From the acting Civil Architect to Secretary to Government, dated Tuttyghur, 22nd June, 1816.

2. Reply of Secretary to the same, dated Fort William, 13th July, 1816.

(1)

SIR,

I some time ago forwarded to the Military Board, the accompanying papers, thinking them military, and they were last night returned with a letter from the Board informing me that they belong to the Civil Department. I have now, therefore the honour to submit them to you for the consideration of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council.

2. As Sir Robert Colquhoun has come forward (his adjutant having declined it) under many difficulties to superintend these buildings I feel bound to recommend that he be allowed to draw the personal salary of 200 rupees and the establishment of 161 rupees per month for the terms of six months : or if more agreeable to His Lordship in Council, that he be allowed 2,000 rupees for his trouble, when the resident or acting resident shall certify that the buildings are finished to his entire satisfaction. I would further recommend that an immediate advance of eight thousand

Sunwat rupees be immediately made to Lieutenant Sir Robert Colquhoun on trust to enable him to commence and if it shall please His Lordship to entrust me with the privilege of giving him certificate on the Resident for the cash that may further be required. I hope we shall between us get this business accomplished on tolerable terms, though from what I have learnt since writing to the Board about these buildings I fear we shall not expend less than 11 or 12,000 rupees, for strange to relate, I am told by many that building materials are dear and that no Saul timber can be got near Howal Baag but at an enormous price for carriage by coolies.

I would strongly recommend that the fire place and two small glass windows for which Sir Robert is so anxious, be allowed to the sergeants' bungalow on account of the severity of the climate.

I have recommended a limited gratuity to Lieutenant Sir Robert Colquhoun not because I think his zeal less worthy of reward than that of others, but because officers leaving their corps to superintend civil buildings, or being obliged to stay behind when their corps march, are put to considerable loss and additional expense : whereas Sir Robert's superintendence is carried on from his own house and scene of it, his own parade. It may however at a future period of my superintendence perhaps be proper to make a general arrangement for remuneration, or should it meet the approbation of His Lordship in Council, propose a liberal compensation for every officer in proportion to the work he has to superintend, as well as the time in which he may reasonably be expected to finish it : and this I think would be most likely to give satisfaction to reasonable men ; as well as prevent interested and unreasonable delays : though I have too many evils at present to contend with to enter into the immediate consideration of this lease.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) LT.-COL. PENSON,
Acting Civil Architect.

(2)

The reply to above.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch to the address of the Secretary to Government in the Judicial department under date the 22nd ultimo.

His Lordship in Council is pleased to approve of the suggestions contained in your letter and the necessary orders will accordingly be issued to Mr. Traill, the acting Commissioner in Kumaon, to make an immediate advance to Sir Robert Colquhoun of Sunwat rupees Eight thousand on account of the Lines for the Provincial battalion and to pay to that officer such further sums as you shall certify to be necessary for the completion of the work.

The fire place and glass windows recommended to be added to the sergeants' bungalows are sanctioned by His Lordship in Council.

With respect to the remuneration to Sir Robert Colquhoun, His

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Excellency in Council is pleased as a special case to grant the amount which you have proposed to be allowed to him on the completion of the work, namely 2,000 rupees and the necessary orders will be issued for the payment of this sum on the Commissioner's report of the work having been finished to his satisfaction.

On the subject of the fourth paragraph of your letter, I am directed to acquaint you that the general question of remuneration to officers employed in the superintendence of civil buildings will be taken into consideration in the Judicial department and you will be hereafter apprized of the resolutions of Government on that subject through the Secretary in that department.

The original papers transmitted with your despatch are returned enclosed.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) JOHN ADAM,
Secretary to the Government.

From LT. SIR ROBERT D. COLQUHOUN,
Supervisor Civil Buildings, Hawalbagh,
To G. W. TRAILL, ESQ.,
Commissioner of Kumaun.

Dated, HAWALBAGH, 1st July, 1818.

SIR,

I have the honour to report to you for the information of Government the completion of the public buildings at Hawal Baag the construction of which were entrusted to my charge by the orders of Government of the 13th July, 1816.

Adverting to the length of period which has elapsed since the advances for the work were made, some explanation of the causes of delay appear necessary.

The first and principal of these has arisen from the impossibility of procuring a sufficient supply of workmen owing to the great number constantly employed on the Works at Almora, the obstacles presented by this cause have in more than one instance been such as to occasion a total interruption to the progress of the buildings.

The weather during the last twelve months has from the continued heavy falls of rain proved peculiarly unfavourable and the occurrence of two severe earthquakes within that period has occasioned no inconsiderable retardment by rendering it necessary after each shock to pull down a portion of the buildings, particularly of the hospital which had sustained much damage.

In consequence of slates not being procurable in the neighbourhood it became requisite to open a quarry at some distance a circumstance which had made the progress of roofing both tedious and expensive.

From the enclosed general statement it will be perceived that the total charges incurred have amounted to Rs. 5,921/12/10, which sum deducted

from the advance made to me of Rs. 8,000 leaves a balance in my hands of Rs. 2,078/3/2. The detailed accounts will be submitted if required.

In conclusion I beg leave to assure you that no exertions were wanting on my part to secure the speedy and due execution of the duty entrusted to my charge.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) R. D. COLQUHOUN,
Supervisor, Civil Buildings, Hawalbagh.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON NEPAL, ETC. :—

1. *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-1823*, by H. T. Prinsep, published in 1825.

2. *Tour through part of the Snowy Range of the Himala Mountains*, by J. B. Fraser, published in 1820.

3. *The Campaign in Kumaon*, by Major W. G. Hamilton, D.S.O., United Service Institution of India, 1903-04.

4. The Bibliography given in the two recent publications mentioned in the footnote to this page.¹

5. *A Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army*, by Lieut. F. G. Cardew, 10th D.C.O. Bengal Lancers, Government Press, Calcutta, 1903.

¹ Since this was written two very important publications have appeared, namely :

Nepal, by Percival Landon, 2 vols. Constable, London, 1928.

The Gurkhas, by Major W. Brook Northey, M.C., and Captain C. J. Morris. John Lane, London, 1928.

APPENDIX 2

COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN CORPS IN FRANCE

From October 1914 to November 1915

Corps Commander

Lieut.-General SIR JAMES WILLCOCKS, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I.,
D.S.O.

LAHORE DIVISION

Commander

Lieut.-General H. B. B. WATKINS, C.B.

FEROZEPORE BRIGADE

Commander

Brigadier-General R. M. EGERTON, C.B.

1st Battalion Connaught Rangers.
129th Duke of Connaught's Own Baluchis.
57th Wilde's Rifles (Frontier Force).
9th Bhopal Infantry.

JULLUNDUR BRIGADE

Commander

Major-General P. M. CARNEGIE, C.B.

1st Battalion Manchester Regiment.
15th Ludhiana Sikhs.
47th Sikhs.
59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force).

SIRHIND BRIGADE

Commander

Major-General J. M. S. BRUNKER.

1st Battalion Highland Light Infantry.
1st Battalion 1st King George's Own Gurkha Rifles.
1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles.
125th Napier's Rifles.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

15th Lancers (Cureton's Multanis).
Headquarters Divisional Engineers.
No. 20 Company Sappers and Miners.
No. 21 Company Sappers and Miners.
Signal Company.
34th Sikh Pioneers.

ARTILLERY UNITS

Headquarters Divisional Artillery.
5th Brigade R.F.A. and Ammunition Column.
11th Brigade R.F.A. and Ammunition Column.
18th Brigade R.F.A. and Ammunition Column.
109th Heavy Battery.

MEERUT DIVISION

Commander

Lieut.-General C. A. ANDERSON, C.B.

DEHRA DUN BRIGADE

Commander

Brigadier-General C. E. JOHNSON.

1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
1st Battalion 9th Gurkha Rifles.
2nd Battalion 2nd King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles.
6th Jat Light Infantry.

GARHWAL BRIGADE

Commander

Major-General H. D'U. KEARY, C.B., D.S.O.

2nd Battalion Leicestershire Regiment.
2nd Battalion 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles.
1st Battalion 39th Garhwal Rifles.
2nd Battalion 39th Garhwal Rifles.

BAREILLY BRIGADE

Commander

Major-General F. MACBEAN, C.V.O., C.B.

2nd Battalion Black Watch.
41st Dogras.
58th Vaughan's Rifles (Frontier Force).
2nd Battalion 8th Gurkha Rifles.

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DIVISIONAL TROOPS

4th Cavalry.
Headquarters Divisional Engineers.
No. 3 Company Sappers and Miners.
No. 4 Company Sappers and Miners.
Signal Company.
107th Pioneers.

ARTILLERY UNITS

Headquarters Divisional Artillery.
4th Brigade R.F.A. and Ammunition Column.
9th Brigade R.F.A. and Ammunition Column.
13th Brigade R.F.A. and Ammunition Column.

APPENDIX 3

SECOND BATTALION

LIST OF AWARDS FOR FRANCE, EGYPT AND PALESTINE

N.B.—The letters E.G.I. stand for “ Extract *Gazette* of India.”

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Authority.</i>
VICTORIA CROSS		
2129	Rifleman Kulbir Thapa - - -	E.G.I. 1296 of 24/12/15
4146	„ Karanbahadur Rana - - -	E.G.I. 2861 of 7/12/18
C.B.		
	Lieut.-Col. V. A. Ormsby - - -	E.G.I. 707 of 30/7/15
D.S.O.		
	Capt. J. T. Lodwick - - -	E.G.I. 583 of 18/6/15
	„ E. J. C. Ashmore - - -	„ 2856 of 12/9/19
	Lieut.-Col. C. S. Eastmead - - -	„ 415 of 22/2/19
	Major W. L. Dundas - - -	„ „
	„ G. M. Glynton - - -	„ „
	Capt. H. F. C. McSwiney - - -	„ 187 of 24/1/20
M.C.		
	Lieut. H. F. C. McSwiney - - -	E.G.I. 313 of 2/4/15
	Capt. A. G. Stone - - -	„
	„ E. J. C. Ashmore - - -	„ 1124 of 31/5/18
	„ C. Newton-Davis, M.B., I.M.S. - - -	„ „
	„ E. G. T. Tuite-Dalton - - -	„ „
	Subadar-Major Bhim Sing Thapa - - -	„ 1178 of 3/6/19
	„ Damar Sing Gurung - - -	„ „
	Lieut. F. Barter, V.C. - - -	„
	Jemadar Budhibal Thapa - - -	„ 1457 of 28/6/18
	Lieut. A. B. Barltrop - - -	„
	„ A. F. Dobbs - - -	„ 2856 of 12/9/19
	„ R. L. Turner - - -	„ „
	Subadar Nawal Sing Thapa - - -	„ 631 of 22/3/19
	„ Dalbir Gurung - - -	„ „
	Lieut. G. H. Allanson - - -	„ 415 of 22/2/19
	„ (T. Capt.) G. M. Ogilvie - - -	„ 680 of 11/7/19

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Regtl. No.

Rank and Name.

Authority.

ORDER OF BRITISH INDIA, 2ND CLASS

	Subadar-Major Gambhir Sing Gurung	E.G.I.	725 of 4/8/15
	„ Kharakbahadur Rana	- „	„ „
	Jemadar Harakbahadur Thapa	- „	313 of 2/4/15
2252	Bugler Kharakbahadur Ale	- „	356 of 16/4/15
	Subadar Bhim Sing Thapa	- „	646 of 9/7/15
1569	Havildar Bahadur Thapa	- „	563 of 11/6/15
1805	L.-Nk. Harak Sing Gharti	- „	„ „
1737	„ Jaman Sing Thapa	- „	111 of 29/1/21
1749	Rifleman Gane Gurung	- „	563 of 11/6/15
	Subadar Balbir Thapa	- „	1178 of 3/6/19
	Jemadar Asbir Gurung	- „	„ „
	„ Dhanraj Gurung	- „	2536 of 25/10/18
1344	S.A.S. Abdul Rahim	- „	„ „
3741	Rifleman Man Sing Thapa	- „	„ „
	Subadar Bagbir Gharti	- „	631 of 22/3/19
378	Rifleman Tulbir Rana	- „	„ „
	Subadar-Major Arjun Sing Thapa	- „	2087 of 3/6/19

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

241160 Sergt. G. E. Harris.

SPECIAL GRANT OF LAND

2nd Lieut. Bhim Sing Thapa, M.C., I.O.M.

Subadar-Major Arjun Sing Thapa, I.O.M.

I.D.S.M.

	Subadar Baran Sing Thapa	- - E.G.I.	563 of 11/6/15
	Jemadar Puran Sing Thapa	- - „	„ „
1313	Havildar Metilal Gurung	- - „	„ „
2118	Rifleman Ganpati Thapa,	- - „	313 of 2/4/15
2533	„ Kharak Sing Gurung	- „	849 of 28/7/16
1108	„ Siridhej Rai	- - „	„ „
2726	„ Dilap Sing Rana	- - „	1178 of 3/6/19
3704	„ Makan Sing Thapa	- - „	„ „
2803	L./Nk. Amar Sing Thapa	- - „	„ „
1878	Havildar Randhoj Gurung	- - „	„ „
2582	„ Man Sing Mall	- - „	„ „
3182	Naick Chandra Sing Gurung	- - „	„ „
3399	L./Naick Ajudhe Rana	- - „	„ „
2348	„ Dalbahadur Gurung	- - „	1457 of 28/6/18
3891	„ Jaman Sing Gurung	- - „	„ „
3060	Rifleman Kusal Sing Bist	- - „	2536 of 25/10/18
1878	Havildar Manbar Sing Gurung	- „	„ „
3627	Rifleman Harke Gharti	- - „	„ „
3477	„ Bhagatbir Thapa	- - „	„ „

AWARDS FOR FRANCE, EGYPT AND PALESTINE 333

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Authority.</i>
4930	L./Naick Hastram Gurung - -	E.G.I. 631 of 22/3/19
3729	Rifleman Mantrilal Rai - -	" " "
2281	Naick Ran Sing Pun - -	" " "
2247	L./Naick Karan Sing Pun - -	" " "
4142	" Shamsher Gurung - -	" " "
871	Rifleman Rudrabahadur Thapa - -	" " "

RUSSIAN CROSS OF ST. GEORGE, 3RD CLASS

1861	Naick Ran Sing Thapa - -	E.G.I. 534 of 13/4/17
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RUSSIAN CROSS OF ST. GEORGE, 4TH CLASS

	Subadar Dalkesar Gurung - -	E.G.I. 615 of 1/10/15
2608	Rifleman Dalbir Burathoki - -	" 534 of 13/4/17

RUSSIAN MEDAL OF ST. GEORGE, 2ND CLASS

1760	Naick Rupdhan Pun - -	E.G.I. 615 of 1/10/15
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RUSSIAN MEDAL OF ST. GEORGE, 3RD CLASS

3530	Rifleman Kharakbir Pun - -	E.G.I. 615 of 1/10/15
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RUSSIAN MEDAL OF ST. GEORGE, 4TH CLASS

2499	Rifleman Maite Gurung - -	E.G.I. 534 of 13/4/17
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SERBIAN ORDER OF THE WHITE EAGLE, 5TH CLASS WITH SWORDS

	Subadar-Major Bhim Sing Thapa, I.O.M. - - - -	E.G.I. 534 of 13/4/17
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SERBIAN GOLD MEDAL

2288	Rifleman Dal Sing Gurung - -	E.G.I. 534 of 13/4/17
1979	" Lilbir Rana - -	" " "
3294	" Dewan Sing Gurung - -	" " "

SERBIAN SILVER MEDAL

2404	Rifleman Balbahadur Thapa - -	E.G.I. 534 of 13/4/17
2286	" Tirthbahadur Gurung - -	" " "

SERBIAN CROSS KARAGEORGE, 1ST CLASS WITH SWORDS

1813	Havildar Lalbahadur Gurung -	E.G.I. 534 of 13/4/17
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ORDER OF THE NILE, 3RD CLASS

	Lieut.-Colonel C. S. Eastmead -	E.G.I. 208 of 25/1/19
	Major W. L. Dundas - -	" " "

CROCE DI GUERRA

	Lieut.-Colonel W. L. Dundas -	E.G.I. 702 of 16/4/20
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334 REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF THIRD GURKHAS

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Authority.</i>
MERITORIOUS MEDALS		
1773	Havildar Siriman Gurung - -	E.G.I. 295 of 9/2/18
1583	„ Narain Sing Bist - -	„ „ „
1838	„ Digambar Sahi - -	„ „ „
3502	Rifleman Khara Pun - -	„ „ „
1852	Havildar Dalbir Gurung - -	„ „ „
1794	„ Bhabesar Gurung - -	„ „ „
1711	„ Kabiram Thapa - -	„ „ „
2617	Rifleman Ambir Gharti - -	„ „ „
2582	Havildar Man Sing Mall - -	„ „ „
2450	„ Naurange Thapa - -	„ „ „
3572	Rifleman Mahabir Rana - -	„ „ „
2462	„ Chhessang Gurung - -	„ „ „
1816	Havildar Pirthiman Thapa - -	„ „ „
2055	Rifleman Paresor Gharti - -	„ „ „
2020	L./Naick Maniparshad Thapa - -	„ „ „
2122	Naick Parem Sing Rana - -	„ „ „
2124	„ Budh Sing Gurung - -	„ „ „
1435	Havildar Dasrath Ale - -	„ „ „
1968	Rifleman Budhiman Gurung - -	„ „ „
2082	Naick Dalbahadur Rana - -	„ „ „
1825	Havildar Gepal Rana - -	„ „ „
3230	L./Naick Jarnu Pun - -	„ „ „
1446	Rifleman Bahadur Gharti - -	„ „ „
3158	Naick Tikaram Gurung - -	„ „ „
2097	„ Birbahadur Thapa - -	„ „ „
3102	Havildar Kasiram Gurung - -	„ „ „
1669	„ Chandraman Gurung - -	„ „ „
1958	„ Budhibal Thapa - -	„ „ „
2293	L./Naick Dale Rana - -	„ „ „
1614	Rifleman Dhanpati Thapa - -	„ „ „
2259	„ Tikaram Pun - -	„ „ „
2495	„ Bhagte Pun - -	„ „ „
2288	L./Naick Dal Sing Gurung - -	„ „ „
2418	Rifleman Saman Gurung - -	„ „ „
1980	Naick Tejbir Thapa - -	„ „ „
2008	L./Naick Khemar Sing Gurung - -	„ „ „
1796	Rifleman Karamraj Bura - -	„ „ „
2173	L./Naick Chandrabir Gurung - -	„ „ „
2480	Naick Balbahadur Gurung - -	„ „ „
1993	Rifleman Bhawan Sing Rana - -	„ „ „
1671	Havildar Nain Sing Thapa - -	„ „ „
2417	Naick Attar Sing Rana - -	„ „ „
1896	Havildar Bhagatbir Thapa - -	„ „ „
977	„ (now Jemr.) Damar Sing Gurung - -	„ „ „
3073	„ Atibal Thapa - -	„ „ „
1606	„ (now Jemr.) Man Sing Rana - -	„ „ „

AWARDS FOR FRANCE, EGYPT AND PALESTINE 335

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Authority.</i>
1873	Havildar Jabar Sing Thapa - -	E.G I. 295 of 9/2/18
1760	„ Rupdhan Pun - -	„ „ „
2736	Colour-Havildar Surbir Thapa -	„ „ „
1810	„ „ Manbahadur Gurung - -	„ „ „
2567	Bugler Bhagesor Thapa - -	„ „ „
1771	Havildar Aspuri Gurung - -	„ „ „
2427	L./Naick Ajambar Gurung - -	„ „ „
3252	„ Bhairaj Pun - -	„ „ „
2507	Rifleman Durjman Gharti - -	„ „ „
2207	L./Naick Narbahadur Gurung -	„ „ „
3097	Bugle-Major Kambar Sing Thapa -	„ „ „
2968	L./Naick Maniram Pun - -	„ „ „
1811	Havildar Manbir Gurung - -	„ „ „

2ND BATCH, MERITORIOUS MEDALS

2508	L./Naick Ranbir Gurung
3172	Havildar Kharakbahadur Rana
3071	„ Dewan Sing Gurung
2831	„ Churamani Rana
1878	„ Manbar Sing Gurung
2610	L./Naick Ranbir Rana
3632	„ Aita Sing Thapa
2289	Havildar Kesri Lohar
2394	Rifleman Pahar Sing Gurung
3257	Naick Bahadur Gurung
2272	„ Ram Sing Khawas
2236	„ Indrabir Thapa
4399	Rifleman Lalbahadur Thapa
2120	Naick Khamba Sing Thapa
3203	Havildar Bahadur Rana
2636	Naick Kharakshamsheer Sahi
1876	Rifleman Maniraj Pun
2769	Havildar Bishna Uchai
1583	„ Narain Sing Bist
1638	„ Tikaram Thapa
1932	„ Narpati Gurung
2227	Naick Karbir Thapa
1603	Rifleman Ganpati Thapa
2413	Havildar Asmani Gharti
1747	„ Tularam Thapa
3626	L./Naick Raghubir Thapa
1514	Rifleman Ranbir Gurung
2416	Naick Kulman Nagarkoti
1276	Rifleman Daljit Gurung

336 REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF THIRD GURKHAS

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Authority.</i>
MENTION IN DESPATCHES		
	Colonel V. A. Ormsby - - - E.G.I.	684 of 23/7/15
	Lieut.-Colonel Brakspear - - - "	313 of 2/4/15
	Major Alexander - - - - - "	" "
	" A. B. Tillard - - - - - "	684 of 23/7/15
	Lieut. Bagot-Chester - - - - - "	" "
	Subadar-Major Gambhir Sing Gurung - - - - - "	" "
	" " Bhim Sing Thapa - - - - - "	" "
	Captain Grigg - - - - - "	" "
	" H. F. C. McSwiney - - - - - "	313 of 2/4/15
	Jemadar Harakbahadur Thapa - - - - - "	" "
2118	Rifleman Ganpati Thapa - - - - - "	" "
	Captain J. T. Lodwick - - - - - "	684 of 23/7/15
	" D. G. Ridgeway - - - - - "	120 of 4/2/16
	2nd Lieut. C. C. Nott Bower - - - - - "	" "
	Subadar-Major Bhim Sing Thapa, I.O.M. - - - - - "	1404 of 24/11/16
1606	Havildar Man Sing Rana - - - - - "	" "
1671	" Nain Sing Thapa - - - - - "	" "
	Brigadier-General V. A. Ormsby, C.B. - - - - - "	175 of 10/2/17
	Captain A. G. Stone - - - - - "	" "
	Captain E. G. T. Tuite-Dalton - - - - - "	1531 of 14/9/17
2581	Havildar Shibparshad Rai - - - E.G.I.	536 of 16/3/18
	Captain H. F. C. McSwiney - - - - - "	" "
	Subadar-Major Bhim Sing Thapa - - - - - "	" "
	Major G. M. Glynton, D.S.O. - - - - - "	536 of 8/3/19
	Capt. (Ty. Major) H. F. C. McSwiney - - - - - "	" "
	Lieut. (A. Capt.) G. H. Ogilvie - - - - - "	" "
	" (A. Capt.) H. A. Robertson - - - - - "	" "
	Lieut.-Col. C. S. Eastmead, D.S.O. - - - - - "	" "
	Subr.-Major Bhim Sing Thapa, I.O.M. - - - - - "	" "
2227	Naick Karbir Thapa - - - - - "	" "
	Major (A. Lieut.-Col.) W. L. Dundas, D.S.O. - - - - - "	" "
	Lieut. R. A. Robertson - - - - - "	709 of 18/7/19
3641	L./Naick Dhanjit Gurung - - - - - "	" "
1773	Havildar Siriman Gurung - - - - - "	" "

APPENDIX 4

SECOND BATTALION

STATEMENT SHOWING BATTLE CASUALTIES AND DEATHS FROM DISEASE
WHICH HAVE OCCURRED AMONG THE 2/3RD GURKHA RIFLES
WHILST SERVING WITH THE E.E.F. SINCE 17TH NOVEMBER, 1915.

BRITISH OFFICERS

<i>Nature of Casualty.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Date of Casualty.</i>
Killed in action	Lieut.	H. L. Rennison -	12/11/17
	Lieut. (T. Capt.)	M. Grey Smith -	19/11/17
	Lieut.	C. F. B. Moggridge -	10/4/18
	Lieut.	P. E. Burrows, M.C. -	19/9/18
Wounded in action	Captain	F. E. Lemarchand -	23/11/17
	Lieut.	R. A. Robertson -	13/11/17
	Lieut.	R. L. Turner -	23/11/17
	Lieut.	W. H. H. C. Brodie -	9/4/18
	Lieut. (A. Capt.)	G. H. Ogilvie -	19/9/18
Died of wounds	- Nil.		
Missing -	- Nil.		
Prisoners of War	- Nil.		
Died of Disease	- Nil.		

GURKHA OFFICERS

Killed in action	Subadar	Wazir Gurung -	10/4/18
	Jemadar	Chame Thapa -	23/11/17
	Jemadar	Budhibal Thapa -	10/4/18
Wounded in action	Subadar	Bhim Sing Thapa -	9/4/18
	Subadar	Damarsing Gurung -	10/4/18
	Subadar	Ane Thapa -	19/9/18
	Jemadar	Mangsing Basneth -	27/7/17
	Jemadar	Tilbir Thapa -	23/11/17
	Jemadar	Dhanwar Gurung -	20/11/17
	Jemadar	Kalu Gurung -	12/3/18
	Jemadar	Dhanbir Thapa -	10/4/18
	Jemadar	Harak Sing Gurung -	19/9/18
	Jemadar	Sardar Singh Gurung -	19/9/18
Died of wounds	- Nil.		
Missing -	- Nil.		
Prisoners of War	- Nil.		
Died of Disease	- Nil.		

Alexandria, 7th February, 1919.

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INDIAN OTHER RANKS

Killed in Action		Died of Wounds		Wounded		Missing		Died of Disease	
Date	Numbers	Date	Numbers	Date	Numbers	Date	Numbers	Date	Numbers
12/11/17	- 8	28/ 7/17	- 1	27/ 7/17	- 3	21/11/17	- 1	4/12/15	- 1
13/11/17	- 7	13/11/17	- 1	30/ 7/17	- 1	10/ 4/18	- 5	11/ 1/16	- 1
19/11/17	- 2	15/11/17	- 2	14/ 9/17	- 1	19/ 9/18	- 2	28/ 3/16	- 1
20/11/17	- 1	5/12/17	- 1	7/11/17	- 1			15/ 4/16	- 1
23/11/17	- 10	13/12/17	- 1	8/11/17	- 1			31/10/16	- 1
21/12/17	- 5	12/ 3/18	- 1	12/11/17	- 44			4/ 2/17	- 1
21/12/17	- 1	20/ 3/18	- 1	13/11/17	- 23			16/ 3/17	- 1
20/ 3/18	- 1	23/ 3/18	- 1	19/11/17	- 14			11/ 5/17	- 1
9/ 4/18	- 15	10/ 4/18	- 2	20/11/17	- 8			21/11/17	- 1
10/ 4/18	- 33	11/ 4/18	- 1	21/11/17	- 3			24/ 9/18	- 1
19/ 9/18	- 14	12/ 4/18	- 1	23/11/17	- 63			25/10/18	- 1
		13/ 4/18	- 2	24/11/17	- 1			15/11/18	- 2
		10/ 5/18	- 1	22/11/17	- 1			18/11/18	- 1
		11/ 8/18	- 1	26/11/17	- 1			24/11/18	- 1
		19/ 9/18	- 1	11/12/17	- 12			27/11/18	- 1
		20/ 9/18	- 2	13/12/17	- 1			15/12/18	- 1
		21/ 9/18	- 1	21/12/17	- 2			17/ 1/19	- 1
		24/ 9/18	- 2	12/ 2/18	- 1				
				7/ 3/18	- 1				
				10/ 3/18	- 1				
				12/ 3/18	- 8				
				15/ 3/18	- 1				
				9/ 4/18	- 53				
				10/ 4/18	- 126				
				12/ 4/18	- 1				
				27/ 4/18	- 2				
				9/ 5/18	- 2				
				16/ 5/18	- 1				
				18/ 5/18	- 3				
				31/ 7/18	- 1				
				3/ 8/18	- 1				
				4/ 8/18	- 1				
				19/ 9/18	- 95				

TOTALS - 97
10/2/19

23
Grand Total - 624

8
18

APPENDIX 5

THIRD BATTALION

THE TRANSLATION OF THE GERMAN ORDERS FOR AN ATTACK ON RAFAT

HEADQUARTERS, 11th July, 1918.

LEFT GROUP,
1/a Artillery No. 785/8 18.

SECRET.

GROUP ORDER

(*re* capture of Rafat).

1. By order of Headquarters VIII Army, an attack on RAFAT will be carried out by the Left Group on 13th July, probably during the evening. The objective is the capture and retention of RAFAT. The exact time for carrying out the attack will be notified later.

2. The ASIA CORPS will be entrusted with the direction and carrying out of the attack.

3. For this purpose, besides its own formations, the following artillery will be placed under the command of the Asia Corps, without, however, change of position of the batteries being undertaken.

By the 7th Inf. Div.—1st Austrian Light Field Howitzer Battery.

2nd Heavy Field Howitzer Battery.

7th Heavy Field Howitzer Battery.

2nd Battery, 23rd Field Artillery.

By the 16th Inf. Div.—1st Battery, 701st Field Artillery.

701st Infantry Gun Battery.

The following ammunition will be allotted :

For 1st Austrian Field Howitzer Battery - - - 144 rounds.

For Light Field Howitzer 98 M.A. (2nd Battery, 23rd Field Artillery) and 16 (3rd Battery, 701st Field Artillery) 576 rounds.

For heavy field howitzers (2nd, 8th and 16th Batteries) a total of about two-thirds of which are with delayed action - - - 322 rounds.

For Field Guns, 96 M.A. (701st Inf. Gun Battery) and 16 (701st Field Artillery) - - - 400 rounds.

Distribution by the Asia Corps.

There is to be direct consultation between the Asia Corps and the Left Group (C.R.A.) regarding ammunition for the 2nd

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Battery, 18th Field Artillery (heavy mountain). Ammunition is to be drawn from existing supplies. Reserve will be brought up.

4. From the evening of 12th July, the 7th Infantry Division will place one battalion at the disposal of the Asia Corps. The Asia Corps will make arrangements for bringing the battalion up. The battalion is only to be employed by the Asia Corps in so far as its own forces do not suffice for carrying out the undertaking.

5. Demands for pioneer material in limited quantities are to be addressed direct to the Pioneer Inspectorate, Headquarters VIIIth Army by the Asia Corps.

6. Attention is drawn to the necessity of maintaining strict secrecy with regard to the above order, and avoidance of all telephone conversations which might prematurely acquaint the enemy with our intentions. Code word for the undertaking, "Inshallah."

7. The Asia Corps will report its intentions by return. Registration by batteries placed under the orders of the Asia Corps may commence at any time.

So far as it is not already allotted to the individual formations in para. 3 of this order, assignment of ammunition is to be notified to the Left Group (C.R.A.) who will regulate the supply of reserve.

(Sgd.) VON FRANKENBURG.

Certified correct.

(Sgd.) SOLGER,
Major, General Staff.

(II)

12th July, 1918.

ASIA CORPS,

1a Nr. 413/18.

SECRET.

CORPS ORDER.

In amplification of the alteration of Corps Order 1a 400/18—secret, of 12/7/18, the following is ordered :

1. During the hour-and-a-quarter's destructive fire, besides the 2nd, 8th and 16th heavy batteries, RAFAT will also be under fire of a light field howitzer battery.

2. After the fire of the batteries bombarding RAFAT has been stopped to the minute, the fire on the enemy approaches and assembly areas, south and south-west of RAFAT will continue for another hour, during the first quarter-of-an-hour of which with increased violence.

3. When the new positions are occupied, the former barrage fire signals will again apply (Red light balls).

4. During the artillery preparation for the 702nd Trench Mortar Sub-Section, 300 trench-mortar shells will be at the disposal of the 701st Inf. Battn.

One of the three assault detachments of the 701st Infantry Battalion is to advance in a wadi north-west of RAFAT, with the left wing company of the 2nd Battn. of the 48th Infantry Regiment. It will deploy towards the left in connection with this company, for the attack on RAFAT.

A second assault detachment will attempt to work its way forward from A Company's position, and attack the place from the north-east.

Whether the Battalion will allow the third assault detachment to advance in WADI EL LEHMAN rests with the Battalion Commander.

5. The artillery preparation will begin on the 13th July at 5.30 p.m. The heavy fire and the fire of the light field howitzer battery bombarding RAFAT will cease at 6.45 p.m. The back barrage on WADI RAFAT, south and south-west of RAFAT, as well as that on the approaches and assembly areas situated there, will continue from 6.45 to 7.45 p.m. The times are to be kept to the second by the artillery, according to the hour which will be communicated by the Asia Corps.

6. Particular attention is drawn to the fact that sufficient quantities of infantry and machine-gun ammunition, as well as bombs, are to be brought up into the new positions during the night of the 13th/14th.

(Sgd.) PLATZ.

Certified correct.

(Sgd.) SIEVEKING,
Lieut. and Adjutant.

Transcript certified correct.

(Sgd.) FINK,
Lieut. and Acting Adjutant.

C.R.A. ASIATIC CORPS,
Journal, Ib. Nr. 7218.

SECRET.

13th July, 1918.

C.R.A.'s SUPPLEMENT.

1. The artillery preparation will commence on 13th July at 5.30 p.m. to the second.

2. Destructive fire on RAFAT on 13th July will cease at 6.45 p.m. to the second. Barrage from 6.45 p.m. to 7.45 p.m.

3. The time will be given to the C.R.A. and to the Commanders of the 1st Battn. 701st Infantry Regt., 3rd Battn. 701st Infantry Regt., 701st Infantry Gun Battery, 11/48th Mountain Section, and Major Pickel by an officer of the Staff in person.

4. Should any friction or any difficulties whatsoever arise, they are to be notified to the C.R.A. for their prompt settlement.

5. 5. 5.

(Sgd.) RECHTERN.

Certified correct.

FINK,
Lieut. and Acting Adjutant.

(III)

Extract from the diary of a Private of the 702nd Trench Mortar Battery, who took part in the attack on RAFAT :

13th July, 1918.

"Morning. Artillery duels from time to time. Otherwise, the calm before the storm. From 5.30 to 6.45 p.m. RAFAT was kept under heavy

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artillery and trench mortar fire. During the fire, our attack troops worked up in front of the enemy's wire entanglements. At about 6.45 p.m. the real attack on RAFAT was to begin. But Tommy was at his post and immediately put our attack troops, which had worked forward, under heavy machine-gun and trench mortar fire. At dawn, our infantry could do nothing but retire, suffering losses from artillery fire. We had the order, if RAFAT were taken, to push our observation post forward thither. This was naturally all in vain ; the whole night through there was heavy infantry fire on our position."

APPENDIX 6

THIRD BATTALION

THE following is a list of honours, awards, and mentions in dispatches made to all ranks of the third battalion for work performed while actually with the battalion.

In the case of the I.M.S.M., all grants were made from the list of men recommended for gallantry in action.

BRITISH OFFICERS

D.S.O.

Major (Ty. Lieut.-Col.) G. K. Channer.

Major (Ty. Lieut.-Col.) H. M. D. Shaw.

M.C.

Captain (Actg. Major) W. G. Bagot-Chester.

Lieut. H. N. Irwin.

Lieut. (Actg. Captain) G. N. Storrs.

Lieut. (Actg. Captain) F. Helm.

Lieut. K. N. Fraser.

Lieut. (Actg. Captain) G. E. R. S. Hartigan.

M.B.E.

Lieut. G. H. Thomas.

ORDER OF THE CROWN OF ITALY

Major (Ty. Lieut.-Col.) G. K. Channer.

ORDER OF THE NILE (3RD CLASS)

Major (Ty. Lieut.-Col.) H. M. D. Shaw.

MENTIONED IN DISPATCHES

Major (Ty. Lieut.-Col.) G. K. Channer.

Major (Ty. Lieut.-Col.) H. M. D. Shaw.

Capt. A. Seddon, M.B. (I.M.S.).

GURKHA RANKS

I.O.M. (1ST CLASS)

Subadar (Acting S. Major) Bahadar Thapa - - 14/4/18

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I.O.M. (2ND CLASS)

Subadar Jaman Sing Rai (since killed in action)	-	24/12/17
Subadar Randhoj Rana - - - - -	-	25/12/17
Subadar Lalbahadur Gurung		

BAR TO I.D.S.M.

1985 Havildar Kharke Pun - - - - -	24/12/17
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I.D.S.M.

Jemadar Narain Sing Rana - - - - -	25/12/17
Jemadar Ajabsing Gurung	
1793 Havildar Dharmasing Rana - - - - -	8/2/18
3930 Naick Jitman Sahi - - - - -	"
3861 Naick Deodast Thapa - - - - -	"
2581 Rifleman Amarsing Gurung - - - - -	"
2829 Rifleman Pothiman Limbu - - - - -	"
2789 Piper Dharne Thapa - - - - -	"
2479 Rifleman Nare Chettri - - - - -	"
1766 Havildar Narain Sing Sahi - - - - -	"
1408 Rifleman Chadrasing Thapa - - - - -	"
3286 Rifleman Kishan Bahadur Chettri - - - - -	14/4/18
3627 Rifleman Harke Gharti - - - - -	"

LONG SERVICE AND GOOD CONDUCT MEDAL

Jemadar Parbal Thapa.

I.M.S.M.

Subadar Damarsing Gurung - - - - -	8/11/17
Jemadar Rupdhan Pun - - - - -	"
Jemadar Nainsing Thapa - - - - -	"
Jemadar Bhagatbir Thapa - - - - -	"
Jemadar Surbir Thapa - - - - -	"
Jemadar Manbahadur Gurung - - - - -	"
1771 Havildar Aspur Gurung - - - - -	"
1811 Havildar Manbir Gurung - - - - -	"
1873 Havildar Jabarsing Thapa - - - - -	"
3073 Havildar Atibal Thapa - - - - -	"
2427 Havildar Ajambar Gurung - - - - -	"
2417 Naick Attar Sing Rana - - - - -	"
2968 Naick Maniram Pun - - - - -	"
2207 Naick Narbahadur Gurung - - - - -	"
3252 L./Naick Bhairaj Pun - - - - -	"
2567 Bugler Bagesor Thapa - - - - -	"
3097 Bugler M. Khambasing Thapa - - - - -	"
2507 Rifleman Durjman Gharti - - - - -	"
1606 Havildar Mansing Rana - - - - -	"

HONOURS, AWARDS AND MENTIONS

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S.A.S.	Bauli Khan	-	-	-	-	-	-	24/2/18
2990	Rifleman Karbir Rana	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
3191	Rifleman Dalbir Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
3471	Rifleman Ranbir Rana	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
3508	Rifleman Jaising Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2454	Swpr. Ramjita	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
3235	Rifleman Pahar Sing Gurung	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2295	Havildar Amrit Mal (1/9th)	-	-	-	-	-	-	31/12/18
2899	Rifleman Haste Pun	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
1885	Havildar Kalu Gurung	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2911	Naick Partab Gurung	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2858	Naick Jitbahadur Rana	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
1585	Naick Manbir Khattri (1/9th)	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2568	Naick Hirasing Pun	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2511	L./Naick Dhaniram Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2591	Havildar Faudsing Gurung	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2160	Coy. Q.M. Havildar Balbir Thapa (1/9th)	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/2/19
2353	Havildar Churamani Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2066	Havildar Kamansing Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2667	Rifleman Tikaram Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
3501	Rifleman Narbir Newar	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
3379	Rifleman Bhimsing Rana	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
3807	Rifleman Indrabir Gurung	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
945	L./Naick Jaibahadur Limbu	-	-	-	-	-	-	"

MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES

2990	Rifleman Karbir Rana	-	-	-	-	-	-	15/3/18
3191	Rifleman Dalbir Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
3471	Rifleman Ranbir Rana	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
3508	Rifleman Jaising Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
	Subadar Birkhdhoj Limbu	-	-	-	-	-	-	8/3/19
1510	L./Naick Sukrim Gharti	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
2591	Rifleman Birkhraj Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
	Subadar Nain Sing Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
	Jemadar Bhagatbir Thapa	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
	A./Subadar-Major Bhimbahadur Banya	-	-	-	-	-	-	18/7/19
2417	Havildar Attar Sing Rana	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
56	Havildar Amarsing Gurung	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
945	L./Naick Jaibahadur Limbu	-	-	-	-	-	-	"
	Jemadar Kalu Ale	-	-	-	-	-	-	21/3/20
2271	Havildar Harku Gurung	-	-	-	-	-	-	8/3/19

FOREIGN DECORATIONS

KARA GEORGE (SERBIA) 1ST CLASS (WITH SWORD)

Jemadar Lalbahadur Gurung.

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CROSS OF ST. GEORGE (RUSSIAN) 4TH CLASS

Jemadar Rupdhan Pun.
Havildar Ransing Thapa.
2608 Rifleman Dalbir Burathoki.

GOLD MEDAL (SERBIA)

1979 Havildar Lilbir Rana.

WHITE EAGLE (SERBIA)

2499 L./Naick Maite Gurung.

APPENDIX 7

THIRD BATTALION

COPY OF THE REPORT ON "OUTPOST HILL" RAID BY THE G.O.C.,
75TH DIVISION

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS, 21ST CORPS.

I BEG to forward a report on the raid carried out on Outpost Hill at 03.00 this morning by the 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles.

(i) The raiding party, strength 160 (actually 197) all ranks, 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles, under command of Captain W. G. Bagot-Chester, formed up in Penton Gully ready to start at 03.00, at which hour the 18 pr. barrage was due to start.

At 02.52 the raiders moved forward a short distance in order to form up parallel to their objective. The movement was observed by a small Turkish patrol from the vicinity of the Burnt Tank, who fired a few shots (opened heavy rifle fire [Sgd.] W.G.B.C.) and then disappeared.

At 03.00 the 18 pr. barrage was placed on the enemy's front and support line.

The raiders advanced close up under the barrage, so close that two or three men were wounded by it, but they were met by no rifle fire.

At 03.09 the guns and howitzers lifted to the line R.5, C.6—R.4, 6, 9, 0, and the raiders rushed the trench, the leading line going straight to the support trench, the second line staying in the fire trench.

A few Turks, who had been lying in front of their trenches, were caught just as they were climbing back on the parapet, pulled down and sent back. A few more Turks were taken or killed in the front trench and in some dug-outs in it, and a Lewis gun was taken on the left.

The majority of Turks were killed in the communication trenches connecting the firing and support lines and in some shallow dug-outs. Six comparatively deep dug-outs were found in the support lines, each containing several Turks. These were bombed. On the way back three Turks were found hiding and were killed.

The enemy started to shell our front line at 03.26, and there was a certain amount of machine gun fire from Middlesex Hill. No definite barrage was put down, the shelling being very promiscuous.

On reaching our front line the signal for stopping the fire of our guns was given.

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(ii) The following information was obtained from the trenches :

- (a) A short length of trench exists about R.4, d.6 i., with a Lewis gun emplacement and two shallow dug-outs.
- (b) The wire in front of Outpost Hill had been destroyed, with the exception of a short strip in front of the right-hand corner R5, C. 2, 1.
- (c) The trenches have been much damaged by our shelling and were only just recognisable.
- (d) The only deep dug-outs were in the support line.
- (e) A number of shallow dug-outs were found in the right trench, which is shallow and has been much damaged.
- (f) A dug-out in the support line and one out of two in a communication trench had been blown in.

(iii) The enemy sent up a considerable number of flares.

A Red Light at O.1.

A Green Light at O.5.

Five Red Lights at O.18.

The latter were rather confusing, as the pre-arranged signal for the barrage to be thickened was six Red Lights in Groups of three.

(iv) The Turks with a very few exceptions showed little inclination to stand up to the Gurkhas, who used their bayonets and kukris with great effect.

The casualties were :

						<i>Turkish.</i>	<i>Ours.</i>
Killed	-	-	-	-	-	21	2
Prisoners	-	-	-	-	-	16	—
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	—	1
Wounded	-	-	-	-	-	9	22 (Only three severe cases)

There is no doubt that several more Turks were killed, as men were seen to run into the dug-outs in the support line, which probably had other occupants, and all these dug-outs were bombed.

The booty included one Lewis gun, six rifles (actually ten), gas masks, etc.

The battalion is very anxious that it may be allowed to keep this Lewis gun, and I hope that this request may be granted.

(v) This is the first fight the 3/3rd Gurkhas has taken part in and the success meant a great deal to them. The raiders were well trained by Captain Bagot-Chester, who showed great resource and skill when leading the raid.

Lieut. H. N. Irwin, the only other British officer who took part, led his men gallantly and himself accounted for two Turks.

The following N.C.O.s and men specially distinguished themselves :

No. 1985	Havildar Kharke Pun.
No. 1793	Rifleman Chabilal Ale.
No. 2479	Rifleman Nari Chettri.
No. 3861	Naick Deodast Thapa.

No. 2557 Bugler Bhabesoi Thapa.
No. 3930 L./Naick Jitman Sahi.
No. 3807 Rifleman Indrabir Gurung.

(Signed) P. C. PALIN,
*Major-General,
Commanding 75th Division.*

COPY OF A LETTER FROM CAPTAIN W. G. BAGOT-CHESTER,
DATED 2ND NOVEMBER, 1917

DEAR DALTON,

I thought you might like to have the enclosed account. I have copied out the official narrative which is all right as far as it goes but does not really bring out the magnificent way the men behaved. I should like to add the following points :

At Zero—15 minutes heavy howitzers were to fire about twenty rounds on the neighbourhood of the Burnt Tank. They did so, but the last few rounds fell actually behind us and almost in amongst us as we were forming up in Penton's Gully. We had one man wounded here.

Then when we got out of the Wadi at Zero—eight minutes to form up and the Turks saw us, they opened heavy fire and continued this fire until the barrage started. Our men took no notice, they fired not a shot in return but continued forming up in the open outside the Wadi.

At Zero, when the barrage started, the 4·5 Howitzers, which should have directed their fire on Middlesex Hill and the Maze, actually were dropping their heavy shells this side of the Turkish front line. However, the men went beautifully, and got right in amongst our shells so that we suffered a bit.

We had machine gun fire following us also on our retirement.

So as you see things seemed a bit discouraging at the start, but it turned out well and we have had telegrams of congratulation from Brigade, Divisional Corps and General Headquarters.

Naturally the men are very pleased with life just now.

Well, I hope you are all right and that the great push is going on all right your end. We have not moved yet but expect to at any moment. All quiet to-night, but last night the Turks were angered about here and the ground was thick with shot and splinters in the morning. No casualties.

Best of luck,

Yours ever,
(Signed) W. G. BAGOT-CHESTER.

APPENDIX 8

FOURTH BATTALION

LIST OF BRITISH OFFICERS AND MEDICAL OFFICERS WHO SERVED
WITH THE 1ST RESERVE BATTALION GURKHA RIFLES, AFTERWARDS
THE 4TH BN. 3RD QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Date—From</i>	<i>To</i>
1.	Lieut.-Col. B. U. Nicolay, 4th Gurkhas	3/10/16	16/3/22
2.	Major W. B. Bailey, 2nd Gurkhas -	1/10/16	26/2/21
3.	Major D. R. H. Jackson, 6th Gurkhas -	1/10/16	21/5/18
4.	2nd Lieut. G. L. Field, I.A.R.O. -	1/10/16	5/7/17
5.	2nd Lieut. W. A. M. Ferguson, I.A.R.O. {	1/10/16	28/8/17
		4/10/18	16/2/22
6.	2nd Lieut. J. C. Kelly, I.A.R.O. - -	1/10/16 Died on 28/9/17 at Kohat.	
7.	2nd Lieut. G. J. Knowles, I.A.R.O. -	1/10/16	6/9/18
8.	2nd Lieut. H. J. L. Phillips, I.A.R.O. -	1/10/16	2/7/18
9.	Lieut. N. H. Vakil, Medical, Tempy. I.M.S. - - - - -	1/10/16	2/3/17
10.	2nd Lieut. R. C. Molesworth, Unat- tached List - - - - -	9/11/16	17/11/17
11.	2nd Lieut. F. W. Oliver, I.A.R.O. -	27/11/16	6/2/18
12.	Major R. D. Willcocks, I.M.S. - -	10/12/16	2/2/17
13.	Lieut. R. C. Kaushash, Tempy. I.M.S.	28/3/17	10/4/17
14.	Lieut. D. D. Variava, Tempy. I.M.S. -	9/4/17	8/10/17
15.	Capt. G. S. Brock, I.M.S. - - -	10/4/17	31/12/17
16.	2nd Lieut. K. H. Harrison, I.A.R.O. -	24/4/17	31/10/17
17.	2nd Lieut. R. E. Cooper, I.A.R.O. - {	24/4/17	7/6/18
		5/9/19	16/10/19
18.	Lieut. F. Barter, V.C., 3rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers - - - - -	18/6/17	21/12/17
19.	Lieut. D. N. Pitcairn, 9th Gordon High- landers - - - - -	18/6/17	16/3/22
20.	2nd Lieut. T. B. Middleton, Unattached } List - - - - -	29/6/17	30/5/18
			16/2/22
21.	Capt. T. M. Morton, 5th Royal Irish } Rifles - - - - -	9/7/17	17/10/18
			25/10/19
			16/3/21
22.	Lieut. F. H. Lewis, 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers - - - - -	4/8/17	2/10/18

<i>No.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Date—From</i>	<i>To</i>
23.	Capt. D. T. Cowan, M.C., 3rd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - -	5/8/17	16/2/22
24.	2nd Lieut. R. T. Mills, I.A.R.O. - -	17/8/17	9/8/18
25.	2nd Lieut. F. W. Gray, I.A.R.O. - -	14/6/19	19/9/19
26.	2nd Lieut. H. Davis, 1/4th Prince Albert's (Somerset L.I.) - - -	17/8/17	12/10/17
27.	2nd Lieut. W. L. Armstrong, I.A.R.O. -	24/8/17	30/5/18
28.	2nd Lieut. G. F. Berkeley, Probationer, I.A.R.O. - - - - -	28/8/17	5/9/18
29.	Lieut. N. E. Satpute, Tempy. I.M.S. -	29/8/17	10/7/18
30.	2nd Lieut. W. A. Simpson, 3rd Royal West Kent Regt. - - - -	31/12/17	22/1/18
31.	2nd Lieut. L. S. Rusby, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) - - -	16/1/18	4/3/19
32.	Lieut. A. Noble, I.M.S. (T.C.) - - -	22/1/18	30/8/18
33.	2nd Lieut. W. R. James, Tempy. Com., I.A. - - - - -	22/1/18	21/3/18
34.	2nd Lieut. A. H. S. Taylor, Probationer, I.A.R.O. - - - - -	24/1/18	11/9/18
35.	Capt. H. A. Barker, 3rd Loyal [North Lancashire] Regt. - - - -	25/1/18	16/2/22
36.	2nd Lieut. S. W. Game, I.A.R.O. - -	26/1/18	2/2/20
37.	2nd Lieut. U. McG. Greer, Unattached List - - - - -	26/1/18	1/6/18
38.	2nd Lieut. R. F. Hall, I.A.R.O. - -	15/2/18	10/2/22
39.	Lieut. O. C. Jones, 4th K.R.R. Corps -	15/2/18	30/5/18
40.	2nd Lieut. J. C. Kerr, 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - - -	26/2/18	1/7/20
41.	Lieut. R. H. Hurst, 1st Garrison Bn. Lincolnshire Regt. - - - -	3/3/18	16/10/19
42.	Major V. H. Roberts, I.M.S. - - -	4/3/18	30/7/18
43.	2nd Lieut. F. C. M. Forward, Unattached List - - - - -	21/3/18	1/12/18
44.	2nd Lieut. T. Logan, Tempy. Com., I.A. -	21/3/18	8/8/18
45.	2nd Lieut. A. R. Mercer, Tempy. Com., I.A. - - - - -	2/4/18	17/8/19
46.	Lieut. R. F. Gordon, I.A.R.O. - - -	10/7/18	28/10/19
47.	Lieut. F. H. French, I.A. - - -	4/4/18	1/4/19
48.	Lieut. A. E. St. J. Adams, 6th Royal Fusiliers (S.R.) - - - -	1/8/18	16/10/19
49.	2nd Lieut. T. R. Hurst, Unattached List - - - - -	8/10/18	16/10/19
50.	2nd Lieut. F. W. Whitehead, Somerset L.I. - - - - -	22/10/18	16/3/22
51.	Lieut. C. N. Daniels, Tempy. Com. I.A. -	28/11/18	14/10/20
52.	Capt. H. J. Macartney, I.A. - - -	10/2/19	31/3/19
53.	Lieut. C. K. A. Iyer, Tempy. I.M.S. -	12/5/19	7/6/19
		18/5/19	20/9/19

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<i>No.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Date—From</i>	<i>To</i>
54.	2nd Lieut. A Lindsay (from 1/4th G.R.)	20/5/19	16/9/19
55.	2nd Lieut. W. R. Jones (from 1/4th G.R.)	20/5/19	25/5/19
56.	Lieut. J. Brookman (from 1/1st G.R.)	30/6/19	16/2/22
57.	Lieut. F. T. Cowell (from 1/1st G.R.)	30/6/19	16/10/19
58.	Lieut. J. G. Hurrell (from 1/1st G.R.)	30/6/19	10/2/22
59.	2nd Lieut. M. P. Steer (from 39th Garhwal Rifles)	16/7/19	12/10/19
60.	2nd Lieut. E. Tutte, (from 2/7th G.R.)	17/7/19	14/11/19
61.	2nd Lieut. V. L. Misselbrook, Unattached List	- - - -	- - - -
62.	Capt. J. D. Ogilvy, 1st G.R.	5/12/19	16/3/21
63.	Lieut. S. R. Macdonald (from 1/1st G.R.)	26/1/20	30/3/20
64.	¹ Lieut. B. S. Mould (from 1/1st G.R.)	26/1/20	16/2/22
65.	Lieut. J. W. Rundall (from 1/1st G.R.)	26/1/20	12/1/21
66.	Lieut. K. T. Roe (from 2/3rd G.R.)	26/1/20	7/10/20
67.	² Capt. N. H. Hind	30/1/20	1/12/20
68.	Capt. V. K. Tolat, Tempy. I.M.S.	31/1/20	29/3/21
69.	2nd Lieut. C. L. Trafford (from 2/3rd G.R.)	6/2/20	16/2/22
70.	2nd Lieut. A. F. C. Tainton	30/3/20	21/7/20
71.	Lieut. V. S. Pandit, Tempy. I.M.S.	20/4/20	10/2/22
72.	Lieut. H. E. Whitby (from 2/1st G.R.)	5/11/20	(Tank-Zam line)
73.	Capt. H. M. Bannon (from 3/11th G.R. and re-transferred at once)	5/11/20	25/11/20
74.	Capt. C. G. Shepherd (from 3/11th G.R., attached for service with 3/11th Co.)	5/11/20	6/11/20
75.	Capt. R. C. Robinson (from 4/39th Garhwal Rifles)	13/11/20	20/6/21
76.	Lieut. A. G. Stewart (from 58th Rifles, F.F.)	13/11/20	16/1/21
77.	Lieut. D. L. Wray (from 3/11th G.R., attached for service with 3/11th Co.)	15/11/20	16/2/22
78.	Capt. F. H. Charnley, M.C. (from 2/7th G.R.)	13/12/20	20/6/21
79.	Capt. and Bt. Major C. A. Gouldsbury, 2/5th G.R.	12/5/21	2/1/21
80.	Capt. G. R. Fortune (from 8th Cavalry)	24/6/21	16/2/22
81.	Capt. R. W. H. Grey (from 1/4th G.R.)	31/7/21	16/2/22
82.	Capt. R. K. W. Cormack (from 1/1st G.R.)	29/6/21	1/1/22
83.	Capt. S. R. Phadke, Tempy. I.M.S.	Attached to the Battalion for Wana Column, 1920-1921.	
84.	Capt. L. M. Banerjee, Tempy. I.M.S.		
85.	Capt. O. C. Madhavan, Tempy. I.M.S.		

¹ Awarded immediate M.C. with Bn. at Makin.

² Severely wounded and awarded immediate M.C. with Bn. at Makin.

APPENDIX 9

FOURTH BATTALION

HONOURS AND AWARDS

1. *Nominal Roll of Awards for good work during service.*

INDIAN MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDALS.

(*With Annuity*)

13 Havildar Jaibahadur Thapa.

(*Without Annuity*)

Jemadar Azad Khan Tanaoli.

209 Havildar Bhagsing Ghale.

168 Havildar Chandansing Khattri.

84 Naick Khambasing Thapa.

An assignment of land revenue of Rs. 600 per annum.

Subadar Major (Hony. Lieut.) Kharaksing Rana, M.C., Bahadur.

Jangi Innams. (G.O.s Rs. 10, N.C.O.s Rs. 5, Riflemen Rs. 2/8).

Subadar Major Indrajit Thapa.

Subadar Dhanraj Pun.

155 Havildar Azad Khan Tanaoli.

Subadar Dhanbahadur Rana.

Jemadar Harakraj Gurung.

Jemadar Manbahadur Gurung.

163 Havildar Himansing Thapa.

1255 Havildar Udesing Thapa.

168 Havildar Chandansing Khattri.

76 Havildar Major Dalbahadur Sahi.

58 Havildar Major Dirgasing Gurung.

23 Havildar Dilbahadur Gurung.

35 Havildar Khale Thapa.

177 Naick Ranbahadur Gurung.

Subadar Partiman Rana.

Jemadar Shamsheer Gurung.

Subadar Gopal Gurung.

Jemadar Damarsing Thapa.

86 Havildar Lachman Gurung.

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107 Havildar Narbir Rana.
125 Havildar Sukbar Gurung.
179 L./Naick Amarsing Gurung.
339 L./Naick Amritdhoj Rai.
Jemadar Ranpati Gurung.
2803 Havildar Bhagsing Ghale.
2743 L./Naick Parsaram Gurung.
Jemadar Sarabjit Gurung.

2. Honours awarded the Battalion in Afghanistan.

Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

Subadar Kumbsing Gurung.

Mention in Despatches.

Lieut.-Col. B. U. Nicolay, 2/4th Gurkha Rifles (attd.).
Subadar Indrajit Thapa (Acting Subadar Major).

157 Naick Mansing Rana.
69 Naick (Lance-Havildar) Purna Pun.
1255 Havildar Udesing Thapa.

3. Honours awarded the Battalion in Waziristan (Mahsud 1920).

Brevet Lt. Colonel.

Major W. B. Bailey.

Military Cross (immediate).

Captain N. G. Hind, 2/2nd Gurkhas (attached).
Lieut. B. S. Mould, 1/2nd Gurkhas (attached).

Order of the British Empire—Member.

Subadar Major Dhanraj Pun.

Indian Order of Merit.

Jemadar Bhawesur Gurung.
822 Naick Rudarbir Sen.
1344 Rifleman Dalbahadur Sen.
Jemadar Dharamraj Gurung.
2935 Rifleman Dhante Pun, 1/6th Gurkhas (attached).

Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

348 Rifleman Lalbahadur Rai.
267 L./Naick Dhanjit Gurung.
616 L./Naick Balbahadur Ale.
1341 Rifleman Kharaksing Thapa.
513 L./Naick Dalsing Thapa.
Jemadar Arjan Gurung.
2043 Rifleman Jasbahadur Gurung.
2406 Havildar Sunaram Gurung.

A Bar to the I.D.S.M.

Subadar Kumbsing Gurung.

Mention in Despatches.

Capt. T. M. Morton.

Lieut. (Acting Capt.) D. T. Cowan, M.C.

Subadar Major Dhanraj Pun.

Subadar Kumbsing Gurung.

Subadar Shamsheer Gurung.

Subadar Bhawesur Gurung.

Subadar Manbahadur Gurung.

830 Havildar Dhane Gurung, 1/6th G.R. (attached).

124 Havildar Nainsing Gurung.

822 Naick Rudarbir Sen.

267 L./Naick Dhanjit Gurung.

616 L./Naick Balbahadur Ale.

348 Rifleman Lalbahadur Rai.

1344 Rifleman Dalbahadur Sen.

1509 Rifleman Damre Thapa.

5887 Rifleman Tikaram Pun, 1/3rd G.R. (attached).

6400 Rifleman Bagsing Gurung, 1/3rd G.R. (attached).

4. *Mention in Despatches (Waziristan, 1920-21).**London Gazette, dated 1/6/1923.*

Lieut. (A. Capt.) T. R. Hurst.

Capt. S. R. Macdonald, 1/1st G.R. (attached).

Lieut.-Col. (now Col.) B. U. Nicolay.

Capt. D. N. Pitcairn.

Subadar Dalbahadur Sahi.

814 Bn. Havildar Major Gangabir Ale.

1003 Havildar Ralleram Sherma.

5. *Honours awarded the Battalion (Waziristan 1920-21) in London Gazette, dated 12/6/23.**Brevet Colonel, dated 23/10/21.*

Lieut.-Col. (now Colonel) B. U. Nicolay.

Military Cross.

Capt. T. M. Morton.

Order of the British Empire—Member.

Lieut. V. L. Misselbrook.

(Record incomplete. The battalion had been disbanded more than a year when Nos. 4 and 5 appeared. On 3/6/24, Col. Nicolay was awarded the "C.B.").

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6. Extract of *Gazette of India*, No. 2593, of 1921 :

In recognition of the distinguished services rendered by the Indian Army during the War, the undermentioned Indian officer is granted, subject to His Majesty's approval, an honorary Commission as stated against his name, with effect from 1st July, 1920 ; and will, if serving on the Active List, be entitled to the pay of his British rank from the 1st March, 1920 :

To be Honorary Lieutenant :—

Subadar Major Kharaksing Rana, Bahadur, M.C., 4th Bn. 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles.

During its Frontier Service the battalion was twice mentioned in the body of despatches.

The battalion gained the Indian Frontier Medal, 1919, and Four Clasps :

Afghanistan and N.W. Frontier, 1919.

Waziristan, 1919-21.

Mahsud, 1919-20.

Waziristan, 1921-24.

The battalion became entitled to the last Clasp before leaving Waziristan in 1921.

APPENDIX 10

SECOND BATTALION

THE VICTORIA CROSSES TO RIFLEMEN

2129 Kulbir Thapa of the 2nd Battalion.

4146 Karanbahadur Rana of the 2nd Battalion.

THE VICTORIA CROSS.

WAR OFFICE, 18th November, 1915.

HIS Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to 2129, Rifleman KULBIR THAPA, 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles, 2nd Batt.

For most conspicuous bravery during operations against the German trenches, south of Mauquissart. When himself wounded, on September 25, 1915, he found a badly wounded soldier of the 2nd Leicestershire Regiment behind the first line German trenches, and though urged by the British soldier to save himself, he remained with him all day and night. In the early morning of September 26th, in misty weather, he brought him out through the German wire, and leaving him in a place of comparative safety, returned and brought in two wounded Gurkhas, one after the other. He then went back in broad daylight for the British soldier and brought him in also, carrying him most of the way, and being at most points under the enemy's fire.

THE VICTORIA CROSS.

WAR OFFICE, 21st June, 1918.

THE King has been pleased to approve of the award of the Victoria Cross to 4146, Rifleman KARANBAHADUR RANA, 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles, 2nd Battalion, for most conspicuous bravery, resource in action under adverse conditions and utter contempt for danger.

During an attack he, with a few other men, succeeded under intense fire in creeping forward with a Lewis gun in order to engage an enemy machine gun which had caused severe casualties to officers and other ranks who had attempted to put it out of action.

No. 1 of the Lewis gun opened fire and was shot immediately. Without a moment's hesitation Rifleman KARANBAHADUR RANA pushed the dead man off the gun, and in spite of bombs thrown at him and heavy fire from both flanks, he opened fire and knocked out the machine gun crew ; then,

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switching his fire on to the enemy bombers and riflemen in front of him, he silenced their fire. He kept his gun in action and showed the greatest coolness in removing defects which on two occasions prevented the gun from firing. During the remainder of the day he did magnificent work, and when a withdrawal was ordered, he assisted with covering fire until the enemy were close on him. He displayed throughout a very high standard of valour and devotion to duty.

Note.—At the end of Chapter XIX reference is made to an autograph letter from Queen Alexandra in reply to some notes given to Her Majesty, and including Kulbir's V.C., by General Hutchinson. The latter wrote again on the 25th June, 1918, and referred to the bestowal of the second Cross to Karanbahadur. Her Majesty at once expressed her true appreciation and her continued interest.—Ed.

APPENDIX II

FIRST AND SECOND BATTALIONS

S. MARY'S, LANSDOWNE

UNVEILING OF THE MEMORIAL
TO THE
BRITISH OFFICERS OF THE
QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S
OWN THIRD GURKHA RIFLES
WHO DIED IN THE GREAT WAR
1914-1918

by

LIEUT.-COL. W. L. DUNDAS, D.S.O.,
Comdg. 2nd Bn., 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles.

SUNDAY, JUNE 10TH, 1923.

HYMN 437

THEN SHALL THE PRIEST SAY

"LET US PRAY."

We render thanks, O Lord, for the gifts which thou didst bestow upon Thy servants, whose names follow and who laid down their lives in the service of their King and Country during the Great War, whose memorial we here dedicate in Thy Holy House as well as for all Thy servants which are departed from us in the life of Faith and now do rest in the sleep of peace. We humbly beseech Thee, that it may please Thee of Thy gracious goodness shortly to accomplish the number of Thine Elect, that we, with all those that are departed in the true Faith of Thy Holy Name, may have our perfect consummation and bliss both in body and soul in Thy Eternal and Everlasting Glory, through Jesus Christ Our Lord.

The Trumpeters will play "Reveillé."

The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, etc. *Amen.*

Brigadier-General Vincent Alexander Ormsby, C.B.	-	France	1917
Lieutenant-Colonel William Rae Brakspear	- - - -	"	1915
Major Eric Grey Drummond	- - - -	"	1914
Major William Cotton French	- - - -	"	1915
Major Frederick Manners-Smith	- - - -	"	1914

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Captain Walter Greville Bagot-Chester, M.C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	Palestine	1918
Captain Allan Henry Bald	-	-	-	-	-	-	France	1915
Captain Harold Bennett	-	-	-	-	-	-	"	1914
Captain Harry Hastings Grigg	-	-	-	-	-	-	"	1915
Captain John Thornton Lodwick, D.S.O.	-	-	-	-	-	-	Drowned at sea	1915
Lieut. (Ty. Capt.) Melville Grey-Smith	-	-	-	-	-	-	Palestine	1917
Lieut. John Cayley Hutchinson	-	-	-	-	-	-	France	1915
Lieut. Charles Francis Blayney Moggridge	-	-	-	-	-	-	Palestine	1918
Lieut. Harold Leslie Rennison	-	-	-	-	-	-	"	1917
Lieut. John Alexander Tower Robertson	-	-	-	-	-	-	Drowned at sea	1915
Lieut. Greville Wynne Thomas	-	-	-	-	-	-	Palestine	1918
Lieut. Thomas Percival Wood	-	-	-	-	-	-	France	1915
Lieut. P. E. Burroughs, M.C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	Palestine	1918
Lieut. Jack Carmichael Kelly	-	-	-	-	-	-	"	1918
2nd Lieut. Charles Cecil Nott-Bower	-	-	-	-	-	-	France	1915
2nd Lieut. James Riddell	-	-	-	-	-	-	"	1915
2nd Lieut. John Tyson-Tyson	-	-	-	-	-	-	"	1915
2nd Lieut. (Ty. Capt.) Charles Russell	-	-	-	-	-	-	Palestine	1917

APPENDIX 12

FIRST AND SECOND BATTALIONS

AHMAD KHEL DAY MUSKETRY COMPETITION

A RIFLE Club musketry competition between the two battalions is fired off annually on Ahmad Khel Day (19th April), or any other suitable date about that time.

Conditions, as agreed upon by both battalions. They vary from time to time to suit local conditions, but to be in accord with the prevailing courses laid down for musketry in India.

Prizes : A Silver Championship Badge of regimental design and a Clasp, with the winner's name inscribed on it, for the highest individual scorer in the two battalions ; also a suitable money prize from the Rifle Club Funds of his unit. Money prizes, in addition, are allotted to the winners of the inter-battalion team competition. The original badge was given by Lieut.-Col. G. S. Ommanney about 1903 or 1904. It was lost in France, when the winner for 1914 was wounded at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, in March 1915. Replaced in 1926, when the competition between the two battalions was revived after a lapse of twelve years.

APPENDIX 13

ESTABLISHMENTS

As the Kumaon Battalion was eventually merged into the Bengal Army it appears necessary to make a brief reference to the earliest regular Indian infantry serving "John Company."

The first regular, disciplined Indian soldiers, assimilated as nearly as possible to European troops and armed, drilled and dressed on the European pattern, consisted of a body of sepoys formed into a battalion by Lieut.-Col. Robert Clive (afterwards Lord Clive) in the year 1757. A British officer was appointed to command and British non-commissioned officers to instruct. This unit was the old "Lal Paltan" of the Bengal Army and so called on account of its red uniform.

Two years later, there were five such battalions, each having a strength of three British officers (one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign), four British non-commissioned officers and 1,000 Indian ranks, headed by an Indian officer called "native commandant."

In 1765 the number was nineteen, and in 1786 thirty-six battalions, while, although the Indian ranks had decreased to 640 men, formed into eight companies, the British element had increased to ten officers and ten non-commissioned officers. A decade later an infantry battalion of the Bengal Army had as many as twenty-one commissioned and two N.C.O. British ranks.

When the Kumaon (then spelt Kemaon) battalion was raised in 1815, its duties being of a civil nature, the strengths of the regular Indian units of the line did not apply. Only two British officers were appointed, namely a subaltern as adjutant on the 27th of July and another subaltern as commandant on the 26th of August. A medical officer was gazetted the following year and a "doing duty" officer in 1819. Names, with other detail, are given in Appendix 19, headed "List of officers of the 3rd Gurkhas."

The strength of the "other ranks" on first formation can only be a matter of conjecture. The fact that the authorities were, at that period, anxious to accommodate as many suitable ex-soldiers of the Nepal Durbar as possible; the free hand given to the civil commissioner; the enormous area the Kumaon Battalion had to police and the very numerous detachments thereby entailed, all lead to the certain assumption that the unit must have been very strong. The Sirmoor Battalion had an official strength of over 1,200 Gurkhas and hill men, reduced, however, in 1818 to 80 men for each of the eight companies. The Kumaon Battalion on formation was probably stronger still because of its wide duties, but a

reduction was recommended in April 1816 by the commander-in-chief and accepted by the Governor-General. It was, however, to take place gradually. The words of the Secretary to Government (Mr. John Adam) to the Adjutant-General, in a letter dated Fort William, 4th May, 1816, read :

“ It is desirable that the reduction should be left to the silent operation of casualties or voluntary resignations, without any declared intention of reducing the establishment which might lead the parties to entertain doubts of the permanency of the service.”

As mentioned in the Appendix on pay and allowances, an estimate of the sum required to pay the battalion for the month of December 1815, when stationed at Chaupukheea, was Rs. 10,000, and the same the following month.

We now come to a very important General Order¹ on this subject, namely G.O.C.C., 6th May, 1823, from which copious extracts are made as follows :

“ It being deemed essential . . . to place the several Corps of Local or Provincial Troops, each on one uniform scale or proportion . . . the Governor General in Council directs that the following rules be established in place of those now in force. . . .

LOCAL INFANTRY

1. That the fourteen battalions named in the margin be declared “ Local Battalions ” raised for the service and defence of the Provinces or Districts in which they were formed, or elsewhere on emergency and liable to active service in the field, that they have rank and precedence next after the troops of the line, and be considered as entitled to the benefits of the Invalid Pension Establishment under Regulations to be issued separately ; in consequence of which they are to pay stoppages when sick in Hospital, according to rules and rates laid down in Section XXIII. Appendix Medical Regulations.

*No. 9
Kemaon
Batt. In
the Civil
Depart-
ment.²*

5. The several ranks of Native Commandant, Soobah, Native Adjutant, Subadar Major and Color Havildar are prospectively abolished in the Corps of Local Infantry, on the demise, promotion or retirement of those now holding those ranks, the two latter being distinctive privileges applicable only to Corps of the Line, except in cases of extraordinary bravery or good conduct in the field, which can be specially brought to the notice of Government, through the Commander-in-Chief.

6. The establishment of each Company of Local Infantry to be in proportion of one Subadar, one Jemadar, two Native Drummers, and generally one Havildar and one Naick to every sixteen Privates which may be ordered for each company : from eighty the regular establishment as far as 100 on emergency.

¹ *Bengal General Orders*, Jan to Dec., 1823. Vol. iv. p. 141, a-j.

² There were four battalions in the civil department, the three others being :

1. Calcutta Native Militia, afterwards 18th Bengal Infantry.
2. Bencoolen Local Battalion.
3. Mharwara Local Battalion.

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7. The staff of all Local Battalions to be generally as follows :

Effective	1 Commandant—Captain or Major	} From the Line.
	1 Adjutant	
	1 Assistant Surgeon	
	1 Sergeant Major	
	1 Quarter Master Serjeant	
	2 Native Doctors	
Non-effective <i>i.e.</i> left at the depot in case of active service	1 Sircar, or Writer	} Each 5/- p.m. staff pay.
	1 Drill Havildar	
	1 Drum Major	
	1 Fife or Bugle Major (light corps only)	
	1 Pay Havildar per Coy.	
	1 Drill Naick, 2/8 p.m. staff pay.	

11. The following scale of Quarter Master's and other Establishments, with their several rates of Pay and Batta is laid down for all Local Battalions . . . from the 1st Proximo, when all in excess thereto will be finally struck off—ample compensation being provided for the expense of the Forge and other duties of a contingent nature in the increased scale of allowances . . . viz. :

		Pay.	H.B.	F.B.
Subject to the fore- going rules re- garding half a full Batta.	Staff { 1 Sircar - - - - - at Rs.	15/-	2/8	5/-
	2 Native Doctors - - - - -	15/-	2/8	5/-
	1 Tindal - - - - -	7/8	1/-	2/-
	1 Lascar per 2 Companies in Canton- ments - - - - -	4/12	-/8	1/-
	1 Ditto per Company Marching			
	1 Hand Bhistic per Company - - -	4/8	-/8	1/-
	1 Mate Carpenter - - - - -	6/-	1/-	2/-
	2 Bildars - - - - -	3/8	-/8	1/-
	1 Bazar Chowdry - - - at 11/-		—	—
	1 Ditto Mootsuddy - - - at 5/-		—	—
	3 Flag or Weighmen at 3/- - 9/-	25/-	—	—

12. The Peepwallas ¹ now with the Kemaon Battalion will, like those of the other Hill Corps, be made over to the Commissariat from the 1st proximo—Thirty (30) for each Hill Corps will be retained and paid by that Department.

13. No more than one English writer is allowed to the Commandant of each Local Battalion, as the Pay Havildars being extended to all must supersede the necessity of having native or Persian writers.

GENERAL ABSTRACT OF THE

Formation—Numbers—Rates of Pay and Allowances of the Local Infantry Corps, serving under the Presidency of Fort William from the 1st of June, 1823.

¹ These were hill coolies recruited for the work of carrying ammunition. They were also used as extra bhistics and for distributing ammunition in the field, and were most brave and valuable regimental followers. They were not abolished until about 1869. (Ed.)

NO. 9 KEMAON BATTALION

Date of Formation—24th April, 1815 (Civil Department).

Gurkha Officers and men	No. of Companies	-	8	
	No. of Subadars	-	8 at 30/- p.m.	
	No. of Jemadars	-	8 at 15/- p.m.	
	No. of Havildars	-	40 at 10/- p.m.	
	No. of Naicks	-	40 at 8/- p.m.	
	No. of Drummers or Buglers	-	16 at 6/- p.m.	
Effective staff British and Indian	No. of Sepoys	-	720* at 5/8 p.m. (* 640 normal)	
	1 Commandant (<i>see</i> Appendix on Pay and Allowances)			
	1 Adjutant	-	at 172/- p.m. staff pay	
	1 Assistant Surgeon	-	at 25/- p.m. per 100 men (med. allowance)	
	1 Sergeant Major	-	at 51/5/2/ p.m.	
	1 Q.M. Serjt.	-	at 45/5/2/p.m.	
	1 Sircar or Writer	-	at 15/- p.m.	„
	2 Native Doctors	-	at 15/- p.m. each	

There are several points of much interest to note in the above extracts.

In October 1817 the rank of subadar-major was first introduced into the regular Indian army for the senior company commander with brevet pay of Rs. 25 per mensem. Paragraph five leads us to presume that the Kumaon battalion had one too, but that in 1823 the rank was abolished for the future. The date of restoration does not appear to be mentioned, but it was quite possibly in 1850, when the unit was made a "general service" corps. Again, it may have been in 1861, when the two British N.C.O.s were dispensed with. This seems more likely, as the first holder recorded is Parsaram Burathoki, S.B., I.O.M., 1861 to 1873.

The few earliest pages of the first battalion's "digest of services" are in one and the same handwriting, page one being headed

H.M. 3RD GOORKHAS

The matter consists of a brief and disconnected story of events concerning the Kumaon battalion from 1815 to about 1871. It is not known now when the entries were made, but it was from this record, together with many references to army headquarters, that the short history of the regiment, contained in the first battalion's standing orders, was compiled in 1903. A comparison with this G.O.C.C. of 1823, recently unearthed, reveals a few discrepancies, for example :

The date of formation of the "Kemaon Battalion" is officially given as the 24th of April, 1815 (the day before Col. Nicoll's advance on Almora), and not the 15th of August as formerly supposed. Again, this unknown writer recorded that the battalion "had been made 'local' in 1830," but we now know that it was declared a "local battalion" on the 6th May, 1823. Prior to that date its designation was "Kumaon Provincial Battalion."

Paragraph 5 of the G.O.C.C. alludes to the opportunity for distinction in the matter of "color havildar." As we know, G.O.C.C. 497 of 1858 sanctioned the appointment of one per company to the Kumaon battalion for its distinguished services in the Mutiny.

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British N.C.O.s (possibly a sergeant-major and Q.M.S.) were evidently with the unit on, or soon after, its formation, for we find in May 1816, when Sir Robert Colquhoun came forward to superintend the construction of the new lines at Hawalbagh, that he laid much stress on the "sergeants' bungalows" having a fireplace and two small glass windows. It is satisfactory to learn from these old documents that Mr. John Adam, the Secretary to Government, wrote on 13th July, 1816 : " The fireplace and glass windows recommended to be added to the sergeants' bungalows are sanctioned by his Lordship in Council."

It has been mentioned that a " doing duty " officer was appointed to the battalion in 1819. This was Lieut. Alexander Durie of the 11th Native Infantry.

These appointments were of two kinds :

(a) " Doing duty " officers, attached to units for regimental duty and usually classified as " paid doing duty officers."

(b) " General duty " officers, employed only on station duties, such as courts martial, courts of inquiry, etc., classified as " unpaid."

Prior to the Mutiny, only seven names of officers (including Lieut. Durie) are recorded as attached to the battalion " doing duty." Of these the fourth (Lieut. F. Mackenzie) in 1846 is entered as being the first *paid* " doing duty " officer. It was in order to fill the vacancy of a regimental officer granted long leave home that such an appointment was usually made.

During the Mutiny (when Almora was garrisoned by the then 66th¹ or Gurkha Regiment, now 1st K.G.O. Gurkhas) and afterwards, officers of both classes were sent to the little hill station which was the permanent home of the Kumaon battalion. The latter unit itself, at Delhi, was allotted six paid " doing duty " officers.

After May 1868, when the establishment of regular British officers was increased to eight, no more duty officers of class (a) were appointed. But as late as 1881 we find an appointment of a class (b) officer (Major Hinde).

The authorities were prompted to these appointments for various reasons. Frequently the " doing duty " officers came from units which had mutinied, or had been disbanded. Occasionally it was a case of an officer's bad health in the plains. Sometimes it was a matter of regimental discord. Class (a) on first arrival at Almora are said to have been put on the square to be drilled by the sergeant-major.

The establishment of the Kumaon battalion remained unchanged from 1823 to the Mutiny. During this outbreak (exact date the 12th of September, 1857) the complement was raised to a commandant, second in command, adjutant, surgeon, six paid " doing duty " officers with the normal British sergeant-major and a quartermaster-sergeant. The Gurkha ranks were increased to ten subadars, ten jemadars, sixty havildars, sixty naicks, twenty buglers and 1,000 privates.

¹ This number was an honourable distinction given to the unit after the Mutiny of the 66th Native Infantry at Amritsar, when foreign service allowance was abolished for troops located in the Punjab. G.O.C.C. of 27th February, 1850, directed that the battalion be marched to Ambala and there discharged ; that the colours be handed over to " the brave and loyal men of the Nasserli Gurkha Battalion, which was in future to be denominated the 66th or Gurkha Regiment."

In June 1859 four "doing duty" officers and 300 men were eliminated. Two years later (G.G.O. 400 of 3.5.61) the two British N.C.O.s were dispensed with, although a great many units, on representation, were allowed to keep on the quartermaster-sergeant; some indeed up to 1870, but the majority only for a year or two, as the appointment of quartermaster was introduced into the complement of British officers by G.G.O. 161 A. of the 29th of October, 1863. Strange to say this order abolished the second in command in the infantry and authorised an establishment of six combatant officers, viz. commandant, senior wing commandant, junior wing commandant,¹ adjutant, quartermaster and "doing duty" officer.

Concurrently with the removal of the British N.C.O.s (1861) there was a further reduction in the strength of the Gurkha ranks, leaving each company with a subadar, a jemadar, five havildars, five naicks, two buglers and seventy-five men. This remained unchanged until 1874, when the total strength was increased by twenty-five men.

As regards British officers the second in command came back in May 1868, and the paid "doing duty" officer went for ever, being replaced by two wing officers. This, with the surgeon, gave a total of eight.

The outbreak of the Afghan War in 1878 occasioned a temporary increase in strength to 912 of all Gurkha ranks, and when in 1882 infantry establishments were reduced to 832 of all native ranks the Gurkha regiments were specially allowed to retain their complement of 912 (G.G.O. 594 of the 3rd November, 1882). This same year saw the British establishment increased by the allotment of an extra wing officer, making a total of nine, including the medical officer.

It was this year too (1882) that G.G.O. 209 first saw the light. An order closely affecting the British ranks, as it ordained that the then holders of regimental commands should continue in that office up to the completion of a term of seven years, or until fifty-five years of age, whichever should happen first, but in no case for less than five years; that their immediate successors should retain command for seven years, or up to fifty-five years of age; that thereafter the limits should invariably be seven years' command, or fifty-two years of age. This was later reduced to five, and then to four years.

The strength of 912 Gurkha ranks remained unchanged for many years, with the exception of an addition of fourteen supernumeraries. These were originally granted on account of Gurkha recruiting being restricted to the period November to March and left a margin for discharges during the non-recruiting season. Recruit boys to the number of fifteen were also sanctioned.

British officers were gradually increased, and when Indian army circular of 1st September, 1901 (clause 97), added one more double company officer to the permanent establishment, the total became thirteen.

On the reorganisation of the Indian infantry after the Great War, each regiment was composed of two to five active battalions and one training battalion. As this was unsuitable for Gurkhas, each battalion was re-

¹ Designation changed in January 1864 to "second-in-command and wing officer" and "wing officer" respectively.

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quired to maintain a training *Company* of one British and one Gurkha officer and 115 other Gurkha ranks—this company to remain at the regimental centre on mobilisation and supply all reinforcements to its battalion in the field.

The needs of modern training have led gradually to a large increase to the allotment of Gurkha officers. The sanctioned establishment for each battalion on the 1st of February, 1928, was : British officers thirteen, Gurkha officers twenty-three, Gurkha other ranks 920, including strength of training company.

APPENDIX 14

ARMS AND COLOURS

FROM 1815 to 1847 the Kumaon Battalion was armed with the "Brown Bess" (so called from the brown walnut stock) and the long bayonet. The kukri was, of course, always worn in addition.

Old pensioners of the corps have handed down the legend that on formation the weapon issued was a *matchlock* of native make. This weapon was an Italian invention of 1475, with a bent stock, devised in Germany. It succeeded the straight stocked "handgun" of 1446, the first firearm to come into practical use. The matchlock was fitted with a cock holding a match, brought down to the priming by a trigger. After the advent of weapons such as the "wheel lock" and "snaphaunce," in which the firing was actuated by flint and steel, the Spanish musket (lit. meaning, "a firearm borne on the shoulder") was introduced carrying a ball supposed to be ten to the pound (ten bore). Next came the flint-lock "Brown Bess" in 1635.

As this modern firelock had been in use for nearly 200 years when the battalion was formed, and as other units raised in the same year were armed with the "Brown Bess," we may assume that the pensioners' story is a myth.

A test in 1834, in England, of six percussion muskets versus six flintlocks proved the superiority of the former. The latter were therefore converted by removing hammer, spring and pan, substituting a nipple to take a copper cap and replacing cock by a small hammer. The powder was contained in paper cartridges greased at the end. With this converted musket, having an effective range of fifty to 100 yards, the battalion was rearmed in 1847, used it all through the Mutiny and Bhutan campaigns, and retained it until receipt of "Enfield pattern smooth bore fusils" in 1866. With this improved weapon musketry practice took place up to 300 yards.

This was the last of the "smooth bores," and as regards "rifles" it is a very curious fact that, although the advantage of a rifle over a smooth bore barrel was realised as early as the 15th century, no attempt was made to arm soldiers generally with a grooved weapon until the middle of the nineteenth.

The long muzzle-loading Enfield rifle (.577, three grooves, one in 78) with greased paper cartridges, was introduced into the army at home in 1855 and became the general weapon of all infantry up to the advent of the breech-loader twelve years later. It was the introduction of this rifle in India which was made the pretext for the outbreak in 1857.

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In 1861, following the reorganisation of that year, the Enfield was again gradually issued to corps of the native army, but the Kumaon battalion did not receive it until January 1871. The increased flight of the bullet necessitated a proper range, which was constructed at Matela (Hawalbagh), where musketry was carried out up to 600 yards.

Two years later "steel mounted short Enfields with sword-bayonet" were issued to the battalion. These had been in use for fourteen years by the Royal Navy, 60th Rifles, Rifle Brigade and sergeants of infantry of the line.

In 1874 India received its first breech-loader, seven years after it (the Snider) was taken into use in England. While at a camp of exercise at Delhi in December 1875, the first battalion was issued with 220 of the short pattern from Allahabad and 200 from Ferozepur. The balance of 285 arrived at Almora from Allahabad in February 1876. The advent of "fixed ammunition," that is, the bullet and powder contained in a brass case, was a matter of great joy to the Gurkha.

With the introduction of the "Lee-Metford" magazine rifle for the British infantry in 1892-93, the whole of the native army in India was rearmed with the Martini-Henry; but Gurkhas were given the weapon earlier, and the 1/3rd commenced to receive their new armament in 1887, and were completed with it by August 1888. The unit retained the weapon for fourteen years.

On the return of the 1/3rd from Waziristan blockade operations in March 1902, the battalion was rearmed with the .303 Lee-Enfield magazine rifle, Mark 1, at Rawalpindi *en route* to Almora. Later "Marks" have since replaced the original issue.

COLOURS

COLOURS were first presented to the 3rd Gurkhas in 1843 by a Mrs. Waters, wife of the G.O.C. District in which Almora was included. The centre portions of these colours [all that remains] are now in the Officers' Mess of the first battalion at Almora. New colours were presented by Major-General J. Parsons, C.B., on the 8th of August 1861. These latter were returned into arsenal in October 1877, not being carried by rifle regiments. Authority, Govt. of India letter, 605 of 23rd August 1877.

In 1900, the officers of the 3rd Gurkhas applied for the return of these colours from arsenal and deposited them in the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, where they remain, as exhibits 2047, 2048.

APPENDIX 15

DRESS AND EQUIPMENT

THE uniform of the officers of the Kumaon Battalion in 1815 is nowhere recorded. Like so many cases in the British service in the previous century—*e.g.* 17th Lancers, then “16th Light Dragoons”—it was generally initiated, and designed, at the taste and fancy of the commanding officer. The existing sketch of Sir Robert Colquhoun confirms this, for we find him seated with his wife in his bungalow at Hawalbagh about ten years later, decked out in the most gorgeous costume: a blue tailed coat with broad red facings heavily slashed with gold, large gold epaulets, white frilled waistcoat, white breeches, black Hessian boots with tassels and gold box spurs. His sword has a black and gold scabbard, while behind him stands his orderly holding a very high cocked hat with white feathered plume.

The Gurkha ranks from the earliest days were always dressed in green. Their first uniform consisted of a dark green coat with tails looped up, white facings, high white shoulder wings, white duck trousers and native shoes. The breast of the coat had eight rows of white braid. Worn over the right shoulder was a black leather cross-belt with the name of the corps on a brass plate in front. This cross-belt passed under a white shoulder strap and from it depended behind a colossal expense pouch.

There was some difficulty about the head-dress at first. Gurkhas did not like the pugri, nor the weighty European affair. To start with, therefore, the men wore the tightly bound Nepalese head-tire in black. A few years later a green leather shako of great height was issued and taken into wear. This imposing cap, of a somewhat cylindrical shape, was worn tilted towards the right ear and had, in the Kumaon battalion, a white band at bottom edge and a white fillet running down from the top centre of cap in front to edge of the green over the left ear. In the centre of the green above the right eye was the badge of crossed kukris, blades uppermost.

This shako was worn by the men until the black Kilmarnock cap was introduced for all infantry of the Bengal Army in 1847. Gurkhas received it some years later, and a smaller pattern, usually “blocked,” remains their full dress head-wear at the present time. The Kilmarnock cap was abolished for infantry of the line in 1861.

While on the subject of head-dress, it is interesting to note that in 1864 khaki covers were sanctioned for this cap by adjutant-general's circular No. 145 of the 27th of October. Later on a flap was hooked on to the cover for use in hot weather, and there were various changes in flap-pattern

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from time to time. About 1900 a slouch or Kashmir hat was introduced for field service, followed in a few years by an improved pattern of felt similar to the "Boy Scouts" hat, but with a small khaki pugri edged with green piping and a badge (Queen Alexandra's cypher and the crown) worn above the pugri in front. An episode regarding pugris for Gurkhas is mentioned in Chapter XII, and the exigencies of very hot weather on service have necessitated all sorts of makeshifts from time to time. It has been the custom in recent years to issue pith hats to Gurkhas on field service.

British officers' helmets have been equally variable. What was worn in the very early days is not recorded. It could hardly have been a cocked hat on ordinary occasions. By G.O. 174 of 1870, Hawkes' patent cork helmet, covered with white cloth and having a small pugri of regimental pattern, was authorised. The next year the covering was changed to green. Later on this became black, until 1911, when all Gurkha regiments were given the white helmet again: the King Emperor at the Delhi Durbar of that year strongly disapproved of the black helmet.

The present shape is called the "Egyptian pattern," whether in khaki or white. Long after the introduction of the stiff forage caps both battalions stuck to the old fatigue cap, introduced into the Bengal Army in 1844. Eventually, however, the former was adopted, but the fatigue cap was retained as well. On field service officers wear the pith helmet (if tin hat not ordered), commonly called the "Cawnpore tent club hat." In 1911 "lines" were sanctioned for British officers' helmets in full dress.

About the year 1833, the mens' uniform was approximated to that of the rifle regiments of the line, i.e. green with black facings, black belts with brass mountings and a green shako. The white trousers, white facings and white braid disappeared. A dozen years later, canvas haversacks were substituted for the very unwieldy knapsack worn in "marching order." In 1863 the green Zouave pattern jacket was introduced, the description six years later (G.O. 199 of 1869) reading, "Zouave tunic with slashed cuffs and serge pyjamahs." This quasi-Moorish dress and its loose leg wear, finished off with black gaiters, suited the Gurkha admirably—much more so than a new green tunic issued in the late 'eighties, with a black collar and tightish trousers, altered to be still tighter by the men themselves. It was customary when the battalion was in the plains to rig the men out with black-dyed drill, as being cooler.

Khaki clothing was first introduced for native regiments of the Bengal Army about 1861, but it was not issued to the 3rd Gurkhas until 1878, just before the unit proceeded to join the Southern Afghanistan field force. Nor was it of shades that are seen to-day, but more of a slatey-grey colour. About the year 1886, Messrs. Lehman and Gatti patented their fast-dyed material and persuaded the Indian Government to give them a contract for it.

G.O.C.C. of the 12th September, 1864, sanctioned the uniform of the Rifle Brigade for British officers, but in the 'seventies the dress was changed in the 3rd Gurkhas to that of the 60th Rifles with two modifications—there was no red, and the colour for full dress, mess dress and serge frock was black, and not bottle green.

When the roll collar for mess dress was generally adopted in the army Gurkha regiments followed suit, but in 1926, after some correspondence, the 3rd and 8th Gurkhas were authorised by the Dress Regulations (India), published that year, to adopt the stand-up collar in mess jacket; also to adopt rifle green cloth for full dress, mess kit and serge frock, with black velvet cuffs trimmed with black braid for the two former.

No records of "dress" can be complete without a reference to "shorts." If any Gurkha of the 3rd, serving with the first battalion at the close of the last century, was asked who invented them originally, he would say, "Rose Sahib." Not quite correct. The first record of them is with the Gurkha scouts in the Tirah campaign of 1897. The first battalion to adopt them as a service dress is believed to have been the 5th Gurkhas in 1898, and General Bruce, late of the 5th and 6th, may be handed down to posterity as the inventor.

The 3rd chose them as a service dress in 1900, and perhaps Col. Hugh Rose may lay claim to a niche in the temple of fame, in that, it is understood, he was the first C.O. to parade his battalion in them in "review order khaki" for the General's annual inspection in 1904. It was an act of great courage, essayed with a certain amount of trepidation, but the General (Major-General A. R. Martin, C.B., commanding the Rohilcund District) was quite pleased with the men's appearance and said they looked very smart.

"Shorts" were speedily adopted in India for work in the hills by British infantry and mountain gunners. They soon became universal for dismounted soldiers, although for years unrecognised officially. Finally they obtained a grudging admission into the list of items of military supply as "shorts, khaki, pairs."

Their position should now be secure, but a year or two after the armistice—although the Great War was won in "shorts"—the then Commander-in-Chief in India would have abolished them had he dared to do so. His Q.M.G. told him he would have the whole army against him, so he refrained.

APPENDIX 16

PAY AND ALLOWANCES

THE monthly estimates for December 1815 and January 1816 show against the Kumaon Battalion "a sum of Rs. 10,000 as required each month by Lieut. Sir R. Colquhoun for the payment of his unit, then stationed at Choupukheea, on the Nepal border. The Bengal pay regulations of 1810, which were in force for many years, give the emoluments of British ranks, as below :

<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Pay per dism Rs.</i>	$\frac{1}{2}$ <i>Batta per dism Rs.</i>	<i>Full Batta per dism Rs.</i>	<i>Tent Allee. per mens. Rs.</i>	<i>Gratuity per mens. Rs.</i>	<i>Addl. Allee. per dism Rs.</i>
Colonel - - -	10	—	25	200	—	—
Lieut.-Colonel - -	8	10	20	150	—	—
Major - - -	6	7½	15	120	—	—
Captain and Surgeon	4	3	6	75	36	—
Lieutenant and Asst.						
Surgeon - - -	2	2	4	50	24	1
Ensign - - -	1	1½	3	50	12	1

Sergeant-Major, Rs. 51/5/2 per mensem.

Quarter Master Sergeant, Rs. 45/5/2 per mensem,

with an established allowance of Rs. 132 p.m. for the Adjutant, and 25/- per 100 men to the medical officer.

The batta system was abolished for British officers in 1864.

Before giving the detail regarding pay of native ranks in the early part of the last century—culled from the general abstract to G.O.C.C. of the 6th of May, 1823, so largely quoted in the Appendix on Establishments—it is convenient to make a few remarks regarding the various allowances, etc., which completed the emolument of the regimental British officer.

An appendix to "Commons' Report, 1832," lays down :

"The pay and allowances of regimental officers in India are composed of six items, viz. :

1. Pay proper, or subsistence.
2. Gratuity.
3. Tent allowance.
4. House rent.
5. Horse allowance.
6. Batta.

To these must be added other perquisites, authorised from the 1st of June, 1823, to the regimental staff of local infantry—for example, the adjutant and the commandant. The former drew two rupees daily as staff pay; twenty per mensem for stationery, and thirty each for quarters, horse allowance and writer—total Rs. 172 per mensem. The latter received (in addition to thirty rupees a month for stationery and the batta of the next superior rank) a monthly allowance of Rs. 150 for “guides and Hurkarus” if so entitled; also an annual proportion of “compensation in lieu of off-reckonings.” This last term “off-reckonings” requires a brief explanation.

As in the olden days colonels of British regiments received a lump sum for clothing and equipping their units and made what they could out of it, so in the case of the Indian corps raised in the eighteenth century, the commandants were granted an allowance for running the regiment. With something in hand at the end of the year, these officers naturally looked upon this off-reckoning as part of their emolument. Then came a time when Government took over the clothing, equipping, etc., of regular troops, but considered it only just that each commandant should receive some allowance to compensate him for the loss he was about to sustain. This allowance previous to 1854 was drawn from the difference between the actual cost of the clothing issued to the soldiers in India and the amount allowed by Government for that purpose. This “off-reckoning” system was abolished in February 1854 and a fixed allowance substituted.

Later on this also was annulled and an extra pension granted to retired officers who could claim “off-reckonings.” But there were only a limited number of such increases of pension in each presidency, so an officer who was eligible had often to wait for a death vacancy.

Then comes the question of “batta,” one of the most extraordinary of olden time Indian emoluments. In Lord Clive’s day it consisted of double-field-batta, single-batta and half-batta, according to location. The abolition of double-field-batta in 1765, by order of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, not only caused a mutiny in the Bengal Native Army, but imperilled the very existence of the Company in India.

As regards “local infantry,” our old friend the G.O.C.C. of the 6th of May, 1823, contained rates regarding batta allowance and ruled that it was only authorised for the numbers actually employed in the following circumstances:

Full-batta, when on actual service with troops of the line.

Half-batta, when on actual service within or beyond the limits of the British territory, no troops of the line being present; or on duty escorting treasure.

The monthly rates of full batta were:

British officers, from Rs. 304/6 for a Lieut.-Col. to Rs. 45/10/6 for an ensign.

Native ranks, subadar, Rs. 30; jemadar, 15; havildar and naick, 8; bugler, 4; sepoy, 3; half batta the moiety of above.

The pay of the British ranks was not greatly changed by this important order of 1823, promulgated to regularise the administration of “local”

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troops. The pay of the Gurkha ranks, as well as of the quartermaster and other establishments is given in the appendix on "Establishments."

In the year 1848 pay generally was revised. The rates for British ranks remained much the same, but there was a special allowance for commanding a battalion of Rs. 400 and a company of Rs. 30 a month. Subadars of the first class (10 years in rank) received monthly pay of Rs. 70 ; second class (six years in rank) 52/8 ; third class (under six years) 42. Jemadars, Rs. 24/8 ; havildars, 14 ; naicks, 12 ; privates, 7.

At the time of the great reorganisation in 1861, there was a "Staff Corps" in each of the three presidencies to which British officers selected for employment with Indian troops were appointed. [An amalgamation of the three was sanctioned and notified in January 1891 under the general designation of the "Indian Staff Corps."] In addition to staff corps pay of rank, G.O.C.C. 161A of 1863 authorised a staff salary for each appointment in the Bengal or Bombay infantry, as below :

	Staff Salary per mensem.
Commandant - - - - -	Rs. 600
Senior Wing Commandant - - -	270
Junior Wing Commandant - - -	230
Adjutant - - - - -	200 (plus Rs. 50 office allowance)
Quartermaster - - - - -	150
Doing Duty Officer - - - - -	100

In 1864 the pay of Gurkha officers by classes was altered and became :

Two Subadars - - - - -	at Rs. 100 a month.
Two Subadars - - - - -	80 "
Four Subadars - - - - -	67 "
Four Jemadars - - - - -	35 "
Four Jemadars - - - - -	30 "

This remained the same until 1877, when it was raised as below :

Four Subadars at Rs. 100 and four at Rs. 80.
Four Jemadars „ 50 „ „ 40.

An increase of two rupees per mensem was granted to all non-commissioned ranks in 1895. Ten years later the rifleman's pay was raised from seven to nine rupees a month and later on increased to eleven.

GOOD CONDUCT PAY

This was an important innovation introduced in April 1837 for privates, at the rate of one rupee a month after sixteen and two rupees after twenty years' service. In 1864 the concession was enhanced by making it one, two and three rupees after six, ten and fifteen years. The length of service was again altered in 1886 to three, six and ten years. Good conduct pay for non-commissioned officers was first sanctioned in 1882 at the rates of one, two, three and four rupees after two, four, six and eight years in the

grade ; but in the case of naicks one and two rupees only, after two and four years in that grade.

HALF MOUNTING ALLOWANCE

In 1877 a grant of thirty rupees on enlistment was granted to every infantry recruit towards the provision of his kit. Also an annual allowance of four rupees to every N.C.O. and private towards its upkeep. In 1886 this annual allowance was increased to five rupees and nine years later was allowed from date of enlistment.

ORDERS OF BRITISH INDIA AND OF MERIT

The same year (1837) which witnessed the introduction of good conduct pay also saw the institution of the above orders. The former, of two classes, was to be given to Indian officers for long and distinguished service. First class, for subadars, or equivalent cavalry grade, carrying an extra pay or pension of two rupees a day. Second class, with one rupee a day, for all Indian officers indiscriminately.

The Order of Merit was originated for conspicuous bravery in action and was divided into three classes. The third, or lowest, carried with it an extra allowance to the extent of one-third of the holder's full pay or pension ; the second class gave two-thirds, while the first class entitled the recipient to double his full pay. At the present day there are only two classes and promotion to the first can only be obtained through the second. This order can be won by any Indian officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier and is the only Indian order or decoration which can be awarded posthumously.

WOUND PENSIONS

The first reference to this subject is G.O. 9 of 1823 entitling Indian officers and men of local corps to the benefit of the invalid pension establishment. By this order various rates were laid down for the several ranks. For instance, in cases of ordinary wounds, decrepitude, etc., a subadar received eighteen rupees a month and a jemadar ten. For loss of both limbs or both eyes on service the former got thirty and the latter twenty rupees a month. In 1838 the Indian commissioned grades of the regular army if permanently disabled or maimed were granted pensions as below for wounds received in action :

Subadar	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs. 25 a month.
Jemadar	-	-	-	-	-	-	12 a month.

As is well known things are very different now, the rules for wound pensions and family pensions for soldiers of the Indian Army being framed on a very liberal scale.

APPENDIX 17

COMMANDANTS

Since the formation of "The Kumaon Battalion" on the
24th of April, 1815.

<i>Rank subsequently attained up to 1928</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Tenure of Command.</i>
Lieut.-Colonel	Sir Robert Colquhoun, Bart. - - -	1815 to 1828
General - -	Sir Stuart Corbett, K.C.B. - - -	1828 to 1842
Major-General	J. Welchman, C.B. - - -	1842 to 1847
Major - -	James Drummond - - -	1847 to 1851
Major - -	The Hon. Robert A. Ramsay - - -	1851 to 1861
Lieut.-General	Sir Robert Macpherson, V.C., K.C.B.	Feb.-Aug. 1862
Colonel - -	J. W. Sanders - - -	1862 to 1873
General - -	A. Paterson - - -	1873 to 1879
Lieut.-General	H. H. Lyster, V.C., C.B. - - -	1879 to 1885
Lieut.-Colonel	R. E. K. Money - - -	1885 to 1886
General - -	Sir E. Stedman, K.C.B., K.C.I.E. - -	1886 to 1887
Colonel - -	E. B. Bishop - - -	1887 to 1894
Lieut.-General	H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I. (2nd Battn.)	1891 to 1896
Colonel - -	C. Pulley, C.B. - - -	1894 to 1901
Colonel - -	H. S. Wheatley, C.B. (2nd Battn.) -	1896 to 1903
Colonel - -	Hugh Rose - - -	1901 to 1908
Colonel - -	G. S. Ommanney (2nd Battn.) - -	1903 to 1910
Colonel - -	W. H. Savage, C.M.G. - - -	1908 to 1913
Brig.-General	V. A. Ormsby, C.B. (2nd Battn.) - -	1910 to 1916
Lieut.-Colonel	A. C. Hickley - - -	1913 to 1917
Lieut.-Colonel	C. S. Eastmead, D.S.O. (2nd Battn.)	1916 to 1920
Colonel - -	J. G. Edwardes, D.S.O. - - -	1917 to 1921
Lieut.-Colonel	W. L. Dundas, D.S.O. (2nd Battn.)	1920 to 1924
Colonel - -	¹ D. I. Shuttleworth, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.	1st Nov., 1921
Colonel - -	D. G. Ridgeway, D.S.O. - - -	1921 to 1925
Colonel - -	C. H. A. Tuck, C.I.E. (2nd Battn.)	1924 to 1928
Colonel - -	A. W. Mills, D.S.O. - - -	1925—trans. 24th P.W.O. Gurkha Rifles
Colonel - -	A. H. R. Dodd - - -	1926 —
Lieut.-Colonel	J. E. Colenso (2nd Battn.) - - -	1928 —

¹ Never took up the appointment, as his services could not be spared from the Army of the Black Sea.

APPENDIX 18

SUBADAR MAJORS

FIRST BATTALION

<i>Rank on Retirement.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Tenure of Appointment.</i>
Sub. Major	- Parsaram Burathoki, S.B., I.O.M. -	- 1861 to 1873
Sub. Major	- Tejbahadur Khawas, S.B., I.O.M. -	- 1873 to 1877
Sub. Major	- Shibu Sing Negi, Bahadur -	- 1877 to 1878
	(died whilst holding the appointment)	
Sub. Major	- Ganga Singh Bisht, Bahadur -	- 1878 to 1882
Sub. Major	- Bhim Sing Gharti, Bahadur -	- 1882 to 1886
Sub. Major	- Teji Singh Rawat -	- 1886 to 1889
	(died whilst holding the appointment)	
Sub. Major	- Pertab Khattri -	- 1889 to 1892
Hon. Captain	Chamu Sing Burathoki, S.B., I.O.M. -	- 1892 to 1907
Hon. Lieut.	- Kushal Sing Burathoki, S.B. -	- 1907 to 1911
Hon. Lieut.	- Gunjbir Ale, O.B.E. -	- 1911 to 1920
Hon. Lieut.	- Shibcharan Burathoki -	- 1920 to 1923
Sub. Major	- Dhanu Gurung -	- 1924 ———

SECOND BATTALION

Hon. Captain	Hanuman Sing Thapa, Sirdar Bahadur	1891 to 1901
Hon. Captain	Singbir Ghale, Sirdar Bahadur -	- 1901 to 1913
Sub. Major	- Gambhir Sing Gurung, Bahadur, I.O.M. -	- 1913 to 1915
¹ Lieut. (Hon. Capt.)	Bhim Sing Thapa, M.C., I.O.M. -	- 1915 to 1919
Sub. Major	- Arjun Sing Thapa, Bahadur -	- 1919 to 1923
Sub. Major	- Nain Sing Thapa, I.D.S.M. -	- 1923 to 1928
Sub. Major	- Kesar Sing Thapa -	- 1928 ———

¹ The only *King's* commissioned Gurkha officer who has ever been promoted.

APPENDIX 19

LIST OF OFFICERS OF THE 3RD Q.A.O. GURKHA RIFLES FROM THE 27TH OF JULY, 1815,
TO THE 1ST OF AUGUST, 1914, AND PARTICULARS REGARDING THEM

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
1	Lieutenant Arthur Wight, 4th N.I.	Adjutant - - 27th July, 1815	This was the first officer appointed to the Kumaon battalion after orders for its formation were issued, and he was probably selected in recognition of his distinguished gallantry in the Gurkha War. Vacated 30th January, 1818, on being appointed Interpreter and Quartermaster to the 2nd battalion 4th Native Infantry. Retired from the service with rank of Major, 28th July, 1833. <i>War Services</i> .—Nepal War, 1815, including the operations in the neighbourhood of Almora, resulting in the conquest of Kumaon. In the storming of one of the enemy's positions in front of Almora, on the 25th April, 1815, this officer was very severely wounded, after a display of gallantry which gained him special mention in Field Force Orders, and would probably have won him the Victoria Cross had there been such a decoration in those days. (See <i>Prinsep's Transactions</i> , vol. i. pp. 154-155, and the <i>East India United Service Journal</i> , September, 1834, pp. 247-527.)

2	Lieutenant Sir Robert Colquhoun, <i>Bart.</i> , 22nd N.I.	Commandant - 26th Aug., 1815		The first Commandant of the corps. Removed to the appointment of commandant of the Calcutta Native Militia, 22nd November, 1828. Died at sea on board the ship <i>Reliance</i> , on the 22nd June, 1838. Also see p. 8 of text.
3	Asst. Surgeon the Hon'ble Francis Sempill	Med. Officer - 1816		The first medical officer attached to the battalion. Removed to another appointment, 6th August, 1817. Died in Fort William, Calcutta, 2nd January, 1823.
4	Assistant Surgeon James Bain	Med. Officer - 6th Aug., 1817		Appointed vice Sempill. Died at Almora, 27th May, 1818.
5	Lieutenant John Kerr, 27th N.I.	Adjutant - 30th Jan., 1818		Promoted Captain (54th Native Infantry), 18th June, 1825, and vacated appointment accordingly, but continued doing duty with the battalion until 14th November following. Died on the 11th February, 1827.
6	Assistant Surgeon Thomas Munro Munro, M.D., Bengal Medical List.	Med. Officer - 10th June, 1818		Appointed in succession to Bain. Promoted Surgeon, 23rd March, 1828, and removed to the 58th Native Infantry on the 24th September, 1828. Retired 1st March, 1838. Died 15th March, 1862.
7	Lieutenant Alexander Durie, 11th N.I.	Doing duty - 1819		Order of appointment cannot be traced. Was serving with the 2nd Nassiri Battalion in 1822-23. Removed on promotion to Captain (15th Native Infantry), 21st April, 1824. Died at Agra, 9th March, 1826.
8	Lieutenant George Irvine, 33rd N.I.	Adjutant - 12th July, 1825		Vacated in August, 1831. Retired (in the rank of Captain), 30th May, 1834.

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
9	Lieutenant George Lewis Vanzetti, 5th N.I.	Doing duty - 3rd March, 1826	Rejoined his regiment in October, 1827. Died at Saugor, 25th December, 1834.
10	Captain Henry Augustus Newton, 66th N.I.	Doing duty - 30th June, 1826	Removed to the 1st Nassiri Battalion, 4th August, 1826. Died at Karra, 27th January, 1830.
11	Captain Charles Halcot Glover, 35th N.I.	Acting Comdt. - 1st Nov., 1826	Acting Commandant vice Sir Robert Colquhoun on leave, from November, 1826, to October, 1828, when he rejoined his own regiment in which he had been promoted to the rank of Major, 18th January, 1828. Retired 17th January, 1829.
12	Assistant Surgeon William Bell	Med. Officer - 3rd Oct., 1828	Appointed vice Munro. Removed to the 30th Native Infantry, 4th February, 1837.
13	Captain James Manson, 72nd N.I.	Acting Comdt. - 24th Oct., 1828 Commandant - 8th Dec., 1828	Appointed vice Glover and vacated on Captain Corbett being appointed permanent Commandant, 8th December, 1828. Died (a Major-General) 15th July, 1862, in Europe.
14	Captain Stuart Corbett, 25th N.I.	Commandant - 8th Dec., 1828	Held command for nearly fourteen years. Reverted to his own regiment (25th Native Infantry) 31st October, 1842. Major-General Sir Stuart Corbett, K.C.B., died at Naini Tal on the 1st August, 1865. <i>War Services</i> .—The Punjab Campaign of 1848-49 (in command of the 25th Native Infantry), including the action at Sadulapur, and the battles of Chillianwala and Gujrat. Commanded

15	Lieutenant Alexander Fraser Tydler, 33rd N.I.	Adjutant - - 9th Aug., 1831	the Lahore division in 1857, and distinguished himself by the prompt disarmament of the mutinous troops at that place for which he was made a K.C.B.
16	Lieutenant Charles Campbell, 42nd N.I.	Adjutant - - 18th May, 1832	Vacated, May, 1832, on appointment as Junior Assistant to the Commissioner of Arakan.
17	Lieutenant William Hercules Ross, 30th N.I.	Acting Adjt. - 18th Nov., 1833	Appointed to the Pay Department in January, 1836.
18	Ensign James Higginson Garrett, 30th N.I.	Acting Adjt. - 26th Dec., 1834	Vacated on the return of Captain Corbett from leave, April, 1834, and rejoined his own regiment. Killed at the battle of Chillianwala, 13th January, 1849.
19	Lieutenant John Liptrott, 30th N.I.	Acting Adjt. - 28th Jan., 1835 Adjutant - - 16th Feb., 1836	Vacated, January, 1835, on receiving a civil appointment.
20	Assistant Surgeon Andrew Walker (2nd)	Med. Officer - 28th Feb., 1837	Removed to the 3rd Local Horse as second in command, 13th August, 1839. Died (a General) 25th February, 1890, in England.
21	Captain James Drummond, 19th N.I.	2nd-in-comd. - 13th March, 1839 Commandant - 15th Nov., 1847	Appointed vice Bell. Removed to the 56th Native Infantry, 2nd February, 1844. Died near Katwa, 18th November, 1844. (The first second in command appointed.)
22	Assistant Surgeon William Veal	Med. Officer - 4th April, 1839	Reverted to his own regiment, 30th September, 1851, in the rank of Major. Died at Simla, 26th April, 1852.
23	Ensign Henry Ramsay, 53rd	Adjutant - - 13th Aug., 1839	Removed to 9th Native Infantry, 2nd February, 1848. Died at Umballa, 9th April, 1850.
			Vacated in August, 1840, on appointment

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
	N.I. (afterwards the Hon'ble Sir Henry Ramsay)		as Junior Assistant to the Commissioner of Kumaon and continued in civil employ in that province for the rest of his service. General the Hon'ble Sir Henry Ramsay, K.C.S.I., C.B., died at Sydenham, Surrey, on the 16th December, 1893.
24	Ensign Septimus Harding Becher, 61st N.I.	Acting Adjt. - 20th Sept., 1839 19th Sept., 1840	Appointed Acting Adjutant during the absence of Ensign Henry Ramsay on the staff of Major-General the Hon'ble J. Ramsay. Rejoined his regiment on 1st May, 1840. Afterwards General Sir S. H. Becher.
25	Ensign Robert Anderson Ramsay, 35th N.I. (afterwards the Hon'ble Robert A. Ramsay)	Adjutant - 8th Aug., 1840 Commandant - 1st October, 1851	Appointed second in command, vice Drummond, 5th November, 1847. Appointed Commandant, 1st October, 1851. Retired 31st December, 1861. Died in London, 5th November, 1897. Commanded the battalion during the Mutiny campaign of 1857-59, including the siege and capture of Delhi, operations in Gurgaon and Oudh and also on the Nepal Frontier.
26	Lieutenant William Brownrigg Lumley, 2nd Bengal European Regiment	Offg. 2nd-in-comd. 18th Mar., 1842	Reverted to the 2nd Irregular Cavalry in the following month. Retired 12th June, 1847.

27	Ensign Hugh Rees James, 44th N.I.	Offg. Adjnt. - 26th April, 1842	Rejoined his own regiment in March, 1843.
28	Captain John Welchman, 10th N.I.	Commandant - 1st Nov., 1842	Appointed vice Corbett, but was unable to join until January, 1844. Vacated the command, 5th November, 1847. Major- General J. Welchman, C.B., died at Leamington, Warwickshire, on the 8th August, 1870.
29	Major William Henry Wake, 44th N.I.	Acting Comdt. - 10th Nov., 1842	Rejoined his own regiment in April, 1843.
30	Lieutenant (Brev. Capt.) Erskine Thomas Erskine, 63rd N.I.	Actg. 2nd-in-comd. 8th April, 1843	Rejoined his own regiment, September, 1843.
31	Lieutenant (Brev. Capt.) William Lamb, 51st N.I.	Actg. 2nd-in-comd. 11th Sept., 1843	Rejoined his own regiment in January, 1844.
32	Assistant Surgeon George Banister	Med. Officer - 11th Dec., 1846	Exchanged to the 6th European Regiment on the 17th January, 1861.
33	Lieutenant François Macken- zie, 26th N.I.	Doing duty - 19th Dec., 1846	The first <i>paid</i> "doing duty" officer ap- pointed. Appointment subsequently cancelled at his own request, and Lieutenant H. F. M. Boisragon was appointed in his place.
34	Lieutenant Henry Francis Maxwell Boisragon, 1st Bengal European Fusiliers	Doing duty - 8th Jan., 1847	Vacated early in 1858 on appointment as Lieutenant of Police and afterwards was Commandant of the 25th Punjab Infan- try (now 5th Gurkhas).
35	Lieutenant George Gaynor, 2nd Bengal European Regiment	Doing duty - 22nd Dec., 1847	Rejoined his regiment in 1848.
36	Assistant Surgeon Richard William Faithfull	Med. Officer - 2nd Feb., 1848	Removed on promotion to the rank of Surgeon, 31st March, 1851.

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
37	Ensign Theodore Walter Ross Boisragon, 69th N.I.	Doing duty - 10th April, 1849 Adjutant - 1st Oct., 1851	Removed to the Nassiri Battalion as second in command, 18th April, 1857.
38	Assistant Surgeon Francis Pearson	Med. Officer - 28th Sept., 1850	Appointed temporarily to the medical charge of the detachments at Lohaghat and Pithoragarh. Appointment ceased on the battalion moving to Dehra Dun and Jutogh.
39	Assistant Surgeon Francis Douglas, M.D.	Med. Officer - 14th June, 1851	Appointed to the medical charge of the left wing at Jutogh. Appointment ceased on the wing rejoining headquarters.
40	Lieutenant Edward William Barwell, 13th N.I.	Acting Adjt. - 30th Nov., 1852 Acting 2nd-in-command 25th Jan., 1853	Removed on appointment to the Hariana Light Infantry, 27th April, 1854. Killed in the Mutiny at Hissar, 29th May, 1857.
41	Lieutenant George Cadogan Thomson, 51st N.I.	Doing duty - 18th June, 1857 Acting Adjt. - 22nd June, 1857	Appointed officiating second in command, 17th Irregular Cavalry, 23rd November, 1857.
42	Lieutenant Benjamin Wil- liams, 51st N.I.	Doing duty - 18th June, 1857	Appointed officiating Adjutant of Cureton's Mooltani Cavalry, 14th January, 1858. Afterwards Director of Remounts, A.H.Q., and died (Colonel and C.B.) at sea off Malta, 27th November, 1889. Was with the battalion during part of the Mutiny Campaign, including the siege and capture of Delhi.
43	Lieutenant Baron Ferdinand von Andlau, 26th N.I.	Doing duty - 28th June, 1857 2nd-in-comd. - 23rd Feb., 1858	Appointed second in command <i>vice</i> Boisragon, 23rd February, 1858. Died 13th June, 1862. Was with the battalion during the Indian Mutiny Campaign of 1857-58, including the siege and capture of Delhi, the operations to the s.-w. of

44	Lieutenant Algar Bowdoin Temple, 49th N.I.	Doing duty 28th June, 1857	Delhi, and the final campaign in Oudh and on the Nepal Frontier. Died at Almora on the 10th December, 1862. Was with the battalion during the Indian Mutiny Campaign, 1857-58, including the siege and capture of Delhi (wounded), operations in the Gurgaon and Jhajjar districts and final campaign in Oudh.
45	Lieutenant John Hugh Browne, 33rd N.I.	Doing duty - 2nd July, 1857	Killed in action before Delhi, 6th August, 1857.
46	Lieutenant Hugh Grant, 74th N.I.	Adjutant - 17th July, 1857	Continued doing duty with the battalion until December, 1860. Died at Simla, 5th June, 1871. Served with the battalion during the Indian Mutiny Campaign, 1857-58.
47	Lieutenant John Frederick Orchard, 4th N.I.	Doing duty - 25th Sept., 1857	Appointed Commandant of the Tiwana Horse, 5th February, 1858.
48	Captain John Hood, 49th N.I. (afterwards John Cockburn Hood)	Doing duty - 30th Sept., 1857	Removed early in 1858 on appointment as officiating second in command of the 4th Punjab Infantry. General J. Cockburn Hood, C.B., died at Stainrigg House, Berwickshire, on the 2nd April, 1901. Served with the battalion during the Indian Mutiny Campaign of 1857-58, including the capture of Jhajjar, the action of Shamshabad and the siege and capture of Lucknow (dangerously wounded).
49	Lieutenant William Wroughton, 54th N.I.	Doing duty - 2nd Oct., 1857	Removed to do duty with the Tiwana Horse, 5th November, 1857. Served with

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
50	Captain Peter Drummond, 22nd N.I.	Doing duty - End of 1857	<p>the battalion during the Indian Mutiny Campaign of 1857, including the operations at Jahijjar and Kanaund, and in the Gurgaon district.</p> <p>Left the battalion 1858. Died at Sironj in Central India, 8th January, 1874. Served with the battalion during the Indian Mutiny Campaign, 1857, including operations in the Gurgaon district.</p> <p>Removed to do duty with the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers about December, 1858.</p> <p>Was with the battalion from about the middle of 1858 to about April, 1859. Exact dates of joining and leaving are not on record. Died 6th October, 1885.</p> <p>Accompanied the regiment on service to Afghanistan in 1878, and died at Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the 25th January, 1879. Served with the battalion during the Indian Mutiny Campaign, 1857-59, outbreak at Jullundur, campaign in Oudh, and operations on Nepal Frontier, including the action at Sitka Ghat. Campaign in Southern Afghanistan, 1878-79.</p> <p>Left the battalion in May, 1859. Retired (Major-General) 30th September, 1885. Died in Tasmania, 7th November, 1896. Served with the battalion during part of the Indian Mutiny Campaign, 1857-59,</p>
51	Ensign Francis Richard Arabin Broun-Constable, 69th N.I.	Doing duty - 23rd June, 1858	
52	Lieutenant Montagu Mitchell Procter, 38th N.I.	Doing duty - Untraceable	
53	Lieutenant Lionel Smith, 36th N.I.	Doing duty - 28th Aug., 1858 Adjutant - 12th July, 1873	
54	Lieutenant Henry Loftus Alexander, 67th N.I.	Doing duty - 29th Oct., 1858	

55	Lieutenant Sir George Law Marshall Parker, <i>Bart.</i> , 36th N.I.	Doing duty - 29th Oct., 1859	actions of Shahganj (wounded), and Agra and operations on the Nepal Frontier, including the action at Sitka Ghat. Died at Madeira, 15th March, 1866.
56	Ensign Rowland Ernle Kyrle Money, 13th N.I.	Doing duty - 23rd July, 1860 2nd-in-comd. - 20th March, 1882 Commandant - 24th Dec., 1885	Appointed Commandant vice Lyster, 24th December, 1885. Removed 23rd June, 1886, and appointed Commandant of Fort Chunar. Retired from the service (as a Colonel) 17th February, 1891. Served with the battalion in the Afghanistan Campaign of 1878-79-80, and was present at the battle of Ahmad Khel, 19th April, 1880.
57	Surgeon George Edward Morton, M.D.	Med. Officer - 17th Jan., 1861	Vacated in November, 1863. Died about 1885.
58	Captain (Brev.-Major) Folliott Walker Baugh, late 26th N.I.	Doing duty - 17th April, 1861	Removed in 1862 and sent to do general duty at Moradabad. Died (a General) at Clifton, Bristol, on 30th March, 1901.
59	Lieutenant Charles Mercer, General List Infantry	Doing duty - 22nd May, 1861	Removed to the 1st Gurkhas to do duty 21st October, 1862. Died (a Captain) Dharamsala, on 22nd May, 1877.
60	Lieutenant Wigram Battye, late 6th European Regiment	Doing duty - 29th May, 1861	Removed to the Corps of Guides as paid doing duty officer, 11th May, 1863. Killed (a Major) in action at Fatehabad, near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on 2nd April, 1879.
61	Lieutenant Brudenell Rogers, late 68th N.I.	Doing duty - 23th July, 1861	Removed to the 16th N.I. as Adjutant, 17th October, 1861. Died (a Major) in the

<i>No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Appointment and Date.</i>	<i>Date and cause of removal, and other details.</i>
62	Lieutenant Edwin Venour, late 40th N.I.	Doing duty - 25th July, 1861	Bengal Staff Corps) 5th December, 1875, at Calcutta. Removed to the 18th N.I. as Quartermaster, 20th January, 1864. Reappointed 4th October, 1864. Removed to the 19th N.I., 18th July, 1868. Died (a Lieutenant-General) when residing at Almora, 9th February, 1894. Served with the battalion in Bhutan Campaign, 1864-65, including the capture of Baxa, and actions in the Bala Pass and at Tazagong.
63	Major Herbert Taylor Macpherson, V.C., Bengal Staff Corps (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir H. T. Macpherson, V.C., K.C.B., C.-in-C., Madras Army)	Commandant - 13th Feb., 1862	Appointed vice R. A. Ramsay, but was at the time officiating Commandant of the 2nd Gurkhas, in which he was confirmed with effect from 26th August, 1863. He does not appear to have ever joined the regiment. After a most distinguished career he became Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army, and died (Lieutenant-General) while holding that appointment near Prome, Burma, 20th October, 1886. Retired (Lieutenant-Colonel), 9th March, 1882. Served with the battalion in Bhutan Campaign, 1864-65. Afghan War, 1878-80, including the battle of Ahmad Khel.
64	Lieutenant George Constable Gregory, late 58th N.I.	Adjutant - 20th June, 1862	Appointed in consequence of Macpherson being employed as Officiating Commandant of the 2nd Gurkhas. Appointed
65	Major John Williams Sanders, late 41st N.I.	Officg. Comdt. - 2nd July, 1862 Commandant - 26th August, 1863	

66	Captain John Adam Tytler, V.C., Bengal Staff Corps	2nd-in-comd. - 18th July, 1862	Commandant on that officer being confirmed in the command of the 2nd Gurkhas. Died in Europe, 27th April, 1873.
67	Lieutenant Francis Frederick Rowcroft, late 2nd N.I.	Doing duty - 29th Nov., 1862	Appointed officiating Commandant, 4th Gurkhas, 16th November, 1863. Died at Thall, 14th February, 1880, while commanding a brigade of the Kurram Field Force.
68	Lieutenant Frederick Augustus Buckley, late 37th N.I.	Doing duty (paid) 3rd June, 1863	Removed to the 4th Gurkhas as Adjutant, 12th February, 1866. Died (a Colonel) at Brighton, Sussex, 29th November, 1883. Served with the battalion in Bhutan Campaign, 1864-65.
69	Ensign Howard Kingscote, General List Infantry	Doing duty - 15th July, 1863	Removed to the 15th N.I. to do duty, 20th February, 1868.
70	Captain Henry Hammon Lyster, V.C., late 72nd N.I.	Officg. 2nd-in-comd. 28th Aug., 1863 Commandant - 1st Dec., 1879	Left the regiment in January, 1866, having been appointed a Lieutenant in the 52nd Foot. Served with the battalion in Bhutan Campaign, 1864-65. (Severely wounded near Baxa, 6th February, 1865.) Vacated the command, 24th December, 1885. Lieutenant-General H. H. Lyster, V.C., C.B., served with the battalion in Afghanistan, 1878-80, and commanded it at the battle of Ahmad Khel and the action at Urzoo. Died February, 1922.
71	Assistant Surgeon George Moncrieff Govan, M.D.	Med. Officer - 17th Oct., 1863	Appointed vice Morton, vacated 3rd February, 1883, on appointment as Civil Surgeon of Azamgarh. Retired 3rd March, 1887. Died at Almora, 1st April,

<i>No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Appointment and Date.</i>	<i>Date and cause of removal, and other details.</i>
72	Lieutenant Roberts William Elton, late 74th N.I.	Doing duty - 26th Sept., 1864	1898. Served with the battalion in Bhutan, 1864-66, including the capture of Bala and Tazagaon.
73	Lieutenant Roberts Adam Wauchope, late 57th N.I.	Doing duty - 3rd Oct., 1864	Removed to do general duty at Lucknow, 1870. Died (a Colonel) at Livingstone, Canada, 5th March, 1899.
74	Captain Edmund Kerr Otho Gilbert, Bengal Staff Corps	Doing duty - 8th Oct., 1864	Appointed to the 20th N.I. in 1865. Retired (Major-General) 1st July, 1885. Died at Brighton, Sussex, 24th September, 1898. Served with the battalion in Bhutan, 1864-65.
75	Lieutenant Alfred Wheler Bird, General List Infantry	Doing duty - 8th Oct., 1864	Removed on appointment to the post of Staff Officer of the Left Centre Column, Duar Field Force, 27th November, 1864. Died (a Major) at Simla, 17th July, 1870.
76	Lieutenant Claude Stewart Morrison, General List Infantry	Doing duty - 15th Oct., 1864	Transferred 13th May, 1869. Died at Benares, 22nd September, 1873. Served with the battalion in Bhutan, 1864-65.
77	Assistant Surgeon Thomas Beard Farncombe	Med. Officer - 9th Nov., 1864	Transferred to the 14th Bengal Cavalry, 21st August, 1869. Died (a Captain) in England, 16th November, 1880. Served with the Battalion in Bhutan, 1864-65 (severely wounded at Tazagaon, 1st February, 1865).
78	Major Alexander Paterson, Bengal Staff Corps	2nd-in-comd. - 12th Dec., 1864 Commandant - 23rd June, 1873	Vacated 29th November, 1864. Retired 1st December, 1879, with the honorary rank of Major-General. Died at Edinburgh, 8th July, 1899. Served

79	Lieutenant Walter Charles Farwell, General List Infantry	Doing duty	- Not traceable	with the battalion in Bhutan, 1865-66, Southern Afghanistan, 1878-79. Was attached for a short time in the winter of 1864-65, but no order either appointing or removing him can be traced.
80	Lieutenant Howe Frederick Showers, 104th Foot	Doing duty	- 25th Feb., 1865	Vacated 17th April, 1865, on resuming his appointment as A.D.C. to Major-General Showers, C.B. Killed in action near Dargai, Southern Afghanistan, 25th March, 1880.
81	Captain Henry Albany Wyndham Waterfield, 27th N.I.	Doing duty	- 29th Jan., 1866	Removed to the 30th Native Infantry, 25th April, 1866. Retired (honorary Major-General) 13th November, 1881. Died in Europe, 1st December, 1893.
82	Captain Murdoch Macleod, 42nd Foot	Doing duty	- 12th Feb., 1866	Resigned his appointment and reverted to the 42nd Foot, 14th December, 1866. Retired from the service by the sale of his commission, 17th August, 1869. Died Mentone (a Captain) 16th December, 1877.
83	Lieutenant Edmund Denman Smith, General List Infantry	Doing duty	- 18th May, 1866	Left the Regiment on taking up civil employment, 5th March, 1868. Retired (Colonel) 27th August, 1889. (Now Colonel the Right Hon'ble Sir Joseph West Ridgeway G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., P.C.)
84	Lieutenant Joseph West Ridgeway, General List Infantry	Doing duty	- 31st Jan., 1867	Resigned the service, 15th November, 1876.
85	Lieutenant Edmund Hughes, General List Infantry	1st Wing Subaltern	21st Aug., 1869	
86	Captain A. T. Davis, General List Infantry	Doing duty	- 28th Feb., 1870	Transferred 5th N.I., 5th June, 1872.
87	Captain W. F. Tucker, 22nd P.I.	Doing duty	- 30th April, 1871	Retired from service, 21st March, 1872.

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
88	Captain (Brev.-Major) Courtenay Harvey Saltren Scott	Doing duty - 15th May, 1872	Appointed to the Staff, 28th February, 1873, and struck off strength.
89	Captain Alexander Harden, 11th N.I.	Doing duty - 1st Sept., 1872	Transferred 2nd N.I., 23rd May, 1873.
90	Captain H. J. Baylis, 39th N.I.	Doing duty - 1st Nov., 1872	Died Pithoragarh, 2nd September, 1874.
91	Major W. A. Garden, 16th N.I.	Doing duty - 15th April, 1873	Struck off strength, 27th December, 1876.
92	Lieutenant Charles Pulley, 26th N.I.	Offg. Wing Subaltern Adjutant - 8th Dec., 1875 Commandant - 12th April, 1877 Commandant - 26th April, 1894	Vacated on completing seven years' command of 1st Battalion, 25th April, 1901. Served with the battalion in the Afghan War, 1878-89, and was present in the engagements at Ahmad Khel and Urzoo (medal with clasp). Also in the Burmese Expedition of 1886-87, and was slightly wounded in an engagement on 25th November, 1886 (despatches, brevet of Major, medal with clasp). Commanded a detachment of 500 rank and file of the battalion in Chin Lushai, 1892-93. Also served in the N.-W. Frontier Campaign of 1897-98, in command of the battalion with the Kurram Kohat Force, including the operations on the Samana Range (despatches), with the Tirah Expeditionary Force, and also with flying column of the Kohat Field Force (despatches twice, brevet of Colonel, medal with three clasps). C.B., 24th June, 1904. Transferred to our 2nd (Garhwali) Batta-
93	Lieutenant Arthur George	Offg. Wing Subaltern	

94	Frederic Browne, 2nd (P.W.O.) Gurkhas	30th Dec., 1876	lion in 1887. Subsequently transferred to 4th Gurkhas. Served with the 3rd in the Afghan War, 1878-79 (medal), and the Burmese Expedition, 1886 (medal with clasp). Transferred, 7th March, 1877.
95	Surgeon Patrick Alexander Weir, M.B. Lieutenant Hugh Frederick Lyons-Montgomery, 33rd Foot.	Med. charge - 1st March, 1877 Officg. W.O. - 25th April, 1877	Transferred to 28th N.I., 9th August, 1878.
96	Lieutenant Horatio Reginald Mends, 2/60th Rifles	Officg. W.O. - 12th May, 1877	Transferred 4th Gurkhas, 31st December, 1877.
97	Lieutenant James Loughnan O'Brien, 31st N.I.	Officg. W.O. - 8th Oct., 1878	Re-transferred 31st N.I., 10th December, 1879. Served with the battalion in the first Kabul Campaign of 1878-79.
98	Surgeon-Major John Wilson Johnston, M.D.	Med. charge - 5th Nov., 1878	Transferred 19th N.I., 14th September, 1880.
99	Surgeon George Augustus Emerson, M.B.	Officg. Med. charge 11th Nov., 1878	Transferred, 3rd B.C., 6th December, 1879.
100	Surgeon-Major James Joseph McCarthy	Officg. Med. charge 6th Dec., 1879	Transferred shortly afterwards.
101	Lieutenant Cecil Barry Brownlow, 1st P.I.	Attached and joined Summer of 1879	Re-transferred, 1st P.I., 9th October, 1879.
102	Captain Edward Barry Bishop, 2nd P.C.	Attached for duty 11th Dec., 1879 Commandant - 26th April, 1887	Vacated on completing seven years' command of 1st Battalion, 25th April, 1894. Served during the Afghan War as Superintendent of Signalling, and was attached to the battalion on 11th December, 1879. Was present in the engagement at Ahmad Khel as orderly officer to Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes, commanding a

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
103	Lieutenant James Alexander Skene Thomson, 100th Foot	Officg. W.O. - 22nd March, 1880	brigade of the Kandahar column (despatches, brevet of Major, medal with clasp). Also served with the battalion in the Burmese Expedition of 1886-87 (despatches, brevet of Lieutenant-Colonel, medal with clasp). Colonel 29th September, 1893. Died 1922.
104	Lieutenant Reginald Campbell Hadow	Attached in Afghanistan, 1880	Joined at Kandahar, 27th March, 1880, and served with the battalion during the remainder of the Afghan War. Was present at the battle of Ahmad Khel and Urzoo, and in the subsequent operations in the Logar Valley (medal with clasp). Reverted to British service about 1881.
105	Lieutenant Granville Henry Loch, 62nd Foot	Officg. W.O. - 24th June, 1880 Adjutant - 11th May, 1889	Transferred, 19th B.I., 7th April, 1880.
106	Surgeon William Owen, M.D.	Officg. Med. charge 8th Sept., 1880	Civil employ, Assam, 1st November, 1891.
107	Surgeon Joseph Sykes, I.M.D.	Officg. Med. charge 7th Oct., 1880	Transferred to Supernumerary List, 2nd November, 1901. Served with the battalion in Afghanistan (medal), also in the Burmese Campaign 1886-87 (medal with clasp); C.I.E., 1902.
108	Lieutenant John Patrick Walter Spankie, 1st Gurkhas	Officg. W.O. - 20th Feb., 1881	Transferred, 14th October, 1880.
109	Major Francis Henry Hinde, 22nd P.I.	Doing duty - 12th Aug., 1881	Transferred, 5th March, 1881.
110	Lieutenant Francis Patrick Hutchinson, Suffolk Regt.	Officg. W.O. - 11th Oct., 1881	Transferred civil employ, 9th January, 1883. Reverted to 22nd P.I., 9th October, 1882. Died 1896. Transferred, 2nd (P.W.O.) Gurkhas, 1st June, 1882.

111	Lieutenant George Whyte Melville Dundas, 92nd Highlanders	Offc. W.O. - 10th June, 1882	Transferred, 4th Gurkhas, 28th February, 1883.
112	Lieutenant Arthur Walter Lyster, 1st West India Regiment	Wing Officer - 1st July, 1882 Adjutant - 28th Oct., 1883	Permitted to retire, 8th March, 1896. Ser- ved with battalion in the Burmese Ex- pedition, 1886-87 (medal with clasp). Also with the 2nd Battalion with the Chitral Relief Force, 1895 (medal with clasp).
113	Captain Henry Metcalfe Rose	Offc. Wing Comdt. 7th Nov., 1882	Transferred, 13th N.I., 16th April, 1883.
114	Lieutenant Godfrey Beckett Hodgson, 4th Gurkhas	Offc. W.O. - 8th Feb., 1883	Transferred Survey Department, 8th Sep- tember, 1883.
115	Lieutenant Hugh Rose, 4th Gurkhas	Offc. W.O. - 8th Feb., 1883 Adjutant - 8th March, 1887 Comdt. 1st Bat. 26th April, 1901	Served with the 1st Battalion in the Bur- mese Expedition, 1886-87 (medal with clasp) and with our late Garhwali Bat- talion in the operation in 1891-92, in the Lushai country. Commanded the Nwen- gal column in its march from Fort White to Chittagong (despatches, clasp). Serv- ed with the 1st Battalion as second in command in the campaign on the N.W. Frontier, 1897-98, including the opera- tions on the Samana Range, relief of Gulistan, etc., also with the Tirah Ex- peditionary Force, and was present in the actions of Chagru Kotal, Dargai and of the Sampagha and Arhanga passes : re- connaissance of the Saran Sah and action of 9th November, 1897 : operations at and around Dwatoi and action of 24th November, 1897 : operations in the Bara

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
116	Surgeon Daniel Francis Barry M.D.	Tempy. Med. charge 3rd Feb., 1883	Valley, 7th to 14th December, 1897. Affair at Shinkamar, 29th January, 1898 (despatches twice, medal with three clasps). Also commanded the 1st Battalion in the Waziristan Blockade, 1901-02 (despatches, clasp). Colonel, 11th May, 1907, A.Q.M.G. Lucknow Division, 15th April, 1908. Transferred, 12th March, 1883.
117	Surgeon-Major James Charles Gordon Carmichael, M.D.	Med. charge - 12th March, 1883	
118	Lieutenant Rolland Frederick Hart Anderson, East Surrey	Officg. W.O. - 27th Jan., 1886	Promoted and transferred, 11th June, 1894. P.M.O., Presidency District, 2nd May, 1895. Served with the battalion in the Burmese Expedition, 1886-87 (medal with clasp). Seconded for civil employ, 20th August, 1887.
119	Surgeon Julian Charles Carington Smith, M.B.	Officg. Med. charge 20th Mar., 1886 Officg. Med. charge 21st Mar., 1889	
120	Colonel Edward Stedman, 32nd Pioneers	Commandant - 30th June, 1886	Vacated on appointment as Inspector-General of Police, Burma, 26th April, 1887. Served with the battalion in the Burmese Expedition, 1886-87, and had command of the operations in the Shan States (mentioned in despatches, C.B. and two clasps). Later became Major-General Sir Edward Stedman, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., Military Secretary, India Office.

121	Lieutenant Arthur Henry Battye, 2nd Cheshires	W.O. 1st Bat. - 13th July, 1886	Transferred to our 2nd (Garhwal) Battalion, 1st June, 1887, and subsequently to the 4th Gurkhas. Served with the 1st Battalion in the Burmese Expedition, 1886-87 (medal with clasp). Transferred, 14th March, 1887.
122	Surgeon Herbert Knowles Fuller, M.B.	Offg. Med. charge 23rd Dec., 1886	
123	Major Henry Doveton Hutchinson, 40th B.I.	2nd-in-comd. 1st Bat. 26th April, 1887 Comdt. 2nd Bat. 15th Jan., 1891	Vacated on appointment as Director of Military Education in India, 24th October, 1896. Served Sikkim Campaign, 1887-88 and with the 2nd Battalion in the Chitral Relief Force, 1895 (medal and clasp). Special duty India Office, 1901-02. Asst. Mil. Sec. India Office, 1902-04. Director of Staff duties, War Office, 1904. Created a C.S.I., 1903, was appointed Colonel of the Regiment, 13th May, 1904. Promoted Lieutenant-General 1st June, 1907.
124	Lieutenant William Henry Savage, 1st Gurkhas	W.O. 1st Bat. - 10th June, 1887 Adj. 1st Bat. - 21st Aug., 1889 Comdt. 1st Bat. 15th April, 1908	Served in the Zhob Valley Expedition, 1884. During the Great War (after retirement) in command of the service battalion of the Royal Irish Rifles from 21st September, 1914, to 14th November, 1916 (despatches, C.M.G.).
125	Lieutenant Nigel Gresley Woodyatt, 1st Gurkhas. (Now Major-General N. G. Woodyatt, C.B., C.I.E., Col., 7th Gurkha Rifles.)	W.O. 1st Bat. - 10th June, 1887 Adj. 2nd Bat. - 15th Jan., 1891 2nd-in-comd. 1st Bat. 26th April, 1901	Appointed Commandant 2/7th G.R., which he raised, in September, 1907. In 1913 made G.S.O.I. Lucknow Division; in 1914 D.A.G. Army Headquarters, Simla; in 1915-16 commanded various brigades in India and all troops in Yusuf-zai Valley against the Bunerwals (des-

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
			<p>patches, C.B.). Promoted Major-General for distinguished service in the field, 1st January, 1917. Was Inspector of Infantry (Southern) 1917-18 and appointed a Divisional Commander (16th Lahore Division) 1919. Retired 1921. For services in Great War and later, received "1914-15 star," British War Medal, Victory Medal, I.G.S. Medal 1908 with clasp "Afghanistan"; C.B., C.I.E., Grand Officer of the Order of the Star of Roumania, Order of the Star of Nepal (2nd class). Has been Colonel of the 7th Gurkhas since 1918.</p>
126	Lieutenant Hugh Newcome Waymouth, the King's	Officg. W.O. 1st Bat. 8th Mar., 1888	Transferred 43rd Gurkhas, 7th January, 1890.
127	Major Lorn Robert Henry Dick Campbell	Officg. Comdt. 22nd Oct., 1888	Reverted to our 2nd (Garhwali) Battalion on 29th October, 1889. Afterwards Major-General and C.B. Served : Hazara Campaign, 1868 ; occupation of the Black Mountain (medal with clasp). Dour Expedition, 1872 ; Afghan War, 1878-80, actions in the Kundil Pass and at Baghao, affair at Synd Boot (despatches thrice, medal) ; Mahsud-Waziri, N.W.F., 1881 (despatches) ; China, 1900, Commanding L. of C. and Base (despatches, medal with clasp, C.B.). Transferred 29th October, 1889.
128	Surgeon Herbert William George MacLeod	Officg. Med. charge 31st May, 1889	

129	Lieutenant Alfred Charles Hickley, West Riding Regiment	Officg. W.O. - 18th Feb., 1890 Adjut. 1st Bat. - 7th Feb., 1896 Comdt. 1st Bat. 15th April, 1913	Served : Hazara Expedition, 1888 (medal with clasp) ; Manipur, 1891 (clasp) ; N.W. Frontier Campaign, 1897-98, including the operations on the Samana Range and in the Kurram Valley (medal with two clasps) ; also Tirah, 1897-98 (medal with clasp) ; Waziristan Blockade 1901-02 (clasp). Transferred 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, 25th February, 1905. Retransferred from 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, 8th June, 1908. <i>War Services</i> .—N.W.F. of India, 1897-98. Operations on the Samana and in the Kurram Valley during August and September, 1897. Relief of Gulistan (medal with two clasps). Tirah, 1897-98. Actions of Chagru Kotal and Dargai and capture of the Sampagha and Argana Passes. Reconnaissance of the Saran Sar. Operations at and around Dwatoi and action of 24th November, 1897. Operations in the Bara Valley, 7th to 14th December, 1897. Affair at Shinkamar on 29th January, 1898 (clasp). Killed in France when commanding the 127th Infantry Brigade, 42nd Division, in May, 1917. C.B. in January, 1915. <i>War Services</i> .—Afghanistan, 1878-79-80. March, Kabul to Kandahar (despatches, medal, two clasps, Bronze Star).
130	Lieutenant Vincent Alexander Ormsby, East Surrey Regiment	1st Battalion - 23rd March, 1890 Adjut. 1st Bat. - 9th Sept., 1893 Comdt. 2nd Bat. 1st May, 1910	
131	Major Henry Spencer Wheatley, 2nd P.W.O. Gurkhas (afterwards Colonel H. S. Wheatley, C.B.)	2nd Battalion - 15th Jan., 1891 Comdt. 2nd Bat. 24th Oct., 1896	

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
132	Captain Edward Hogarth Molesworth, 39th B.I. (afterwards Colonel E. H. Molesworth, C.B.)	2nd Battalion - 15th Jan., 1891	Transferred, 44th Gurkhas, 18th December, 1891. <i>War Services</i> .—Afghan War, 1879-80. Zaimusht Expedition (medal). Akha Expedition, 1883-84 (despatches). Abor Expedition, 1894.
133	Lieutenant Frederick Anderson Kingston, 39th B.I.	2nd Battalion - 15th Jan., 1891 Adjut. 2nd Bat. - 12th May, 1894	Transferred to the Burma Military Police, 28th June, 1904, to June, 1906. 2nd Battalion, 19th December, 1907 to 27th July, 1910. <i>War Services</i> .—Chitral Relief Force 1895 (medal and clasp). Retired 27th July, 1910, on account of ill-health; died 1915.
134	Lieutenant Arthur Patrick Bateman - Champain, old 2/3rd Gurkhas (Garhwalis)	2nd Battalion - 15th Jan., 1891	<i>War Services</i> .—Burma, 1890-91. Chitral Relief, 1895 (medal and clasp). N.W. Frontier, 1897-98 (three clasps, despatches). Died at Lansdowne, 7th October, 1907.
135	Lieutenant Charles Sidney Eastmead	2nd Battalion - 15th Jan., 1891 Adjut. 2nd Bat. - 14th Sept., 1898 Comdt. 2nd Bat. 28th Feb., 1916	<i>War Services</i> .—Chitral Relief, 1895 (medal and clasp). Waziristan, 1901-02 (clasp). War of 1914 to 1921 (B.W.M. and Victory medal, despatches, D.S.O., Order of the Nile, 3rd Class).
136	Surgeon-Major Frederick Augustus Smyth, I.M.S., old 2/3rd Gurkhas (Garhwalis)	M.O. 2nd Bat. - 15th Jan., 1891	Vacated 1895 on promotion as Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel.
137	Lieutenant William Rae Brakspear, 2nd (P.W.O.) Gurkhas	2nd Battalion - 28th June, 1891 Adjut. 2nd Bat. - 30th Jan., 1897	<i>War Services</i> .—Burma, 1888-89 (medal and clasp). Lushai, 1889-90 (clasp). Chitral Relief, 1895 (medal with clasp).

138	Lieutenant William George Lawrence Beynon, 4th Gurkhas (now Major-General Sir W. G. L. Beynon, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., Colonel of the Regiment from 26th of March, 1928).	1st Battalion - 28th Nov., 1891	<p>Tirah, 1897 (clasp). Great War, 1914-15. Killed in action in France, 26th September, 1915.</p> <p>Transferred to 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, 1st September, 1908. <i>War Services</i>.—Hazara Campaign, 1888 (medal with clasp). Operations in Chitral with the Relief Force from Gilgit as Staff Officer to the Force (despatches, D.S.O., medal with clasp). N.W.F. of India, 1897-98, Operations on the Samana and in the Kurram Valley during August and September, 1897, Relief of Gulistan (two clasps). Tirah, 1897-98, Actions of Chagru Kotal and Dargai and capture of the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes. Reconnaissance of the Saran Sar and action of 9th November, 1897. Operations at and around Dwatoi and action of 24th November, 1897. Operations in the Bara Valley, 7th to 14th December, 1897. Affair at Shinkamar on 29th January, 1898; (despatches, brevet of Major, clasp). E. Africa, 1901: Operation in Somaliland. In Command of the Mounted Troops (despatches, medal with clasp). Tibet, 1903-04: D.A.Q.M.G., Action at Miani, operations at and around Gyantse (despatches, medal with clasp, brevet of Lieut.-Col.). War of 1914-21 ("1914-15 star," B.W.M. and Victory medal and despatches twice, C.B., C.I.E., K.C.I.E.).</p>
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No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
139	Lieutenant Walter Medlicott Rodney-Brown, The Hampshire Regiment	2nd Battalion - 1st Jan., 1892 Adjut. 1st Bat. - 14th Dec., 1897 Retransf'd. 2nd Bat. 18th July, 1903	<p>Afghanistan, 1919 (despatches, clasp). Promoted Major-General for distinguished service in the field, 1st January, 1917. Appointed Commandant 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, March, 1913. Later commanded Nowshera Bde., and then the 16th (Lahore) Division. Retired 1920. Appointed Colonel of the Regiment vice General Hutchinson, deceased, 26th March, 1926. <i>War Services</i>.—As for General Beynon from "N.W.F. of India" to "Bara Valley," giving Lieutenant Brown a medal and three clasps. Retired, December, 1912. Transferred to 4th Gurkha Rifles, 1915. Commandant, 1/4th Gurkhas, 21st November, 1917. <i>War Services</i>.—Chin-Lushai 1892-93. N.W. Frontier, 1897-98 as above (medal and three clasps, despatches twice, D.S.O.). Waziristan, 1901-02 (clasp). Tibet 1903-04 (medal). War of 1914-21 (1914-15 star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches three times). Afghanistan, 1919 (I.G.S. 1908 medal and clasp, despatches, C.B.E.). <i>War Services</i>.—Chin-Lushai, 1892-93. Died of enteric in Chitral, 15th December, 1895. Transferred to 2nd (P.W.O.) Gurkhas, 13th September, 1901.</p>
140	Lieutenant Arthur Basil Tildard, The Hampshire Regiment	1st Battalion - 30th Jan., 1892	
141	Lieutenant Charles Ernest Bliss, The West Yorks Regiment	2nd Battalion - 4th April, 1892	
142	Lieutenant Fleetwood George Campbell Ross, The Wilts Regiment	2nd Battalion - 9th April, 1892 Adjut. 2nd Bat. - 1st Oct., 1898	

143	Surgeon Captain William Grant Thorold, I.M.S.	2nd Battalion - 5th May, 1892	Voluntarily offered his services in a cholera epidemic at Sitoli.
144	Surgeon Captain James Muir Crawford, I.M.S.	2nd Battalion - 30th May, 1892	Relieved Thorold with 2nd Battalion H.Q., and later accompanied a detachment of the 1st Battalion to Chin-Lushai, November 1892.
145	Lieutenant George William Maxwell West, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	1st Battalion - 5th May, 1892 Adjut. 1st Bat. - 8th Dec., 1897	Killed in action on the 13th December, 1897, in the Bara Valley, N.W. Frontier.
146	Lieutenant William Cotton French, The Lancashire Fusiliers	2nd Battalion - 25th July, 1892	<i>War Services.</i> —Operations in Chitral, 1895, with the Relief Force (medal with clasp). S. African War, 1902 (Queen's medal with three clasps). Killed in action, France, March, 1915 (Neuve Chapelle).
147	Lieutenant John Grahame Edwardes, The Royal Irish	1st Battalion - 10th Aug., 1892 Adjut. 1st Bat. - 14th Dec., 1901 Comdt. 1st Bat. 3rd July, 1917	<i>War Services.</i> —Operations in Chitral, 1895 (medal with clasp). N.W.F. of India, 1897-98. Operations on the Samana and in the Kurram Valley, August and September, 1897 (two clasps). Tirah, 1897-98. Actions of Chagru Kotal, Dargai and of the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes. Reconnaissance of the Saran Sar and action of 11th November, 1897 (clasp). N.W.F. of India, Waziristan, 1901-02 (clasp). War, 1914-21, operations in France and Belgium, October, 1914, to May, 1915. Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 22nd May to 18th June, 1917. Mesopotamia, 20th November, 1917 to 31st October, 1918. Wounded (1914 Star, B.W.M., Victory Medal, clasps Iraq and Kurdistan, despatches twice, D.S.O.)

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148	Lieutenant Torquil John McLeod, 1/60th Rifles	2nd Battalion - 26th Aug., 1892	Transferred to 1st Gurkhas, 23rd March, 1894. <i>War Services</i> .—Miranzai (2nd) Expedition, 1891 (medal with clasp). Waziristan Expedition, 1894-95 (clasp). N.W.F. of India, 1897-98. Mohmand (medal with clasp). Tirah, 1897-98. Capture of the Sainpaghia and Arhanga Passes. Operations in the Bazar Valley, 25th to 30th December, 1897 (clasp). Transferred 2/7th G.R. 1907. Attached; transferred, January 1893.
149	Lieutenant John Graham Crosthwaite	1st Battalion - 23rd Nov., 1892	
150	Surgeon - Captain John Stuart Shephard Lumsden, I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 2nd Bat. 24th Feb., 1894	Transferred P.F.F., 15th June, 1894.
151	Surgeon-Major Andrew Duncan, M.D., I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat.	Transferred December, 1894, reappointed May, 1898, to August, 1898.
152	Surgeon-Major Henry Hamilton, M.D., I.M.S. (afterwards Surgeon-General and C.B.).	Med. charge 1st Bat. vice Carmichael - 11th June, 1894	Vacated on promotion, 20th July, 1901.
153	Surgeon-Lieutenant Arthur Oldham Hubbard, I.M.S.	Officg. Med. charge 1st Bat. 12th Dec., 1894	Sick leave, May, 1896, and did not rejoin.
154	Lieutenant Frederick Manners Smith, The Gloucestershire Regiment	2nd Battalion - 24th Feb., 1895 Adjut. 2nd Bat. - 6th June, 1901 to 5th June, 1905	<i>War Services</i> .—Operations in Chitral, 1895 (medal with clasp). Killed in action, France, 1914.
155	Surgeon-Captain Joshua Chaytor-White, M.O., I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 2nd Bat. 5th April, 1895	With battalion in Chitral, 1895 (medal and clasp). Reverted to civil, February, 1896.

156	Surgeon-Major Patrick Mul- lane, M.D., I.M.S.	M.O. 2nd Bat. - 22nd Feb., 1896	Retired, 29th November, 1901.
157	Surgeon-Lieutenant Charles Thomson, M.B., I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat. 31st March, 1896	
158	Lieutenant Donald Munro Watt, Gordon Highlanders	2nd Battalion - 23rd Nov., 1896	Transferred, 2nd (P.W.O.) Gurkhas, 28th October, 1897.
159	Lieutenant Hugh St. Aubyn Wake, 43rd Gurkhas	2nd Battalion - 2nd Dec., 1896	Rejoined 43rd Gurkhas, 15th March, 1899.
160	Surgeon-Captain Robert Everard Molesworth, I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat. 21st Mar., 1897	Transferred, June, 1897.
161	Surgeon-Captain Benjamin Hobbs Deare, I.M.S.	M.O. 1st Bat. - August, 1897	Invalided, Tirah Campaign, 17th Novem- ber, 1897 (medal, three clasps).
162	Lieutenant John Stewart Mortimer Harcourt	W.O. 2nd Bat. - 16th Oct., 1897	Transferred to 2nd (P.W.O.) Gurkhas, 29th October, 1899.
163	Surgeon-Lieutenant Hugh Answorth, M.B., I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat. 15th Nov., 1897	} Each transferred after a few days.
164	Surgeon-Lieutenant William Hamilton Kenrick, I.M.S.	M.O. 1st Bat - 25th Nov., 1897	
165	Surgeon-Capt. Harry George Melville, M.B., I.M.S.	M.O. 1st Bat. - 6th Dec., 1897	Transferred, 10th May, 1898.
166	Captain Arthur Ross Barwell, 9th Gurkhas	1st Battalion - 5th Feb., 1898	Killed, Camp Barkai, Bara Valley, 24th February, 1898.
167	Lieutenant Edward William Crawford Ridgeway, Un- attached List.	2nd Battalion - 16th March, 1898	Transferred to 2nd (P.W.O.) Gurkhas, 14th June, 1898.
168	Lieutenant Maxwell Edward Dopping-Hepenstall, 2nd Infantry Hyderabad Con- tingent	1st Battalion - 28th March, 1898	<i>War Services.</i> —Tirah, 1897-98 (medal with clasp). Transferred to 1st Gurkhas as Commandant 2nd Battalion, 11th March, 1918. Waziristan, 1901-02 (clasp). War, 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches three times, D.S.O., French War Cross). Afghanistan,

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169	Lieutenant George Kendal Channer, 12th B.I.	1st Battalion - 28th March, 1898	1919 (I.G.S. 1908 medal and clasp, despatches, C.B.E.). Waziristan, 1920-21 (clasp to I.G.S. 1908). <i>War Services.</i> —N.W.F. of India, 1897-98 (medal and two clasps). Tirah, 1897-98 (clasp). Waziristan, 1901-02 (clasp) to I.G.S. 1895 medal, despatches, 8th August, 1902. War of 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory medal, despatches, D.S.O., Order of the Crown of Italy, 4th Class). Commanded the 3rd Battalion, on its being raised.
170	Lieutenant Walter Leslie Dundas, Unattached List	2nd Battalion - 28th March, 1898 Comdt. 2nd Bat. 28th Feb., 1920 to 27th Feb., 1924	<i>War Services.</i> —N.W.F. of India, 1897-98 (medal with clasp). War of 1914-21 : France and Belgium, January to September, 1915 ; Egypt, September to December, 1915 ; Iraq, December 15th to January 16th. Wounded. (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory medal, despatches, D.S.O., Order of the Nile, 4th Class, French War Cross). Waziristan, 1921-23 (I.G.S. 1908 medal and clasp, despatches, Brevet of Colonel).
171	Second-Lieutenant Digby Ingis Shuttleworth, Un- attached List	2nd Battalion - 28th March, 1898 1st Battalion - 11th July, 1900 Adjt. 1st Bat. - 6th Nov., 1905 Commandant - 1st Nov., 1921, but never took up the appoint- ment as his services could not be	<i>War Services.</i> —War of 1914-21. Iraq, 1916-18 ; N.W. Persia, 1918 ; Caucasus, 1919 ; Army of the Black Sea, 1920 (despatches five times, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, French War Cross, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.). Commanding Jullundhar Bri-

172	Surgeon-Captain John Fisher M.B., D.S.O., I.M.S.	spared from the Army of the Black Sea Officg. M.O. 1st Bat. 7th Aug., 1898	gade, 5th February, 1924. Major- General, 1st April, 1929. Transferred, 11th March, 1899.
173	Captain Albert George Thompson, M.B., R.A.M.C.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat. 10th March, 1899	Invalided, 10th June, 1899.
174	Captain Edward Surman Peck, M.B., I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat. 22nd June, 1899	Transferred, 6th October, 1899.
175	Captain William Selby, D.S.O., I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat. 11th Aug., 1900	Transferred 22nd May, 1901.
176	Lieutenant George Harley Newcombe	2nd Battalion - 10th July, 1901	<i>War Services</i> .—Operations in Mekran, 1898. China, 1900 (medal). Civil employ, Burma, 22nd April, 1907.
177	Lieutenant-Colonel Laurence Augustus Waddell, M.B., C.I.E., I.M.S.	M.O. 1st Bat. - 21st July, 1901	Burma, 1886-87 (medal and clasp); Chit- ral, 1895 (medal and clasp); China, 1900 (despatches, C.I.E., medal and clasp); Waziristan Blockade, 1901-02 (clasp).
178	Lieutenant William Lapsley, M.B., I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat. 26th Oct., 1901	Transferred to 1/50th Kumaon Rifles, as Commandant, January, 1922. <i>War Ser- vices</i> .—China, 1900, Relief of Pekin.
179	Lieutenant John Carysfort Loch, 7th Rajputs	1st Battalion - 26th Oct., 1901	Actions at Peitsang and Yangtsun (medal with clasp). War of 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches twice, Brevet of Lieutenant-Colonel. Waziris- tan, 1920-21 (medal and clasp). Mahsud, 1920 (clasp).
180	Lieutenant Gerald Maxwell Glynton, Unattached List	2nd Battalion - 3rd Nov., 1901	Transferred to 1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles, as Commandant from 1st Sep-

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
181	Lieutenant William Campbell Little	1st Battalion - 12th Nov., 1901	tember, 1922. <i>War Services</i> .—War, 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches three times, D.S.O.). Transferred to 6th Gurkhas, February, 1905. <i>War Services</i> .—Waziristan, 1901-02 (medal and clasp).
182	Lieutenant George Hewett, 48th Pioneers	13th Dec., 1901	Left the Battalion for their respective Corps at Camp Kohat on 21st March, 1902. <i>War Services</i> .—N.W.F. of India : Waziristan, 1901-02 (medal with clasp).
183	Lieutenant Henry Robert Baynes Reed, 39th Garhwal Rifles	18th Dec., 1901	
184	Captain Kennett Scougall Cassels, 43rd Gurkhas	21st Dec., 1901	
185	Lieutenant George Charles Lovell Kerans, I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat.	
186	Lieutenant Godfrey Eustace Charles, I.M.S.	21st Dec., 1901 Officg. M.O. 1st Bat.	Left, 10th January, 1902.
187	Lieutenant Anderson Gray McKendrick, I.M.S.	10th Jan., 1902 Officg. M.O. 1st Bat.	Transferred, 2nd May, 1902.
188	Captain Thomas Hunter, M.B., I.M.S.	Winter 1901-02 M.O. 1st Bat. - 22nd March, 1902	Depot Work, transferred, 12th April, 1902.
189	Lieutenant David Graeme Ridgeway, The Bedfordshires	2nd Battalion - 21st Sept., 1902 Adjut. 2nd Bat. - 6th June, 1905 Comdt. 1st Bat. 5th June, 1921	Transferred to civil employ, 29th January, 1903.
190	Lieutenant Robert Steen, M.B., I.M.S.	M.O. Depot 1st Bat. 22nd Oct., 1901	<i>War Services</i> .—War of 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches, Brevet of Lieutenant-Colonel). Waziristan, 1919 (I.G.S. 1908 medal and clasp). Waziristan, 1923-24 (clasp, despatches, D.S.O.). Wounded in France. Transferred 1903.

191	Lieutenant Robert Dundas Alexander	2nd Battalion - 23rd July, 1902 Adjut. 2nd Bat. - 18th Jan., 1909	<i>War Services.</i> —Waziristan, 1901-02 (I.G.S. 1895 medal and clasp). War of 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches). Severely wounded.
192	Lieutenant Claude Alexander Brewer Hamilton	2nd Battalion - 23rd Oct., 1902	<i>War Services.</i> —South African War, 1899-1902 (medal and four clasps). Tibet, 1903-04 (medal). Retired 1922.
193	Lieutenant Cuthbert Allen Sprawson, M.B., I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 2nd Bat.	Transferred, 10th August, 1903.
194	Lieutenant William Charles Ross, I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat.	
195	Major George Stewart Ommanney, 1st Gurkhas	1st May, 1903 Comdt. 2nd Bat. 16th May, 1903	<i>War Services.</i> —Afghanistan, 1879 - 80 (medal). N.E. Frontier of India (Sikhim 1888 medal with clasp). N.W. Frontier of India, Waziristan, 1894-95 (clasp). Retired 1910. Died in London, 21st March, 1918.
196	Lieutenant Ralph Curteis Jackson, Somerset Light Infantry	1st Battalion - 24th Dec., 1903 Adjut. 1st Bat. - 1st Feb., 1909	Died at Camp Maluakhan, 11th September, 1909, <i>en route</i> to Chitral.
197	Lieutenant Charles Harold Amys Tuck, The Norfolk Regiment	1st Battalion - 20th March, 1905 Adjut. 1st Bat. - 12th Sept., 1909 Comdt. 2nd Bat. 28th Feb., 1924	Transferred to 2nd Battalion, 1923. <i>War Services.</i> —South African War, 1900-01. Railway Staff Officer, Operations in Orange River Colony, November, 1900, to May, 1901. Operations in Cape Colony, May to November, 1901 (Queen's Medal with three clasps). War of 1914 to 1921 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches). Kurdistan, 1919 (G.S. Medal and clasp, despatches, Brevet of Lieutenant-Colonel).

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
198	Lieutenant Allan Marriott Hutchins, 73rd Carnatic Infantry	1st Battalion - 11th April, 1905	Iraq, 1920 (clasp to G.S. medal, despatches, C.I.E.). <i>War Services.</i> —South African War, 1899-1902 (Queen's Medal and three clasps, King's Medal and two clasps). Abor Expedition, 1911-12 (medal and clasp). Died of illness contracted on Abor Expedition at Dibrugarh, 3rd December, 1911.
199	Captain Edmund Hamilton Blake Stanley, I.M.S.	M.O. 2nd Bat. - 2nd June, 1905	East Africa, 1902-04, operations in the Somaliland (medal with clasp).
200	Lieutenant Alan Gething Stone, The South Wales Borderers	1st Battalion - 4th Sept., 1905	<i>War Services.</i> —South African War, 1902 (Queen's Medal and three clasps). War of 1914-21 : France, 1914-15 ; Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1915-17 ; Iraq and Kurdistan, 1917-21, Waziristan, 1923-24 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, G.S. Medal with two clasps, despatches five times, O.B.E., M.C.). Transferred, 7th March, 1907.
201	Lieutenant Hugh Clive Buckley, I.M.S.	Officg. M.O. 1st Bat. 28th Oct., 1905	Killed in action, France, October, 1915.
202	Second - Lieutenant Alan Henry Bald, Unattached List	2nd Battalion - 14th Nov., 1905	
203	Second-Lieutenant Edward George Thomas Tuite-Dalton, Unattached List	2nd Battalion - 15th Nov., 1905 Adj't. 2nd Bat. - 19th Jan., 1913	<i>War Services.</i> —War, 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches, M.C.). Waziristan, 1920 (medal and clasp). Waziristan, 1921-23 (clasp).

204	Lieutenant Harry Hastings Grigg, 45th Sikhs	1st Battalion - 14th Feb., 1906	2nd Battalion, 24th October, 1914. <i>War Services</i> .—Killed in action, France, 16th May, 1915. Transferred to 1/39th Garhwal Rifles on 1st August, 1906.
205	Lieutenant Percy Thomas Etherton, 78th Moplah Rifles	1st Battalion - 17th Feb., 1906	
206	Lieutenant John Thornton Lodwick, The King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment	2nd Battalion - 21st Feb., 1906	<i>War Services</i> .—South African War, 1900-02 (Queen's Medal and two clasps, King's Medal and two clasps). Great War (France), 1914-15. Drowned at sea with s.s. <i>Persia</i> , 1915. Sunk by submarine. Sacrificed his life saving others.
207	Lieutenant Harold Bennett, The Essex Regiment	1st Battalion - 12th Nov., 1905 2nd Battalion - 11th May, 1907	<i>War Services</i> .—South African War, 1902 (Queen's Medal with three clasps). Great War, 1914. Killed in action, France, November, 1914. Transferred, 10th November, 1908.
208	Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Norman Bensley, I.M.S.	M.O. 1st Bat. - 15th Dec., 1906	
209	Second - Lieutenant John Arthur Burlton-Bennet, Somerset Light Infantry	1st Battalion - 26th Oct., 1907	Transferred to 9th Bhopal Infantry, 29th September, 1908.
210	Second-Lieutenant Herbert Frederick Cyril McSwiney, Unattached List	2nd Battalion - 20th Nov., 1907	<i>War Services</i> .—War, 1914-21 : Operations in France and Belgium, 13th October, 1914, to 24th December, 1915. Mesopotamia, 28th January to 24th June, 1916. Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 12th January, 1917, to 31st October, 1918. Wounded. (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches three times, D.S.O., M.C.)

No.	Rank and Name.	Appointment and Date.	Date and cause of removal, and other details.
211*	Major Frank Wall, I.M.S.	M.O. 1st Bat. - 2nd Dec., 1908	
212	Lieutenant Edmund Thomas William McCausland, The Royal Berkshire Regiment	1st Battalion - 9th March, 1909	.
213	Second-Lieutenant Robert Boisragon Dent, Unattached List	1st Battalion - 9th April, 1909	.
214	Second-Lieutenant George Wigram Pocklington Money, 9th Gurkha Rifles	1st Battalion - 13th Nov., 1909	.
215	Second-Lieutenant Walter Greville Bagot-Chester, Unattached List	2nd Battalion - 22nd Nov., 1909	War Services.—War, 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal and clasp). Iraq, 1920 (clasp to G.S. Medal). Waziristan, 1923-24 (I.G.S. 1908 medal and clasp, M.C.). Killed in action in Palestine, April, 1918, when second in command of the 3rd battalion. War Services.—War 1914-18 (despatches, M.C.).
216	Lieutenant St. Vincent Frederick Hammick, South Lincs. Regiment.	2nd Battalion - 8th Dec., 1909	Transferred to 13th Rajputs, 29th November, 1910.
217	Second-Lieutenant Gerald Thomas Fisher, Unattached List	1st Battalion - 10th Nov., 1909	Transferred to Political Department. War Services.—War of 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches).
218	Second-Lieutenant John Cayley Hutchinson	1st Battalion - 17th March, 1913	2nd Battalion, 25th November, 1914. Killed in action, France, 4th August, 1915.
219	Second-Lieutenant Stewart Frederick Ormsby	2nd Battalion -	Posted but did not join. Invalided out of service.

* After this appointment, and during the Great War, Medical Officers were not placed in medical charge of a battalion at Almorá or Lanadowne, but posted to a hospital. Major C. Newton-Davis, I.M.S., who is frequently mentioned in the text of the history, joined the 2nd Battalion in the front line, Neuve Chapelle area, on May 17th, 1915, and left it, when in the trenches north of Jerusalem, 20th March, 1918. He received the M.C. (immediate award) for the action of Eljib on 23rd November, 1917.—Ed.

LIST OF OFFICERS WHO JOINED THE 1ST BATTALION
AFTER THE 1ST AUGUST, 1914. (*Not including those
transferred from the 2nd Battalion.*)

2nd Lieutenant George Geoffrey Voelcker, Unat- tached List	18/12/14	War of 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal). Waziristan, 1923- 24 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
2nd Lieutenant Edward Maxwell West, Unattach- ed List	26/2/29	Transferred to 2nd Battalion on 12/12/1922. War, 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Vic- tory Medal). Waziristan, 1923 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp). Killed in Bur- ma whilst serving with B.M.P., 1927.
2nd Lieutenant Cecil Ro- derick Cave, I.A.R.O.	10/9/15	War of 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal). Afghanistan, 1919 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
2nd Lieutenant Leonard William McKay Forbes, Adj. Unattached List	19/3/16 6/4/18	War of 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal). Kurdi- stan, 1919 (G.S. Medal and clasp). Iraq, 1919-20 (clasp to G.S. Medal, despatches).
2nd Lieutenant Charles Edward Gray, Unattach- ed List	25/4/16	War of 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medals). Wa- ziristan, 1923-24 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp, despatches).
2nd Lieutenant Lawrence Monier-Williams, Unat- tached List	16/1/17 Adj. 20/11/17	War of 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal). Kur- distan, 1919 (G.S. Medal and clasp). Iraq, 1919-20 (clasp to G.S. Medal, des- patches). Afghanistan, 1919 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp). Waziristan, 1923 (clasp to I.G.S. 1908 Medal).

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2nd Lieutenant Arthur Wilmot Wadeson Holworthy, Unattached List	29/6/17 Officg. Adjt. from 11/12/22 to 31/5/23 Adj. 1/6/23	War of 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal). Kurdistan, 1919 (G.S. Medal and clasp, M.C.). Iraq, 1920 (clasp to G.S. Medal). Waziristan, 1923-24 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
2nd Lieutenant Eric Salter, Unattached List	29/6/17	War of 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal). Kurdistan, 1919 (G.S. Medal and clasp). Iraq, 1920 (clasp to G.S. Medal). Waziristan, 1923 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
2nd Lieutenant George Alexander Ballinger, Unattached List	19/10/18	Transferred to 2nd Battalion on War of 1914-21 (B.W.M.). Waziristan, 1921-23 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
Lieutenant Lionel Alfred Foster, 2/5th Gurkha Rifles	2/3/19	War of 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal). Kurdistan, 1919 (G.S. Medal and clasp). Iraq, 1920 (clasp to G.S. Medal, despatches twice, M.C.). Waziristan, 1923-24 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
2nd Lieutenant John Harold Randall, Unattached List	27/4/19	Afghanistan, 1919 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp). Mahsud, 1919-20 (clasp to I.G.S. 1908). Waziristan, 1919-21 (clasp to I.G.S. 1908). Waziristan, 1921-24 (clasp to I.G.S. 1908).
Lieutenant Francis Keysall Bradford, 2/5th Gurkha Rifles	6/10/20	War of 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal). Iraq, 1920 (G.S. Medal and clasp). Waziristan, 1923-24 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
2nd Lieutenant Hugh Kemlo Collie Ritchie Rodger, Unattached List	18/3/22	Waziristan, 1923-24 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
Major (Brevet Lieut.-Col.) Arthur Harvey Russell Dodd, 17th Cavalry	30/3/22 Commandant 1/12/16	War of 1914-21 (B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches three times and Brevet of Lieut.-Colonel). Waziristan, 1923-24 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp, despatches).

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Captain Thomas Howard Battye, 1/10th Gurkha Rifles	1/5/22	War of 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, Star of Nepal, 3rd Class). Afghanistan, 1919 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
2nd Lieutenant Robert Neville Falkner Marks, Unattached List	19/3/23 Adj. 1/6/27	Waziristan, 1923-23 (I.G.S. 1908 Medal and clasp).
2nd Lieutenant John Stan- ley Maxwell Edwardes, Unattached List	3/11/24	
Major (Brevet Lieut.-Col.) Arthur Mordaunt Mills, P.W.O., Gurkha Rifles	Commandant from 2/4/25 to 31/1/26	Transferred to 2/4th Gurkha Rifles on 31-1-26. S. Afri- can War, 1901 (Q.M. five clasps). War of 1914-21 (1914-15 Star, B.W.M. and Victory Medal, despatches twice, D.S.O. and two bars).

**LIST OF OFFICERS, OTHER THAN I.A.R. OFFICERS, WHO
SERVED WITH THE 1ST BATTALION OR DEPOT
DURING THE PERIOD 1914-23.**

	<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>
2nd Lieut. J. A. E. Upton	R.M.C., Quetta, 6/11/17	Demobilised 29/7/22
Lieut. F. H. Hargrave	2/13 1st Regt., 30/9/18	Demobilised 27/7/23
2nd Lieut. W. F. H. Scott	Cadet College, Wellington, 29/12/18	Demobilised 9/5/19
Lieut. J. C. R. Sampson	R.M.C., Sandhurst 15/1/19	Transferred to 1/50th K.R., 26/5/21
Captain A. S. Mackay, M.C.	7th G.R., 3/2/19	Nepalese Contingent 4/7/19
Lieut. J. S. Morrow	2/9th G.R., 26/2/19	Demobilis'd 21/10/22
Lieut. B. S. Hartland	2/9th G.R., 26/2/19	Transferred to 1/9th G.R.
Lieut. A. L. de V. Rundle	5th G.R., 13/3/19	Demobilised 3/7/22
Lieut. J. W. B. Sadlier	1/7th G.R.	{ Attached for a Col- umn from 17/11/19 to 11/12/19
Lieut. L. P. J. Winter	1/39th G.R.	
2nd Lieut. W. E. Williams	Cadet College, Wellington, 6/2/20	Transferred to 1/50th K.R., 15/10/20
Captain A. C. Ewen	3/9th G.R., 5/10/20	S. & T. Corps, 20/4/22
Captain P. P. Penn1922	Transferred to 2/10th G.R., 4/12/22

LIST OF INDIAN ARMY RESERVE OF OFFICERS WHO
SERVED OR WERE ATTACHED TO THE 1ST BAT-
TALION OR DEPOT DURING THE PERIOD 1914-21

2nd Lieut. S. G. Fry, killed in action.
2nd Lieut. M. C. O'Brien.
2nd Lieut. J. Tyson-Tyson, missing, believed killed.
Lieut. J. A. T. Robertson, killed in action.
2nd Lieut. G. P. Cooke.
2nd Lieut. G. N. Storrs.
2nd Lieut. H. P. T. Latley.
2nd Lieut. A. C. Declermont.
2nd Lieut. R. T. Innes.
2nd Lieut. R. L. Turner.
2nd Lieut. A. J. Peake.
2nd Lieut. H. G. Powers, killed in action.
2nd Lieut. C. M. Pearson.
2nd Lieut. C. R. Stedman.
2nd Lieut. G. H. Thomas.
2nd Lieut. C. le G. Poingdestre.
2nd Lieut. R. G. H. Fell.
Lieut. Margin.
2nd Lieut. J. C. Kelly.
2nd Lieut. L. E. Walsh.
2nd Lieut. F. H. French.
2nd Lieut. P. J. Patrick.
Lieut. W. S. Mackenzie.
2nd Lieut. Ferguson.
2nd Lieut. A. S. Armitage.
2nd Lieut. V. W. Corbett.
Lieut. G. H. Mayer.
Lieut. T. W. Oliver.
Lieut. A. R. Kirkpatrick.
Lieut. A. P. Cooper.
Lieut. H. A. Lowe.
Lieut. K. T. Roe.
Lieut. D. Gibby.
2nd Lieut. B. B. Hill.
Lieut. W. F. Duke.
Lieut. S. R. Cockerill.
2nd Lieut. N. G. Johnson.
Lieut. J. E. Carstens.
Lieut. E. L. Davies.
Lieut. J. R. Dodd.
Captain R. H. Hurst.

**LIST OF BRITISH OFFICERS, 2ND BATTALION 3RD QUEEN
ALEXANDRA'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES, WHO JOINED
AFTER 1ST AUGUST, 1914.**

Colonel C. H. A. Tuck, C.I.E.
Major R. C. Duncan.
Lieut.-Colonel K. S. Cassels.
Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Colenso.
Captain W. St. J. Carpendale.
Captain E. J. C. Ashmore, D.S.O., M.C.
Captain F. Barter, V.C., M.C.
Captain G. H. Paget.
Captain H. J. A. Simpson, M.C.
Captain C. J. Morris.
Captain W. B. O. Fox.
Captain E. Salter.
Captain C. H. Boucher.
Captain A. Beckett.
Captain A. B. Barltrop, M.C.
Major E. J. Shearer, M.C.
Captain G. A. Ballinger.
Captain H. A. Skone.
Captain G. E. R. S. Hartigan, M.C.
Captain H. E. Garland.
Captain E. W. Langlands.
Lieut. F. H. French.
Lieut. L. G. Forster.
Lieut. R. L. Whyte.
Lieut. H. V. Rose.
Lieut. B. S. Thapa, M.C., I.O.M.
Captain G. H. Randall.
Lieut. B. B. Hill.
Captain H. N. Irwin, M.C.
Captain G. G. Voelcker.
Captain A. F. Dobbs, M.C.
Major A. B. Tillard, D.S.O.
Captain H. H. Grigg.
Major E. H. Lynch.
Captain M. C. O'Brien, M.C.
Captain A. H. Woodhouse.
Captain C. L. Trafford.

Captain R. Booth.
Captain L. Parisotti.
Lieut. H. C. M. Davis.
Captain A. Macbeth.
Lieut. P. S. Day, M.M.
Captain W. H. L. Welman.
Captain C. S. J. Berkeley.
Captain J. E. Read.
Captain H. F. C. Sheeshan.
Captain E. M. West.
Captain W. Middleton.
Lieut. W. R. Taylor.
Captain H. R. C. Meade.
Lieut. C. D. E. Martin.
Lieut. D. Gibby.
Lieut. A. S. Armitage.
Captain C. J. W. Lillie.
Captain C. F. S. Nicholson, M.C.
Captain G. H. Allanson, M.C.
Captain G. H. Thomas, M.B.E.
Lieut. K. H. Harrison.
Captain J. A. H. Maund.

N.B.—As regards the 2nd Battalion, it has been found impossible to supply the Editor with accurate *detail* of officers joining after 1st August, 1914, owing to the destruction of many of that battalion's documents in a fire at Lansdowne, but their names are given in the text in most cases.—ED.

LIST OF BRITISH OFFICER I.A.R.O.s, 2ND BATTALION
3RD Q.A.O. GURKHA RIFLES, 1914 TO DATE.

Captain R. L. Turner, M.C.
Captain D. G. Wright.
Captain J. Innis.
Captain C. J. Riley-Irving.
Lieut. H. Rogers.
Lieut. W. Grey.
Lieut. H. G. Brandt.
2nd Lieut. C. C. Nott-Bower.
Lieut. (Ty. Capt.) G. H. Ogilvie, M.C.
Captain C. F. B. Moggridge.
Captain C. H. McNeill.
Lieut. W. Rowson.
Lieut. F. L. Grille.

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